Barrett v. Ballard

No. 80-195

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1980

PATRICIA BARRETT ,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
VS .
LORNA BALLARD,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Carbon.
Honorable William J. Speare, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Bridger Law Office; Joseph E. Mudd, Bridger, Montana
For Respondent:

Stephen M. Barrett, Bozeman, Montana

Submitted on briefs: November 26, 1980
Decided :

Filed:
Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.

T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from a judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

t o r e c o v e r damages i n t h e form of a commission from t h e s a l e

of real e s t a t e . The matter w a s t r i e d t o a j u r y which re-

t u r n e d a v e r d i c t f o r p l a i n t i f f i n t h e amount of $4,200 p l u s

i n t e r e s t and c o s t s . From t h i s judgment, d e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s .

T h i s m a t t e r began w i t h a r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t , d a t e d

March 7, 1975, between r e s p o n d e n t r e a l t o r and a p p e l l a n t

seller. I n t h a t c o n t r a c t a w r i t t e n l i s t i n g agreement was

s i g n e d s e t t i n g f o r t h a l i s t i n g p e r i o d of s i x months. On

September 7, 1975, r e s p o n d e n t and a p p e l l a n t e n t e r e d i n t o

a n o t h e r l i s t i n g agreement f o r t h e same p r o p e r t y . During t h e

e n t i r e p e r i o d of t h e l i s t i n g , r e s p o n d e n t a d v e r t i s e d t h e

p r o p e r t y i n t h e B i l l i n g s G a z e t t e and showed t h e p r o p e r t y t o

s e v e r a l p r o s p e c t i v e buyers.

Both t h e f i r s t and second l i s t i n g a g r e e m e n t s w e r e

s i g n e d o n l y by Lorna B a l l a r d and n o t by h e r husband, V i r g i l

Ballard. On September 7, t h e t i m e of t h e s i g n i n g of t h e

second l i s t i n g , r e s p o n d e n t showed a p p e l l a n t a l i s t of a l l

p a r t i e s who m i g h t b e i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e p r o p e r t y .

On September 20, 1975, r e s p o n d e n t a d v e r t i s e d t h e l a n d

f o r s a l e e r r o n e o u s l y a s "under $6,000" i n s t e a d of "$106,000."

A s a r e s u l t o f t h i s a d v e r t i s e m e n t , William S c i l l e y of B i l l i n g s ,

Montana, c a l l e d r e s p o n d e n t a b o u t t h e p r o p e r t y . S c i l l e y came

from t h e a r e a i n which t h e l a n d was l o c a t e d and s t a t e d t h a t

h e was i n t e r e s t e d i n p u r c h a s i n g i t . Contrary t o her usual

p r o c e d u r e , r e s p o n d e n t gave S c i l l e y t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e

p r o p e r t y and t h e name o f owner o v e r t h e phone.

S e v e r a l d a y s a f t e r t h i s c a l l , r e s p o n d e n t went t o

B i l l i n g s and d i s c u s s e d t h e p r o p e r t y , t e r m s , and p o s s i b l e
methods of payment w i t h t h e p o t e n t i a l and e v e n t u a l b u y e r ,

~ i l l i a m cilley.
S L a t e r r e s p o n d e n t went t o t h e p r o p e r t y t o

d i s c u s s t h e s a l e w i t h a p p e l l a n t , Lorna B a l l a r d . When s h e

a r r i v e d , S c i l l e y was t h e r e t a l k i n g w i t h V i r g i l B a l l a r d ,

a p p e l l a n t f s husband. A t t h a t time respondent t a l k e d t o

a p p e l l a n t and d i s c u s s e d t h e b u y e r , t h e amount of money t h a t

would be r e q u i r e d a t c l o s i n g t o pay o f f t h e u n d e r l y i n g

mortgages and o t h e r n e c e s s a r y i n f o r m a t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e

sale. Respondent t h e n l e f t t h e p r o p e r t y .

On t h e same d a y , S c i l l e y made a n o f f e r f o r t h e p u r c h a s e

of t h e property. T h i s o f f e r was n e i t h e r a c c e p t e d n o r re-

j e c t e d by a p p e l l a n t and h e r husband. A p p e l l a n t and h e r

husband c o n t i n u e d t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h S c i l l e y w i t h o u t a d v i s i n g

r e s p o n d e n t of t h e s e n e g o t i a t i o n s . A short t i m e later,

a p p e l l a n t ' s husband went t o B i l l i n g s and m e t w i t h S c i l l e y a t

h i s p l a c e of b u s i n e s s . V i r g i l Ballard attempted t o accept

t h e f i r s t o f f e r made by S c i l l e y ; however, he was informed

t h a t t h a t o f f e r w a s no l o n g e r up f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . During

t h a t m e e t i n g , however, S c i l l e y and B a l l a r d d i d r e a c h a n

agreement r e g a r d i n g t h e s a l e of t h e p r o p e r t y a t a p r i c e less

t h a n o r i g i n a l l y o f f e r e d by S c i l l e y . T h i s agreement was

e v e n t u a l l y reduced t o w r i t i n g , and t h e c o n t r a c t f o r deed w a s

e x e c u t e d i n t h e amount of some $70,000.

