United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 07-1588
ALEXANDRE ARONOV,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL CHERTOFF, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Tashima, Circuit Judge,*
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Surell Brady, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, with whom
Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas H. Dupree,
Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Donald E. Keener,
Deputy Director, were on brief, for appellant.
Gregory Romanovsky, with whom the Law Office of Boris B.
Maiden was on brief, for appellee.
August 1, 2008
*
Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. We address in this case whether
appellee Alexandre Aronov is entitled to attorney's fees from the
government under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28
U.S.C. § 2412. The act provides that a court shall award fees and
expenses to a prevailing party in a civil action against the United
States unless the court finds that the position of the government
was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an
award unjust.
Aronov filed the action in this case to force the
government to act on his long-pending application for
naturalization. The district court awarded him attorney's fees
under the EAJA on the grounds that he was the prevailing party in
the litigation and that the pre-litigation position taken by the
government was not substantially justified. We affirm the district
court's award.
I.
A native of Russia and a permanent resident of the United
States since 2001, Aronov applied for naturalization with the
Vermont Service Center of the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services ("USCIS") on May 22, 2004. After initial
processing and completion of the required fingerprint check,
Aronov's case was forward to the Boston USCIS office. Pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and 8 C.F.R. § 335.2(a), Aronov was interviewed
on February 14, 2005 regarding his application. However, as the
-2-
government acknowledges, the agency's interview with Aronov was
premature. The agency's own regulation dictates that an initial
examination should be undertaken only after an applicant's full
background check has been completed. See 8 C.F.R. § 335.2(b) ("The
Service will notify applicants for naturalization to appear before
a Service officer for initial examination on the naturalization
application only after the Service has received a definitive
response from the Federal Bureau of Investigation that a full
criminal background check of an applicant has been completed.").
The government has not explained why it did not follow its
regulation in this case.
At the time of the interview, Aronov was informed that
his application could not be approved until additional security
checks were completed. After hearing nothing from the USCIS for
more than a year, Aronov received a letter from the agency on March
23, 2006 informing him that his application was being actively
processed, but that additional review was required. The notice
also instructed Aronov to contact USCIS if he did not receive a
decision within six months of the date of the notice.
On August 28, 2006, more than eighteen months after being
interviewed by the agency, Aronov filed an action in the district
court under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b), requesting that the court grant his
application for naturalization or, alternatively, remand his
-3-
application with instructions to the agency to adjudicate it.1
Five weeks later, on October 6, the government and Aronov filed a
Joint Motion for Remand Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). In full,
the joint motion read:
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b), the
parties in this action, plaintiff . . . and
defendants Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the
United States Department of Homeland Security,
et al., hereby jointly move this Honorable
Court to remand this matter to the USCIS, so
that [it] can grant plaintiff's application
for naturalization, and schedule plaintiff's
oath ceremony for no later than November 8,
2006. In support of this motion, the parties
state as follows:
1. On or about August 28, 2006,
plaintiff Alexandre Aronov filed this action.
2. Since that date, USCIS has
completed its review of plaintiff's
application for naturalization and, if
jurisdiction is returned to the agency, would
grant the application and schedule plaintiff's
oath ceremony for no later than November 8,
2006.
3. The governing statute, 8 U.S.C. §
1447(b), provides that, in cases in which the
agency has failed to render a decision on an
1
8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) reads:
If there is a failure to make a determination
under section 1446 of this title [to grant or
deny the naturalization application] before
the end of the 120-day period after the date
on which the examination is conducted . . . ,
the applicant may apply to the United States
district court for the district in which the
applicant resides for a hearing on the matter.
Such court has jurisdiction over the matter
and may either determine the matter or remand
the matter, with appropriate instructions, to
the [USCIS] to determine the matter.
-4-
application for naturalization within 120 days
of the examination of the applicant, the
applicant may file suit in district court
requesting to adjudicate the application and
"[s]uch court has jurisdiction over the matter
and may either determine the matter or remand
the matter, with appropriate instructions, to
the Service to determine the matter."
Wherefore, with good cause having been
shown, the parties respectfully request that
this Court remand this matter to USCIS so that
it can grant plaintiff's application for
naturalization and schedule plaintiff for an
oath ceremony for no later than November 8,
2006.
On October 12, 2006, the court entered an electronic
order granting the motion and the remand. The docket text for the
remand order states: "Judge Nancy Gertner: Electronic ORDER entered
granting 3 Joint Motion to Remand to US Citizenship and Immigration
Services."2 Aronov was sworn in as a U.S. citizen on November 8,
2006.
On November 28, 2006, Aronov filed an application for
attorney's fees pursuant to the EAJA. The statute provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by
statute, a court shall award to a prevailing
party other than the United States fees and
other expenses, in addition to any costs
awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred
by that party in any civil action (other than
cases sounding in tort), including proceedings
for judicial review of agency action, brought
by or against the United States in any court
having jurisdiction of that action, unless the
court finds that the position of the United
2
The "3" references the previously submitted joint remand
motion.
-5-
States was substantially justified or that
special circumstances make an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The government opposed the application,
asserting that Aronov was not a prevailing party in the litigation
under the test established in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc.
v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S.
598 (2001), and that the government's position regarding his
application was substantially justified. The district court agreed
with Aronov and ordered the government to pay him $4,270.94 in
attorney's fees and costs. The government appeals this decision.
II.
Although parties are ordinarily required, win or lose, to
bear their own attorney's fees, see, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975), a number of
exceptions to this default rule have been adopted by statute. One
such exception, the EAJA, authorizes the award of attorney's fees
and costs to a litigant who has brought a civil suit against the
United States if (1) she is the prevailing party in the matter; (2)
the government fails to show that its position was substantially
justified; and (3) no special circumstances would make such an
award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see also Schock v. United
States, 254 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2001). By offering qualifying
litigants attorney's fees and other expenses, the EAJA seeks "to
remove economic deterrents to parties who seek review of
unreasonable government action." Schock, 254 F.3d at 4.
-6-
We review the district court's decision to grant or deny
a fee application under the EAJA for abuse of discretion, id.,
"mindful that the district court has an 'intimate knowledge of the
nuances of the underlying case,'" New England Regional Council of
Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 30 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Gay
Officers Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 292 (1st Cir.
2001)). "Such deference is particularly appropriate where, as
here, the correctness of the court's decision depends in large part
on the proper characterization of its own statements." Id. We
apply this standard to both the prevailing party and substantial
justification determinations. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,
558-63 (1988) (substantial justification); McDonald v. Secretary of
HHS, 884 F.2d 1468 (1st Cir. 1989) (prevailing party). An error of
law is always an abuse of discretion. Rosario-Urdaz v. Rivera-
Hernandez, 350 F.3d 219, 221 (1st Cir. 2003).
A. Prevailing Party
1. The District Court's Decision
The district court began its attorney's fees analysis by
addressing whether Aronov was a prevailing party under the EAJA.
Invoking the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon, the district
court found that the first requirement of the prevailing party
standard -- whether there was "a material alteration of the legal
relationship of the parties" -- was indisputably met because
Aronov's status had changed from legal permanent resident to U.S.
-7-
citizen. The government does not dispute that this requirement has
been satisfied.
Proceeding to the second element of the test -- whether
there was a "judicial imprimatur3 on the change" in status -- the
court rejected the government's assertion that the imprimatur
requirement had not been met here because the agency had acted
voluntarily to grant Aronov's naturalization application. Instead,
the court concluded that the remand order satisfied the second
element set forth in Buckhannon because the order effectuated the
change in legal status that Aronov had sought. The court indicated
that the remand did not merely return jurisdiction to USCIS. It
also mandated the agency's compliance with a November 8, 2006
deadline for granting Aronov's naturalization. The court noted
that "[w]here the government in Buckhannon took its conciliatory
action purely voluntarily, and took on no further duties in the
dismissal, the government here was granted not a dismissal, but a
remand to the agency conditional on the granting of plaintiff's
naturalization action by November 8, 2006." (emphasis in
original). It asserted, therefore, that "[h]ad the naturalization
not so occurred, the parties might very well be back in front of
this court litigating a contempt action. This is far more than a
catalyst theory -- it was an order of the Court."
