COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Annunziata
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
BARBARA K. PARKS, N/K/A
BARBARA M. KUNDRAT
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1892-97-4 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
FEBRUARY 10, 1998
CARL M. PARKS
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA
Donald M. Haddock, Judge
Thomas F. Coates, III (Coates & Davenport, on
briefs), for appellant.
W. Michael Holm (Redmon, Boykin & Braswell,
on brief), for appellee.
Barbara K. Parks contends that the trial court erred: (1)
in interpreting the provisions of a foreign child support order;
(2) in refusing to award her arrearages based upon that support
order; (3) in ruling that registration of the foreign child
support order for purposes of enforcement satisfied registration
requirements for other purposes under the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act (UIFSA), see Code §§ 20-88.32 to -88.82; and
(4) in determining that the separation agreement governs payment
of child support after the parties' remaining minor child
attained majority. We dismiss questions one through three, and
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
I.
Mr. and Ms. Parks were married in 1971. On June 12, 1984,
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois granted them a
divorce. At the time of the divorce, the parties had two minor
children. The decree of divorce incorporated, ratified, and
affirmed the parties' separation agreement. That agreement
established child support and defined the time of emancipation,
when the payment of child support should cease. After the
emancipation of Ashley, the elder son, the agreement provided for
support payments of $500 per month for Adam, the younger son.
On January 9, 1991, the Cook County, Illinois Circuit Court
increased Mr. Parks' child support obligation. The 1991 Illinois
order provided in part:
1. That CARL PARKS shall pay BARBARA PARKS
20% (1122.00) of his net income from all
sources for the support of ADAM PARKS, age
12. 1
2. That a Withholding Order shall be entered
against the wages of CARL PARKS for $1,122.00
per month as and for child support for ADAM
PARKS, age 12.
4. That CARL PARKS shall provide BARBARA
PARKS with a copy of his Federal Income Tax
return with all attachments annually until
his obligation of support for ADAM PARKS
shall cease and terminate.
On February 29, 1996, Ms. Parks registered the 1991 Illinois
order for enforcement. See Code §§ 20-88.66 to -88.73. She
1
A certified copy of this order contained the handwritten
interlineation, "(1122.00)," in the first paragraph.
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alleged an arrearage equal to the difference between $1,122 per
month and twenty percent of Mr. Parks' net income since entry of
the 1991 Illinois order. She stated that she could not know the
exact amount of the arrearage because Mr. Parks had failed to
provide her with copies of his federal income tax returns as
required by the 1991 Illinois order.
On appeal from the juvenile and domestic relations district
court, the trial court held that the 1991 Illinois order did not
automatically adjust Mr. Parks' child support obligation.
Because Ms. Parks had never sought modification of the 1991
Illinois order, the trial court denied her arrearages. The trial
court ruled also that child support after the parties' younger
son achieved majority was limited to the amount contracted for in
the separation agreement.
Mr. Parks filed a motion to modify child support. The trial
court held that registration of the 1991 Illinois order for
enforcement constituted sufficient registration for all purposes.
It did not rule on Mr. Parks' motion to modify child support.
II.
Ms. Parks argues that, under Illinois law, the child support
obligation contained in the 1991 Illinois order self-adjusts
annually to an amount equal to twenty percent of Mr. Parks' net
income. Because the record is insufficient to permit
determination of Ms. Parks' allegations, we dismiss this part of
her appeal.
If the record on appeal is sufficient in the
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absence of the transcript to determine the
merits of the appellant's allegations, we are
free to proceed to hear the case. . . . If,
however, the transcript is indispensable to
the determination of the case, then the
requirements for making the transcript a part
of the record on appeal must be strictly
adhered to.
Turner v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 96, 99, 341 S.E.2d 400, 402
(1986) (citation omitted).
Ms. Parks did not file timely a transcript or written
statement of facts, see Rule 5A:8, and the record does not
indicate the amount of the arrearage, if any. Although Ms. Parks
argues that Mr. Parks' failure to produce copies of his income
tax returns precluded her from calculating a sum certain, we are
unable to grant relief where none may be due, and will not engage
in speculation as to the meaning of foreign support orders.
