F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
APR 6 2004
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
ANDREA L. BEAVER; FLOYD
TURNER; MINELLE L. BATSON;
MARY Y. BURNETT; MICHAEL L.
SEYMOUR; TERRY L. BEAVER;
ROBERT T. MURPHY; SHARON
LYNN ATHERTON; ROGER
BLOXHAM; STEVE GALPIN;
RICHARD P. PRAWDZIENSKI;
MICHAEL A. CLEM; WHITNEY L.
BOUTIN, JR.; CHRISTOPHER S.
POWELL; CHARLES A. BURRIS;
and the LIBERTARIAN PARTY OF
OKLAHOMA a/k/a/ Libertarian
Political Organization,
No. 03-6058
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
MICHAEL CLINGMAN, Secretary of
the Oklahoma State Election Board;
GLO HENLEY, Chairman of the
Oklahoma State Election Board;
KENNETH MONROE, Vice Chairman
of the Oklahoma State Election Board;
THOMAS E. PRINCE, Member of the
Oklahoma State Election Board; and
the OKLAHOMA STATE ELECTION
BOARD,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. CIV-00-1071-F)
James C. Linger, Tulsa, Oklahoma for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Wellon B. Poe, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for
Defendants-Appellees.
Before KELLY , LUCERO , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.
LUCERO , Circuit Judge.
This case presents issues at the intersection of two Supreme Court cases
concerning the associational rights of political parties in the context of primary
elections. Oklahoma’s election statutes currently provide for a semi-closed
primary system, in which a party may invite only its own party members and
registered voters designated as Independents to vote in its primary. Along with
registered voters of the Republican and Democratic parties, the Libertarian Party
of Oklahoma (the “LPO”) filed a § 1983 action, alleging that the Oklahoma
election statutes regulating primaries violate their rights to freedom of political
association and free speech by preventing the LPO from inviting members of
other parties to vote in its primary elections.
The district court found the Oklahoma statutes to be constitutional.
Because we conclude that the election laws impermissibly violate the LPO’s
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associational rights, we exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
REVERSE.
I
Several types of primary systems exist in the United States. 1 Oklahoma’s
statute regarding primaries provides that:
A. No registered voter shall be permitted to vote in any Primary
Election or Runoff Primary Election of any political party except the
political party of which his registration form shows him to be a
member, except as otherwise provided by this section.
B.
1. A recognized political party may permit registered voters
designated as Independents . . . to vote in a Primary Election
or Runoff Primary Election of the party.
Okla. Stat. tit. 26, § 1-104. By the statute’s terms, a political party in Oklahoma
may allow Independents to vote in its primary and runoff elections, but a party
may not invite voters registered with other parties to vote in its primary.
Having exercised its statutory option to allow Independents to vote in its
1
In a “closed primary,” there is a separate primary ballot for each party,
and no cross-over voting is allowed. In other words, a registered Republican can
vote only in the Republican primary. A “semi-closed primary,” which resembles
the closed primary, permits a party to invite independents to vote in the party’s
primary if it so chooses. In an “open primary” system, all voters, regardless of
party affiliation, are able to choose the primary in which they vote. Finally, a
“blanket primary” system allows each voter to choose in which primary he or she
will vote for each separate office. A “party-option open primary,” which is at
issue in this case, is a variation of the “open primary.” In a party-option open
primary, a party may choose either to open its primary to registered independents
or voters from other parties or to restrict its primary to only voters of its own
party.
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primaries, the LPO would also like to invite all registered Oklahoma voters,
regardless of their political affiliations, to participate. The LPO has decided that
such an action would help it reach out to Libertarian-oriented voters of other
political affiliations, thereby producing a more viable Libertarian candidate.
The LPO initially asked the Secretary of the Oklahoma State Election
Board for permission to invite all registered voters to participate in its primaries
for the 2000 election cycle, and the Secretary denied the request. After
announcing the same intention for the 2004 election cycle and being denied again,
the LPO filed suit in federal district court. It claimed that the First Amendment’s
guarantee of free association gave it the right to invite all registered voters,
regardless of political affiliation, to vote in its primaries; it sought a permanent
injunction to enjoin the Oklahoma State Election Board from enforcing the state
election statutes. If granted such an injunction, the LPO suggested that Oklahoma
would become a party-option open primary state, allowing each party the option
of opening its primary to registered voters of other parties.
