Athridge, Thomas v. Rivas, Francisco

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed December 17, 2002

No. 01-7185
& No. 01-7186

Thomas P. Athridge, Jr.,
Appellant

v.

Francisco Rivas, et al.,
Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 89cv01222 & No. 92cv01868)

Erik S. Jaffe was on the brief for appellants. William J.
Rodgers entered an appearance.

David F. Grimaldi was on the brief for appellees.

Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, and Edwards and Garland,
Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Edwards.

 Edwards, Circuit Judge: Thomas Athridge, who was struck
by a driver operating a car owned by the appellees, seeks to
impose vicarious liability on the appellees on the theory that
they expressly or impliedly consented to the driver's use of
their car. Under the District of Columbia Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act ("MVSRA"), D.C. Code
s 50-1301.08, proof of ownership of a car is prima facie
evidence that a driver operated the car with the owner's
permission, and the defendant bears the burden of proving
non-consent. The District Court granted summary judgment
for the appellees, holding that the appellees had overcome the
statutory presumption of consent. We reverse.

The appellees' evidence of non-consent was contradicted by
the appellants' evidence of implied consent. Therefore, be-
cause there is a genuine issue of material fact, the District
Court erred in granting summary judgment. The weighing
of evidence and the drawing of legitimate inferences from
disputed facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. On
the record at hand, it cannot be held that, as a matter of law,
the appellees have presented evidence sufficient to overcome
the statutory presumption. The District Court should have
allowed a jury to weigh the evidence. Accordingly, we re-
verse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case
for further proceedings.

I. Background

In July 1987, Francisco and Hilda Rivas went on an
extended vacation, arranging for Jorge Iglesias, the 17-year-
old son of Mrs. Rivas' first cousin, to mow their lawn while
they were away from home. In the Rivases' absence, Iglesi-
as, who did not have a driver's license, entered their house,
found the keys to their car, and went for a drive. The car
was titled to Churreria Madrid Restaurant, a partnership
then owned by the Rivases. Iglesias accidentally struck and
seriously injured his friend Tommy Athridge.

On May 4, 1989, Athridge and his father filed a suit in the
District Court against Iglesias, Francisco Rivas, and the
restaurant, alleging that Iglesias' negligence caused the inju-

ries. Four months later, GEICO, the Rivases' insurance
carrier, sued Francisco Rivas, the restaurant, and Iglesias in
D.C. Superior Court, seeking a declaratory judgment that
Iglesias' use of the car was without the owners' permission,
and that therefore GEICO was not liable for any judgment
that may be rendered against Rivas, the restaurant, or Iglesi-
as. On March 7, 1990, GEICO, for reasons not contained in
the record, moved to dismiss its own case against Rivas and
the restaurant with prejudice, and the motion was granted.
GEICO continued to pursue its claim against the driver
Iglesias. On June 6, 1990, the D.C. Superior Court granted
summary judgment for GEICO on the issue of non-coverage
of Iglesias. See June 6, 1990 Order, reprinted in Joint
Appendix 75. This judgment did not purport to implicate the
Athridges or the Rivases.

On August 12, 1992, the Athridges filed additional com-
plaints in the District Court against Hilda Rivas, Iglesias'
parents, and Aetna, the insurance carrier of Iglesias' parents.
The District Court consolidated these three new actions with
the original lawsuit. The District Court then dismissed the
claims against all defendants except Iglesias. On November
8, 1996, after a bench trial, the District Court found Iglesias
liable for negligence and awarded the Athridges a $5.5 million
judgment. See Athridge v. Iglesias, 950 F. Supp. 1187, 1190-
94 (D.D.C. 1996).

The Athridges appealed the District Court's grant of sum-
mary judgment for the Rivases, Iglesias' parents, and Aetna.
This court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for
Iglesias' parents and Aetna, reversed the grant of summary
judgment for the Rivases, and remanded the case to the
District Court. See Athridge v. Rivas, 141 F.3d 357, 364
(D.C. Cir. 1998).

