Beattie v. Madison County School District

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________

m 00-60545
_______________

JOY BEATTIE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

MADISON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT;
MADISON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION;
BERT JACKSON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
KEN MCCOY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
SHIRLEY SIMMONS, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
MARY MCDONALD, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
LEE MILLER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
KEN ACTON, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES;
MARIA A. JONES, IN HER INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
_________________________
July 5, 2001
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, I.
HIGGINBOTHAM, and SMITH, From 1994-96, Beattie worked as secretary
Circuit Judges. to Mike Kent, principal of Rosa Scott Middle
School. From 1996 until her termination, she
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge: worked for Ken Acton, the principal of Olde
Towne Middle School. Beattie claims she had
Joy Beattie, an at-will employee, was fired no history of disciplinary problems, but school
as a secretary for Madison County Schools, board members indicated that parents had
allegedly in retaliation for her support of Mi- complained about her rudeness. On April 6,
chael Kent’s candidacy for school superinten- 1999, Acton wrote a letter recommending her
dent in opposition to the incumbent, Maria for annual re-employment.
Jones. Beattie sued the school district, the su-
perintendent, the principal, and the school Later that month, Larry Roberts, a city al-
board members for First Amendment retalia- derman and parent, came into the office and
tion under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for violation discussed the upcoming election for school su-
of MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-871, which pro- perintendent. Acton suggested a reason that
hibits certain actions by employers regarding Roberts should not vote for Kent, and Beattie
employee’s voting rights. Beattie asked for a interjected her opinion to the contrary. Acton
permanent injunction, reinstatement, punitive orally reprimanded Beattie and instructed her
damages, and compensatory damages for lost that as a school employee, she owed the cur-
past and future wages, mental anguish, emo- rent superintendent her loyalty. Beattie tes-
tional stress, and loss of reputation. The dis- tified in her deposition that Acton instructed
trict court dismissed the state law claim with- her not to express her opinions about Kent’s
out prejudice and granted summary judgment candidacy “out of the office or anywhere be-
for the defendants on the § 1983 claim on the cause it was perceived . . . as coming from me
basis that Beattie had failed to establish a caus- [Acton].” Acton supported Jones in the elec-
al connection between her political activity and tion.
her discharge, an essential element of her
§ 1983 claim.1 In June 1999, Jones visited the school and
informed Beattie that she had heard that Beat-
Beattie appeals, contending that the district tie had made negative comments about her po-
court erred in concluding that she failed to sition on a proposed bond issue to build a new
prove causation and erred in denying her mo- high school. Shortly thereafter, Jones asked
tion to conduct additional discovery under Beattie to stuff envelopes for her campaign at
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f). We affirm. work, which Beattie did. Jones never deliv-
ered the envelopes. A few days later, Acton
drafted a letter recommending that Beattie be
1
See, e.g., Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d
transferred “not based on Joy’s ability to do
923, 932 (5th Cir. 1999) (listing elements of a First the job but on philosophical differences on
Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 as (1) how a middle school should operate,” such as
engaging in a protected activity; (2) suffering an her support of Who’s Who Among American
adverse employment action; (3) a causal connection High School Students, her opposition to Ac-
between the two; and (4) the execution of a city ton’s proposals on cheerleaders and the dance
policy causing the adverse action).