Accordingly, the questions presented concerning interpretation of
the order and the amount in arrears thereon are dismissed.
III.
Ms. Parks contends that the trial court erred in ruling that
her registration of the 1991 Illinois order for enforcement
satisfied the requirements for registration for modification.
She argues that the procedures prescribed in UIFSA require
separate registration of a foreign support order when it is to be
used for alternate purposes. Cf. Code § 20-88.67, with Code
§ 20-88.74. Because we lack jurisdiction to entertain the merits
of this question, we dismiss the appeal of this issue without
prejudice.
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Code § 17-116.05(3) confers jurisdiction upon this Court to
hear appeals from a circuit court's final orders involving child
support and other domestic relations matters. An aggrieved party
may also appeal an interlocutory order or decree that adjudicates
"the principles of the cause." Code § 17-116.05(4).
"A final [order] is one which disposes of the whole subject,
gives all the relief that is contemplated, and leaves nothing to
be done by the court." Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389, 390,
451 S.E.2d 711, 712 (1994) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). The trial court ruled upon a procedural matter
that permitted Mr. Parks to pursue the contemplated relief at a
later time. Thus, the trial court's ruling does not constitute a
final order from which an appeal may be made.
Nor is the trial court's ruling an interlocutory order.
For an interlocutory decree to
adjudicate the principles of a cause, the
decision must be such that "'the rules or
methods by which the rights of the parties
are to be finally worked out have been so far
determined that it is only necessary to apply
those rules or methods to the facts of the
case in order to ascertain the relative
rights of the parties, with regard to the
subject matter of the suit.'"
Id. at 391, 451 S.E.2d at 712-13 (citations omitted).
An interlocutory order that adjudicates the principles of a
child support modification case must respond to the chief object
of the case, the modification of support. See id. at 391, 451
S.E.2d at 713. The trial court's ruling that the foreign support
order need not be re-registered did not adjudicate the principles
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of the cause. That order neither determines the rights of the
parties, nor affects the final order in the case. See id.
Accordingly, we may not address this question and dismiss it
without prejudice.
IV.
Ms. Parks contends that the 1991 Illinois order set the
level of post-majority child support. We disagree.
Ms. Parks correctly notes that UIFSA provides that "a
registered order issued in another state is enforceable in the
same manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order
issued by a tribunal of this Commonwealth." Code § 20-88.68(B).
Moreover, "the law of the issuing state governs the nature,
extent, amount, and duration of current payments and other
obligations of support and the payment of arrearages under the
order." Code § 20-88.69(A). See 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(h)(2) ("In
interpreting a child support order including the duration of
current payments and other obligations of support, a court shall
apply the law of the State of the court that issued the order.").
However, the trial court's interpretation of the Illinois
support order is not at issue. Rather, the issue presented on
appeal concerns the level of post-majority child support that
courts in Virginia can enforce.
A parent has the legal obligation to
support his children only during their
minority. Of course, this obligation does
not preclude the parent from contracting to
support the children after their minority.
However, where such contracts are
incorporated into support decrees by a
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divorce court, they can only be modified by
that court to the extent of its jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of a court to provide
for child support pursuant to a divorce is
purely statutory. The relevant statutes only
deal with the court's power to provide for
support and maintenance of minor children.
Once the child reaches majority, the
jurisdiction of the divorce court to provide
for his support and maintenance terminates
unless otherwise provided by agreement
incorporated into the divorce decree.
Cutshaw v. Cutshaw, 220 Va. 638, 641, 261 S.E.2d 52, 54 (1979)
(citations omitted). See 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(h)(1) ("In a
proceeding to establish, modify, or enforce a child support
order, the forum State's law shall apply" except in regards to
interpretation of the order and the period of limitation for
enforcement.).
The trial court correctly ruled that because Adam was no
longer a minor, the trial court's authority to order support for
him was limited to the amount provided for in the separation
agreement, $500 per month. Accordingly, the order of the trial
court is affirmed.
Affirmed in part,
dismissed in part.
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