During t h i s t i m e a p p e l l a n t made no a t t e m p t t o make

r e s p o n d e n t aware of t h e c o n t i n u e d n e g o t i a t i o n s and e f f o r t s

with Scilley. Respondent had no o p p o r t u n i t y t o become
i n v o l v e d b e c a u s e a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t keep h e r informed.

Upon l e a r n i n g of t h e s a l e , r e s p o n d e n t c a l l e d a p p e l l a n t

and r e q u e s t e d a commission. Appellant wrote t o respondent

and acknowledged t h a t r e s p o n d e n t had i n i t i a l l y o b t a i n e d t h e

e v e n t u a l buyer. I n one l e t t e r a p p e l l a n t s t a t e d t h a t she
f e l t s h e owed r e s p o n d e n t something and would pay $50 a month

u n t i l t h e commission w a s p a i d . S i n c e payments of $50 a

month would t a k e a number o f y e a r s , r e s p o n d e n t s u g g e s t e d

t h a t a p p e l l a n t borrow t h e amount from t h e bank. After

r e p e a t e d r e q u e s t s f o r h e r commission f a i l e d , r e s p o n d e n t

brought t h i s s u i t a g a i n s t appellant.

Appellant p r e s e n t s seven i s s u e s f o r our consideration.

The f i r s t i s s u e i s whether t h e l i s t i n g agreement d a t e d

September 7, 1975, was s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n a r e a l e s t a t e

commission ( a ) under any f a c t s , and/or ( b ) under t h e f a c t s

of t h i s case.

A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e agreement i s i n a d e q u a t e on

i t s f a c e f o r several reasons: (1) The w r i t i n g d o e s n o t

adequately i d e n t i f y t h e property t o be sold. ( 2 ) The l i s t -

i n g does n o t d e f i n e i t s t e r m s . ( 3 ) The w r i t i n g i t s e l f d o e s

n o t meet t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of s p e c i f i c i t y .

R e l y i n g on s e c t i o n 28-2-603, MCA, which p r o v i d e s ,

" [ w l h e r e a c o n t r a c t h a s b u t a s i n g l e o b j e c t and such o b j e c t

is . . . wholly i m p o s s i b l e of performance o r s o v a g u e l y

e x p r e s s e d a s t o be wholly u n a s c e r t a i n a b l e , t h e e n t i r e con-

t r a c t i s v o i d , " a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t i n view of t h e f a c t

t h a t a p o r t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y w a s owned s o l e l y by V i r g i l

B a l l a r d and he d i d n o t s i g n t h e agreement o r a g r e e t o s e l l

t h e p r o p e r t y , t h e l i s t i n g on i t s f a c e c o u l d n o t be p e r -

formed. 17 Am.Jur.2d C o n t r a c t s , 57 a t 342. Therefore,
a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s , t h e c o n t r a c t i s v o i d and i m p o s s i b l e of

performance.
I t h a s l o n g been r e c o g n i z e d t h a t a c o t e n a n t i n j o i n t

t e n a n c y h a s a r i g h t and a b i l i t y t o s e l l h e r i n t e r e s t . See

20 Am.Jur.2d Cotenancy and J o i n t T e n a n t s , 516 a t 109, which

states:
 "Any a c t of a j o i n t t e n a n t which d e s t r o y s one
o r more of i t s n e c e s s a r i l y c o e x i s t i n g u n i t i e s
o p e r a t e s a s a s e v e r a n c e of t h e j o i n t tenancy
and e x t i n g u i s h e s t h e r i g h t of s u r v i v o r s h i p .
The a c t of o n e j o i n t t e n a n t i n s e v e r i n g h i s
i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y by a l i e n a t i o n s e v e r s
t h e j o i n t tenancy t o t h a t e x t e n t , s o t h a t i f
t h e r e w e r e b u t two t e n a n t s , t h e j o i n t tenancy
i s terminated."

T h i s i s t h e l a w i n Montana. See S t a t e Board of E q u a l i -

z a t i o n v. C o l e ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 1 2 2 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989, where t h e

C o u r t c o n s t r u e d S e c t i o n 6680 of t h e Revised Codes of Montana

1937, which p r o v i d e d a d e f i n i t i o n of j o i n t i n t e r e s t a l m o s t

i d e n t i c a l t o t h e one e x i s t i n g i n t o d a y ' s c o d e s . Construing

t h a t s t a t u t e , the Court s a i d :

". . . For example e i t h e r c o - t e n a n t of a j o i n t
tenancy i n real property could sever t h e
e s t a t e by conveying h i s i n t e r e s t t o a t h i r d
p a r t y and a s between t h e remaining c o - t e n a n t
and t h e t r a n s f e r e e t h e new e s t a t e became a
t e n a n c y i n common. .." 195 P. 2d a t 994.