2
team, and her support of membership in the used ‘most sparingly in . . . First Amendment
Little Six Conference for the football team. case[s] . . . involving delicate constitutional
rights, complex fact situations, disputed testi-
Beattie put up signs in her yard to show her mony, and questionable credibilities.’” Ben-
support for Kent. When Jones was campaign- ningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369,
ing in the neighborhood, she allegedly com- 377 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Porter v. Califa-
mented to one of Beattie’s neighbors that “Joy no, 592 F.2d 770, 778 (5th Cir. 1979)). Sum-
Beattie has two signs in her yard [supporting mary judgment should be granted, however,
Kent] and I’m going to her house to find out “when the nonmoving part y fails to meet its
why.” Jones did not confront Beattie about burden to come forward with facts and law
the signs. demonstrating a basis for recovery that would
support a jury verdict.” Little v. Liquid Air
The next Monday, Acton revised his letter Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1071 (5th Cir. 1994) (en
recommending Beattie’s transfer, proposing banc).
instead that she be removed. Acton sent the
memo to Jones. Beattie claims that all the III.
reasons cited in the memo for her removal oc- Beattie contends that the district court
curred before the April 6 letter. Beattie be- erred in deciding that she failed to present
lieves that four days later, Acton met with a summary judgment evidence that her political
school district attorney, James Keith, and re- speech and activities motivated her termination
vised the letter to include additional reasons and therefore that the school district was not
for her termination, most notably an allegation liable. She also argues that the court erred in
of a breach of confidence. concluding that Acton and Jones did not cause
her adverse employment action. To prevail on
Jones presented Acton’s recommendation her First Amendment retaliation claim, Beattie
to the board, which on July 19, 1999, voted must show either that the school board acted
unanimously to terminate Beattie. The board in retaliation or that the improper motives of
previously had discussed complaints that Beat- another actor can be imputed to it.2
tie was rude to teachers, parents, and students.
All board members testified in affidavits that To prove a First Amendment retaliation
they were not aware of Beattie’s political claim, Beattie must show that (1) she suffered
activities or any alleged misconduct by Jones an “adverse employment decision”; (2) her
and Acton and that they were neutral in the
campaign for superintendent. Further, they 2
stated that they would have terminated Beattie Under § 1983, Beattie may sue a local gov-
without Acton’s recommendation. erning body, such as the school district, or the
school board as policymaker for the district, for
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief if the
II. challenged action implements or executes a policy
We review a grant of summary judgment de officially adopted by that body’s officers. Neither
novo, applying the same standard as did the the school board nor the school district can be li-
district court. E.g., Bos Dairy, L.C. v. United able for the actions of Acton and Jones, if im-
States Dep’t of Agric., 209 F.3d 785, 786 (5th permissible, under a respondeat superior theory.
Cir. 2000). “Summary judgment should be See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 690, 694 (1978).

3
speech involved “a matter of public concern”; Beattie’s evidence that the board violated
(3) her “interest in commenting on matters of her rights is based on her assertion that she
public concern . . . outweigh[s] the Defen- had an excellent record with no reprimands.
dant’s interest in promoting efficiency”; and She believes the conversation with Roberts
(4) her speech motivated the adverse employ- about the upcoming election precipitated her
ment decision. Harris v. Victoria Indep. Sch. difficulties at work and that the court should
Dist., 168 F.3d 216, 220 (5th Cir.), cert. infer improper motive from the timing of the
denied 528 U.S. 1022 (1999).3 The only firing. Moreover, she asserts that the stated
contested issue is causation. reasons for her firingSSinsubordination, disclo-
sure of confidential information, undermining
To prevail, Beattie must show that she en- Acton, rudeness to parents and teachers,
gaged in protected conduct and that it was a violating school policy, and being disloyal to
motivating factor in her discharge. Then, the ActonSSoccurred before Acton’s initial recom-
burden shifts to defendants to show by a pre- mendation of re-employment. She states,
ponderance of the evidence that they would without corroborating evidence, that the alle-
have come to the same conclusion in the ab- gations of breach of confidence and rudeness
sence of the protected conduct. Mt. Healthy have no basis in fact. Thus, she contends, Ac-
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 ton’s real motive in changing the recommenda-
U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Beattie has not met her tion from a transfer to a removal (and Jones’s
initial burden of demonstrating that her speech real motive in accepting it) was retaliation.
motivated her discharge.
Even if Beattie is correct, her reasoning
A. bears no relation to the school board’s liability
The parties do not contest that the board is unless either the board acted in retaliation in-
a policymaker for the school district or that the dependently or the improper motives (if prov-
board fired Beattie. They appear to agree that en) of Jones and Acton can be imputed to the
the district may be liable for the board’s ac- board. Acton and Jones cannot be liable in-
tions because the board is a policymaker for dependently if they did not make the final de-
the school district in its capacity to terminate cision.5 If, however, the board adopted the al-
employees.4 If the board acted in retaliation legedly impermissible motives of Acton and
against Beattie for her support of Kent, the Jones through acting on the recommendation
school district may be liable. or delegated its policymaking authority in the
area of at-will employment to Jones, it may be
liable.

