Belding v. Pitkin

THOMPSON, J.

delivered the opinion of the court. We think the plaintiff’s demand cannot be supported. Although the caso is somewhat obscurely drawn, we assume, as facts admitted, that the claim possessed by the testator, Pitkin, to the township of land in Luzerne county, in Pennsylvania, was nothing more than what is usually called the Connecticut claim, and that there was an adverse possession under the Pennsylvania title, at the time of the sale made to Maxwell. In this we are warranted, because the counsel on the argument *have so considered the case. Under this statement, the sale to Maxwell was illegal, and would fall under the denomination of maintenance. This court have gone the length of saying they will judicially recognize the situation of that county, and will not enforce contracts relative to the sale of the Connecticut claim. If the sale by Pitkin would have been illegal, we are unable to discover how it could be legalized by his agent, or broker. It is too salutary and well settled a principle to be in any measure infringed, that courts of justice ought not to assist an illegal transaction in any respect. To sustain the present action, would be in some degree ratifying, countenancing and sanctioning an illegal contract. It is a first principle, and not to be touched, that a contract, in order to be binding, must be lawful. Whenever the consideration, which is the ground of the promise, or the promise, which is the effect, or consequence, of the consideration, is unlawful, the whole contract is void. In the present case, the object and consequence of the agreement was the sale of the pretended title. This being illegal the promise to divide the spoil was of course illegal, and not to be enforced. All contracts that have a fraudulent object in view, are void, both at law and in equity. It is also laid down by Powell, in his Treatise on Contracts, as an established principle, that all contracts are void that are of an unfair nature in respect to their influence on third persons, although otherwise as between the parties to them; because if their object be to impose on third persons, the parties to them cannot have remedy at law, or in equity, for they are immoral. If the consideration money for this pretended claim had been paid to the plaintiff, neither a court of law, or equity, would have aided the defendant in recovering it from him. This is, therefore, a case to which ihe maxim melior esl conditio possidentis must be applied, and judgment as in case of nonsuit entered.