Finding that the LPO had standing to bring the suit, the district court
proceeded to weigh the character and magnitude of the burden imposed on the
LPO’s rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments against the
interests set forth as justifications by the state. It concluded that the burden of
the statute on the LPO was not a severe one and accordingly analyzed whether
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any of Oklahoma’s proffered interests were sufficiently important to justify the
burden. Though it found unavailing Oklahoma’s interests in avoiding voter
confusion, administrative difficulties, “swamping,” and “raiding,” 2 the district
court concluded that the state’s interest in “preserving the political parties as
viable and identifiable interest groups, insuring that the results of a primary
election . . . accurately reflect the voting of the party members” (R. at 68–69) was
sufficiently important for the state to prevail.
II
We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 52(a). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (citation omitted). Our review of
questions of law, on the other hand, is de novo. See Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S.
510, 516 (1994). “[T]he difference between a de novo review of a record and a
review under the clearly erroneous standard is significant,” Ocelot Oil Corp. v.
2
Swamping is defined as the control of a minor party’s candidate selection
by voters affiliated with other parties; it was described by the Supreme Court in
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 578 (2000). Raiding is
similarly defined and gives non-members of a minor party the ability to overtake
the minor party as a flag of convenience, thus affecting the ideology of the ticket
representatives of the party. Id.
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Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464 (10th Cir. 1988); in de novo review, “no
form of appellate deference is acceptable,” Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499
U.S. 225, 238 (1991).
A
Because Oklahoma statutes currently recognize the LPO as a political
organization rather than a political party, we must first determine whether the
LPO has standing to bring a suit to enjoin laws that restrict political parties. In
Oklahoma, party status depends on statutory requirements; specifically, a group
may attain party status during even-numbered years by getting a petition signed by
five percent of the number of people who voted in the last general election. Okla.
Stat. tit. 26, § 1-108. Having regularly completed these requirements in even-
numbered years, the LPO has consistently and cyclically achieved party status. In
order to maintain party status until the following election cycle, however, the
party must achieve ten percent of the total votes cast for certain offices. Okla.
Stat. tit. 26, § 1-109. If a party fails to achieve the required ten percent, it loses
its status as a party and becomes a “political organization” until it is able to
regain party status through the mechanisms described in § 1-108. Because the
LPO has never achieved the required ten percent, it consistently has lost its party
status in years following elections. Therefore, over the last two decades, the LPO
has managed to temporarily attain party status in the few months surrounding the
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elections but has not maintained it during the off years.
Our Article III standing jurisprudence requires that an actual controversy
exist at all stages of litigation, and that the parties to the litigation all have a
personal stake in its outcome. Because the LPO’s status was that of a political
organization rather than a political party when it brought the instant suit, there
exists some doubt as to the LPO’s standing to challenge a law that regulates
political parties. As to the injury requirement, the LPO must demonstrate that the
Oklahoma primary election statutes injure or threaten to injure the LPO. See
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The district court
found that “[t]he LPO is an active organization with political plans for the 2004
election cycle.” (R. at 23.) In addition, the LPO has been on the Oklahoma ballot
in every presidential election from 1980 to 2000 and had primary elections in
1980, 1996, and 2000.
Moreover, we allow claims when plaintiffs contest “wrongs capable of
repetition yet evading review.” See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n.5
(1973); see also Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514–515
(1911). One area in which the Supreme Court has applied this exception
frequently is election law. In Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969), for
example, the Court allowed plaintiffs to challenge a state law that required a
certain number of signatures to place an independent candidate’s name on the
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ballot. There, the Court concluded that the case was not moot because plaintiffs
might be expected to seek similar access to the ballot in the future, and thus the
wrong was capable of repetition yet evading review.
