F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
OCT 28 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
PHILADELFIO C. ARMIJO, a
deceased minor, by and through his
mother/father and next friends,
JUANITA D. CHAVEZ and
ATANACIO ARMIJO,
Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-
Appellants,
v.
WAGON MOUND PUBLIC
SCHOOLS; WAGON MOUND
PUBLIC SCHOOL BOARD, BOB
Nos. 97-2150, 97-2167
BACHEN, Chairman, J.D. SCHMIDT,
Vice-Chairman, DON SCHULTZ,
Secretary, ELDIE CRUZ and
HERMAN FERNANDEZ, Members;
TONY GARCIA, Superintendent;
MARY SCHUTZ, Principal; TOM
HERRERA, Counselor; and PAM C.
CLOUTHIER, Educational Aide; all of
the above individually and in his/her
official capacity,
Defendants-Appellants-Cross-
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. CIV-95-1519-M/LCS)
Kevin M. Brown, Brown & German, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for
appellants/cross-appellees.
Adam G. Kurtz (Joe M. Romero, Jr. with him on the briefs), Romero &
Associates, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for appellees/cross-appellants.
Before EBEL, HOLLOWAY and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
After being suspended and driven home without parental notification, a
special education student at a public school committed suicide. His parents
brought a cause of action against the school district and various school officials
alleging violation of their deceased son’s civil rights. The district court denied
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.
Defendants now appeal. Plaintiffs cross-appeal the district court’s grant of
summary judgment against them on some of their claims. We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand.
BACKGROUND
In 1994, Philadelfio C. Armijo (“Armijo”) was a sixteen-year-old special
education student at Wagon Mound Public Schools (“WMPS”), in Wagon Mound,
New Mexico. 1 Armijo is represented in this action by Juanita D. Chavez and
1
For purposes of this appeal, we consider the facts in a light most
(continued...)
-2-
Atanacio Armijo (the “Plaintiffs”), his mother and father and next friends.
Armijo was classified as learning disabled, and had other psychological and
emotional problems, including impulsivity and depression. Armijo had been a
special education student at WMPS for seven years. WMPS charted Armijo’s
progress as a special education student through Individual Education Plans
(“IEP”) that school officials developed for him.
The October 6, 1994, IEP notes for Armijo stated that “Phil will see [a]
social worker for assistance with dealing with school and self-esteem.” Earlier in
the year, Armijo had told school aide Pam Clouthier (“Clouthier”), “maybe I’d be
better off dead.” In a discussion with Clouthier in 1994, Armijo stated “I’m just
going to shoot myself.” Both Clouthier and school counselor Tom Herrera
(“Herrera”) knew that Armijo had access to firearms.
On December 1, 1994, Principal Mary Schutz (“Schutz”) verbally
reprimanded Armijo for harassing an elementary student. While in the presence
of Schutz and Herrera, Armijo threatened physical harm to the teacher that
reported the incident, to the teacher’s son, and to the teacher’s car. Schutz
immediately suspended Armijo on an emergency basis. Schutz considered Armijo
to be at risk for committing violence. Schutz instructed Herrera to drive Armijo
1
(...continued)
favorable to Plaintiffs.
-3-
home, which he did. Schutz also contacted the police to inform them of the
suspension and instructed the police to detain Armijo if they saw him returning to
school. On the way to Armijo’s house, Herrera observed Armijo to be “very
angry.”
Schutz did not follow stated school disciplinary policy by sending Armijo
home. The WMPS policy allows for “[t]emporary suspensions of students who
are eligible for special education services . . . in accordance with the normal
procedures . . . provided that the student is returned to the same educational
placement after the temporary suspension.” However, the WMPS Parent/Student
Handbook provides, “If a student is placed on out-of-school suspension, but
his/her parents will not be home, that student will be placed instead on in-school
suspension without credit for work done.” 2 Schutz did not inform Armijo’s
parents about his emergency removal from the school. Schutz also did not
instruct Herrera to notify Armijo’s parents. Nor did Schutz tell Herrera to check
if Armijo’s parents were home or to bring him back to school if no one was home.