3
1.
See also Sharp, 164 F.3d at 932. Municipal liability for constitutional torts
4
Cf., e.g., Harris, 168 F.3d at 225 (finding that
arises when the execution of an official policy
a board’s decision to affirm a superintendent’s rec- causes the injury. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
ommendation to transfer a teacher was an act of Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “[A] single
official policy, noting that “[o]n at least two
occasions, we have held that the board of trustees
5
of an independent school district . . . is a pol- Beattie has abandoned all claims against Ac-
icymaker for purposes of § 1983”). ton and Jones individually.

4
action by a municipal official possessing final official policymaker, would give
policymaking authority regarding the action in rise to municipal liability. Instead,
question constitutes the official policy of the if county employment policy was
municipality and . . . the determination of set by the Board of County
whether a municipal official wields final Commissioners, only that body’s
policymaking authority regarding a particular decisions would provide a basis
action constitutes a question of state law.” for county liability. This would be
Brady v. Fort Bend County, 145 F.3d 691, true even if the Board left the
698 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing McMillan v. Sheriff discretion to hire and fire
Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997)). In employees and the Sheriff
Mississippi, the school board has the power exercised that discretion in an
“[t]o select all school district personnel.” unconstitutional manner; the
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-7-301(p) (2000). The decision to act unlawfully would
question, then, is whether the board delegated not be a decision of the Board.
that authority to Jones.
Id. (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,
Municipal liability attaches only where 475 U.S. 469, 484 & n.12 (1986)). Beattie
the decisionmaker possesses final argues that the board’s deference to the su-
authority to establish municipal perintendent’s recommendations on at-will
authority with respect to the action employment matters exhibits a delegation of
ordered. The fact that a particular policymaking authority and suggests that this
o fficialSS even a policymaking alleged complete control over a particular area
officialSShas discretion in the exercise of makes Jones an official policymaker whose
particular functions does not, without liability can be imputed to the district and the
more, give rise to municipal liability board.
based on an exercise of that discretion.
The official must also be responsible for An official may be a policymaker for the
establishing final government policy county in a particular area or on a particular
respecting such activity before the issue.6 In Brady, we noted that discretion
municipality can be held liable.12 alone is not enough; the official also must cre-
ate policy. The official in Brady, however, re-
12
Thus, for example, the County ceived his authority from a state statute that
Sheriff may have discretion to hire granted him final policymaking power. Even
and fire employees without also more importantly, his authority was unreview-
being the count y official
responsible for establishing county
employment policy. If this were
the case, the Sheriff’s decisions 6
See Brady, 145 F.3d at 699 (internal citations
respecting employment would not omitted) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,
give rise to municipal liability, al- 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (plurality opinion) (ob-
though similar decisions with re- serving that “the challenged action must have been
spect to law enforcement practic- taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the official
es, over which the Sheriff is the or officials responsible under state law for making
policy in that area”)).

5
able by any other body. Id. at 700.7 the board.

