United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
04-1048, -1064
ASYST TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
EMTRAK, INC., JENOPTIK AG,
JENOPTIK INFAB, INC., and MEISSNER + WURST GmbH,
Defendants-Cross Appellants.
Darryl M. Woo, Fenwick & West LLP, of Mountain View, California, argued for
plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief were Daniel Johnson, Jr., Sean P. DeBruine,
and Jonathan H. Takei.
Richard L. Stanley, Howrey Simon Arnold & White, LLP, of Houston, Texas,
argued for defendants-cross appellants. With him on the brief were Daniel T. Shvodian
and James F. Valentine, of Menlo Park, California.
Appealed from: United States District Court for the Northern District of California
Judge Jeremy Fogel
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
04-1048,-1064
ASYST TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
EMTRAK, INC., JENOPTIK AG,
JENOPTIK INFAB, INC., and MEISSNER + WURST GmbH,
Defendants-Cross Appellants.
___________________________
DECIDED: March 22, 2005
___________________________
Before MICHEL,* Chief Judge, NEWMAN, and BRYSON, Circuit Judges.
BRYSON, Circuit Judge.
Asyst Technologies, Inc., filed this action against Jenoptik AG and other parties
(collectively, “Jenoptik”) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California. Asyst charged Jenoptik with infringing Asyst’s U.S. Patent Nos. 4,974,166
(“the ’166 patent”) and 5,097,421 (“the ’421 patent”). Asyst asserted independent
claims 1 and 2 of the ’421 patent, as well as dependent claims 11-14.
After construing pertinent terms in the asserted claims, the district court granted
summary judgment of noninfringement as to both patents. Asyst appealed, and we
concluded that the district court had erred in certain respects. Accordingly, we reversed
*
Paul R. Michel assumed the position of Chief Judge on December 25, 2004.
the summary judgment of noninfringement and remanded for further proceedings.
Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Empak, Inc., 268 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001). On remand, the
district court again granted summary judgment of noninfringement as to the asserted
claims of the ’421 patent, and it dismissed the claims of infringement of the ’166 patent
pursuant to the parties’ agreement. Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Empak, Inc., No. C-98-20451
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2003). We conclude that the court correctly entered summary
judgment with respect to one of the two independent claims at issue, but not with
respect to the other. Accordingly, while we affirm the district court’s summary judgment
as to the first claim at issue, we vacate the summary judgment of noninfringement and
remand for further proceedings on the second. Because the court’s summary judgment
decision was based on limitations in independent claims 1 and 2, our judgment affects
the dependent claims as well. In light of our disposition of the claims on appeal, we
deny Asyst’s request that we direct the district court to enter summary judgment in its
favor.
I
Integrated circuits are used in a wide variety of electronic devices, and the
production of such circuits is an important industry. The production process begins with
the fabrication of large silicon wafers. Various tools are then used to process the wafers
in multiple stages by generating one processed layer at a time. After all of the layers
are processed, the manufacturer cuts each silicon wafer into many individual integrated
circuits. The layers of the wafer must be processed in a particular sequence by
particular tools. Any deviation will ruin the wafer as well as the many integrated circuits
made from the wafer.
04-1048,-1064 2
Fabricators typically process wafers in large lots, keeping all the wafers ultra-
clean throughout the manufacturing process. To maintain an ultra-clean processing
environment, fabricators place the wafer lots in sealed transportable containers known
as “pods.” Human operators typically transport the pods from tool to tool as each wafer
layer is processed.
The sequence of tools used to process the wafers is dictated by the integrated
circuit design. The sequence differs with each design. For that reason, the pods do not
invariably travel in the same path from tool to tool. Rather, an operator must carry a
pod of wafers back and forth among the various tools in different orders. It is critical
that the operator have the correct routing information to ensure that the wafers are not
irreparably damaged by processing them at the wrong tool or at the wrong point in the
process.
Asyst’s ’421 patent describes an information processing system and an inventory
management system that can be used in the production of integrated circuits to
increase efficiency and reduce the risk of human error. A central feature of the system
is an automated process of pod-tool recognition that ensures that each pod is
processed by the right tool at the right time and that enables the system operators to
monitor the status of the wafers during the fabrication process.