2
WMPS policy also allows: “Students whose presence poses a continuing
danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of interfering with the
educational process may be immediately removed from school . . . .” Under the
policy, “‘ immediate removal’ means the removal of a student from school for one
school day or less under emergency conditions and without a prior hearing.”
However, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the non-
moving party, we assume that the suspension violated school policy because
Armijo was sent home when neither parent was at home.
-4-
Although Herrera knew that he should speak with Armijo’s parents about their
son’s suspension, Herrera did not attempt to contact them.
After arriving at Armijo’s house, Armijo got out of Herrera’s car and ran
around to the back of the house as Herrera drove away. Armijo’s parents returned
home later that day and found their son in their bedroom dead of a self-inflicted
gunshot wound to the chest from a rifle. In her hand-written statement to the
Wagon Mound Police made immediately after learning of Armijo’s death,
Clouthier noted that within the last months before his death “Phil [Armijo] was
constantly depressed and nervous and not really knowing who or what he was.”
Clouthier added that earlier that day, while discussing Armijo’s misbehavior and
his inability to understand why he was in trouble, “Phil then told me that maybe
he should just leave the school and go to Colorado. I replied, ‘mi hijo relax your
[sic] upset but everything will be okay.[’] He then said I don’t know Pam, maybe
I’d be better off dead.”
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against WMPS, the WMPS School Board,
WMPS Superintendent Tony Garcia, Schutz, Herrera, and Clouthier
(“Defendants”) under the Individual with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20
U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3 Plaintiffs claimed that the
3
Plaintiffs also filed a claim under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 41-4-6 (1989). The district court dismissed that claim and Armijo
(continued...)
-5-
WMPS Defendants violated IDEA and that the violation caused Armijo’s death.
Plaintiffs also alleged that WMPS, the WMPS School Board, and WMPS
Superintendent Garcia (“WMPS Defendants”) improperly failed to train school
officials to handle situations involving potentially violent and suicidal students
such as Armijo, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Finally, Plaintiffs brought a
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Schutz, Herrera, and Clouthier
(the “Individual Defendants”), alleging that they violated Armijo’s substantive
due process rights.
In an April 15, 1997, Memorandum Opinion and Order (“Order”), the
district court granted the WMPS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
the IDEA claim and the § 1983 failure to train claim. The district court denied
the Individual Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity from the § 1983 substantive due process claim. The district court found
that Plaintiffs presented a triable issue regarding Defendants’ knowledge of the
danger of suicide and the reasonableness of sending Armijo home without
parental notification in light of that risk. Holding that “danger creation”
jurisprudence was clearly established well before Armijo committed suicide, the
district court found that Plaintiffs’ allegations stated a cause of action under the
3
(...continued)
does not appeal the district court’s ruling on the issue.
-6-
danger creation theory of liability. The district court also found that “the precise
measure of state restraint that engenders an individual’s right to claim a
corresponding affirmative duty” by the state to protect that individual from harm
is not defined. However, the district court went on to state that Plaintiffs
presented sufficient facts to create a genuine dispute as to whether the Defendants
had a “special relationship” with Armijo which gave rise to a corresponding duty
to protect him from injury.
In Case No. 97-2150, Defendants filed an interlocutory Notice of Appeal of
the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. Plaintiffs contest the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction. In the alternative, in Case No. 97-2167, Plaintiffs cross-
appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the failure to train and
IDEA claims.
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction
We determine whether a defendant may bring an interlocutory appeal of the
denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity under the
standard set forth in Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995), and Behrens v.
Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996). We recently stated that, under Johnson, “[o]rders
denying qualified immunity before trial are appealable to the extent they resolve
-7-
abstract issues of law.” Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 1997).