Similarly, in Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992), the Court allowed a
plaintiff to challenge a ballot-access law. Explaining why it allowed the
challenge despite the fact that the elections had already taken place, the Court
stated that “[t]here would be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a
similar, future controversy subject to identical time constraints if we should fail
to resolve the constitutional issues that arose in 1990.” Id.; see also First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774 (1978) (allowing plaintiffs
to challenge a law prohibiting corporations from spending money in elections
because the issue would likely arise in future elections).
The injury of which the LPO complains is similarly capable of repetition
yet evading review. Both of the necessary elements are present. With respect to
the injury’s tendency to evade review, as explained above, it has been impossible
to this point for the LPO to maintain its party status for more than a period of a
few months. Equally apparent is the likelihood that the injury will be repeated.
Although the LPO was not a political party at the time of its suit, it has a
consistent record of demonstrating the ability to achieve party status. Moreover,
the LPO intends to petition to regain full political party status for the 2004
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election cycle, and thus it is likely that there will be a primary election with
various LPO candidates competing for the right to stand for election. Indeed,
“[t]here would be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a similar,
future controversy subject to identical time constraints if we should fail to resolve
the constitutional issues.” Norman, 502 U.S. at 288. Accordingly, we conclude
that the LPO has standing to bring the instant suit.
B
Turning to the merits of the appeal, the LPO’s claim requires us to consider
the impact of the Oklahoma election laws upon its rights to free association and
speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. To this end, we must balance
the state’s authority to regulate elections with the freedom of political parties to
choose those with whom they will associate. The Constitution grants the states
the power to legislate the “Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives,” Art. I, § 4, cl. 1, and states have parallel control
over state elections. However, this general power alone “does not justify, without
more, the abridgment of fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, or, as here,
the freedom of political association.” Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479
U.S. 208, 217 (1986) (citation omitted).
The nature of the constitutional rights at stake in the instant case is
axiomatic; “[t]he freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth
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Amendments includes partisan political organization.” Id. at 214; see Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976) (plurality opinion); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 15 (1976). In this context, our conception of the freedom of association is not
simply an acknowledgment that individuals should be free to join or not join a
party. The associational rights of political parties are distinct; indeed, “[f]reedom
of association means not only that an individual voter has the right to associate
with the political party of her choice, but also that a political party has a right to
identify the people who constitute the association.” Eu v. San Francisco County
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 229 (1989) (citations omitted).
More recently, the Supreme Court reiterated:
In no area is the political association’s right to exclude more
important than in the process of selecting its nominee. That process
often determines the party’s positions on the most significant public
policy issues of the day, and even when those positions are
predetermined it is the nominee who becomes the party’s ambassador
to the general electorate in winning it over to the party’s views . . . .
[Thus we acknowledge] the special place the First Amendment
reserves for, and the special protection it accords, the process by
which a political party select[s] a standard bearer who best represents
the party’s ideologies and preferences.
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 575 (2000) (citations
omitted). Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that party “enrollment or
public affiliation with the Party itself is merely one element in the continuum of
participation in Party affairs, and need not be . . . the most important.” Tashjian,
479 U.S. at 215. In accordance with this precedent, the LPO claims that the
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Oklahoma statutes burden its right to determine the bounds of its association in its
quest for political success.
Having articulated the associational rights at stake, we must assess the
degree of the burden imposed on those rights by the current Oklahoma election
laws. To determine whether a state election law’s burden on associational rights
is impermissible:
a court . . . must first consider the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must
identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing
judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and
strength of each of those interests, it also must consider the extent to
which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s
rights.
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). More recently, the Supreme
Court clarified that if the burden is severe, the regulation must be narrowly
tailored and advance a compelling state interest; on the other hand, if we
determine the burden to be less severe, then important regulatory interests are
generally enough to justify the regulation. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New
Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358–59 (1997); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434
(1992).