The board oversaw Jones’s employment 2.
decisionsSSan indication that she may not be a Even if speech on a matter of public
final policymaker. The mere existence of concern was a substantial or motivating factor
oversight, however, is not enough; the in the termination, a defendant may escape lia-
oversight must pertain to the area of authority bility by demonstrating that it would have tak-
in question. Brady, 145 F.3d at 701. For en the same action in the absence of the
example, a superintendent’s transfer of a protected conduct. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at
teacher to another position might be a final 287. As explained above, Beattie must prove
policy decision if that action was a causal connection between her constitution-
unreviewable, even if the superintendent did ally-protected activity and the board’s
not have complete control over the hiring and decision.8 Because Acton and Jones are not
firing of district personnel. See id. at 701 final policymakers, Beattie must impute their
(citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 allegedly improper motives to the board by
U.S. 701 (1989)). demonstrating that the board approved both
Jones’s decision and the basis for it.9
Jones presented her recommendation to the
board, which terminated Beattie. Because the All board members testified that they had
board oversaw the precise action in question, no idea t hat Beattie supported Kent in the
Jones did not have final policymaking power. election and that they had remained neutral in
By the same analysis, Acton is not a final the campaign. They further testified to per-
policymaker: Jones oversaw each of his ac- sonal knowledge of complaints against Beattie,
tions pertaining to Beattie’s discharge. such as those detailed in the letter
Therefore, neither the board nor the school recommending her termination. The letter
district is liable for their actions, unless their maintained that Beattie refused to support
allegedly improper motives can be imputed to school polices and disclosed confidential em-

7
See also Reeves v. Claiborne County Bd. of
Educ., 828 F.2d 1096, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 1987) 8
See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
(finding a superintendent liable for transferring a 378, 385 (1989) (requiring a “direct causal link
teacher in retaliation for her testimony in a court between a municipal policy or custom and the
case and emphasizing the importance of oversight alleged constitutional deprivation”); Polk County v.
by remanding for a determination of whether a Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (holding that
school board customarily deferred to the decisions “official policy must be ‘the moving force of the
of the superintendent); Neubauer v. City of Mc- constitutional violation’ in order to establish the
Allen, 766 F.2d 1567, 1573-74 (5th Cir. 1985) liability of a government body”) (citing Monell,
(holding a governmental entity liable under § 1983 436 U.S. at 694).
“where the policy was made by an official to whom
9
the governing body had given policymaking E.g., Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (“If the au-
authority,” noting that the official’s decisions were thorized policymakers approved a subordinate’s
not subject to review), overruled on other grounds decision and the basis for it, their ratification
by Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119, would be chargeable to the municipality because
126 (5th Cir. 1992). their decision is final.”).