S e e a l s o Cooley v. V e l i n g ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 9 Ariz.App. 208, 505 P.2d

1381; P l a c e v. Carmack ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 33 Colo.App. 4 1 1 , 522 P.2d

592; G i l l e s v . Norman Plumbing Supply Company of Oklahoma

c i t y , Inc. (0kla.App. 1 9 7 5 ) , 549 P.2d 1351; Nelson v . Davis

(Utah 1 9 7 9 ) , 592 P. 2d 594.

A p p e l l a n t r e l i e s on t h e a u t h o r i t y s e t f o r t h i n 17

Am. J u r . ad, s u p r a , t o s u p p o r t h e r c o n t e n t i o n t h a t this i s a

void contract. W e f i n d t h a t although the c i t a t i o n i s the

c o r r e c t holding of the l a w a s a general r u l e , it i s n o t

r e l e v a n t h e r e a s t h e a u t h o r i t y i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e on f a c t s .

I n a d d i t i o n , s h e a r g u e s t h a t t h e c o n t r a c t i s i m p o s s i b l e of

fulfillment. A C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t has noted t h a t " [ t l h e

burden o f p r o v i n g t h e d e f e n s e of i m p o s s i b l i t y i s on t h e

party asserting i t . " H e n s l e r v . C i t y of Los Angeles ( 1 9 5 4 ) ,
 J u s t why t h e c o n t r a c t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o perform on t h e

p a r t of a p p e l l a n t i s n o t c l e a r . A p p e l l a n t w a s f r e e and

c a p a b l e of a c t i n g w i t h o u t h e r husband, even though h e r e t h e

husband knew a t a l l t i m e s s h e had p u t the p r o p e r t y up f o r

sale. The p r e v i o u s l y c i t e d c a s e s i n d i c a t e t h a t s h e h a s a

r i g h t t o sell. She i s c a p a b l e of e n t e r i n g and p e r f o r m i n g

c o n t r a c t s and b e i n g l e g a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r h e r a c t s .

I m p o s s i b l i t y of performance i s a s t r i c t s t a n d a r d t h a t c a n

o n l y be m a i n t a i n e d where t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t r u l y d i c t a t e

impossibility. S e e Smith v . Zepp ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 173 Mont. 358, 567

P.2d 923, 927, where t h i s C o u r t h e l d : "The g e n e r a l r u l e i s

t h a t , where a p a r t y t o a c o n t r a c t o b l i g a t e s h i m s e l f t o a

l e g a l and p o s s i b l e performance, he must perform i n a c c o r d -

ance w i t h t h e c o n t r a c t terms." The f a c t t h a t a p a r t y con-

t r a c t s t o s e l l something he d o e s n o t own d o e s n o t r a i s e t h e

d e f e n s e of i m p o s s i b i l i t y . H e may b e h e l d l i a b l e when h e

rescinds without l e g a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Federal Deposit I n s .

C o r p o r a t i o n v . P e t e r s o n ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 1 0 4 Mont. 447, 6 7 P.2d 305.

I n a d d i t i o n , a p p e l l a n t r a i s e s t h e i s s u e t h a t t h e con-

t r a c t s h o u l d be d e c l a r e d v o i d due t o vagueness. Here,

a p p e l l a n t p r o t e s t s t o o l i t t l e and t o o l a t e . N o b j e c t i o n of
o

vagueness w e r e made a t t h e t i m e of t h e s i g n i n g of t h e r e a l

e s t a t e agreement. N o b j e c t i o n of v a g u e n e s s was made a t t h e
o

t i m e t h e p r o p e r t y was a d v e r t i s e d f o r s a l e . N vagueness
o

argument w a s made when r e s p o n d e n t b r o u g h t p e o p l e t o t h e

property. There w a s n o t a n y o b j e c t i o n of vagueness a t t h e

t i m e S c i l l e y made h i s o f f e r , and no o b j e c t i o n of v a g u e n e s s

a t t h e t i m e t h e s a l e w a s consummated. Vagueness was n o t

r a i s e d d u r i n g t h e t r i a l and, t h e r e f o r e , i s n o t properl-y

b e f o r e u s on a p p e a l .
 Appellant p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h i s c o n t r a c t throughout i t s

e n t i r e existence. Where vagueness o r i m p r e c i s i o n i n a

c o n t r a c t i s r a i s e d , t h e c o u r t s have s e t a s t a n d a r d f o r re-

s o l v i n g such q u e s t i o n s . I n SW Co. v. Schwenk ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 3
-