Thus:
a district court’s order denying a defendant’s motion for summary
judgment [is] an immediately appealable “collateral order” (i.e., a
“final decision”) . . . where (1) the defendant [is] a public official
asserting a defense of “qualified immunity” and (2) the issue
appealed concern[s] not which facts the parties might be able to
prove, but, rather, whether or not certain given facts show[ ]a
violation of “clearly established” law.
Johnson, 515 U.S. at 311 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985)).
However, denial of summary judgment is not reviewable as a collateral order “[t]o
the extent that the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is predicated on ‘evidence sufficiency,’ i.e. which facts a party may, or
may not, be able to prove at trial.” Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1152 (quoting Johnson,
515 U.S. at 313). “Rather, ‘immunity appeals . . . [are] limited to cases
presenting neat abstract issues of law.’” Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1153 (quoting
Johnson, 515 U.S. at 317).
In Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416 (10th Cir. 1997), we stated:
A determination that the law allegedly violated by the defendant was
clearly established at the time of the challenged actions is an abstract
issue of law that is immediately appealable. A determination that
under either party’s version of the facts the defendant violated
clearly established law is also immediately appealable. However,
government officials cannot appeal pretrial denial of qualified
immunity to the extent the district court’s order decides nothing more
than whether the evidence could support a finding that particular
conduct occurred. An order denying qualified immunity on summary
judgment is not appealable if it merely determines the facts asserted
-8-
by the plaintiff are sufficiently supported by evidence in the record to
survive summary judgment.
Id. at 1422 (internal citations omitted); see also Wilson v. Meeks, 98 F.3d 1247,
1250-51 (10th Cir. 1996) (surveying Tenth Circuit cases interpreting Johnson);
Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1133 (10th Cir. 1996) (dismissing part of
defendants’ appeal after finding jurisdiction to review district court’s legal
determination of what constituted clearly established law, but finding no
jurisdiction to review district court’s ruling that genuine issues of material fact
precluded summary judgment).
The district court found “a genuine dispute of fact as to whether defendants
knew that Philadelfio was suicidal and thus able to care for himself when he was
suspended from school and driven to his home where he was left alone without
parental notification.” Plaintiffs argue that we do not have jurisdiction over the
appeal because the district court denied summary judgment after finding a dispute
of fact regarding whether the Individual Defendants knew that Armijo was
suicidal and thus would unreasonably be placed at risk of harm if he were
removed from school and left alone at home without parental notification.
Defendants argue that there is no material dispute of fact as to whether they knew
that Armijo was suicidal because Clouthier did not take Armijo’s suicidal
statements seriously, Clouthier now does not recall Armijo making any of the
statements she related in her affidavit to the police, Clouthier was not involved in
-9-
Armijo’s suspension decision, and Armijo did not make suicidal threats to either
Schutz or Herrera. Defendants also claim that their appeal involves the purely
abstract legal question of whether Armijo’s federal rights allegedly infringed were
“clearly established.”
We have jurisdiction to consider the appeal, but only over the legal issues
raised in the case. We do not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s
factual findings, including its finding that a genuine dispute of fact existed as to
the school’s knowledge of Armijo’s suicide risk and his ability to care for
himself. In considering the legal issues:
[We] review whether, under [plaintiff’s] version of the facts,
[defendant] violated clearly established law. In making this
determination, we must scrupulously avoid second-guessing the
district court’s determinations regarding whether [plaintiff] has
presented evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment. Rather,
we review only whether [defendant’s] conduct, as alleged by
[plaintiff], violated clearly established law.
Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1153 (internal citation omitted).