The claims of the ’421 patent recite a system in which microcomputers mounted
on each pod communicate with microcomputers mounted on each wafer processing
tool. The two sets of microcomputers communicate by means of communication
devices mounted on the pods and tools. Each tool processes the wafers in a particular
04-1048,-1064 3
pod only after the microcomputer on the tool verifies that the particular pod is at the
correct tool at the correct time in the fabrication sequence.
The two independent claims at issue in this appeal, claims 1 and 2 of the ’421
patent, read as follows:
1. A processing system comprising:
(1) at least one transportable container for transporting articles to
be processed;
(2) first two-way communication means mounted on said at least
one transportable container;
(3) first microcomputer means mounted on said at least one
transportable container for receiving and processing digital
information communicated with said first two-way communication
means;
(4) storage means mounted on said at least one transportable
container for storing digital information processed by said
microcomputer means; and
(5) a plurality of work stations each respectively adapted to having
said at least one transportable container removably mounted
thereon and each respectively including mounted thereon,
(a) respective second two-way communication means
adapted for two-way communication with said at least one
transportable container when said container is mounted on
the respective work station therewith, and
(b) respective second microcomputer means for receiving
and processing digital information communicated with said
respective second two-way communication means mounted
on the respective work station therewith.
2. An inventory management system comprising:
(1) At least one transportable container for transporting articles,
said at least one container including mounted thereon,
(a) first two-way communications means,
04-1048,-1064 4
(b) first microcomputer means for receiving and processing
digital information communicated with said first two-way
communication means, and
(c) storage means for storing digital information processed
by said microcomputer means;
(2) a plurality of respective sensing means for sensing the presence
of said at least one transportable container, each respective
sensing means including respective second two-way
communication means adapted for two-way communication with
said first two-way communication means;
(3) selection means for selecting between respective sensor means
of said plurality;
(4) central processor means coupled to said selection means for
receiving digital information from and for providing digital
information to respective two-way communication means of
respective sensor means of said plurality.
Two representative figures from the ’421 patent, depicting aspects of the
inventions of claims 1 and 2, respectively, are reproduced below:
II
A
On the first appeal in this case, we held that the structure corresponding to the
“second microcomputer means” element of claim 1 was “the local control processor 20.”
Asyst, 268 F.3d at 1370. On remand, the district court ruled on summary judgment that
04-1048,-1064 5
Jenoptik’s accused system, known as the IridNet system, does not contain any structure
that is the same as or equivalent to the local processor 20 recited in claim 1 of the ’421
patent, and that the system therefore did not satisfy the “second microprocessor means”
limitation of that claim. The district court based its conclusion on two grounds.
First, the court held that the IridNet system does not have a “local
microprocessor means” that is mounted on the workstation and performs the functions
of the second microprocessor means identified in claim 1. Instead, the court ruled that
those functions are performed in the IridNet system by a central processing computer,
known as the Ridian Server, which acts as a translation hub for the devices in the
system. The court explained that, rather than using a local control processor, the
IridNet system “uses a central computer, which then communicates with the workstation
via a cell controller.” The court concluded that Asyst’s system “of independent
workstations with locally mounted microcomputers” is “not the same or substantially
equivalent structure as the accused system.”
Second, the district court ruled that the second microprocessor means in the
IridNet system is not “mounted on the respective workstation,” as required by claim 1.
Even assuming that the cell controller constitutes the second microprocessor means,
the court ruled that the cell controllers of the IridNet system are not “mounted on” the
workstations. With respect to that issue, the court noted that the evidence showed that
the cell controllers in the IridNet system are merely electrically connected to the
workstations and that multiple workstations may be controlled by the same cell
controller. The existence of an electrical connection between a cell controller and the
04-1048,-1064 6
workstation, the court held, does not render the cell controller “mounted on” the
workstation. Accordingly, the court entered summary judgment for Jenoptik on claim 1.