3
Black's Law Dictionary defines "imprimatur" as "a grant of
approval; commendatory license or sanction." (8th ed. 2004).
-8-
2. Buckhannon
The issue in Buckhannon was whether a legislative change
that effectively awarded petitioner its sought-after relief could
provide the basis for a statutory fee award.4 The plaintiff was an
operator of assisted living homes who failed a state fire
inspection because some of the residents of plaintiff's homes were
not capable of "self-preservation," as defined by West Virginia
law. On behalf of itself and other parties similarly situated, the
home operator brought suit against the state, two state agencies,
and several individuals, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief
to the effect that the "self-preservation" requirement violated
provisions of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA") and
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). Before the
federal district court decided the issue, the West Virginia
legislature eliminated the "self-preservation" requirement by
statute. The court subsequently granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss the case.
4
Although the Supreme Court in Buckhannon interpreted the
fee-shifting provisions of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988
("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, "the
principles underlying [its] holding [we]re broadly stated and []
not statute-specific." Doe v. Boston Pub. Schs., 358 F.3d 20, 25
(1st Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we have held that the Supreme
Court's reasoning in "Buckhannon is presumed to apply generally to
all fee-shifting statutes that use the 'prevailing party'
terminology." Smith v. Fitchburg Pub. Schs., 401 F.3d 16, 22 n.8
(1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Doe, 358 F.3d at 25). The parties do not
dispute the applicability of Buckhannon in this case.
-9-
The plaintiffs filed an application for attorney's fees
under the FHAA and the ADA, which was denied by both the district
court and the Fourth Circuit. The Supreme Court affirmed. The
Court held that petitioner could not obtain a fee award in the
matter because the legal change had not been judicially sanctioned
by a court. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605 ("[D]efendant's voluntary
change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the
plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lack[ed] the necessary
judicial imprimatur."). The Court explicitly rejected the notion
that a party is entitled to attorney's fees simply because the
underlying litigation triggered her sought-after relief -- the so-
called "catalyst theory." Id. It noted that previously it had
"only awarded attorney's fees where the plaintiff ha[d] received a
judgment on the merits or obtained a court-ordered consent decree,"
but not "where the plaintiff ha[d] secured the reversal of a
directed verdict, or acquired a judicial pronouncement that the
defendant ha[d] violated the Constitution unaccompanied by judicial
relief," id. at 605-06 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). A private settlement not incorporated into a court order
does not confer prevailing party status. See id. at 606 ("Never
have we awarded attorney's fees for a nonjudicial alteration of
actual circumstances.") (emphasis added) (internal quotation
omitted).
-10-
3. Smith v. Fitchburg Public Schools
As a circuit, we have applied Buckhannon in a number of
cases, see Smith v. Fitchburg Public Schools, 401 F.3d 16, 22 (1st
Cir. 2005) (applying the Supreme Court's decision in the context of
an action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA")); Doe v. Boston Public Schools, 358 F.3d 20, 22-26 (1st
Cir. 2004) (similar analysis); Kinton, 284 F.3d at 30 (declining to
award attorney's fees because the district court had not entered
any order "compelling, or even leading to" the plaintiff receiving
the relief it had requested), each time evaluating the specific
facts of the case to determine whether the court's conduct was
sufficient to "provide the necessary judicial imprimatur on the
change in the legal relationship between the parties," Smith, 401
F.3d at 23 (citation omitted).
The government relies in particular on our Smith
decision. There, the parents of a disabled child initiated a
proceeding under the IDEA against the Fitchburg Public Schools,
seeking special education services for their child. After several
pre-hearing orders by a hearing officer of the Bureau of Special
Education Appeals ("BSEA"), the entity in charge of overseeing the
proceeding, the parties reached a private settlement that provided
the plaintiffs all of the relief they had sought. The plaintiffs
subsequently filed an action in the district court seeking to
recover attorney's fees pursuant to the IDEA. They argued that the
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orders of the BSEA, which required the school district to take
certain actions and set deadlines for those actions, served as the
necessary "judicial imprimatur" to grant them "prevailing party"
status. Id. at 22.
After recognizing that the administrative relief was not
in the form of a consent decree or a final judgment on the merits,
and that the plaintiffs had not argued that the administrative
orders were functionally equivalent to a consent decree, we
addressed in Smith whether the facts of the case generally met the
two required elements of Buckhannon.5 Acknowledging that the
plaintiffs had achieved a material change in the parties'
relationship -- thereby satisfying the first prong of Buckhannon,
we rejected the plaintiffs' claim for attorney's fees on the ground
that the BSEA orders had not provided sufficient "judicial
imprimatur" on the relief obtained. Id. at 27. On this issue, we
observed that when the administrative orders were imposed, the BSEA
had not yet begun to analyze the plaintiffs' substantive claim --
whether they were entitled to relief pursuant to the IDEA --
because it had yet to convene a due process hearing. Id. at 26-27.
The BSEA's decisions, therefore, were not substantive ones made
5
We noted in Smith that this circuit had not "squarely
addressed whether judgments on the merits or consent decrees are
the only forms of relief sufficient to confer prevailing party
status, whether a functional equivalent of such relief may be
adequate, or whether any other types of relief could satisfy
Buckhannon's requirements." Smith, 401 F.3d at 23; see also Doe,
358 F.3d at 24 n.4.
-12-
after reviewing the merits of plaintiffs' claims, but rather orders
directing Fitchburg to do what it had already promised the
plaintiffs it would do. Id. at 27. Accordingly, the "orders and
ruling were [not] issued . . . to place the weight of judicial
authority behind Fitchburg's substantive concession that
[plaintiff] was entitled to an IEP," and hence the relief obtained
by the plaintiffs lacked the necessary judicial imprimatur. Id.
4. Applying Buckhannon and Smith
Citing Smith, the government contends that the district
court's remand order did not provide the necessary "judicial
imprimatur" for Aronov's sought-after remedy, naturalization. The
government maintains that it already had voluntarily decided to
grant Aronov's application. It then established a specific time-
frame for doing so, and the court order merely "memorialized" the
government's independent concessions, as it did in Smith. Further,
the remand order did not include any "appropriate instructions"
directing the government to take specific action, see 8 U.S.C. §
1447(b), or retain jurisdiction in order to determine whether the
government followed through on its voluntary decision to approve
Aronov's application. Accordingly, the order had no substantive
effect on the proceeding and, therefore, did not constitute a
"judicial imprimatur," as the Supreme Court defined it in
Buckhannon and as we applied the standard in Smith.
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We reject the government's arguments and find its
reliance on Smith misplaced. Most of the language from Smith
relied upon by the government comes in that portion of the panel's
decision where it assesses whether the plaintiff's relief, "even
though not in the form of a consent decree or a final judgment on
the merits, comports with the overarching requirements of
Buckhannon; that is, whether the [administrative hearing officer's
involvement] provided the necessary judicial imprimatur on a
material alteration of the legal relationship between the parties."
Smith, 401 F.3d at 26. As the panel noted, "[the plaintiff] does
not argue that the order dismissing her case is the functional
equivalent of a consent decree, and thus we deem that argument
waived." Id. at 24. Moreover, the Smith panel assessed whether
the order of an administrative hearing officer, rather than the
order of a judge, meets the prevailing party standard set forth in
Buckhannon. Since the administrative law analog to a judicial
consent decree is uncertain, the focus of the panel in Smith was
whether the administrative orders were akin to a judgment on the
merits. In short, the Smith decision has little relevance to the
prevailing party issue here, which turns on whether the district
court's order was the functional equivalent of a consent decree.
Nevertheless, though offered as dicta, the Smith panel
made some useful observations about the concept of the functional
equivalent of a consent decree. Specifically, the panel
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distinguished between a court's incorporation of the terms of an
agreement between the parties, which made the court order
functionally equivalent to a consent decree, and mere recognition
of an agreement accompanied by the dismissal of the case because
there is no longer a dispute, which was not equivalent to a consent
decree. Relying on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Smyth v.
Rivero, the panel put that critical difference in these terms:
Thus, "either incorporation of the terms of
the agreement or a separate provision
retaining jurisdiction over the agreement will
suffice for [an order to be considered the
functional equivalent of a consent decree]" .