However, if the district court does not “identify the particular charged
conduct that it deemed adequately supported” by the evidence, “‘a court of
appeals may have to undertake a cumbersome review of the record to determine
what facts the district court . . . likely assumed.’” Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313
(quoting Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319). Thus, if the district court concludes that a
genuine issue of material fact exists in denying qualified immunity, but does not
- 10 -
set forth with specificity the facts presented by the plaintiff that support a finding
that the defendant violated a clearly established right, then we may look behind
the order denying summary judgment. In such circumstances, but only in such
circumstances, we may review the entire record, construing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine de novo whether the plaintiff
in fact presented sufficient evidence to forestall summary judgment on the issue
of qualified immunity. Conversely, where the district court makes a legal finding
and states specific facts upon which that finding is based, we do not have
jurisdiction to delve behind the ruling and review the record to determine if the
district court correctly interpreted those facts to find a genuine dispute.
Here, the district court found that Plaintiffs presented a dispute of fact
regarding whether Defendants knew that Armijo was suicidal and could not care
for himself. As a result, we do not have jurisdiction to consider Defendants’
argument that there is no material dispute of fact as to those issues. Even if the
district court erred in reaching that finding, we would not have jurisdiction to
review that fact-based determination on an interlocutory appeal. See Myers v.
Oklahoma County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 80 F.3d 421, 424-25 (10th Cir.) (no
jurisdiction to hear an appeal when “the district court denied summary judgment
to the individual defendants on their qualified immunity defense on the sole basis
that there was a genuine issue for trial regarding the reasonableness of
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defendants’ conduct.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted), cert. denied
sub nom. Sharp v. Myers, 117 S. Ct. 383 (1996).
However, because the district court did not identify any other specific facts
in support of its conclusion that summary judgment was inappropriate, we will
review the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs on all other factual
questions in considering Defendant’s appeal. Thus, we address de novo
Defendants’ claim that no violation of any clearly established law occurred even
taking Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding those facts as true, where those allegations
have some record support. See Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1153. 4
II. Qualified Immunity
“State government officials performing discretionary functions enjoy
qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Clanton, 129 F.3d at
1153. “Such immunity is qualified in that it does not obtain when otherwise
immune officials violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. In this case, Plaintiffs claim
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the
4
The parties also briefed the question of jurisdiction over the issue of
qualified immunity as to the WMPS Defendants. However, Defendants did not
move below for summary judgment on qualified immunity for the WMPS
Defendants nor did the district court rule on this issue. Consequently, we need
not address this issue on appeal.
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Individual Defendants a clearly established duty to protect Armijo from his self-
inflicted death.
In Clanton, we articulated the Tenth Circuit’s framework for analyzing a
question of qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim:
In analyzing qualified immunity claims, we first ask if a plaintiff has
asserted the violation of a constitutional right at all, and then assess
whether that right was clearly established at the time of a defendant’s
actions. Once a public official raises a qualified immunity defense,
the plaintiff bears the burden of (1) coming forward with sufficient
facts to show that the defendant’s conduct violated the law; and (2)
demonstrating that the relevant law was clearly established when the
alleged violation occurred.
Id. (quoting Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1533 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotations
and internal citations omitted).
In showing that the law was clearly established, the plaintiff does not have
to show that the specific action at issue had been held unlawful, but the alleged
unlawfulness of the defendant’s conduct must be apparent in light of preexisting
law. See id. at 1154. “The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”
Id. (quotations omitted). “[I]t is the plaintiff’s burden to establish the asserted
right’s contours are sufficiently clear such that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 1156 (quotations
omitted). The plaintiff may satisfy his or her burden by showing that there is a
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit opinion on point, or that his or her proposition is
- 13 -
supported by the weight of authority from other courts. Id. However, we do not
require plaintiffs to produce a factually identical case, but allow some degree of
generality in factual correspondence. See id. at 1156-57.
Generally, state actors are liable only for their own acts, and not the violent
acts of third parties. See Liebson v. New Mexico Corrections Dep’t, 73 F.3d 274,
276 (10th Cir. 1996). However, there are two exceptions to this general rule:
The first exception, known as the special relationship doctrine,
“exists when the state assumes control over an individual sufficient
to trigger an affirmative duty to provide protection to that
individual. . . .” The second exception, sometimes referred to as the
“danger creation” theory, provides that a state may also be liable for
an individual’s safety “if it created the danger that harmed the
individual.”