Mont. 481, 568 P.2d 145, t h i s C o u r t s a i d :

"Where a m b i g u i t y d o e s e x i s t on t h e f a c e of
t h e c o n t r a c t , t h e question of t h e p a r t i e s '
i n t e n t a s t o t h e l a n g u a g e i n v o l v e d i s sub-
m i t t e d t o t h e t r i e r o f f a c t . [ C i t a t i o n omit-
t e d . ] Ambiguity e x i s t s when a c o n t r a c t t a k e n
as a whole i n i t s wording o r p h r a s e o l o g y i s
r e a s o n a b l y s u b j e c t t o two d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e -
tations. [Citations omitted.] . . ." 568
P.2d a t 147.

A s w e have p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d , t h e t r i e r of f a c t must

t a k e t h e c o n t r a c t a s a whole. W e s t a t e d f u r t h e r i n Schwenk:

"When a c o n t r a c t i s ambiguous, t h e l a n g u a g e
of t h e p a r t i e s must be c o n s i d e r e d i n l i g h t
of s u b j e c t m a t t e r and t h e s u r r o u n d i n g c i r -
cumstances, a s w e l l as t h e p o s i t i o n s of t h e
p a r t i e s a t t h e t i m e t h e c o n t r a c t was made.
[Citations omitted.] . . ." 568 P.2d a t 148.

Here, t h e s u r r o u n d i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s and t h e p o s i t i o n s

of t h e p a r t i e s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e t h e i r i n t e n t t o e n t e r i n t o

a n agreement and t o perform t h a t agreement. The p a r t i e s

e n t e r e d i n t o a w r i t t e n agreement; a t t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h a t

agreement t h e y e n t e r e d i n t o a second l i s t i n g agreement.

During t h a t t i m e r e s p o n d e n t c o n t i n u e d t o a d v e r t i s e t h e

p r o p e r t y i n l o c a l newspapers. I n addition, respondent

worked w i t h a p p e l l a n t i n w r i t i n g l e t t e r s f o r a p p e l l a n t t o

o b t a i n s u r v e y o r s t o g e t b i d s on s u r v e y i n g t h e p r o p e r t y . A t

t h e t i m e of t h e s a l e a p p e l l a n t s t a t e d s h e f e l t t h a t respon-

d e n t was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e s a l e . A p p e l l a n t o n l y changed

h e r mind when i n f l u e n c e d by h e r husband. It is interesting

t o n o t e i n t h e t r a n s c r i p t t h a t i n answer t o a q u e s t i o n ,

appellant stated:

"Q. So you w r o t e t h a t l e t t e r , e x c u s e m e , on
November 2 5 t h , you t h o u g h t t h a t s h e had b r o u g h t
a b o u t t h e s a l e , b u t t h e n when your husband t o l d
you t h a t h e d i d t h e s a l e , you changed your
mind. A. Yes."
T h i s C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t , when r e v i e w i n g a c o n f l i c t i n

testimony regarding an ambiguity, t h e t r i e r of f a c t i s

e n t i t l e d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e meaning of t h e c o n t r a c t i n i t s own

right. I n Dooling v . Casey ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 152 Mont. 267, 448 P.2d

749, 754, w e s t a t e d :

". .. Where t h e r e i s a c o n f l i c t i n t h e t e s t i -
mony as t o t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s re-
s p e c t i n g an ambiguity i n a c o n t r a c t , determin-
a t i o n of t h e t r u e meaning of t h e c o n t r a c t i s
one of f a c t f o r t h e j u r y . ..Upon a p p e a l ,
t h i s Court w i l l review t h e evidence only t o
t h e e x t e n t of d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e r e i s
s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence supporting the
verdict. [Citations omitted. 1"

Concerning t h e i s s u e of vagueness t h a t was r a i s e d on

a p p e a l , w e f i n d t h a t t h i s i s s u e was n o t r a i s e d i n t h e D i s -

t r i c t Court. Thus, i t w i l l n o t be c o n s i d e r e d on a p p e a l .

The s t a n d a r d of r e v i e w i s t h a t t h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t

r e v i e w q u e s t i o n s d e c i d e d by t h e t r i e r of f a c t i f t h e r e i s

s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e finding i n t h e

lower c o u r t . R e c e n t l y , i n Ankeny v. Grunstead ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170

Mont. 128, 551 P.2d 1027, 1031, t h i s C o u r t n o t e d : "We k e e p

i n mind t h e r u l e t h a t a t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s w i l l n o t be

d i s t u r b e d on a p p e a l where t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o

s u p p o r t them." Here, t h e jury l i s t e n e d t o t h e testimony,

found s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e and based t h e i r v e r d i c t on t h a t

evidence.