On remand, the Athridges moved for partial summary
judgment. They argued that the D.C. Superior Court's dis-
missal with prejudice of GEICO's claim against the Rivases
should be deemed a determination that Iglesias had the
Rivases' permission to drive the car, and that this determina-
tion precluded the Rivases from relitigating the issue of

permission. They also argued that the Rivases were preclud-
ed from contesting damages, which had already been deter-
mined in the Athridges' lawsuit against Iglesias. On Novem-
ber 14, 2000, the District Court denied the Athridges' motion
for summary judgment. It held that the Superior Court's
dismissal with prejudice of GEICO's claim against the Rivas-
es could not be deemed to have determined that the Rivases
gave Iglesias permission to use the car. See Athridge v.
Iglesias, Nos. 89-1222 & 92-1868, 2000 WL 1780273, at 2
(D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2000). Therefore, the District Court held
that the Rivases were not precluded from arguing that Iglesi-
as' use of their car was non-permissive. The District Court
declined to reach the issue of whether the Rivases were
precluded from relitigating the question of damages that had
previously been resolved in the suit against Iglesias, since
there was no reason to reach the issue until the Rivases'
liability was first established. See id. at 5.

The Rivases then filed a motion for summary judgment on
the ground that they were not liable as a matter of law under
the MVSRA. The statute provides that, when a vehicle is
operated by a person other than the owner, "proof of owner-
ship of said motor vehicle shall be prima facie evidence that
such person operated said motor vehicle with the consent of
the owner." D.C. Code s 50-1301.08. The Rivases claimed
that Iglesias' use of the car was non-permissive. The Ath-
ridges opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion for partial
summary judgment. On October 15, 2001, the District Court
granted the Rivases' motion, finding that they had met their
burden of proving that they did not consent to Iglesias' use of
their car, by presenting uncontradicted and conclusive evi-
dence of non-consent, including the testimony of both Iglesias
and the Rivases. See Athridge v. Rivas, 167 F. Supp. 2d 389,
394 (D.D.C. 2001). The District Court rejected the Athridg-
es' arguments that there was consent and rejected their
motion for summary judgment. See id. at 395-98. The
Athridges now appeal the District Court's judgment in favor
of the appellees.

 II. Analysis

This court reviews the District Court's grant of summary
judgment de novo. Ass'n of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v.
USAir, Inc., 24 F.3d 1432, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Summary
judgment may not be granted if the record reveals genuine
issues of material fact. Goldman v. Bequai, 19 F.3d 666, 672
(D.C. Cir. 1994). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of
the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from
the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge ... on a
motion for summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

Under the MVSRA, proof of ownership of a car is prima
facie evidence that the driver operated the car with the
owner's permission. This creates a rebuttable presumption
that the owner consented to the use of the car, a powerful
presumption that can only be overcome by "uncontradicted
and conclusive evidence" of non-consent. The defendant has
the heavy burden of establishing non-consent. See Gaither v.
Myers, 404 F.2d 216, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding that the
presumption of consent "will support a jury verdict and
judgment for the plaintiff unless the defendant demonstrates
nonconsent by 'uncontradicted' and 'conclusive' evidence")
(citing Hiscox v. Jackson, 127 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
Rosenberg v. Murray, 116 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1940)).

Under District of Columbia law, an automobile owner is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law if he or she asserts
without contradiction that the vehicle was taken and used
without consent. " 'If the presumption is overcome by uncon-
tradicted proof - and this may be done by the positive
testimony of the owner - the defendant is entitled to a
directed verdict as a matter of law.' " Love v. Gaskins, 153
A.2d 660, 662 (D.C. Mun. App. 1959) (quoting Stumpner v.
Harrison, 136 A.2d 870, 871 (D.C. Mun. App. 1957)). In
other words, if the owner's testimony of non-consent is uncon-
tradicted and the statutory presumption has been overcome,
then there is no issue to be submitted to a jury and judgment
must be granted in favor of the defendant. See Curry v.
Stevenson, 26 F.2d 534, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1928); Miller v.

Imperial Ins. Inc., 189 A.2d 359, 360 (D.C. App. 1963). But if
the plaintiff proffers facts to discredit the defendant's evi-
dence of non-consent, then the issue must be submitted to a
jury. Alsbrooks v. Washington Deliveries, Inc., 281 A.2d 220,
221 (D.C. 1971) ("Any contradiction or inconsistency found in
the owner's proof prevents a directed verdict....").