Id. (quoting Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir. 1995), and DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989)).
a. Special Relationship
A state is not required to provide its citizens with “particular protective
services” under the Due Process Clause, and “failure to protect an individual
against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process
Clause.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197. However, if the state restrains an
individual’s freedom to act to protect himself or herself through a restraint on that
individual’s personal liberty, the state may thereby enter into a “special
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relationship” during such restraint to protect that individual from violent acts
inflicted by others.
In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s affirmative
act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf--
through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint
of personal liberty--which is the “deprivation of liberty” triggering
the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to
protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means.
Id. at 200; see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239
(1983) (duty to provide medical care to injured suspects in police custody);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (duty to protect involuntarily
committed mental patients from harm by themselves and others). This court has
held that a plaintiff must show involuntary restraint by the government official in
order to establish a duty to protect under the special relationship theory. See
Liebson, 73 F.3d at 276 (holding that a librarian who was sexually assaulted while
working in a prison failed to show the existence of a special relationship because
her employment was voluntary).
We have applied this principle in the context of a claim that a school
district had a duty to protect a student from his fellow students. In
Graham v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. I-89, 22 F.3d 991, 994-95
(10th Cir. 1994), we held that schools have no duty under the Due
Process Clause to protect students from assaults by other students,
even where the school knew or should have known of the danger
presented. If the state takes a person into custody or holds him
against his will, the state assumes some measure of a constitutionally
mandated duty of protection. Id. at 994. Compulsory attendance
laws for public schools, however, do not create an affirmative
constitutional duty to protect students from the private actions of
- 15 -
third parties while they attend school. Id. (citing Maldonado v.
Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
914, 113 S. Ct. 1266, 122 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993)). Inaction by the state,
in the face of a known danger, is not enough to trigger a
constitutional duty to protect unless the state has a custodial or other
“special relationship” with the victim. See Graham, 22 F.3d at 995.
“The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s
knowledge of the individual’s predicament . . . but from the
limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own
behalf.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200, 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1235-36 (10th Cir. 1996).
The district court made no findings of specific facts that would support a
special relationship theory of liability. Thus, we may review the record to
determine what facts the district court likely assumed. See Behrens, 516 U.S. at
313. At most, Armijo was a student in a public school confined in Herrera’s car
during the drive home from school. Even if such circumstances constituted a
custodial relationship, that relationship ended once Armijo exited the car and ran
to his house because at that point he was no longer under any involuntary restraint
by a school official. The only “restraint” imposed upon Armijo after his removal
from school was Schutz’ directive that he not return to school that day.
Otherwise, Armijo was free to do whatever he wanted, including voluntarily
leaving his house. Banning a student from the school grounds does not rise to the
same level of involuntary restraint as arresting, incarcerating, or institutionalizing
an individual. The fact that Armijo ended his life after he was “released” by
- 16 -
Herrera bars any liability under the special relationship doctrine. 5 Thus, the
district court erred as a matter of law by denying qualified immunity to the
Individual Defendants on the special relationship claim.
b. Danger Creation
As noted above, the district court found that Plaintiffs presented sufficient
evidence to create a dispute over whether the Individual Defendants generally
knew that Armijo was suicidal and knew that removing him from school and
leaving him home alone could unreasonably create a risk of harm. Thus, we do
not have jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis supporting
these specific findings by the district court. See Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1153.
However, the district court nowhere made findings as to whether there were facts
creating a dispute as to whether each of these Individual Defendants in fact did
anything to cause the danger that arguably cost Armijo his life. On the issue of
actual danger creation, all the district court did was to issue the conclusory legal
ruling that “Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts pointing to affirmative actions taken
by defendants that created or increased the danger to Philadelfio Armijo”
5
Defendants’ knowledge of the risk of harm to Armijo is not relevant to
the determination of whether a special relationship existed. See Graham v.