We must therefore determine the magnitude of the burden that the
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Oklahoma statutes place on the LPO. 3 Of course, not every burden that state
regulations impose on associational rights in the election law context is a severe
one. See, e.g., Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432–34 (concluding that Hawaii’s ban on
write-in voting was not entitled to strict scrutiny). The Court has applied
intermediate scrutiny, for example, when the law’s restrictions were chiefly
administrative. See, e.g., Rosario, 410 U.S. at 760–62 (employing intermediate
scrutiny in evaluating a New York law that required voters to enroll in a political
party by a cutoff date).
However, when states have statutorily restricted parties from defining the
bounds of their own association, the Court has tended to employ strict scrutiny.
See, e.g., Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582 (2000); Eu, 489 U.S. 214, 225 (1989)
(requiring California’s election provisions prohibiting parties from endorsing
candidates in primaries to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest); Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 225 (1986); Democratic Party of the United States
3
This task is somewhat complicated by the fact that prior to Burdick, the
Court had not specifically articulated the need for a court to base its analysis on
whether the burden imposed by an election statute on constitutional rights was a
“severe” one. Thus, many cases do not use that terminology. In such prior cases,
however, the Court either generally was explicit in employing strict scrutiny or
intermediate scrutiny to evaluate the burdens imposed by election statutes on
associational rights. We thus rely on the type of scrutiny employed as a useful
proxy for purposes of determining whether the Court viewed the particular burden
as severe (if it applied strict scrutiny) or less substantial (if it used intermediate
scrutiny).
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v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 124 (1981) (applying strict
scrutiny when Wisconsin attempted to force the Democratic Party to accept its
system for selecting delegates to the national party convention); Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489 (1975) (using strict scrutiny to analyze whether
Illinois’ interest in determining the delegates at its primaries trumped parties’
associational rights); but see Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358–59 (employing
intermediate scrutiny when analyzing Minnesota’s prohibition of fusion
candidacies).
Most instructive to our present analysis are Tashjian and Jones; the facts in
the case before us place it squarely between those two cases. In Tashjian, the
Court considered Connecticut’s election statutes, which provided for an entirely
closed primary system. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 211. In other words, only voters
registered with a particular party could vote in that party’s primary; even
independents could not vote in Connecticut’s primaries. Id. Like the LPO in the
instant case, the Republican Party in Tashjian asserted that Connecticut’s election
statutes violated its First Amendment freedom of association rights by restricting
it from inviting certain registered voters to assist it in selecting its standard-
bearer. Id.
The Supreme Court explained that in order to trump the Republican Party’s
associational rights in this context, Connecticut’s regulation would need to be
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narrowly tailored to advance a compelling interest. Id. at 217. Deciding that
none of Connecticut’s asserted interests met strict scrutiny, the Court held that a
state could not restrict a party from inviting independent voters to participate in
its primary election absent a compelling state interest. 4 Id. at 229.
Almost two decades later in Jones, the Court analyzed California’s “blanket
primary” system, in which parties were required to allow voters to choose the
primaries in which they wanted to vote. Jones, 530 U.S. at 570. As directed by
Timmons, the Court analyzed the burden imposed by the California regulations
and concluded that it was severe. Id. at 581–82. Accordingly, it required
California to demonstrate that its regulations were narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling interest; concluding that none of the interests were sufficiently
compelling, the Court held that California’s primary system impermissibly
violated parties’ associational rights—more specifically, their ability to choose
4
Footnote 13 of Tashjian is relevant:
Our holding today does not establish that state regulation of primary
voting qualifications may never withstand challenge by a political
party or its membership. A party seeking, for example, to open its
primary to all voters, including members of other parties, would raise
a different combination of considerations. Under such
circumstances, the effect of one party’s broadening of participation
would threaten other parties with the disorganization effects which
the statutes in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974), and Rosario v.
Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973), were designed to prevent.
479 U.S. at 224 n.13. This case poses such circumstances.
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the group of people who selected their candidates. Id. at 586.