. . In contrast, "[w]here a court merely
recognizes the fact of the parties' agreement
and dismisses the case because there is no
longer a dispute before it, the terms of the
agreement are not made part of the order and
consequently will not serve as a basis of
jurisdiction."
Smith, 401 F.3d at 24 (quoting Smyth, 282 F.3d 268, 283 (4th Cir.
2002)).
Here, the district court held that its remand order fell
under the first category of orders -- where the court incorporates
the terms of the parties' agreement into an order -- rather than
the second -- where the court merely recognizes the agreement and
dismisses the matter as no longer in dispute. As the district
court put it:
In Buckhannon, the government acted
independently to give the plaintiff what it
wanted, and then sought dismissal. Here, the
Court remanded specifically "so that USCIS can
grant plaintiff's application for
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naturalization, and schedule plaintiff's oath
ceremony for no later than November 8, 2006."
This is the judicial imprimatur required by
and lacking in the specific facts of
Buckhannon. Where the government in
Buckhannon took its conciliatory action purely
voluntarily, and took on no further duties in
the dismissal, the government here was granted
not a dismissal, but a remand to the agency
conditional on the granting of plaintiff's
naturalization by November 8, 2006. Had the
naturalization not so occurred, the parties
might very well be back in front of this Court
litigating a contempt action. This is far
more than a catalyst theory -- it was an order
of the Court.
Aronov v. Chertoff, No. 06-11526-NG, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40455,
at *4-5 (Jan. 30, 2007) (emphasis in original).
Because the district court is in the best position to
explain the meaning of its own order, we defer to its conclusion on
the significance of the remand order. See Kinton, 284 F.3d at 30
("Clearly, the district court is in the best position to determine
whether its statements . . . should be considered as the functional
equivalent of a judicial order within the meaning of Buckhannon.");
Harvey v. Johanns, 494 F.3d 237, 242 (1st Cir. 2007) ("We must, of
course, accord deference to the district court's interpretation of
the wording of its own order."); see also Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816
F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[U]ncertainty as to the meaning and
intendment of a district court order can sometimes best be
dispelled by deference to the views of the writing judge.").
Moreover, based on our assessment of the remand order and
the circumstances of its issuance, we see no reason to question the
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district court's assessment of its own work. After Aronov filed
suit in the district court under the statute, USCIS lost
jurisdiction to adjudicate Aronov's application, thereby precluding
it from entering a binding legal agreement with Aronov regarding
his application. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) ("Such court has jurisdiction
over the matter and may either determine the matter or remand the
matter, with appropriate instructions, to the [USCIS] to determine
the matter."); see Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 384-85 (4th
Cir. 2007).6 The parties acknowledged as much in their joint
motion for remand to the district court, which highlights the terms
of 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). Therefore, despite the agency's concession
to allow Aronov's naturalization, it did not have the authority to
effectuate that outcome until the district court returned
jurisdiction to the agency. The court's order was indispensable to
the naturalization outcome.
The court's remand order also ended the dispute by
providing Aronov his sought-after relief. To be sure, the district
6
The question of whether the court maintains exclusive
jurisdiction or, alternatively, concurrent jurisdiction with the
USCIS has been litigated in other courts. Most courts have held
that the district court has exclusive jurisdiction over the
application until it has acted pursuant to the statute. See, e.g.,
Etape, 497 F.3d at 384-85 (holding that § 1447(b) vests the
district court with exclusive jurisdiction over a naturalization
application); United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1159 (9th
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (same). But see, e.g., Bustamante v.
Chertoff, 533 F. Supp. 2d 373, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (reaching the
opposite conclusion). Here, the government does not assert that
the USCIS maintained jurisdiction over Aronov's application after
he filed suit in district court.
-17-
court relied on the government's statements in the joint motion for
remand that naturalization was appropriate. However, because of
the jurisdictional element, the district court could reasonably
conclude that it was ultimately the remand order, not the agency's
concession, that brought about the material change in the parties'
relationship and "place[d] the weight of judicial authority" on the
agreed-upon alteration in Aronov's legal status, see Smith, 401
F.3d at 26.
There remains the question of the form of the court's
order. If the district court had entered an order explicitly
setting forth the agreement of the parties as set forth in the
joint motion for remand, its order would unquestionably be a
consent decree. See Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S 431, 437 (2004) ("A
consent decree 'embodies an agreement of the parties' and is also
'an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected
in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the
rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.'"
(quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378
(1992))); see also Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (defining
a "consent decree" as "[a] court decree that all parties agree
to"). Yet the district court's brief remand order here, which
incorporated the terms of the joint motion by reference, had the
same import and effect. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994) (indicating that a court would
-18-
maintain jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement "if the
parties' obligation to comply with [its] terms . . . had been made
part of the order of dismissal -- either by separate provision . .
. or by incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the
order. In that event, a breach of the agreement would be a
violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the
agreement would therefore exist."). Hence the brief remand order
was the functional equivalent of a consent decree. If the
government had failed to comply with the terms of the remand order,
Aronov could have sought enforcement of the order through a
contempt proceeding, as the district court noted. He would not
have had to file a separate contract action against the agency or
another suit under § 1447(b).7
7
This distinction has an analog in the private realm, where
one party is seeking to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement
against another private party. If the terms of the settlement
agreement have not been incorporated into a court order, the
federal courts will often lack jurisdiction to enforce its terms.
In contrast, where the parties have obtained a consent decree or a
court order that either incorporates the terms of the settlement
agreement or explicitly retains jurisdiction, a federal court will
possess "enforcement" or "ancillary" jurisdiction to enforce the
terms of the order. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381; Buckhannon, 532
U.S. at 604 n.7 ("[F]ederal jurisdiction to enforce a private
contractual settlement will often be lacking unless the terms of
the agreement are incorporated into the order of dismissal.")
(emphasis added); see also Fafel v. DiPaola, 399 F.3d 403, 414
(recognizing that a federal court had ancillary jurisdiction to
enforce its prior Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 68 judgment because the
judgment, although limited in nature, "necessarily incorporate[d]
the terms of the underlying Rule 68 offer" and the district court
limited its exercise of ancillary jurisdiction to enforcing the
terms of that prior judgment); Martel v. Fridovich, 14 F.3d 1, 3
n.4 (1st Cir. 1993) (per curiam) ("The appropriate vehicle for
-19-
There is ample authority for the proposition that the
functional equivalent of a consent decree satisfies the
requirements of Buckhannon.8 Like our sister circuits, we do not
read Buckhannon so narrowly as to preclude all forms of judicial
enforcement of the consent decree is an action for contempt brought
before the court responsible for the decree.").
8
See, e.g., Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159,
165 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that a court order, characterized by
the defendant as a stipulated settlement, was sufficient to support
a finding of judicial imprimatur where the order contained
mandatory language, included the judge's signature, and was
judicially enforceable); Smyth, 282 F.3d at 281 ("We doubt that the
Supreme Court's guidance in Buckhannon was intended to be
interpreted so restrictively as to require that the words 'consent
decree' be used explicitly."); T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102,
349 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[S]ome settlement agreements,
even though not explicitly labeled as a 'consent decree' may confer
'prevailing party' status, if they are sufficiently analogous to a
consent decree."); Carbonell v. INS, 429 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir.
2005) ("[W]hen a court incorporates the terms of a voluntary
agreement into an order, that order is stamped with sufficient
'judicial imprimatur' for the litigant to qualify as a prevailing
party for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees."); Am.
Disability Ass'n, Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir.
2002) ("A formal consent decree is unnecessary . . . because the
explicit retention of jurisdiction or the court's order
specifically approving the terms of the settlement are . . . the
functional equivalent of the entry of a consent decree."); Davy v.
CIA, 456 F.3d 162, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("Where a settlement
agreement is embodied in a court order such that the obligation to
comply with its terms is court-ordered, the court's approval and
the attendant judicial over-sight (in the form of continuing
jurisdiction to enforce the agreement) may be equally apparent. We
will assume, then, that an order containing an agreement reached by
the parties may be functionally a consent decree for purposes of
the inquiry to which Buckhannon directs us."); see also Bell v. Bd.
of County Comm'rs. of Jefferson County, 451 F.3d 1097, 1103 (10th
Cir. 2006) ("Most circuits recognize that some settlement
agreements, even though not explicitly labeled as a consent decree
may confer prevailing party status, if they are sufficiently
analogous to a consent decree.") (internal quotations omitted).