6
ployment information.10 Beattie does not dis- board had actual knowledge of the alleged
pute defendants’ position that the board saw improper basis of Jones’s and Acton’s
only this letter (not the previous draft recommendation, the board cannot be liable
recommending a transfer) and had no actual for the alleged retaliation. See Cabrol, 106
knowledge of her campaign activities.11 If F.3d at 108.14
there is no evidence that the board knew of the
protected activity, Beattie cannot show that Even assuming the board did terminate
the activity motivated retaliatory behavior.12 Beattie in retaliation for her campaign
activities, it can escape liability, because it
Beattie urges that Harris controls because would have terminated her for other reasons.
there, we found a board liable under § 1983 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.15 Board
for approving a superintendent’s members testified that they would have voted
recommendation; the board delegated to terminate Beattie even without Acton’s
employment authority to the superintendent, letter, based on the complaints they received
and in ratifying his decision through a that she was rude to students, parents, and
grievance hearing, the board assumed liability. teachers. Beattie offers no evidence to refute
Harris, 168 F.3d at 225. During that
grievance procedure, however, the board
13
acquired actual knowledge of the basis for the (...continued)
termination.13 Without a showing that the sumably Beattie did not avail herself of this pri-
vilege.
14
10
Beattie allegedly discussed, with a teacher There is an exception to this rule where the
applicant, names that had been recommended to the final policymaker’s decision is merely a “rubber
board, before the board’s final decision, and sent stamp.” If an employee can demonstrate that the
an e-mail to other teachers after a teacher had subordinate’s evaluation was tainted by an illegal
resigned but before the board had had a chance to intent and that it had sufficient influence or lev-
act. erage over the ultimate decisionmaker, the motives
of the subordinate become relevant. See Rios v.
11 Rossotti, No. 00-50226, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
She does not suggest that the school policies
with which she openly disagreed are protected 9420, at *19-*20 (5th Cir. 2001). Beattie
speech on matters of public concern. suggested that the board merely “rubber stamped”
the superintendent’s employment decisions, but she
12
See Cabrol v. Town of Youngsville, 106 F.3d presented no evidence to support that assertion.
101 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment
15
for a town and mayor who terminated an employee See also Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21
who had challenged a cockfighting ordinance, (1999) (“The government can avoid liability by
because no evidence indicated that they knew about proving that it would have made the same decision
his opposition to the ordinance). without the impermissible motive.”); White v.
South Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 693 F.2d 1163, 1169
13
Mississippi law provides that a terminated (5th Cir. 1982) (“[E]ven if we assume the exercise
employee of a school district may initiate a griev- of protected first amendment activity played a
ance hearing before the board to contest his ter- substantial part in the decision to terminate an
mination. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-9-111 (2000). employee, the termination is not unconstitutional if
Neither party references this procedure, so pre- the employee would have been terminated
(continued...) anyway.”).

7
these affidavits. Thus, the board’s “The Constitution requires only that an em-
independent reason for her termination shields ployee be placed in no worse a position than if
it from liability under Mt. Healthy.16 he had not engaged in the conduct.” White,
693 F.2d at 1169. Because the board fired
B. Beattie for permissible, constitutional motives
Beattie claims that because she was fired at independently of Acton’s and Jones’s
the recommendation of Acton and Jones, and recommendation, that superseding cause
because they were retaliating against her for shields them from liability.
support of a political candidate, they are inde-
pendently liable. If Acton and Jones had fired 2.
Beattie for the reasons she alleges, they may Beattie attempts to connect the board’s de-
have violated her First Amendment rights. cision, by its timing, to Acton’s and Jones’s
“[A] public employer cannot act against an motives. Timing alone does not create an in-
employee because of the employee’s affiliation ference that the termination is retaliatory.18
or support of a rival candidate unless the
employee’s activities in some way adversely Therefore, Beattie has not shown a causal
affect the government’s ability to provide ser- connection between Acton’s and Jones’s al-
vices.” Vojvodich v. Lopez, 48 F.3d 879, 887 leged retaliatory motives and her adverse em-
(5th Cir. 1995).17 ployment action. Because the board made its
ultimate decision independently of these un-
1. proven unconstitutional aims, summary
As we have noted, Acton and Jones did not judgment was proper.
fire Beattie directly, but merely recommended
her termination to the board, which made the IV.
final decision. If Acton and Jones did not Beattie contends that the district court er-
cause the adverse employment action, they roneously denied her motion for additional
cannot be liable under § 1983, no matter how discovery under rule 56(f).19 We review for
unconstitutional their motives. Moreover,
even if the board adopted their
recommendation, that recommendation 18
See Seaman v. CSPH, Inc., 179 F.3d 297,
exhibited no unconstitutional motive on its 301 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a retaliation
face. Further, the evidence suggests that the claim lacked merit where the employee mentioned
board fired Beattie for independent reasons, his EEOC filing minutes before his termination for
and Beattie offers nothing but her own beliefs insubordination, but no other evidence suggested a
to the contrary. retaliatory motive); see also O’Connor v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 985 F.2d 1362, 1370 (7th Cir.
1993) (“[T]he fact that protected speech may
precede an adverse employment decision alone does
16
See Gerhart v. Hayes, 217 F.3d 320, 322 not establish causation under Mt. Healthy.”).
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 573 (2000).
19
The rule provides:
17
See also Reeves, 828 F.2d at 1103 (“[A]
government employer cannot retaliate against an Should it appear from the affidavits of a
employee for the exercise of first amendment party opposing the motion that the party
rights.”). (continued...)