This case falls between Tashjian and Jones. Whereas Tashjian concluded
that states could not restrict parties from allowing independent voters to vote in
their primaries, and Jones held that states could not compel parties to allow voters
from other parties to vote in their primaries, the instant case asks whether it is
permissible for states to forbid parties from allowing registered voters from other
parties to participate in their primaries. 5
The similarities among Tashjian, Jones, and this case prove useful in our
analysis, as they demonstrate that state regulations can impair associational rights
either by compelling political association as in Jones, or by precluding political
association as in Tashjian. More generally, in both cases the Supreme Court
considered statutes that directly affected a political party’s freedom to set the
boundaries of the group of voters it would invite to help it select its standard-
bearer. To this end, the Court explained that a state generally may not “prevent
5
One of our sister circuits had occasion to consider a question similar to
the one before us. In Cool Moose Party v. Rhode Island, the First Circuit
analyzed Rhode Island’s election statute, which like Oklahoma’s, provided for a
semi-closed primary system. 183 F.3d 80, 82–83 (1st Cir. 1999). The First
Circuit held that Rhode Island’s semi-closed primary system impermissibly
violated the associational rights of the Cool Moose Party. That case is somewhat
distinguishable from the instant case, because Rhode Island apparently asserted
only an interest in protecting the Cool Moose Party from raiding and swamping.
Concluding that those interests did not trump the party’s associational rights, the
First Circuit held that Rhode Island’s primary system was unconstitutional.
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the parties from taking internal steps affecting their own process for the selection
of candidates.” Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224.
When read together, the clear and unavoidable implication of Tashjian and
Jones is that a state generally may not restrict the ability of a political party to
define the group of citizens that will choose its standard-bearer. 6 That conclusion
dictates the terms of our present analysis, for among Tashjian, Jones, and the
instant case runs a connecting thread. In each of the three cases, the regulation at
issue restricted the options of parties seeking to define the scope of their
associational rights. Faced with the prospect of such burdens in Tashjian and
Jones, the Supreme Court employed strict scrutiny. Given the similarities among
the cases, we are compelled to exercise similar vigilance here. Because we
conclude that the burden in the instant case is a severe one, we proceed to analyze
whether the regulations are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
Jones, 530 U.S. at 586.
Oklahoma sets forth the following four state interests in support of its
current primary election statutes: (1) protecting the LPO from “swamping” and
“raiding”; (2) preventing voter confusion; (3) minimizing administrative
difficulties; and (4) promoting and protecting “the integrity of the election
6
Analyzed in the context of related cases such as Eu and La Follette,
moreover, it is apparent that the Court closely scrutinizes almost all state
regulations that disrupt the decisionmaking processes of the parties.
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process,” which includes “preserving the political parties as viable and
identifiable interest groups, insuring that the results of a primary election . . .
accurately reflect the voting of the party members, and prevention of confusion or
misleading of the general electorate to the extent that the voting public often
relies on party labels to make their choice.” (R. at 68–69.)
With respect to Oklahoma’s interest in protecting the LPO from “raiding”
and “swamping,” the Supreme Court has concluded that it is not for the state to
determine what is in the best interests of a political party, explaining that “even if
the State were correct, a State, or a court, may not constitutionally substitute its
own judgment for that of the Party.” LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 122. Even though it
employed only intermediate scrutiny in analyzing Oklahoma’s interests, the
district court in the instant case rejected the asserted interest of protecting the
LPO. We agree that Oklahoma may not substitute its judgment for that of the
LPO, and thus that its interest in protecting the LPO from itself is not sufficiently
compelling to justify the burden on the LPO’s associational rights.
As to Oklahoma’s interests in avoiding voter confusion and administrative
difficulties, whether such interests could ever be sufficiently compelling to justify
a severe burden in any instance is a question that we need not decide. The district
court found that on the record before it, the state had not offered sufficient facts
to demonstrate even a substantial possibility of either confusion or administrative
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problems. With respect to voter confusion, it found that the LPO’s exhibits
clearly showed that “simple rules for voting eligibility can be posted at polling
places when the primary and runoff elections are conducted,” (R. at 75), thus
eliminating the possibility of confusion. We owe deference to the district court
on these findings of fact and conclude that the findings were not clearly
erroneous. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573.