B
On appeal, Asyst argues that the district court erred in finding that the IridNet
system lacks the “second microcomputer means” of claim 1 of the ’421 patent, i.e., the
microcomputer means that performs the functions of “receiving and processing digital
information communicated with [the] second two-way communication means.” Asyst
contends that the district court incorrectly ruled that in the IridNet system the Ridian
Server performs those functions. According to Asyst, those functions are performed by
cell controllers that are associated with the workstations in the IridNet system. Asyst’s
expert stated, for example, that “when a pod is mounted and engaged on a tool’s load
port, the cell controller for that tool receives and processes digital information
communicated with the tool-mounted IRT.” In response to that information, according to
Asyst’s expert, “the cell controller determines whether the lot is at the proper processing
tool. Thus, the cell controller processes that information to determine whether the
workstation’s load port should extract the wafer cassette from the . . . pod for processing
of the wafers.” In addition to expert testimony, Asyst offered portions of Jenoptik’s
documentation for the IridNet system, which showed that the cell controller verifies lot
identifications, directs the process of loading the contents of the pod into the tool,
directs the tool process, and directs the unloading process.
According to Asyst’s evidence, the cell controller in the IridNet system provides
or implements commands to the processing tool through the use of software run on a
microcomputer. The evidence before the court on summary judgment showed that the
04-1048,-1064 7
IridNet cell controller containing the microcomputer that performs that function need not
be affixed to a processing tool, but can simply be placed near a tool or a cluster of tools.
IridNet’s cell controller is connected by a serial cable to the processing tool that it
controls, and it is possible for a single cell controller to serve multiple processing tools.
The district court ruled in its summary judgment order that the IridNet system
lacks the “second microcomputer means” of claim 1 because in the IridNet system it is
the Ridian Server, not the cell controller, that performs the functions of the second
microcomputer means. The court thus appears to have concluded that the local cell
controllers in the IridNet system merely serve to convey information between the Ridian
Server and the local workstations. However, because Asyst introduced evidence that
the cell controllers in the IridNet system perform the functions identified with the second
microcomputer means, it was incorrect for the court to conclude, for summary judgment
purposes, that the Ridian Server, not the cell controllers, performs the functions of the
second microcomputer means.
Although we disagree with the court’s conclusion that, as a matter of law, the
Ridian Server constituted the second microcomputer means in the IridNet system, that
was not the only ground on which the district court based its summary judgment on
claim 1. The court also held that claim 1 could not be infringed because, “[e]ven if there
was a corresponding local second microcomputer means, it is not mounted.” In
particular, the court construed the ’421 patent to require that the structures
corresponding to the second microcomputer means be “mounted on the workstation,
with the result that each workstation is independent.” In the accused system, the court
04-1048,-1064 8
concluded that the alleged second microcomputer means is not mounted on each
workstation, and each workstation does not contain a unique mounted microcomputer.
In support of the district court’s claim construction, Jenoptik argues that the
phrase “mounted thereon” should be given its ordinary meaning of “fastened into
position” or “fixed securely to a support.” Jenoptik contends that the cell controllers in
the IridNet system, which are electrically connected to one or more workstations by a
serial cable but are not otherwise attached to the workstations, cannot be regarded as
“mounted on the respective work station” within the ordinary meaning of that phrase. In
contrast, Asyst argues that the phrase “mounted on the respective workstation” includes
direct electrical connection with the workstation, such as by a serial cable. Asyst further
contends that the fact that a single cell controller in the IridNet system may be
connected to and serve more than a single workstation does not avoid infringement,
because claim 1 does not require that there be a one-to-one relationship between each
second microcomputer means and each workstation.
We agree with Jenoptik that the ordinary meaning of “mounted on,” i.e., securely
attached, affixed, or fastened to, applies here and that Asyst’s much broader definition
must be rejected. Asyst failed to point to any intrinsic evidence to show that in the
pertinent art or in the context of the ’421 patent the phrase “mounted on” means
connected via a serial cable.
Asyst’s expert, Phillip Faillace, submitted a declaration in which he stated that, in
his opinion, a cable connection between the cell controller and the workstation satisfies
the “mounted thereon” limitation. That single conclusory statement by Mr. Faillace,
however, is insufficient to demonstrate that the term “mounted on” had that meaning to
04-1048,-1064 9
a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the patent application, particularly in
light of the fact that Mr. Faillace’s definition departs significantly from the ordinary
meaning of the phrase.