-20-
relief other than a judgment on the merits or a court order in the
form of a consent decree, or one explicitly labeled as such, from
satisfying the judicial imprimatur requirement.9 Therefore, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that its
remand order issued pursuant to § 1447(b) incorporated the terms of
the parties' joint motion and hence was the functional equivalent
of a court-ordered consent decree.10 Accordingly, the order
constituted the necessary "judicial imprimatur" on the parties'
9
Although in Smith we noted that there was disagreement among
our sister circuits on this question, citing the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990 (8th Cir.
2003), as an example of a court reading Buckhannon narrowly to
preclude all other forms of relief, the Eighth Circuit has more
recently repudiated our reading of its decision. See Smith, 401
F.3d at 23. In Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Jackson, 433 F.3d 1083,
1085 n.2 (8th Cir. 2006), the court asserted that its decision in
Christina A. did not foreclose the possibility that other types of
court-ordered relief could provide the requisite judicial
imprimatur required by Buckhannon.
10
The dissent asserts that the issue of whether the district
court's remand order was the equivalent of a consent decree was not
raised by either party, nor was it the theory on which the district
court relied, and therefore we should not analyze that issue in
deciding the case. The district court did not use the phrase
"functional equivalent of a consent decree" in its decision
awarding attorney's fees and costs to Aronov. Nevertheless, in
addressing the judicial imprimatur question in its decision, the
district court described its order as incorporating the terms of
the parties' joint motion for remand. It further stated that its
order could be enforced through a contempt action. Hence the
district court described its order in consent-decree terms. The
government chose not to challenge this consent-decree aspect of the
district court's decision. Instead, it advanced a largely
irrelevant judicial imprimatur argument under our Smith decision
that it deemed more favorable to its position. Aronov responded to
the argument made by the government. He had no obligation to
respond to an argument that the government did not make.
-21-
change in legal relationship, qualifying Aronov as a prevailing
party.
B. Substantial Justification
1. Framework for Review
The government bears the burden of demonstrating that its
position was substantially justified. Shock, 254 F.3d at 5. The
Supreme Court has interpreted the "substantially justified"
language in the EAJA to require reasonableness: "[A]s between the
two commonly used connotations of the word 'substantially,' the one
most naturally conveyed by the phrase before us here is not
'justified to a high degree,' but rather 'justified in substance or
in the main' -- that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy
a reasonable person." Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565; see also, e.g.,
Shock, 254 F.3d at 5; Dantran, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 246
F.3d 36, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2001). Thus, the key question is whether
the government's position has "a reasonable basis in law and fact."
Pierce, 487 U.S. at 566 n.2.
As a matter of law, the government's position is
substantially justified when the government's actions are required
by a statute or law. See Dantran, 246 F.3d at 41; United States v.
One Parcel of Real Prop., 960 F.2d 200, 208-09 (1st Cir. 1992); see
also United States v. B & M Used Cars, 860 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir.
1988) ("Whether the government's decision . . . was reasonable must
be examined in light of . . . the appropriate statute.").
-22-
Additionally, the government's position may be substantially
justified even if its reasonable interpretation of its legal
obligations is not ultimately affirmed by a court. Schock, 254
F.3d at 5. The district court having concluded that the
government's litigation position was substantially justified, we
review only the government's pre-litigation position. 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(2)(D); Shock, 254 F.3d at 5.
2. The District Court's Decision
In focusing on the government's pre-litigation position,
the court noted that more than a year and a half had passed between
Aronov's citizenship exam and the filing of his action -- an amount
of time that exceeded by a multiple of four the statutory period
that was a prerequisite for filing an action under 8 U.S.C. §
1447(b). The court viewed this delay as unjustified because the
government had procedures in place for expediting an FBI name check
application, including issuance of a writ of mandamus. The court
concluded that "[i]t is not 'substantially justified' for the
government to force naturalization applicants to incur additional
expense -- and the courts to be burdened -- just to have
naturalization applications processed in the timely manner already
supposedly guaranteed by statute." It rejected the government's
argument that it was unable to act on Aronov's application sooner
because the FBI did not complete its background check until
September 2006.
-23-
3. The Government's Position
The government claims that two statutes justify its
actions and inactions on Aronov's application. First, it cites 8
U.S.C. § 1446(a), which provides that "[b]efore a person may be
naturalized, an employee of the [USCIS], or of the United States
designated by the Attorney General, shall conduct a personal
investigation of the person applying for naturalization." It
asserts that because the personal investigation of Aronov required
by the statute had not been completed before he filed suit, USCIS
could not legally grant him citizenship. Second, the government
cites language included by Congress in the 1998 Appropriations Act,
which has continuing effect: "During fiscal year 1998 and each
fiscal year thereafter, none of the funds appropriated or otherwise
made available to [USCIS] shall be used to complete adjudication of
an application for naturalization unless [USCIS] has received
confirmation from the Federal Bureau of Investigation that a full
criminal background check has been completed . . . ." Depts. of
Commerce, Justice & State, The Judiciary & Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-119, Stat. 2440-2448-49
(1997) (8 U.S.C. § 1446 note) (emphasis added). It asserts that
this language prevented USCIS from taking final action on Aronov's
application before the FBI finished its background check in
September 2006, after Aronov had filed suit.
-24-
In response, Aronov argues that neither the language of
8 U.S.C. § 1446(a) nor the 1998 Appropriations Act requires the
USCIS to undertake the comprehensive FBI name check, which the
government concedes has been the primary cause of the delay in
Aronov's proceeding. Further, he notes that the agency policy
calling for such name checks has not been codified in any
regulation. Finally, he cites a report from the USCIS's ombudsman
that raised questions about the wisdom of the USCIS policy to
require such searches, particularly in light of the significant
backlog of applicants waiting for their FBI name checks to be
completed.
Before addressing the parties' arguments, we briefly
discuss the FBI name check process and the USCIS's use of that
process for adjudicating naturalization applications.
a. The FBI's National Name Check Program
The FBI's National Name Check Program ("NNCP") was
established during the Eisenhower Administration by Executive Order
10450. The NNCP reviews information in the FBI's files to
determine whether an individual has been the subject of, or
mentioned in, any FBI investigations. NNCP provides this
information to dozens of federal, state, and foreign agencies
"seeking background information from FBI files on individuals
before bestowing a privilege -- [w]hether that privilege is
government employment or an appointment; a Green card or
-25-
naturalization; admission to the bar; or a visa for the privilege
of visiting our homeland." Foreign Travel to the United States:
Testimony Before the H. Comm. on Gov. Reform (July 10, 2003)
(statement of Robert J. Garrity, Jr., Assistant Dir., Records Mgmt.
Div., Fed. Bureau of Investigation), available at 2003 WL 21608243
(hereinafter Garrity). The NNCP also "conducts numerous name
searches in direct support of the counterintelligence,
counterterrorism, and homeland security efforts of the FBI." Id.
The USCIS commissions the FBI on a fee-for-service basis
to provide the name checks, in accordance with USCIS-defined
standards. USCIS Ombudsman, Annual Report to Congress June 2007, at 38, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOMB_Annual%20Report_2007.pdf.
The scope of these standards has expanded over time. Until late
2002, the FBI was required to search only its "main" files for
possible links between the applicant and an individual who was
previously the target of an FBI investigation. In late 2002,
however, in response to heightened security concerns after the
attacks on September 11, 2001, and an incident in which an
individual who was a member of a terrorist group was awarded
benefits, the USCIS revised its policy and began requiring more
comprehensive FBI name checks. These checks entailed a search of
the FBI's "reference" files in addition to its main investigation
files. United States Dep't of Homeland Security, Office of
Inspector General, A Review of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
-26-
Services' Alien Security Checks 24 n.30 (Nov. 2005), available at
www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_06-06_Nov05.pdf; see
also Spencer S. Hsu and N.C. Aizenman, FBI Name Check Cited in
Naturalization Delays, Wash. Post, June 17, 2007, at A1.