Regarding the specter of administrative problems raised by Oklahoma, the
district court found that Oklahoma had introduced into the record “no basis for a
finding that the implementation of a party-open primary system would create
insuperable administrative burdens.” (R. at 76.) We are unable to locate any
evidence in the record that administrative difficulties would ensue under the
LPO’s proposed system; therefore, we conclude that the district court’s finding
that Oklahoma failed to show that administrative problems would occur if it
implemented the LPO’s proposed primary scheme was not clear error. See
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573.
Thus, we turn finally to Oklahoma’s asserted interest in “protecting the
integrity of the political process . . . [by] preserving the political parties as viable
and identifiable interest groups, [and] insuring that the results of a primary
election . . . accurately reflect the voting of the party members.” (R. at 68–69.)
This interest might be separated into two distinct interests—preserving political
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stability as a general matter, and protecting the non-LPO parties from the
“poaching” of their voters by the LPO.
As to Oklahoma’s general interest in political stability, the Supreme Court
held in Timmons that though states may not “completely insulate the two-party
system from minor parties’ or independent candidates’ competition and
influence,” 520 U.S. at 367, a state’s interest in the stability of its political system
is strong. In the ballot access context, moreover, the Court described a state’s
interest in political stability as “not only permissible, but compelling.” Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974).
We grant that a state has a compelling interest in political stability as a
general matter, but our task is to examine whether “in the circumstances of this
case, [that interest is] compelling.” Jones, 530 U.S. at 584. In Jones, for
example, California asserted state interests in promoting fairness, affording voters
greater choice, increasing voter participation, and protecting privacy. The Court
recognized that theoretically, those interests might be compelling; however, it
explained that the determination of whether they were compelling in any
particular case was “not to be made in the abstract, by asking whether fairness,
privacy, etc., are highly significant values; but rather by asking whether the aspect
of fairness, privacy, etc., addressed by the law at issue is highly significant.” Id.
In Eu, California asserted that its regulation forbidding parties from
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endorsing candidates was justified by its compelling state interest in political
stability. Alhough conceding that a state’s interest in political stability was
compelling as a general matter, the Court held that California had not
demonstrated that the interest was compelling in the circumstances of that case.
It explained that “[m]aintaining a stable political system is, unquestionably, a
compelling state interest. California, however, never adequately explains how
banning parties from endorsing or opposing primary candidates advances that
interest.” Eu, 489 U.S. at 226 (citation omitted).
Our determination of whether Oklahoma’s interest in political stability is
sufficiently compelling in the instant case begins with the Supreme Court’s
comparison of the statute in Storer, 415 U.S. at 736, which considered a
California statute forbidding a ballot position to an independent candidate who
“had a registered affiliation with [a] political party at any time within one year
prior to the immediately preceding primary election,” to Connecticut’s closed
primary system in Tashjian, the latter of which is much more closely analogous to
the Oklahoma regulations at issue. The Court articulated:
The statute in Storer was designed to protect the parties and the party
system against the disorganizing effect of independent candidacies
launched by unsuccessful putative party nominees. This protection
[was] undertaken to prevent the disruption of the political parties
from without, and not, as in this case, to prevent the parties from
taking internal steps affecting their own process for the selection of
candidates . . . . The Party’s determination of the boundaries of its
own association, and of the structure which best allows it to pursue
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its political goals, is protected by the Constitution.
Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224 (citation omitted).
On its face, the Court’s language suggests that Oklahoma’s interest in
protecting the integrity of the political process is insufficiently compelling. After
all, the regulation at issue here “prevent[s] the parties from taking internal steps
affecting their own process for the selection of candidates.” Id. However,
Tashjian specifically disclaimed in footnote 13 that such a conclusion necessarily
followed from its holding, suggesting that a case like the one before us would
“raise a different combination of considerations . . . [by] threaten[ing] other
parties with [] disorganization effects.” Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224 n.13.