The n e x t i s s u e i s d i r e c t e d a t whether t h e f a c t u a l

s i t u a t i o n warrants recovery. On t h i s i s s u e a p p e l l a n t i s

a t t e m p t i n g t o r a i s e f a c t u a l i s s u e s t h a t w e r e r e s o l v e d by t h e

jury. The d e f i n i t i o n of a n e x c l u s i v e o r n o n e x c l u s i v e con-

t r a c t and t h e r i g h t s o f t h e p a r t i e s under t h e c o n t r a c t w e r e

d e t e r m i n e d by t h e lower c o u r t . The q u e s t i o n of r e s o l v i n g

a m b i g u i t i e s and t h e p o s i t i o n of t h i s C o u r t on t h a t i s s u e h a s

been c l e a r l y c o n s i d e r e d i n p r e v i o u s l y c i t e d c a s e s . See SW
-

Co. v . Schwenk, s u p r a , and Dooling v . Casey, s u p r a .

A s previously noted, t h i s Court w i l l only set a s i d e t h e
 be e n t i t l e d t o h i s compensation.' Ice v. Max-
w e l l , 61 W.Va. 9, 55 S.E. 899. 'It is suffi-
c i e n t ' t o e n t i t l e r e a l e s t a t e brokers t o t h e i r
commissions i f a s a l e i s e f f e c t e d t h r o u g h
t h e i r agency a s i t s p r o c u r i n g c a u s e , a l t h o u g h
t h e s a l e may be made by t h e owners of t h e
p r o p e r t y , i f by t h e i r e x e r t i o n t h e p u r c h a s e r
and t h e owner a r e b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r and a s a l e
r e s u l t s t h e r e f r o m . ' P l a n t v . Thompson, 42 Kan.
664, 22 Pac. 726. . ." 1 2 7 P. a t 332.

The law i n t h i s s t a t e i s w e l l s e t t l e d . The b r o k e r need

n o t do e v e r y t h i n g t o c o m p l e t e t h e s a l e b u t o n l y be r e s p o n s i b l e

f o r bringing the p a r t i e s together. I n Shober v . Dean ( 1 9 0 9 ) ,

39 Mont. 255, 102 P. 323, 324, t h i s C o u r t s e t t h e s t a n d a r d

which s h o u l d judge b r o k e r c a u s a t i o n :

". . . I t a p p e a r s t o u s t h a t t h e r e c a n be b u t one
answer: I t was i n t e n d e d t h a t , i f t h e e f f o r t s of
Shober s e t i n motion a c h a i n of e v e n t s which f i n a l l y
c u l m i n a t e d i n a s a l e of t h e p r o p e r t y , t h e n he s h o u l d
r e c o v e r t h e maximum f e e ; . . ."
The f a c t s i n t h i s c a s e f i t t h e Shober d e f i n i t i o n on a l l

fours. Respondent p l a c e d a n a d v e r t i s e m e n t i n t h e newspaper

which a c c i d e n t a l l y named a n e r r o n e o u s p r i c e . A s a r e s u l t of

t h a t advertisement, S c i l l e y , t h e eventual buyer, c a l l e d

r e s p o n d e n t and o b t a i n e d t h e l o c a t i o n and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f

t h e p r o p e r t y and t h e s e l l e r s . Because i t i s n o t a normal

p r a c t i c e f o r the r e a l e s t a t e agent t o pass t h i s information

t o t h e buyer when t h e a g e n t h a s a n o n e x c l u s i v e l i s t i n g ,

r e s p o n d e n t immediately c a l l e d a p p e l l a n t and t o l d h e r t h a t

s h e had a d v i s e d S c i l l e y who t h e owners w e r e and what prop-

e r t y w a s f o r s a l e and t h a t S c i l l e y was h e r c u s t o m e r . This

c a l l o n l y r e l a t e d t o S c i l l e y , a s r e s p o n d e n t had n o t g i v e n

a p p e l l a n t ' s name o r a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y t o any

other callers.

S h o r t l y a f t e r t h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n , r e s p o n d e n t went t o

B i l l i n g s , m e t w i t h S c i l l e y and d i s c u s s e d t h e p r o p e r t y .

I n a d d i t i o n r e s p o n d e n t d i s c u s s e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of S c i l l e y ,

who was i n t h e a u t o m o b i l e b u s i n e s s , g i v i n g r e s p o n d e n t one

of h i s v e h i c l e s as p a r t o f a commission. W i t h i n two d a y s of
d e c i s i o n o f t h e t r i e r of f a c t when i t l a c k s s u b s t a n t i a l and

supporting c r e d i b l e evidence. Here, t h e f a c t s p r e v i o u s l y

s e t f o r t h , a s w e l l a s t h e a c t i o n s of t h e p a r t i e s , i n d i c a t e

t h e p a r t i e s c l e a r l y i n t e n d e d t o perform t h i s c o n t r a c t . Both

p a r t i e s d i d a l l t h i n g s n e c e s s a r y and p r o p e r t o f u l l y p e r f o r m

t h e c o n t r a c t . I t w a s o n l y when i t became n e c e s s a r y t o pay

t h e commission t h a t a p p e l l a n t a t t e m p t e d t o i g n o r e h e r a g r e e -

ment w i t h r e s p o n d e n t .