As Jenoptik points out, both the specification and the prosecution history support
the district court’s determination that the phrase “mounted on” should be accorded its
ordinary meaning. The specification uses the phrase “mounted on” to refer to a number
of other components, and the context makes clear that the phrase is used in those
instances to mean securely affixed to objects such as the transportable container, a
workstation, or some component of those structures. See, e.g., ’421 patent, col. 2, ll.
19-41 (describing storage means “mounted on” the transportable container;
communicating means “mounted” on the processing station “[a]djacent the engaging
means”; data processing means “mounted on” the transportable container; and means
for receiving data “on the transportable container”). The phrase “mounted on” is
repeatedly used interchangeably with the term “on,” which in context clearly denotes a
form of attachment, not simply an electrical connection. See id., col. 3, line 41 to col. 4,
line 20. Moreover, on occasion the patent distinguishes between features that are
“mounted on” an object and those that are “connected to” or “in electrical
communication with” an object, which strongly supports the court’s conclusion that the
phrases “mounted on” and “in electrical communication with” do not mean the same
thing in the ’421 patent. See id., col. 3, ll. 48-53 (“means 50 for communication with an
electronic card 40” is “mounted on the processing station” but is “connected to a data
processor 20 on the processing station”); id., col. 8, ll. 14-16 (local processor 20 “is
04-1048,-1064 10
mounted on the work station 100” but is “in electronic communication with the
[communication] means 50”).
The prosecution history also suggests that the inventors intended the phrase
“mounted on” to have its ordinary meaning and not the broader meaning proposed by
Asyst. In claim 10 of the parent to the application that matured into the ’421 patent, the
inventors referred to a “data processing means mounted on the transportable
container,” but did not specify any location for the associated “communication means.”
When the examiner rejected that claim based on a prior art patent to Hainsworth (U.S.
Patent No. 4,492,504), the inventors added a limitation that required the communication
means to be “disposed adjacent the at least one processing station.” The examiner
continued to reject the claim on the ground that “adjacent” simply meant “not distant”
and thus did not sufficiently distinguish the prior art reference. At that point, the
inventors filed the continuation-in-part application that matured into the ’421 patent.
Claim 21 of that application, which corresponded to claim 10 of the parent application,
claimed both a second two-way communication means “mounted on” a workstation and
a microcomputer means “mounted on” a transportable container. The inventors
commented at that time that the new claim language distinguished the Hainsworth
patent because Hainsworth did not teach or suggest “the ‘second two-way
communication means’ mounted on a work station.” Although those changes related
principally to the communication means rather than to the second microcomputer
means, they provide evidence that the inventors meant for the term “mounted on” to be
narrowly limited to a structure that is “affixed to” an object and not to include structure
that is “adjacent to” that object.
04-1048,-1064 11
There are two further problems with Asyst’s proposed definition of “mounted on.”
First, as the district court pointed out, in the IridNet system a single cell controller may
be connected to multiple workstations, and it is awkward, at the very least, to refer to a
single device as being “mounted on” two separate workstations. Second, Asyst’s
proposed definition is in tension with one of the objectives of the “distributed processing
system,” as expressed in the specification and the prosecution history, i.e., to enable a
system that “does not require centralized control.” ’421 patent, col. 11, ll. 5-6. As the
inventors explained to the examiner, the claimed apparatus “permits the control of the
processing of articles . . . to be maintained locally (at the ‘work station’) without the need
for a central computer.” Since Asyst’s definition of “mounted on” would be consistent
with a system in which a single cell controller controlled all the workstations in the
system (and thus, according to Asyst’s definition, would be deemed “mounted on” all of
them), that system would no longer feature localized control, but would be centralized in
nature, contrary to the inventors’ characterization of their invention in the specification
and the prosecution history. These considerations lead us to conclude that the district
court was correct in holding that the IridNet system does not literally infringe claim 1 of
the ’421 patent.
With respect to whether the IridNet system might infringe under the doctrine of
equivalents, the district court concluded that the “mounted on” limitation is binary in
nature. That is, the second microcomputer means must be either mounted or
unmounted. For purposes of equivalents, the court concluded, “an unmounted
microcomputer means cannot be equivalent to a mounted one.”