We are mindful that footnote 13 of Tashjian counsels caution; in so
proceeding, however, we ultimately conclude that Oklahoma’s interest on this
record and in the circumstances of this case is not a compelling one. Finding the
interest in protecting the integrity of the political process to be sufficiently
important, the district court relied on evidence that close to twenty-four percent of
Oklahoma’s primaries were decided by a margin of five percent or less in 2000.
(R. at 63.) Those numbers in hand, it hypothesized that the LPO’s proposed
party-option open primary might result in enough cross-over to change some
election results and that the integrity of the political system would thereby be
undermined. (Id.)
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We acknowledge that the district court’s hypothetical might come to
fruition. To be sure, some election results might change if Oklahoma switches
from a semi-closed primary system to a party-option open primary system. It may
be the very possibility of such change that impels the litigation before us. What
is less clear, and what Oklahoma fails to demonstrate, is why a few changed
outcomes in tightly contested primaries would undermine the integrity of the
political process, or how somewhat altered election results would diminish
Oklahoma’s political stability.
Relevant to our analysis of whether Oklahoma’s interest in political
stability is compelling under these circumstances is that the system urged by the
LPO is already in place in two states. Specifically, Utah 7 and Alaska 8 currently
employ a party-option open primary, and in neither state has there been a report of
instability in the political process. We grant that a state has a compelling interest
in general political stability, but the fact that neither Utah nor Alaska has
collapsed under the weight of its allegedly destabilizing primary system calls into
question whether Oklahoma’s interest in political stability is implicated under
these circumstances.
In analyzing Oklahoma’s asserted interest in political stability and viability
7
See Utah Code Ann. § 20A-9-403.
8
See Alaska Stat. § 15-25-010.
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of the political parties, the district court also seemed concerned with protecting
the non-LPO parties from “poaching” by the LPO. In worrying about the impact
upon the associational rights of the other Oklahoma parties of allowing the LPO
to open its primary to registered members of those parties, the district court
explained that Oklahoma’s statutes were justifiable in part because they “bar a
party from poaching another party’s primary election voters.” (R. at 82.)
It is true, as Oklahoma asserts, that at first blush this case appears to
require us to consider both the associational rights of the LPO and those of the
other parties in Oklahoma, each of which is virtually certain to be affected to
some degree by a change in the statute. It would effect a strange result indeed to
protect some associational rights at the direct expense of others, and if allowing
the LPO to choose to invite members of the Republican and Democratic parties to
vote in the LPO’s primary election burdened the corresponding associational
rights of the Republican and Democratic parties, this would be a different case.
Such an argument, however, reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the
freedom of association, which at its core protects against state regulations that:
(1) preclude association, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622
(1984); or (2) “force[] inclusion of an unwanted person in a group,” Boy Scouts
of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). By finding protection against
poaching of other parties’ voters to justify the regulations at issue, the district
-23-
court effectively would add a new associational right that has to this point been
absent from constitutional discussion—the ability of a group to harness and
control the associational opportunities of its members.
Parties may assuredly guard their associational rights against forced
inclusion of unwanted people, see, e.g., Jones; such an option is readily available
under the LPO’s proposed alternatives, for parties may choose not to open their
primary elections to members of other parties under a party-option open primary
scheme. We cannot conclude, however, that the associational rights asserted by
the LPO in this case are counterbalanced by any associational rights of parties
seeking to restrict the associational opportunities of their registered members.
Moreover, any concern that the Republican and Democratic parties might
have for losing voters to the LPO primary elections overlooks the countervailing
consideration that allowing Oklahoma’s voters additional choices in primary
voting promotes the associational rights of the individual voters within those
parties. In this regard, to allow the LPO to invite registered voters of other
parties to participate in their primaries not only advances the associational
interests of the members of the LPO, but it also allows voters the benefit of
choosing a primary.
III
Absent a clearer demonstration of political instability than the one present
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in the record before us, we conclude that Oklahoma’s current election statutes are
not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest. Because Oklahoma’s
semi-closed primary scheme does not survive our strict scrutiny, we REVERSE
the district court’s denial of the LPO’s request for a permanent injunction and
REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Beaver v. Clingman
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2004-04-06
Citations: 363 F.3d 1048
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