Independent Sch. Dist. No. I-89, 22 F.3d 991, 994 (10th Cir. 1994)
(“foreseeability cannot create an affirmative duty to protect” under the special
relationship doctrine “when plaintiff remains unable to allege a custodial
relationship”).
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(emphasis added). This statement by the court, however, is only a generalized
statement of what constitutes sufficient allegations, as a matter of law, to state a
danger creation cause of action. It does not constitute findings of fact, nor even a
finding that particular material facts were in dispute. Thus, we are free to
examine the record to see what evidence, if any, the district court may have been
relying on in denying summary judgment on the ground that these Individual
Defendants created the danger that arguably cost Armijo his life.
First, however, we must determine whether the district court was correct in
determining that danger creation jurisprudence was clearly established as a matter
of law at the time of the conduct here at issue. On this issue we agree with the
district court that the law was clearly established.
“[S]tate officials can be liable for the acts of third parties where those
officials ‘created the danger’ that caused the harm.” Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1236
(quoting Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir. 1995). In Uhlrig, we held
that “the danger creation theory must ultimately rest on the specifics of a
substantive due process claim – i.e. a claim predicated on reckless or intentional
injury-causing state action which ‘shocks the conscience.’” 64 F.3d at 572. In
order to discern whether the facts of a particular case “shock the conscience” so
as to support a substantive due process claim,
we must bear in mind three basic principles highlighted by the
Supreme Court . . .: (1) the need for restraint in defining [the] scope
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[of substantive due process claims]; (2) the concern that § 1983 not
replace state tort law; and (3) the need for deference to local
policymaking bodies in making decisions impacting upon public
safety.
Id. at 573 (internal citations omitted). We held that to satisfy the “shock the
conscience” standard, “the plaintiff must demonstrate a degree of outrageousness
and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking.”
Id. at 574. We declined to precisely define this level of conduct, but left it to
evolve over time. See id. “We do know, however, that the ‘shock the
conscience’ standard requires a high level of outrageousness, because the
Supreme Court has specifically admonished that a substantive due process
violation requires more than an ordinary tort . . . .” Id.
In Uhlrig, we articulated a five-part test to determine whether a defendant
created a special danger for the plaintiff:
Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) [Plaintiff] was a member of a
limited and specifically definable group; (2) Defendants’ conduct put
[Plaintiff] . . . at substantial risk of serious, immediate and proximate
harm; (3) the risk was obvious or known; (4) Defendants acted
recklessly in conscious disregard of that risk; and (5) such conduct,
when viewed in total, is conscience shocking.
Id. Although this five part test is correct, so far as it goes, it is not entirely
complete in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in DeShaney , 489 U.S. at 201.
In DeShaney , the Court held that the State had not violated the Due Process
Clause by returning a child to the custody of his abusive father, who then beat the
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child and caused him permanent brain damage. Id. Although the plaintiff in that
case arguably met the five criteria set forth in Uhlrig , the Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim must fail. Specifically, the DeShaney Court
stated:
While the State may have been aware of the dangers that [plaintiff]
faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it
do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them. . . . [I]t
placed him in no worse position than that in which he would have
been had it not acted at all.
Id. Thus, in addition to meeting Uhlrig’s five-part test, a plaintiff must also show
that the charged state entity and the charged individual defendant actors created
the danger or increased the plaintiff’s vulnerability to the danger in some way. 6
In other words, if the danger to the plaintiff existed prior to the state’s
intervention, then even if the state put the plaintiff back in that same danger, the
state would not be liable because it could not have created a danger that already
existed. 7
6
Because the court in Uhlrig found that the plaintiff in that case did not
meet the five requirements set forth in the opinion, see Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 575-76,
the court did not need to reach the question of the state’s role in causing or
enhancing the danger to the plaintiff. As a result, our holding is not inconsistent
with the holding in Uhlrig or subsequent Tenth Circuit opinions relying on Uhlrig
that also denied recovery because the plaintiff failed to meet Uhlrig’s five-part
test. See Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1236; Liebson, 73 F.3d at 276-77.