Additionally, USCIS resubmitted 2.4 million applicant names to the
FBI for these expanded checks. As currently undertaken, the FBI
name check process entails the following:
The name is electronically checked against the
FBI Universal Indices (UNI). The searches
seek all instances of the individual's name
and close date of birth, whether a main file
name or reference. . . . The names are
searched in a multitude of combinations,
switching the order of first, last, middle
names, as well as combinations with just the
first and last, first and middle, and so on.
It also searches different phonetic spelling
variations of the names . . . .
If there is a match with a name in a
FBI record, it is designated as a 'Hit,'
meaning that the system has stopped on a
possible match with the name being checked,
but now a human being must review the file or
indices entry to further refine the names
'Hit" on. . . .
Approximately 85% of name checks are
electronically returned as having "No Record"
within 72 hours. . . . A secondary manual name
search usually identifies an additional 10% of
the requests as having a "No Record" . . . .
The remaining 5% are identified as possibly
being the subject of an FBI record. The FBI
record must now be retrieved and reviewed. If
the records were electronically uploaded into
the FBI Automated Case Support (ACS)
electronic recordkeeping system, it can be
viewed quickly. If not, the relevant
information must be retrieved from the
existing paper record.
Garrity, supra.
-27-
Before September 11, 2001, the FBI received approximately
2.5 million name check requests per year. After the USCIS revised
its policy in 2002, that number increased. Id. For example, in
the FBI's fiscal year 2003 alone, it received over 6 million name
check requests. Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Name
Check Program, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/nationalnamecheck.htm (last
visited June 27, 2008). USCIS currently processes approximately
1.5 million applications requiring name checks annually, including
applications both for green cards and for citizenship, and 99% of
these are cleared by the FBI in less than six months. Julia
Preston, Rules Eased to Expedite Green Card Applications, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 12, 2008, at A12. Other applications, however, take
longer; approximately 140,000 USCIS applications have been held up
in the FBI's name check system for six months or longer. Spencer
S. Hsu, U.S. To Skirt Green-Card Check, Wash. Post, Feb. 12, 2008,
at A3. As of May 2007, of the about 329,000 cases pending before
USCIS, "64% were stalled [with the agency] for more than 90 days,
32% for more than one year and 17% for more than two years." Hsu
and Aizenman, supra, at A1.11
11
To help alleviate this backlog, USCIS decided in February
2008 to give preliminary approval to green card applicants for whom
an FBI fingerprint check and Interagency Border Inspection Services
check have been successfully completed and an FBI name check
request has been pending for over six months. If the eventual name
check turns up negative information, the visa will be canceled and
deportation proceedings commenced. Memorandum from Michael Aytes,
Assoc. Dir., USCIS Domestic Operations, to USCIS Field Leadership
2 ( F e b . 4 , 2 0 0 8 ) , a v a i l a b l e a t
-28-
The FBI name check is one piece of the larger background
check that the USCIS commissions for all naturalization applicants.
In addition to the FBI name check, the agency conducts a name check
in the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS), "a multiagency
effort with a central system that combines information from
multiple agencies, databases and system interfaces to compile data
relating to national security risks, public safety issues and other
law enforcement concerns." Fact Sheet, USCIS Press Office, Immigration Security
Checks -- How and Why the Process Works 2 (April 25, 2006), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/security_checks_42506.pdf.
Results of an IBIS check are typically available immediately. Id.
The FBI also obtains an applicant's fingerprints in order to search
the existing criminal databases for records of arrests and criminal
convictions. The FBI typically forwards a response on the
fingerprint check to USCIS within 24 to 48 hours. Id.
b. Statutory Requirements
There is nothing in the language of 8 U.S.C. 1446(a) or
the 1998 Appropriations Act that requires USCIS to include the NNCP
in the naturalization process. Neither provision cited by the
government states explicitly that an FBI name check is required,
let alone a name check that includes an evaluation of all FBI
http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/DOC017.pdf. This change
does not apply to citizenship applicants because "revoking
naturalization is a much more difficult thing to do" than revoking
a green card. Hsu, supra, at A3 (quoting USCIS Spokesman
Christopher S. Bentley).
-29-
reference files in addition to the main files. Section 1446(a)
requires only that a "personal investigation" be conducted prior to
allowing an individual to be naturalized, while the 1998
appropriations bill limits funds to the USCIS to complete
adjudication of a naturalization application until the agency has
received FBI confirmation that a "full criminal background check"
has been completed. There is no specification in the bill beyond
this phrase. It is entirely plausible -- indeed likely -- that the
language used by Congress in the 1998 appropriations bill referred
to the FBI's criminal history check, which is an established,
preliminary step taken in the naturalization process, rather than
the FBI name check.
Importantly, the FBI name check program had already been
in place for decades at the time the statutes relied upon by the
government were enacted. If Congress intended to mandate that the
USCIS commission FBI name checks before granting naturalization
applications, it could have explicitly referenced such checks.
See, e.g., United States v. Cabrera, 208 F.3d 309, 314 (1st Cir.
2000) (examining Congress's other textual options in interpreting
the statutory language at issue). Other than an unpersuasive
reliance on the text of the statutes, the government has not
-30-
identified any evidence that Congress intended to require the FBI
name checks.12
Indeed, USCIS did not even begin requiring the full,
comprehensive FBI name checks until 2002, years after passage of
the applicable statutes. That fact confirms that the comprehensive
name checks were a result of a policy change within the agency
12
Although the government has not invoked it, a regulation
relevant to interpreting the scope of the statutory provisions at
issue does exist. In full, 8 C.F.R. § 335.2(b) reads:
Completion of criminal background checks
before examination. The Service will notify
applicants for naturalization to appear before
a Service officer for initial examination on
the naturalization application only after the
Service has received a definitive response
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation that
a full criminal background check of an
applicant has been completed. A definitive
response that a full criminal background check
on an applicant has been completed includes:
(1) Confirmation from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that an applicant does not have
an administrative or a criminal record;
(2) Confirmation from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that an applicant has an
administrative or a criminal record; or
(3) Confirmation from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that two properly prepared
fingerprint cards (Form FD-258) have been
determined unclassifiable for the purpose of
conducting a criminal background check and
have been rejected.
The regulation does not assist the agency's claims because, like
the statutes, it gives no indication that a "full" criminal
background check includes an FBI name check.
-31-
after the September 11, 2001 attacks rather than a congressional
mandate.13
In sum, the statutes cited by the government did not
require USCIS to commission FBI name checks -- let alone
comprehensive ones -- before adjudicating a naturalization
application. Therefore, the "mandated by statute" rationale fails
as a substantial justification for the agency's delays in
adjudicating Aronov's application.
c. The Application of Chevron
Perhaps realizing the flaws in its statutory argument,
the government offers an alternative basis for finding that its
pre-litigation position on Aronov's naturalization application was
substantially justified. Relying on Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984), the
government asserts that we must defer to the USCIS's decisions
regarding the scope of the "personal investigation" and "full
criminal background check" of an applicant for naturalization
because Congress, pursuant to the statutes discussed above, has
13
The USCIS's recent change of policy to grant thousands of
green-card applicants permanent residency before their full FBI
name checks are completed reinforces this view. Although the
agency did not take the same step with respect to naturalization
applications, it attributed the differential treatment to the
difficulty of revising naturalization decisions, not to statutory
requirements. Hsu, supra, at A3 (citing USCIS Spokesman
Christopher S. Bentley). In so explaining the discrepancy, the
agency implicitly acknowledged that it was not prohibited by
law from extending the policy to naturalization decisions.
-32-
committed to the agency the decision-making authority on these
issues. The government argues that the agency, having concluded
that the comprehensive FBI name checks are "essential" to the
background investigations, was substantially justified in awaiting
completion of Aronov's background check before adjudicating his
naturalization application. Acknowledging that a small percentage
of name checks take a considerable amount of time to complete, the
agency asserts implicitly that those isolated delays, which are the
fault of the FBI and not USCIS, should not prevent the government
from maintaining the name check requirement as its policy and
applying to it Aronov's naturalization application. That is, the
agency argues that its general policy of requiring the name checks
excuses the delays associated with individual naturalization
applications, such as Aronov's.
