This is an action for a declaratory judgment determining the marital status of the parties to this appeal. In issue is the validity of "a decree of divorce obtained by the defendant wife in. Las Vegas, Nevada, on December 20, 1951. The trial court granted judgment, in accordance with the prayer of the complaint, that the divorce was void, that defendant never acquired a bona fide domicile in Nevada, and that the parties’ marriage had never been dissolved. Defendant' appeals.
Appellant does not question the power of the court to pronounce judgment declaratory of the parties’ rights and legal relations (Civ. Prac. Act, § 473; Baumann v. Baumann, 222 App. Div. 460, affd. 250 N. Y. 382; Lowe v. Lowe, 265 N. Y. 197; Long v. Long, 281 App. Div. 254). But it is urged in her brief that “ it is the public policy of New York State to refuse to recognize judgments of courts of other states * * * where it is established that the court of the foreign state did not have jurisdiction of the non-resident party to such action. It is equally true that such policy of New York State is only exercised for the protection of its own citizens who are domiciled in this State.” Several cases are then cited, all of which except Engel v. Engel (275 App. Div. 14), which is actually in support of respondent’s position, were decided prior to the two decisions in Williams v. North Carolina (317 U. S. 287; 325 U. S. 226) at
But the question remains whether, granting the invalidity of the foreign decree, our courts in the exercise of a reasonable discretion should decline to grant a declaratory judgment (Rules Civ. Prac., rule 212). That would be true if the case were none of our concern — if there were no substantial contacts with New York. However, the following points of contact are sufficient to sustain the trial court’s discretionary decision to declare the marital status of the parties: (1) plaintiff and defendant were married in New York; (2) this State was for a time the matrimonial domicile; (3) defendant has continuously been a domiciliary of New York since 1950; (4) she married her present husband in Buffalo and lives with him there; (5) the children of her marriage with plaintiff live with her in New York, (6) plaintiff, although not a domiciliary of this State at the time of the divorce which he seeks to declare invalid, has resided here continuously since December, 1952, and was apparently domiciled in New York when he commenced this action and certainly at the time of judgment. In short, the judgment declares the status of New York domiciliaries. (See Engel v. Engel, 275 App. Div. 14, supra; cf. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 A D 2d 3; Bata v. Bata, 304 N. Y. 51; Civ. Prac. Act, § 1165-a; 18 Carmody-Wait on New York Practice, p. 268, § 144.) No State except New York has any interest in the status of the parties, and as a practical matter, there is no other forum available. In our opinion, if the trial court had declined to entertain this suit, it would have been a serious abuse of discretion.
Judgment insofar as appealed from affirmed, without costs of this appeal to either party.