7
Compare Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993)
(allowing recovery for injury that resulted from police indication to “skinheads”
that they would not interfere if “skinheads” beat up flag-burning protesters
(continued...)
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The key to the state-created danger cases . . . lies in the state actors’
culpable knowledge and conduct in affirmatively placing an
individual in a position of danger, effectively stripping a person of
her ability to defend herself, or cutting off potential sources of
private aid. Thus the environment created by the state actors must be
dangerous; they must know it is dangerous; and, to be liable, they
must have used their authority to create an opportunity that would not
otherwise have existed for the third party’s [acts] to occur.
Johnson v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal
citations and quotations omitted); see also Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126
(7th Cir. 1993) (plaintiffs “may state claims for civil rights violations if they
allege state action that creates, or substantially contributes to the creation of, a
danger or renders citizens more vulnerable to a danger than they otherwise would
have been”); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990) (DeShaney
“establishes the possibility that a constitutional duty to protect an individual
7
(...continued)
because “the defendant officers indeed had made the demonstrators more
vulnerable to assaults”); Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422, 1431 (7th Cir.
1990) (allowing recovery for injury resulting from state prevention of private
rescue attempt); and Estate of Sinthasomphone v. City of Milwaukee, 785 F.
Supp. 1343, 1349 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (city increased vulnerability of boy when its
officers threatened to arrest private citizens who wanted to intervene to protect
the boy and then sent the boy back naked to Jeffrey Dahmer); with Salas v.
Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 309-10 (5th Cir. 1992) (no liability where city did not
increase risk of harm to hostage by declining assistance from a SWAT team from
another department and taking a hard line with hostage taker); Jackson v. City of
Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204-1205 (7th Cir. 1983) (no liability where “state
officers did not create but merely failed to avert danger” by not promptly rescuing
victims from burning car); and Rogers v. City of Port Huron, 833 F. Supp. 1212,
1218-19 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (no liability where police did not increase danger to
drunken man lying next to the road by refusing to assist him).
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against private violence may exist in a non-custodial setting if the state has taken
affirmative action which increases the individual’s danger of, or vulnerability to,
such violence beyond the level it would have been at absent state action.”).
The particular facts found in dispute by the district court, in conjunction
with the evidence culled from our review of the record on issues not specifically
addressed by the district court, 8 were sufficient to raise factual inferences that
could satisfy the five part test set forth in Uhlrig as to Individual Defendants
Schutz and Herrera: (1) Armijo was a member of a limited and specifically
definable group--special education students who have expressed threats of
suicide, (2) Schutz’ and Herrera’s conduct put Armijo at substantial risk of
serious, immediate and proximate harm by suspending him from school, which
caused him to become distraught and to threaten violence, and then taking him to
his home and leaving him alone with access to firearms, (3) they had some
knowledge that might support an inference that Armijo was suicidal and
distraught, was unable to care for himself, was home alone, and at least some of
the Individual Defendants knew Armijo had access to firearms, (4) by taking this
8
The district court made no findings on whether Plaintiffs presented
evidence that the Individual Defendants knew that Armijo would be home alone
or whether the school knew that the disciplinary action would worsen Armijo’s
situation. Thus, we can review the record for evidence on those issues. Taking
the evidence in the light most favorable to Armijo, Plaintiffs did present genuine
disputes of fact on those two factual questions.
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action, knowing of Armijo’s vulnerability and risks of being left alone at home,
Schutz and Herrera acted recklessly in conscious disregard of the risk of suicide,
and (5) such conduct, if true, when viewed in total, possibly could be construed as
conscience-shocking, depending on context as determined after a full trial. In
addition, these facts taken as true also could be construed to show (6) that Schutz
and Herrera increased the risk of harm to Armijo. Thus, the district court
properly denied summary judgment on this issue as to Schutz and Herrera. 9
However, we reverse the district court’s order denying summary judgment
as to Defendant Clouthier. Clouthier was a school aide and there is nothing in
this record to support a conclusion that Clouthier caused or created the danger
that arguably led to Armijo’s death. There is nothing in this record to suggest
that Clouthier was involved in the decision to suspend Armijo or to send him
home alone without adult supervision. In the absence of any evidence that
Clouthier caused or created the danger, she was entitled to summary judgment.
Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313.
9
As pointed out above, we must draw all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs
because this matter comes before us upon a denial of summary judgment for the
Individual Defendants. It may be that, at trial, Plaintiffs will be unable to carry
their burden of proof as to these Individual Defendants, and we cannot help but
observe that the facts presently before us are very thin to establish a number of
the six factors required for liability. However, given all inferences to Plaintiffs
and accepting the unreviewability of the district court’s factual findings pursuant
to Johnson v. Jones, we must affirm the denial of summary judgment to Individual
Defendants Schutz and Herrera.
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III. Cross-Appeal
In order to consider the cross-appeal, we must exercise pendent appellate
jurisdiction. See Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 929 (10th Cir.
1995). Although discretionary, the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction “is
generally disfavored.” Id. In Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35,
50-51 (1995), the Supreme Court held that pendent appellate jurisdiction
generally should not be exercised over otherwise interlocutory appeals. The
Court stated that purely pragmatic considerations such as judicial economy would
not support the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction because “a rule loosely
allowing pendent appellate jurisdiction would encourage parties to parlay . . .
collateral orders into multi-issue interlocutory appeal tickets.” Id. at 49-50.
However, this court has interpreted Swint as suggesting that “pendent appellate
jurisdiction might still be appropriate where the otherwise nonappealable decision
is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the appealable decision, or where review of the
nonappealable decision is ‘necessary to ensure meaningful review’ of the
appealable one.” Moore, 57 F.3d at 930 (quoting Swint, 514 U.S. at 51). “[A]
pendent appellate claim can be regarded as inextricably intertwined with a
properly reviewable claim on collateral appeal only if the pendent claim is
coterminous with, or subsumed in, the claim before the court on interlocutory
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appeal – that is, where the appellate resolution of the collateral appeal necessarily
resolves the pendent claim as well.” Id.
Plaintiffs argue that Moore supports the exercise of pendent appellate
jurisdiction in this case. This court in Moore chose to exercise pendent appellate
jurisdiction over a municipality’s appeal of the denial of summary judgment in its
favor in conjunction with a city official’s appeal of the denial of summary
judgment on the issue of qualified immunity because resolving the issue of
qualified immunity in favor of the city official completely resolved the claim
against the municipality. See Moore, 57 F.3d at 930. As a result, the court in
Moore found that the pendent claims were “coterminous with, or subsumed in,”
the claim appropriately before the court on interlocutory appeal. Id. However,
the court in Moore noted that the “narrow avenue for the continued use of pendent
appellate jurisdiction left open by Swint” does not apply if a “ruling on the
merits” of the interlocutory appeal does not “resolve all of the remaining issues
presented by the pendent appeal.” Id.
Here, a ruling on the issue of qualified immunity will not resolve Plaintiffs’
claims on which the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
WMPS Defendants. For example, the IDEA claim does not involve the
application of the “danger creation” or “special relationship” theories. Indeed,
because we find that the individual defendants Schutz and Herrera are not entitled
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to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ danger creation theory claims, our holding
does not conclusively resolve any claims in this case against the WMPS
Defendants. As a result, we refuse to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, in Case No. 97-2150, we REVERSE the district court’s
order denying summary judgment to individual defendant Clouthier on the
“danger creation” theory, and we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying
summary judgment to individual defendants Schutz and Herrera on the “danger
creation” theory; we REVERSE the district court’s order denying summary
judgment on the “special relationship” theory as to all Individual Defendants; and
we REMAND for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Appeal
No. 97-2167 is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
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