Even if the government is entitled to invoke Chevron to
defend its general policy on the FBI name check process, see, e.g.,
Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187 (2006)
(analyzing the standards for determining whether an agency
interpretation is entitled to evaluation under the Chevron
framework), deference to its general policies does not require us
to find substantial justification in this particular instance.14
14
Aronov argues on a number of grounds that the USCIS's name
check policy is not entitled to Chevron deference. We need not
reach that question because of our conclusion that even if the
agency is entitled to Chevron deference for its policy requiring
FBI name checks, this deference does not substantially justify the
-33-
The government's eighteen-month delay in acting on Aronov's
naturalization application directly contravened § 1447(b), which
gives a district court jurisdiction to evaluate a naturalization
application if the agency has failed to adjudicate the application
within 120 days after conducting its initial examination. See
Etape, 497 F.3d at 385; see also Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1163 ("A
central purpose of [§ 1447(b)] was to reduce the waiting time for
naturalization applicants." (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-187, at 8
(1989); 135 Cong. Rec. H4539-02, H4542 (1989) (statement of Rep.
Morrison))) Both the courts and the agency itself have interpreted
§ 1447(b) as imposing a 120-day deadline for agency action. See
Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1161; 8 C.F.R. § 335.3(a) ("A decision to
grant or deny the application shall be made at the time of the
initial examination or within 120-days after the date of the
initial examination of the applicant for naturalization . . . .")
(emphasis added); see also Walji v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 432, 439
(5th Cir. 2007) ("[B]ecause the clear intent of Congress was to
accelerate naturalization applications, and the statutory and
regulatory language gives a definite time frame for decision once
an examination has occurred, [§ 1447] is violated in situations
[where the 120-day period is not complied with].").
government's pre-litigation conduct in this particular instance.
-34-
In addition to § 1447(b)'s specific command,15 the
Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), offers a
more general directive to agencies to resolve matters presented to
it within a reasonable amount of time. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)
("With due regard for the convenience and necessity of the parties
or their representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency
shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it."). Our
assessment of what is reasonable is informed by the relevant
statutes and regulations. See Towns of Wellesley, Concord and
Norwood, Mass. v. FERC, 829 F.2d 275, 277 (1st Cir. 1987)
(discussing the guidelines, including the existence of a "rule of
reason," which govern the time an agency may take to make a
decision) (citing Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750
F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984))); Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9, 16
(1st Cir. 1978) (indicating that courts may look to statutory text
to provide a reasonable time limit on agency action). Here, §
15
The dissent's treatment of the 120-day time frame
established by 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) is curious. Although the dissent
acknowledges that the agency has adopted a regulation, 8 C.F.R. §
335.3(a), that treats the 120-day time frame as a deadline, the
dissent treats the statutory and regulatory time frame as merely
aspirational in nature, with no consequence for the agency if it
fails to comply. If Congress had taken such a relaxed view of its
120-day time frame, it would not have explicitly provided that an
applicant whose naturalization application remains unresolved at
the end of the 120-day period may file suit in federal court to
have the application either adjudicated by the court or remanded to
the agency with instructions to adjudicate it. See, e.g., Etape,
497 F.3d at 384-85 (concluding that after an applicant has filed
suit with the district court pursuant to § 1447(b), the court has
exclusive jurisdiction over the application).
-35-
1447(b) and 8 C.F.R. § 335.3(a)16 provide such guidance. See Sze
v. INS, No. C-97-0569 SC, 1997 WL 446236, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 24,
1997) ("[T]he 120-day rule provides the court with a measure of
what constitutes a reasonable period for INS to process
naturalization applications.").
Without foreclosing the possibility that the government
could provide substantial justification grounded in the facts of a
particular case for not complying with the 120-day statutory
requirement, the government has advanced no such particularized
justification here. Instead, the agency has offered only general
justifications for the delay, including the agency's policy of
requiring name checks for security purposes and the significant
backlog of names that the FBI is processing. These explanations,
however, do not justify the agency's disregard of the clear
statutory mandate. As a district court deciding this exact issue
has aptly stated:
But while a reasonable person would not
dispute the necessity of conducting a
background check on an applicant for
naturalization, a reasonable person would
require a satisfactory justification for a
substantial delay in completing the background
check. Indeed, government agencies are
required to conclude matters presented to them
within a "reasonable time." See 5 U.S.C. §
16
8 C.F.R. § 335.3(a) states: "A decision to grant or deny the
[naturalization] application shall be made at the time of the
initial examination or within 120-days after the date of the
initial examination of the applicant for naturalization under §
335.2."
-36-
555(b). Otherwise, an applicant for
naturalization remains in perpetual limbo and
is by de facto, denied his citizenship, a
right that has been afforded by Congress to
deserving individuals since the rise of the
American democracy. This is particularly true
when Congress has enacted legislation
permitting the applicant to apply to federal
district court if a decision is not rendered
on the application within 120 days of the
completion of the examination under 8 U.S.C. §
1447(b). Here, Defendants offer no
justification for the delay; rather, they
merely state that "background checks were
necessary and had to be completed before the
plaintiff could be naturalized." This
explanation merely restates, in a conclusory
manner, the necessity of completing the
background check; it does not justify the
delay.
Alghamdi v. Ridge, No. 3:05cv344-RS, 2006 WL 5670940, at *14 (N.D.
Fla. Sept. 25, 2006). Although we also acknowledge that the agency
has valid -- indeed persuasive -- reasons for requiring
comprehensive FBI name checks under ordinary circumstances, that
policy determination cannot justify the failure to comply with a
statutory deadline. See, e.g., Rotinsulu v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 68,
72 (1st Cir. 2008) ("An agency has an obligation to abide by its
own regulations.").
Indeed, despite the agency's assertions that the FBI
backlog was a significant cause of the delays in this case, the
ultimate cause of the agency's failure to comply with the law was
its own non-compliance with its regulations.17 If the agency had
17
Specifically, the agency failed to comply with 8 C.F.R. §
335.2(b). The regulation states: "The Service will notify
-37-
properly deferred conducting its initial interview of Aronov until
the FBI name check process had been completed, the statutory
obligation would not have arisen.18 In its brief, the government
has neither explained nor justified its non-compliance with 8
C.F.R. § 335.2(b) in connection with Aronov's application or that
of any other naturalization applicant.19
Therefore, the government's assertion that it was
required to wait until Aronov's FBI name check was completed before
finally adjudicating his naturalization application does not have
"a reasonable basis in law and fact." Pierce, 487 U.S. at 566 n.2.
applicants for naturalization to appear before a Service officer
for initial examination on the naturalization application only
after the Service has received a definitive response from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation that a full criminal background
check of an applicant has been completed." Id.
18
We acknowledge the oddity that arises because of the
agency's regulations. If USCIS had complied with its regulations
and waited to interview Aronov until the FBI name check had been
completed, his waiting time for the completion of the
naturalization process might have been longer than it was here.
However, this fact does not alter our legal analysis. Once USICS
gave Aronov his initial interview, it had to confront the clear
timing obligation imposed by Congress.
19
Based on a recent press release issued by USCIS on April 2,
2008, there appear to be approximately 29,800 applicants whose
naturalization applications were submitted to the FBI before May
2006 and whose interviews have already been completed. The agency
has requested that the FBI prioritize their name checks. This is
one piece of a larger, joint plan between the agency and the FBI to
eliminate the backlog of name checks. The FBI also announced its
intention to have processed all name checks pending for more than
three years by May of this year. See News Release, USCIS, USCIS and FBI
Release Joint Plan to Eliminate Backlog of FBI Name Checks (Apr. 2, 2008), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/NameCheck_2Apr08.pdf.
-38-
Indeed, the government's attempt to invoke an administrative policy
to trump an explicit statutory command turns Chevron deference on
its head. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993)
("Under Chevron, if a statute is unambiguous the statute
governs."). In light of the 120-day statutory directive, the
agency's long delay (over four times the statutory period), and the
absence of any evidence that the government tried to expedite
Aronov's application to comply with the statute, the government's
conduct toward Aronov can only be classified as unreasonable and
not substantially justified. See Russell v. Nat'l Mediation Bd.,
775 F.2d 1284, 1290 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding that the
government's position was not substantially justified because it
breached a clear statutory mandate). Accordingly, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the
government's pre-litigation conduct was not substantially
justified.20
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's
order granting Aronov's application for attorney's fees and
expenses under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Additionally, we remand
the matter to the district court so that the fee award may be
20
We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that there are no "special circumstances
[that] make an award [of attorney's fees] unjust." See Schock, 254
F.3d at 4 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)).
-39-
recalculated to reflect the fees and expenses associated with this
appeal.
So ordered.
-- Dissenting Opinion Follows –
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LYNCH, Chief Judge, dissenting. With respect, I dissent.
Because the award rests on errors of law, I would reverse.
The Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(a), must be construed in favor of the United States.
Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 137 (1991). The Act requires a
court to award fees and expenses to a prevailing party in a civil
action against the United States unless the court finds that the
position of the United States was substantially justified, or that
special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(a). The purpose of the Act was to "ensure that certain
individuals . . . will not be deterred from seeking review of, or
defending against, unjustified governmental action because of the
expense involved . . . . The Act reduces the disparity in
resources between individuals . . . and the federal government."
H.R. Rep. 99-120(I), at 4 (1985); see also Scarborough v. Principi,
541 U.S. 401, 407 (2004).21
I disagree with the majority's reasoning on both prongs
of the EAJA analysis. This result contravenes the purposes of the
21
See also 131 Cong. Rec. S9991-02, 1985 WL 715613 (daily
ed. July 24, 1985) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (noting that the
purpose of the Act was to prevent "meritless" government action);
id. (statement of Sen. DeConcini) ("Before the [EAJA], small
businesses, faced with unjustified Federal agency actions, were
confronted with a difficult choice -- to comply without question to
Government regulatory enforcement which they believed improper, or
challenge the Government, often at a cost exceeding the fine or
penalty imposed.").
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Act. It imposes on United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services ("USCIS") the costs of plaintiff's attorneys' fees when
the agency at all times acted in accordance with the law. It also
imposes such costs on the agency for attempting to resolve the
matter by agreement and withdrawing the issue from the court and
back to the agency so that the agency could give the relief the
plaintiff sought. It also has the practical effect of draining
resources from an agency which is already struggling to do its job.
I.
In my view, plaintiff is not a prevailing party. A party
is prevailing for EAJA purposes if there is a material alteration
in the party's position that bears a "judicial imprimatur."
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604-05 (2001). In Buckhannon, the Supreme
Court noted two specific ways in which a party can prevail: by
obtaining a judgment on the merits or a consent decree in its
favor. Id. at 605. Other circuits have read Buckhannon as
allowing parties to prevail if they receive the equivalent of a
consent decree or some other form of judicial relief that both
affects a material alteration and bears a judicial imprimatur. See
Smith v. Fitchburg Pub. Sch., 401 F.3d 16, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2005).
This circuit has not taken a position on the issue. Id. at 23.
The majority focuses on the first situation, asking
"whether the district court's order was the functional equivalent
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of a consent decree." The majority distinguishes this circuit's
decision in Smith on the ground that Smith was not concerned with
whether the orders in question were the equivalent of a consent
decree. However, as in Smith, here the question of whether the
order was the equivalent of a consent decree was not raised by
either party, nor was that the theory on which the district court
relied. Thus the issue was waived. Id. at 24 (the issue is waived
if not presented by the parties). Instead, the parties and
district court focused on the second situation: whether the
district court's order put the necessary judicial imprimatur on the
change in Aronov's legal status. The majority should not create
arguments the parties and the district court did not use, nor do so
to justify its result.
But even if the issue had not been waived, the district
court's brief order remanding the case is not the equivalent of a
consent decree. The order contains no statement incorporating an
agreement between the parties or requiring that either party act in
a particular way. All the order does is to remand the case at the
request of the agency. The order here thus differs from the ones
cited by the majority which other circuits have found to be the
functional equivalent of consent decrees. See, e.g., Carbonell v.
INS, 429 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2005) (district court incorporated
parties' stipulation into an order); Truesdell v. Phila. Hous.
Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2002) (district court order
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included detailed terms of parties' settlement); Am. Disability
Ass'n v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2002) (parties'
settlement was "approved, adopted, and ratified" by the district
court in an order where the court expressly retained jurisdiction).
As the Supreme Court has made clear, the distinction is
material: "The situation would be quite different if the parties'
obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement had
been made part of the order . . . ." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994). It is quite clear that
a "judge's mere awareness and approval of the terms of the
settlement agreement do not suffice to make them part of his
order." Id.
I would hold that the district court's order lacks the
necessary judicial imprimatur to entitle Aronov to prevailing party
status. Our circuit precedent in Smith requires that result. The
majority's treatment of the order as the functional equivalent of
a consent decree is inconsistent with our holding in Smith.22 That
case involved an administrative hearing officer's pre-hearing
orders, some of which were accompanied by the threat of sanctions,
which "memorialized the voluntary concessions made by [defendant]
and attempted to keep the settlement process moving forward in a
22
The majority also suggests that Smith is somehow
different because the orders in question came from an
administrative hearing officer rather than a district court, but
Smith lends no support to that proposition.
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timely manner." Smith, 401 F.3d at 26. We held that these orders,
although they imposed specific requirements on defendant, did not
have sufficient judicial imprimatur to make plaintiff a prevailing
party because they simply made defendant "follow through with what
[defendant] had already voluntarily promised to do." Id. at 27.
That is exactly the case here. The district court's remand
permitted USCIS to follow through with its announced intention to
make Aronov a citizen by November 8, 2006. USCIS had voluntarily
agreed to do so before it requested the remand. As in Smith, the
remand may have kept the process moving in a timely manner, but
that is not enough to make Aronov a prevailing party. His claim
under the EAJA should have stopped there.
II.
I also disagree with the majority that the government's
pre-litigation position was not substantially justified.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the "substantially
justified" language in the EAJA: "[A]s between the two commonly
used connotations of the word 'substantially,' the one most
naturally conveyed by the phrase before us here is not 'justified
to a high degree,' but rather 'justified in substance or in the
main' -- that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a
reasonable person." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988);
see also, e.g., Schock v. United States, 254 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
2001); Dantran, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 246 F.3d 36, 40-41
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(1st Cir. 2001). The government's position is substantially
justified if required by law. See Dantran, 246 F.3d at 41; United
States v. One Parcel of Real Prop. With Bldgs., 960 F.2d 200, 208-
09 (1st Cir. 1992). That was true here.
The government's position may be substantially justified
even if its reasonable interpretation of its legal obligations is
not ultimately affirmed by a court. Schock, 254 F.3d at 5. This
court earlier reversed a district court for abuse of discretion in
granting attorneys' fees when the government "was at least
reasonable" in denying a visa because it wanted to "communicate the
attitude of the United States government toward the activities of
the Soviet Union," even though the visa applicant's interpretation
of the underlying law ultimately prevailed. Allende v. Baker, 891
F.2d 7, 12, 13 (1st Cir. 1989); see also, e.g., Li v. Keisler, 505
F.3d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 2007) ("In the absence of guidance from
this court, the government's position was substantially
justified."); Bricks, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 426 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir.
2005) (although EPA was unsuccessful in its attempt to show a
hydrological connection, it was still substantially justified in
doing so).
Here, the government argues that USCIS's pre-litigation
position was substantially justified because that position was
taken pursuant to federal law. In particular, the government
points to two congressional enactments with which it has complied
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here. The first is 8 U.S.C. § 1446(a), which provides that
"[b]efore a person may be naturalized, an employee of the [USCIS],
or of the United States designated by the Attorney General, shall
conduct a personal investigation of the person applying for
naturalization." The second is language included by Congress in
the 1998 Appropriations Act which has continuing effect: "[D]uring
fiscal year 1998 and each fiscal year thereafter, none of the funds
appropriated or otherwise made available to [USCIS] shall be used
to complete adjudication of an application for naturalization
unless [USCIS] has received confirmation from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that a full criminal background check has been
completed . . . ." Dep'ts of Commerce, Justice & State, The
Judiciary & Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. 105-
119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2448-49 (1997) (8 U.S.C. § 1446 note)
(emphasis added).
The majority faults USCIS for interpreting the phrase
"full criminal background check" to include a FBI name check. In
the end, the award here turns on the majority's view that USCIS did
not need to include the FBI name check as part of a "full" check,
and that the agency's compliance with its name check policy renders
its pre-litigation position here (to await the results of a
requested name check) not substantially justified. But the
agency's policy and its pre-litigation decision to comply with its
policy were entirely reasonable.
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The question before us is not whether the language in 8
U.S.C. § 1446 and the 1998 Appropriations Act specifically requires
that FBI name checks be part of the background check on citizenship
applicants, but whether the agency's interpretation of these
statutes as requiring FBI name checks to fulfill its statutory
responsibilities renders its position not substantially justified.
The position is substantially justified because it was a reasonable
interpretation of a legislative command23 and that interpretation
was committed to the agency's expertise.
Principles of administrative law require that courts
defer to reasonable interpretations by agencies of matters
committed to the agency's expertise by Congress. Chevron U.S.A. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); Global
NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 505 F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir.
2007). Agencies are also entitled to deference with respect to
policy determinations. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); Global NAPs, 505 F.3d at 47;
Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 109 (1st
Cir. 1997) ("[P]olicy choices are for the agency, not the court, to
23
The majority says that the government has presented no
argument that Congress intended that USCIS use the FBI name check.
That reasoning puts the cart before the horse. The broad language
used by Congress lets the agency determine how best to perform a
full criminal background check and does not limit the agency to a
particular type of check. There is no evidence, textual or
otherwise, that Congress intended to require the agency not to use
FBI name checks.
-48-
make. Even if a reviewing court disagrees with the agency's
conclusions, it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the
agency."). We also note that we are describing a consistent USCIS
interpretation and practice, not one adopted for purposes of the
issues in this attorneys' fees litigation.
USCIS, not the majority, has the expertise to determine
what should constitute a full criminal background check. The
concern that applicants be adequately vetted before they become
citizens has taken on added urgency in an age where terrorism is a
reality and a continuing threat. That the agency came to decide in
2002 that the inclusion of FBI name checks provided better full
criminal background investigations only undercuts the majority's
position.
The majority holds that although a court might ordinarily
defer to USCIS's policy of using FBI name checks to fulfill its
statutory mandate to complete background investigations on
citizenship applicants, here we cannot do so because the agency
contravened 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). The statute permits a citizenship
applicant to file suit in federal district court if USCIS fails to
adjudicate his application within 120 days of conducting an initial
examination. The majority places great weight on this provision,
treating it as a "statutory mandate" that the agency must
adjudicate an application within 120 days of an initial
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examination. That is plainly not what the statute says. It says
only that suit may be brought within 120 days of the examination.
The provision's legislative history discusses the
importance of eliminating delays but says nothing about imposing a
deadline on the agency, only that after 120 days relief can be
sought in federal court. See 135 Cong. Rec. H4539-02, 4542-43,
1989 WL 182156 (daily ed. July 31, 1989). Thus the authorization
to file suit in district court is meant to encourage the agency to
act fast, but that does not mean that Congress meant to impose a
strict deadline on the agency. Indeed, if Congress wanted to
impose a strict deadline, it could have done so directly. It is
true that the agency's regulations suggest that it treat the 120-
day provision as an internal deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 335.3(a), but
that does not create a "statutory mandate." The statute simply
governs the timing of suits.24
Corresponding with its view that 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b)
creates a mandate, the majority suggests that the government would
24
Additionally, the cases the majority cites for the
proposition that the statute creates a deadline involved different
questions. United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir.
2004), was concerned with the question of whether exclusive
jurisdiction rests in the district court after 120 days, and it
provided no analysis or support for its observation that § 1447(b)
"requires the INS to make a decision . . . within 120 days." Id.
at 1161. Walji v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2007), involved
the question of when the 120-day period begins to run and used the
language "the statute is violated in situations such as
[petitioner's]" in the context of supporting its conclusion that
the 120-day period applies from the time the examination, and not
the entire background check, is completed. Id. at 439.
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have to make a very strong showing in order to justify missing the
120-day mark. It also faults the government for not advancing a
"particularized justification" regarding Aronov and why a name
check was necessary for him. In my view both rationales are wrong
on their own terms and both miss the point.
Even reading the statute as imposing a deadline on the
agency, the majority is nonetheless wrong because there is nothing
to say that 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) was meant to trump the agency's
obligations to see that an applicant meets the requirements for
citizenship or to trump the agency's mandate to conduct a full
criminal background check.
Here the agency made a mistake by conducting Aronov's
initial examination before it had completed his background
investigation, including obtaining the results from the FBI of his
name check.25 Bureaucracies make mistakes. Given this mistake, the
relevant question is whether it was unreasonable for the agency to
proceed with the name check even though doing so meant that Aronov
could pursue relief in federal court because of the 120-day
provision.
I would hold that it was not unreasonable for USCIS to
miss the 120-day mark in order to complete a name check before
granting Aronov citizenship. No "particularized justification" is
25
There is no question that doing so was an error. See 8
C.F.R. § 335.2(b).
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necessary because the entire point of conducting name checks is
that the government does not know what the check will uncover. As
USCIS has stated,
Although these security checks may require a
more lengthy processing time, USCIS believes
that performing them is essential to
identifying national security and public
safety concerns that would not have been
uncovered by other means. This is
particularly true given that in[] a few cases,
the information obtained from the FBI through
this process has reflected very significant
issues and risks. FBI name checks disclose
information to USCIS that is otherwise not
available. . . . USCIS is committed to
effective background checks, and thus is
committed to the FBI name check.
USCIS, Response to the Citizenship and Immigration Services
Ombudsman's 2006 Report, at 10, available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/USCIS-Response-Ombudsman-06-Report-May-2007.pdf.
Moreover, as the majority points out, although USCIS
recently eliminated the name check requirement for visa applicants
in order to lessen its backlog, it has not done so for citizenship
applicants for the very sensible reason that once a person is
granted citizenship, that decision is not easily reversed. There
is nothing unreasonable about USCIS's decision to postpone a
decision on Aronov's application for citizenship until obtaining
information about whether the name check revealed risks to national
security or public safety, even if doing so meant that a decision
could not be reached within 120 days of his examination.
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Indeed, the case law also provides no basis for the award
here. USCIS's pre-litigation position in this case bears no
resemblance to pre-litigation positions that courts have found not
to be substantially justified. In Healey v. Leavitt, 485 F.3d 63
(2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit held that the government's pre-
litigation position was not substantially justified when the
government "failed to offer any justification for the Secretary's
failure to require [home health agencies] to provide written notice
of the termination of benefits." Id. at 67. Here the agency
points to statutes forbidding it to grant citizenship before
certain actions are taken. In Sierra Club v. Secretary of Army,
820 F.2d 513 (1st Cir. 1987), this court held that an agency's
refusal to prepare an environmental impact statement for a project
was unreasonable when there was significant evidence that the
project required one and several other federal agencies had
advocated for one and warned that one might be legally required.
Id. at 519-20 (citing Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 874-75
(1st Cir. 1985)). Here, the agency did not act contrary to law,
but according to its reasonable interpretation of the law.
III.
The majority opinion will, in my view, have a number of
unfortunate consequences. The majority holds that the government,
by acting reasonably and requesting a remand so that it could grant
Aronov citizenship, exposed itself to liability under the EAJA
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because Aronov necessarily became a prevailing party once the court
granted the remand. This will discourage USCIS from acting to
resolve these cases in a similarly efficient and amicable way in
the future. The majority also says that it would be very difficult
for the government to show that it was substantially justified in
missing the 120-day mark to act on a citizenship application. The
majority would thus discourage USCIS from conducting investigations
of applicants that could turn up important information but would
require longer than 120 days after the applicant's examination for
the agency to make a final determination. Ultimately the decision
could be contrary to the interests of applicants because in the
face of incomplete information, the agency might choose the safer
course of denying citizenship.
I respectfully dissent.
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Aronov v. Chertoff
Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date filed: 2008-08-01
Citations: 536 F.3d 30
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