8
abuse of discretion a decision to end at 1397.
discovery.20
Beattie had several months, from the time
Rule 56(f) motions are generally favored she sued, to depose the board members, who
and should be liberally granted. Stearns Air- are named defendants. She submits that she
port Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, did not depose them earlier because the parties
535 (5th Cir. 1999). Beattie “may not simply were in settlement negotiations, but a party
rely on vague assertions that additional suspends discovery at his own risk. She claims
discovery will produce needed, but unspecified she did not become aware that she needed to
facts.” Krim, 989 F.2d at 1442 (internal ci- depose the board members until sixteen days
tations omitted). She must show (1) why she before the discovery deadline, and then the
needs additional discovery and (2) how that parties could not find a mutually agreeable
discovery will create a genuine issue of time. She filed her rule 56(f) motion three
material fact. Stearns, 170 F.3d at 535 (citing days after the defendants filed their motion for
Krim, 989 F.2d at 1442). If Beattie has not summary judgment, the date at which she
diligently pursued discovery, however, she is alleges she first became aware of the
not entitled to relief under rule 56(f). See contradiction in testimony.21
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics In-
telligence & Coordination Unit, 28 F.3d 1388, Defendants explain that Beattie knew, as
1397 (5th Cir. 1994). We need not address early as February 2000, when the fact was in-
whether Beattie has shown why she needs ad- cluded in responses to interrogatories, that the
ditional discovery to create a genuine issue of board had voted to terminate her and had cited
material fact, because she was not diligent. Id. her rudeness to parents and teachers as a rea-
son for her dismissal. Moreover, Jones stated
in deposition that board members had received
19
complaints about Beattie. Furthermore,
(...continued) Beattie became aware that she needed to
cannot for reasons stated present by affi-
depose school board members as early as
davit facts essential to justify the party’s
March 15, giving her sixteen days before the
opposition, the court may refuse the appli-
cation for judgment or may order a con- end of discovery to seek an extension.
tinuance to permit affidavits to be obtained Instead, she waited until after defendants had
or depositions to be taken or discovery to be filed their motion for summary judgment.
had or may make such other order as is just.

21
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f). Although Beattie claims that defendants,
shortly before the expiration of discovery, pro-
20
See Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 638 duced documents that warranted additional dis-
F.2d 1272, 1289 (5th Cir. Mar. 1981) (reviewing covery, she has not indicated with specificity how
decisions determining scope and effect of discovery these documents raised issues of material fact. The
for abuse of discretion); Krim v. BancTexas district court found that they merely clarified issues
Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1441 (5th Cir. 1993) raised earlier in the depositions of Acton and Jones,
(reviewing, for abuse of discretion, decisions to and Beattie received an extension of time to file her
preclude discovery before granting summary judg- response to the motion for summary judgment to
ment). respond to those documents.

9
 Even though rule 56(f) motions should be
liberally granted, “[a] district court has broad
discretion in all discovery matters, and such
discretion will not be disturbed ordinarily un-
less there are unusual circumstances showing
a clear abuse.” Kelley v. Syria Shell Petrole-
um Dev., B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 855 (5th Cir.)
(internal quotation marks omitted), cert. de-
nied, 121 S. Ct. 426 (2000). Although
Beattie’s conduct during discovery does not
rise to the level disparaged in Leatherman,22
the district court acted within its discretion in
concluding that she had not pursued discovery
diligently enough to warrant relief under rule
56(f).

AFFIRMED.

22
In Leatherman, plaintiffs conducted very
little discovery for more than one year before filing
their rule 56(f) motion. Leatherman, 28 F.3d at
1397.

10