In the instant case, the owners and the driver both assert-
ed that no consent was given. However, while this evidence
supports the defendants' claim that Iglesias drove the car
without the owners' consent, it is neither "uncontradicted"
nor "conclusive." The appellants convincingly contend that
the record is inconclusive on the question of consent, because
there is evidence indicating that the Rivases may have given
Iglesias their consent to use the automobile. The appellants
are correct on this point.

The appellants point to several facts that support the
conclusion that Iglesias acted with the owners' consent. The
appellants first argue that an inference can be drawn that
Iglesias drove the owners' car in the past, because of his
facility with a stick-shift vehicle. The appellants contend that
this inference is strengthened by the fact that Iglesias
claimed to have driven the car in the past, and also by the
fact that Iglesias was seen on a different occasion driving
another car belonging to the Rivases' son. Second, the
owners and Iglesias are relatives, which might raise doubts
about their veracity on the matter of consent. Third, the
Rivases did not press charges against Iglesias for unautho-
rized use of the vehicle after the accident, and this failure is
arguably inconsistent with a claim that the car was used
without consent. Fourth, the Rivases allowed Iglesias access
to their house while they were away and left the car keys
available therein. Finally, the appellants suggest that the
non-consent testimony is less than categorical, since Francis-
co Rivas could not read English when he signed an affidavit
asserting that no consent was given.

These facts do not constitute conclusive evidence of express
or implied consent. They do, however, raise a "genuine issue
of material fact" regarding consent. The District Court

found otherwise, reasoning that no reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the plaintiffs: "The implausibility that
[the Rivases], without any reason, would have ever consented
to such a remarkable, extraordinary, and dangerous use of
their car while they were out of the country requires that
plaintiffs' evidence of consent amount to more than dubious
inferences to be 'significantly probative.' " Athridge, 167
F. Supp. 2d at 392-93 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v.
Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)). The District
Court's judgment is based on the erroneous conclusion that
there are no genuine issues of material fact on the question of
consent. As indicated above, the record is inconclusive on the
question of consent, because there is evidence indicating that
the owners may have given Iglesias consent to use their
automobile. This evidence also calls into question the credi-
bility of the driver's and the owners' testimony on non-
consent. Therefore, the defendants have not demonstrated
non-consent by "uncontradicted" and "conclusive" evidence
necessary to support a judgment as a matter of law.

In short, the District Court was obliged to submit the case
to a jury. The factual assertions offered by the appellants
weighed against the consent to which the owners and the
driver had testified, and clearly raised a genuine issue of
material fact. The evidence was insufficient to justify a
judgment as a matter of law for either side. The District
Court therefore should have allowed a jury to weigh the
evidence to determine whether the defendants' evidence of
non-consent is sufficient to overcome the statutory presump-
tion of consent.

In reaching this conclusion, we reject the appellants' con-
tention that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law
based on the statutory presumption. As noted above, the
defendants' assertions of non-consent are sufficient to send
the case to a jury. In an effort to avoid this result, the
appellants argue that the Rivases should be precluded from
arguing that Iglesias' use of their car was non-permissive,
because the D.C. Superior Court dismissed with prejudice
GEICO's claim against the Rivases. We reject this conten-
tion. In dismissing the claim against the Rivases, the Superi-

or Court never made any findings on the question of consent
in conjunction with that claim. Although a "judgment dis-
missing [a] previous suit with prejudice bars a later suit on
the same cause of action," a judgment "unaccompanied by
findings ... [does] not bind the parties on any issue ...
which might arise in connection with another cause of action."
Lawlor v. Nat'l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 327 (1955)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we hold that
the Superior Court dismissal cannot have preclusive effect on
the issue of consent in the instant case.

Appellants also claim that they are entitled to partial
summary judgment on the issues of Iglesias' negligence and
damages, based on the preclusive effect of the $5.5 million
judgment against Iglesias. The District Court declined to
reach this issue until the Rivases' liability was first estab-
lished. We therefore leave that issue for resolution by the
District Court in the first instance.

III. Conclusion

We reverse the District Court's judgment for the appellees
and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.