The n e x t i s s u e i s d i r e c t e d a t whether t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s

o f t h e r e a l e s t a t e l i s t i n g agreement were s u f f i c i e n t l y m e t

by t h e b r o k e r t o a l l o w t h e c o l l e c t i o n of h e r commission.

Appellant argues t h a t t h i s Court i n considering her

a p p e a l s h o u l d u s e t h e d e f i n i t i o n of a s a l e made s e t f o r t h i n

r e c e n t c a s e s t o r e v i e w t h e lower c o u r t judgment. Particu-

l a r l y c i t e d and r e l i e d upon by a p p e l l a n t i s D i e h l and Asso-

c i a t e s , I n c . v. Houtchens ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 173 Mont. 372, 567 P.2d

930. Our h o l d i n g t h e r e i s c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . In

D i e h l no s a l e took p l a c e , w h i l e i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e w e have

a concluded t r a n s a c t i o n . The q u e s t i o n h e r e i s whether t h e

b r o k e r i s e n t i t l e d t o a commission from t h e s a l e .

D i e h l i s n o t t h e o n l y s t a t e m e n t of Montana l a w r e g a r d -

i n g t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of b r o k e r a g e c o n t r a c t s . The q u e s t i o n

w e have b e f o r e u s h e r e i s whether r e s p o n d e n t was t h e "pro-

c u r i n g " f o r c e i n b r i n g i n g t h e buyer and t h e s e l l e r t o g e t h e r .

I t h a s l o n g been t h e law of Montana, s e e Shober v .

B l a c k f o r d ( 1 9 1 2 ) , 46 Mont. 194, 127 P. 329, t h a t t h e u l t i -

mate s a l e t e r m s need n o t be what t h e b r o k e r ' s c o n t r a c t

s t a t e s , b u t o n l y t h a t t h e s e l l e r and t h e buyer were b r o u g h t

t o g e t h e r by t h e b r o k e r . I n Shober w e s t a t e d :

". . . 'Where a n a g e n t c o n t r a c t s t o f u r n i s h a
p u r c h a s e r f o r l a n d a t a s t i p u l a t e d p r i c e and
such a g e n t d o e s f u r n i s h a p u r c h a s e r whom t h e
owner a c c e p t s , and i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s of t h e
c o n t r a c t t h e owner a g r e e s upon and a c c e p t s a
d i f f e r e n t p r i c e from t h a t a t which t h e a g e n t
was i n s t r u c t e d t o s e l l , s t i l l such a g e n t would
t h i s m e e t i n g , r e s p o n d e n t , upon g o i n g t o a p p e l l a n t ' s r a n c h

t o d i s c u s s t h e p o t e n t i a l s a l e , c l o s i n g c o s t s and o t h e r

i t e m s , met S c i l l e y a t t h e r a n c h where he was t a l k i n g t o

a p p e l l a n t ' s husband.

I n a n e a r l y Montana c a s e , Apple v . Henry ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 66

Mont. 244, 213 P. 4 4 4 , t h i s C o u r t s e t f o r t h t h e l a w con-

c e r n i n g procurement by a b r o k e r :

". . . The r u l e s which d e t e r m i n e t h e r i g h t of a
r e a l e s t a t e b r o k e r t o compensation a r e of now t o o
w e l l s e t t l e d t o a d m i t of much c o n t r o v e r s y . I f t h e
b r o k e r f i n d s and i n t r o d u c e s t o h i s p r i n c i p a l a p e r -
son who i s r e a d y , a b l e , and w i l l i n g t o p u r c h a s e o r
exchange upon t e r m s a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e p r i n c i p a l ,
t h e b r o k e r h a s e a r n e d h i s commission. Laux v .
Hogl, 45 Mont. 445, 123 Pac. 949. I t is altogether
i m m a t e r i a l t h a t t h e f i n a l c o n t r a c t between d e f e n -
d a n t and Anderson was made w i t h o u t t h e p r e s e n c e ,
o r even t h e knowledge, of p l a i n t i f f , i f i t r e s u l t e d
from t h e means and e f f o r t s employed by him [ c i t a -
t i o n omitted] , o r t h a t it provided d i f f e r e n t terms
from t h o s e s u b m i t t e d t o p l a i n t i f f [ c i t a t i o n omit-
ted]. I n Shober v . B l a c k f o r d , 46 Mont. 194, 127
Pac. 329, t h i s c o u r t approved t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e -
ment of t h e r u l e by R a p a l j e on Real E s t a t e B r o k e r s :

"'Where t h e t e r m s of s a l e a r e f i x e d by t h e vendor,
i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h which t h e b r o k e r u n d e r t a k e s t o
produce a p u r c h a s e r , y e t i f , upon t h e procurement
of t h e b r o k e r , a p u r c h a s e r comes, w i t h whom t h e
vendor n e g o t i a t e s and t h e r e u p o n v o l u n t a r i l y r e d u c e s
t h e p r i c e of t h e property, o r t h e q u a n t i t y , o r
o t h e r w i s e changes t h e t e r m s of s a l e , as proposed
t o t h e b r o k e r , s o t h a t a s a l e i s consummated, o r
t e r m s o r c o n d i t i o n s a r e o f f e r e d which t h e proposed
buyer i s r e a d y and w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t , i n e i t h e r
such c a s e t h e b r o k e r w i l l be e n t i t l e d t o h i s com-
m i s s i o n a t t h e r a t e s p e c i f i e d i n h i s agreement
with h i s principal.'" Apple, 213 P. a t 445-446.

See a l s o Mohamed v. Robbins ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 23 Ariz.App. 195, 531

A p p e l l a n t h a s f u r t h e r r a i s e d t h e D i e h l i s s u e by c i t i n g

t h e c a s e of Roscow v. Bara ( 1 9 4 3 ) , 1 1 4 Mont. 246, 135 P.2d

364. Roscow i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e on t h e s a m e b a s i s a s D i e h l .

I n Roscow no s a l e took p l a c e . I n the i n s t a n t case the s a l e

took place. The arguments a d d r e s s e d above t o d i s t i n g u i s h

D i e h l a r e e q u a l l y s u i t a b l e t o r e b u t t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d by

a p p e l l a n t i n c i t i n g Roscow.
 The n e x t i s s u e d r a i s e d i s w h e t h e r , even i f t h e C o u r t

f i n d s t h a t r e s p o n d e n t was r e q u i r e d o n l y t o f i n d a p u r c h a s e r

r e a d y and w i l l i n g t o e n t e r i n t o t h e sales agreement, t h a t

t h e terms w e r e n o t m e t .

A p p e l l a n t c l a i m s t h a t t h e f i n a l t e r m s a c c e p t e d by t h e

s e l l e r s were d i f f e r e n t t h a n t h o s e g i v e n i n t h e o r i g i n a l

l i s t i n g and/or d i s c u s s e d by r e s p o n d e n t . From t h i s a p p e l l a n t

c o n c l u d e s t h a t no commission s h o u l d be p a i d . This i s c l e a r l y

erroneous. See Apple, 213 P. a t 445-446 (quoted above);

Mohamed v. Robbins, s u p r a .

I n a d d i t i o n , a p p e l l a n t c i t e s Shober v . B l a c k f o r d ,

s u p r a , wherein t h e a p p e l l a n t argued t h a t t h e s e l l e r w a s

t r y i n g t o a v o i d t h e commission by n e g o t i a t i n g a d i f f e r e n t

price. Here, t h e s e l l e r i s t r y i n g t o a v o i d t h e commission

by e x c l u d i n g t h e b r o k e r from n e g o t i a t i o n , and t h e c a s e s a r e

clearly distinguishable. Appellant i s attempting t o d e a l

r e s p o n d e n t o u t o f h e r commission by t a k i n g o v e r t h e s a l e and

n o t a d v i s i n g h e r of t h e a c t i v i t i e s .

The n e x t i s s u e r a i s e d i s whether i t was e r r o r f o r t h e

c o u r t t o g i v e i n s t r u c t i o n s on p r o c u r i n g c a u s e under t h e

f a c t s of t h i s c a s e . A p p e l l a n t o b j e c t s t o I n s t r u c t i o n Nos.

7, 9, and 1 4 . These a r e c o n t r a c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n s t r u c -

t i o n s t a k e n a l m o s t v e r b a t i m from Montana s t a t u t e s and a r e

applicable t o t h i s case.

T h i s C o u r t , i n d i s c u s s i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e i n t e r -

p r e t a t i o n of c o n t r a c t s , n o t e d i n Montana/Dakota U t i l i t i e s v .

Lower Yellowstone (1978) , Mont. , 585 P.2d 626, 35

St.Rep. 1409, t h e f o l l o w i n g g u i d e l i n e s f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g

contracts:
"In i n t e r p r e t i n g contracts, our guideposts a r e
t h e s t a t u t e s e n a c t e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , and a
l a r g e body of c a s e law. In short, a contract
 i s t o be c o n s t r u e d s o a s t o make i t d e f i n i t e ,
o p e r a t i v e and r e a s o n a b l e ( s e c t i o n 13-709,
R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 ) ; words a r e t o be u n d e r s t o o d i n
t h e i r u s u a l s e n s e ( s e c t i o n 13-710, R.C.M.
1 9 4 7 ) ; and t e c h n i c a l words are i n t e r p r e t e d
i n t h e s e n s e used i n b u s i n e s s t o which t h e y
r e l a t e ( s e c t i o n 13-711, R.C.M. 1947). . ."
585 P.2d a t 630-631,

I n t h i s case, t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d j u s t t h a t . The j u r y

was g i v e n i n s t r u c t i o n s t o u s e t h e words i n a normal, o p e r a -

t i v e and r e a s o n a b l e s e n s e . I n a d d i t i o n , because t h e i n -

s t r u c t i o n s s e t f o r t h t h e a c t u a l law of Montana f o r t h e

c o n s t r u c t i o n of c o n t r a c t s , t h e y a r e p a r t of t h e c o n t r a c t

itself. See Ryan v. Ald, I n c . ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 146 Mont. 299, 406

Appellant argues t h a t the c o u r t e r r e d i n refusing her

I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 6 and 7, which r e a d :

" [ 6 . ] There i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between a
b r o k e r a g e c o n t r a c t which r e q u i r e s a b r o k e r
t o merely f i n d a p u r c h a s e r and a b r o k e r a g e
c o n t r a c t which r e q u i r e s a b r o k e r t o s e l l ,
make o r e f f e c t t h e s a l e . I n t h e f i r s t c a s e
t h e b r o k e r e a r n s h i s commission when he pro-
c u r e s a buyer a b l e , r e a d y and w i l l i n g t o
p u r c h a s e on t h e s e l l e r ' s t e r m s . A broker
employed t o s e l l o r e f f e c t a s a l e d o e s n o t
e a r n h i s commission u n t i l h e c o m p l e t e s t h e
sale. Completion of t h e s a l e where r e a l
p r o p e r t y i s i n v o l v e d amounts t o payment of
t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e and conveyance of t h e
title.

" [ 7 . ] A s a general r u l e a broker i s n o t
e n t i t l e d t o compensation u n t i l he h a s p e r -
formed t h e u n d e r t a k i n g assumed by him; and,
i n t h e a b s e n c e of any c o n t r a r y p r o v i s i o n s i n
t h i s c o n t r a c t , i t m a t t e r s n o t how g r e a t have
been h i s e f f o r t s n o r how m e r i t o r i o u s h i s ser-
v i c e s i f he i s unsuccessful i n accomplishing
t h e o b j e c t o f h i s employer, he i s n o t en-
t i t l e d t o compensation. "

A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s s h o u l d have been

g i v e n on t h e b a s i s of D i e h l & A s s o c i a t e s , I n c . v. Houtchens,

supra. A s previously noted, b o t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t and t h i s

C o u r t have d i s t i n g u i s h e d D i e h l i n t h a t i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e

t h e r e was a s a l e , w h i l e i n D i e h l t h e r e was no sale. The
i n s t r u c t i o n s , t h e r e f o r e , c o u l d n o t p r o p e r l y be founded i n

t h e h o l d i n g of D i e h l .

W have a l s o examined a p p e l l a n t ' s argument c o n c e r n i n g
e

t h e r e f u s a l of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o g i v e h e r proposed

I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 0 which r e a d :

"You are i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i n o r d e r t o re-
c o v e r a commission on a s a l e a b r o k e r must
p r o v e by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of t h e e v i d e n c e
t h a t he performed under t h e t e r m s of t h e
agreement. "

W e f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e r e f u s a l of t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n , a s

i t was c o v e r e d by g i v e n I n s t r u c t i o n No. 5.

The c o u r t p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y , and w e f i n d no

error.

F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t raises t h e i s s u e of whether i t w a s

e r r o r i n n o t a l l o w i n g h e r a t t o r n e y t o a r g u e f o r a lesser

commission. I t was a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n , on argument,

t h a t r e s p o n d e n t was n o t e n t i t l e d t o a commission on t h e s a l e

o f a l l t h e p r o p e r t y , b u t o n l y upon t h e i n t e r e s t owned by

appellant. T h i s w a s o b j e c t e d t o by r e s p o n d e n t ' s c o u n s e l a t

t h e t i m e of argument s e v e r a l t i m e s on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e

c o u r t had i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y , i n I n s t r u c t i o n No. 21, on t h e

method of c a l c u l a t i n g t h e damages i n t h e e v e n t t h e r e w a s a

verdict for plaintiff. The arguments b e i n g made by c o u n s e l

f o r a p p e l l a n t were c l e a r l y c o n t r a r y t o t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s .

W f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e o b j e c t i o n by r e s p o n d e n t t o t h e
e

argument of a p p e l l a n t ' s c o u n s e l .

The judgment i s a f f i r m e d .
W e concur:

I
Chief- JU'S t i c e

/ / Justices (j