04-1048,-1064 12
We agree with the district court’s conclusion with respect to the claim of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. To hold that “unmounted” is equivalent
to “mounted” would effectively read the “mounted on” limitation out of the patent. As the
district court noted, the “all elements rule” provides that the doctrine of equivalents does
not apply if applying the doctrine would vitiate an entire claim limitation. See Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997). This case falls within
both that doctrine and its corollary, the “specific exclusion” principle, since the term
“mounted” can fairly be said to specifically exclude objects that are “unmounted.” See
SciMed Life Sys. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 242 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (noting the close kinship of the “all elements rule” and the “specific exclusion”
principle); Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1106 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“it would defy logic to conclude that a minority—the very antithesis of a
majority—could be insubstantially different from a claim limitation requiring a majority,
and no reasonable juror could find otherwise”); Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg.,
Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“specific exclusion” principle is “a corollary to
the ‘all limitations’ rule”). In this case we hold that the district court was correct in ruling
that the doctrine of equivalents cannot be extended to reach an “unmounted” system
such as the IridNet system without vitiating the “mounted on” limitation altogether. We
therefore uphold the district court’s summary judgment of noninfringement with respect
to claim 1, both literally and under the doctrine of equivalents.
III
With regard to claim 2, the district court entered summary judgment of
noninfringement on the ground that the IridNet system fails to satisfy the limitation
04-1048,-1064 13
requiring “a plurality of respective sensing means for sensing the presence of said at
least one transportable container.” That limitation further requires that each respective
sensing means include “respective second two-way communication means adapted for
two-way communication with said first two-way communication means.”
A
In our previous decision in this case, we determined that claim 2 was not
indefinite for failing to recite structure corresponding to the sensing means limitation.
We reached that conclusion based on the reference in the patent to the “ready, set”
protocol that is performed when a transportable container is transported to a
workstation. The portion of the patent that describes the inventory management system
refers to the “two-way communication” between the card on the transportable pod and
the communication means 50-1, which is part of the workstation. Although we regarded
the question as close, we held that claim 2 is not indefinite because the reference to the
communication between the card 40 and communication means 50-1, together with the
reference to the “ready, set” protocol that can be run when the pod is attached to the
workstation, provide sufficient support for the claim language to avoid invalidation of the
patent on grounds of indefiniteness. Asyst, 268 F.3d at 1375-76.
On remand, the district court ruled that our reference to the two-way
communication effected by communication means 50-1, and in particular the “ready,
set” protocol, contemplated the participation not only of the communication means 50-1,
but also of a local control processor 20. The court explained that it treated local control
processor 20 as part of the structure constituting the sensing means in the ’421 patent,
because “the communication means cannot perform the protocol independent of the
04-1048,-1064 14
microcomputer means, and because the specification describes the protocol only in
terms of performance by computers, and not in terms of performance by a
communication means.” Because the court had already concluded that the IridNet
system does not have a local microcomputer equivalent to local control processor 20
described in the specification, the court held that the IridNet system could not infringe
the “sensing means” limitation on the ground that it lacks “the same or equivalent
sensing means structure.” Accordingly, the court granted Jenoptik’s motion for
summary judgment of noninfringement of claim 2.
B
In their appeal briefs, the parties debate the meaning of our opinion in the prior
appeal regarding the structure that performs the sensing function of the “sensing
means” limitation. In support of the district court’s analysis, Jenoptik argues that our
prior opinion required that communication means 50-1 be capable of performing the
“ready, set” protocol in order to qualify as the corresponding structure to the sensing
means of claim 2. Asyst, on the other hand, argues that our reference to the “ready,
set” protocol performed by communication means 50-1 was not meant to suggest that
the protocol was a necessary feature of that structure, but was merely a description of
the manner in which communication means 50-1 performs the function of sensing the
presence of a transportable container.
Apparently, our prior opinion was not as clear on this point as it should have
been. To clarify any possible confusion on the point, we did not intend to suggest that a
particular structure had to perform the “ready, set” protocol in order to fall within the
scope of the “sensing means” limitation of claim 2. Instead, we merely noted that
04-1048,-1064 15
communication means 50-1, which was shown to effectuate that protocol, is structure
that corresponds to the “sensing means” and performs the sensing function. Thus, any
structure that is the same as, or equivalent to, communication means 50-1 and performs
the function of “sensing the presence of at least one transportable container” infringes
the “sensing means” limitation of claim 2, regardless of whether it performs that function
by way of something like the “ready, set” protocol or otherwise.
Moreover, we do not agree with the district court that the structure corresponding
to the “sensing means” of claim 2 necessarily includes local processor 20. It is true that
communication means 50-1 is not sufficient, standing alone, to direct the process of
detecting the presence of a transportable container or to convert the signal sent by
communication means 50-1 into a form that is useable by a system operator. Those
functions would appear to be performed in the claimed system by software running on
local processor 20. Nonetheless, because communication means 50-1 exchanges
signals with the transportable container and generates a signal in response to the
presence of a pod, it performs the sensing function, even if later processing of the signal
is necessary to make the signal meaningful to a system user.
Jenoptik makes two further, and related, arguments regarding the “sensing
means” limitation. First, Jenoptik argues that because the “ready, set” protocol in the
claimed invention is not triggered until the system detects the presence of the
transportable container at the workstation, the “ready, set” protocol “does not perform
the function of sensing the presence of the container in the first place.” Second,
Jenoptik argues that in its system the presence of the container at the workstation is
detected when the tray depresses a mechanical switch. Because a mechanical switch
04-1048,-1064 16
is not the same as or equivalent to the communication means 50-1 disclosed in the
specification, Jenoptik contends that it does not infringe the sensing means limitation.
These arguments were answered in substance in our prior opinion in this case.
We noted that the recited function is “sensing,” not “initiating a sensing protocol.” We
therefore held that it was not necessary to set forth structure that initiates the sensing
protocol in order to satisfy the requirement of reciting structure corresponding to the
claimed function. Asyst, 268 F.3d at 1376. The same analysis answers Jenoptik’s
arguments regarding the triggering device for the “ready, set” protocol and the
mechanical switch in the IridNet system. Because the “ready, set” protocol is capable of
performing the function of sensing the presence of the container, the structure that first
detects the presence of the container is not an essential feature of the “sensing means”
limitation. Moreover, the fact that the IridNet system employs a mechanical switch to
detect the presence of the transportable container does not avoid infringement if the
IridNet system also contains a sensing means that is the same as or equivalent to the
sensing means claimed in the ’421 patent, i.e., communication means 50-1. See N.
Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 945 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The addition of
features does not avoid infringement, if all the elements of the patent claims have been
adopted.”); Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 731 F.2d 840, 848 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (same).
On remand, Asyst introduced evidence designed to show that the IridNet system
has structure equivalent to the “sensing means” of claim 2 that is capable of “sensing
the presence of at least one transportable container.” In particular, Asyst sought to
show that the means for sensing the presence of a container at the workstation in the
04-1048,-1064 17
IridNet system included the IRTs on the workstations, which satisfied the claim
requirement of “second two-way communication means adapted for two-way
communication with said first two-way communication means.”
Because the district court entered summary judgment on claim 2 based on other
grounds, the court did not determine whether the evidence offered by Asyst as to the
“sensing means” limitation established at least a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the IridNet system has structure equivalent to communication means 50-1 that
performs the function of sensing the presence of a transportable container. Inasmuch
as the district court has not addressed that question, we think that rather than address
that issue ourselves, it is preferable to leave that question to the district court, which is
conversant with the evidence proffered by the parties at the summary judgment stage.
For present purposes, it is enough to hold that we disagree with the grounds employed
by the district court in reaching summary judgment of noninfringement, and that we
reject Jenoptik’s alternative grounds for supporting the summary judgment (including a
request that we revisit our prior decision in this case). Accordingly, while we affirm the
decision of the district court with respect to claim 1 of the ’421 patent, we vacate the
court’s order of summary judgment with respect to claim 2. On remand, the court
should reconsider the issue of infringement with respect to claim 2 and with respect to
claims 11-14 to the extent that they are dependent from claim 2.
Each party shall bear its own costs for this appeal.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and REMANDED.
04-1048,-1064 18
Asyst Technologies, Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc.
Court: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Date filed: 2005-03-22
Citations: 402 F.3d 1188
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion