Bingham Township v. RLTD Railroad

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________

C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh

Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

FILED APRIL 18, 2001

THE TOWNSHIP OF BINGHAM,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 115602

RLTD RAILROAD CORPORATION and

LEELANAU TRAILS ASSOCIATION,

INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________________

PER CURIAM

This is a dispute between a township and proponents of a

“rails to trails” recreational pathway that passes through the

township. The Court of Appeals has twice found that the

township’s zoning ordinance is preempted by laws that govern

such pathways. We reverse the judgment of the Court of

Appeals and remand this case to circuit court for further

proceedings.

This case concerns a former rail line that, roughly

speaking, extends from Traverse City to Suttons Bay. The

right of way in Leelanau County is about one hundred feet wide

and about fifteen miles long.1 Until the late 1970s, the

Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad provided freight service along

this corridor.2

“Abandonment” of a rail line is a term that has a

specific meaning under federal and state transportation law.3

In common parlance, however, one may say that this rail line

has been abandoned since the early 1990s, when a tourist

railroad ceased operation.4

At the time this litigation arose, the owner of the

corridor was RLTD Railroad Corporation, which was in the

process of selling the property (on land contract) to the

Leelanau Trails Association, Inc. The association’s intent

was to construct and maintain a “rails to trails” recreational

pathway for hikers, runners, bicyclists, and others.

From the materials at hand, it appears that the sale has

been completed. The record is less clear regarding the

present status of the pathway, but we gather that it has been

1
At oral argument, counsel for the township explained

that the pathway is slated to be joined with a similar tract

in Grand Traverse County, creating a renamed trail of greater

length.

2
We are told that passenger service ended in 1948.

3
See RLTD R Corp v Surface Transportation Bd, 166 F3d

808, 810-811 (CA 6, 1999).

4
For several years in the early 1990s, the tourist line

carried sightseers back and forth.

at least partially open to the public for several years.

The project had opponents. Some lived in Bingham

Township, through which the rail line passed. Backers of the

project apparently had indicated that as many as sixty or

seventy thousand persons might use the pathway each year, and

opponents were concerned about the potential effect of such

traffic.

In September 1995, RLTD filed a petition with the Surface

Transportation Board,5 seeking to formally abandon this

stretch of track. The association filed on the same day a

statement of its willingness to assume control of the line.6

However, the eventual result of those proceedings was a

determination that the federal board lacked jurisdiction.

RLTD R Corp v Surface Transportation Bd, 166 F3d 808 (CA 6,

1999).

While the federal matter was under way, Bingham Township

filed a February 1996 complaint against RLTD and the

association. The township alleged a dispute regarding the

extent of its zoning authority over the project, and asked for

a declaration of rights and a preliminary injunction against

the project.

Jointly represented, the defendants moved for summary

Actually, the petition was filed with the Interstate

Commerce Commission, which no longer exists. The matter was

transferred to the Surface Transportation Board. See RLTD,

n 3 supra at 810 and 811, n 2.

In February 1995, the Michigan Department of

Transportation and the Michigan Department of Natural

Resources had declined to purchase the former rail corridor.

disposition. MCR 2.116(C)(8), (10). In their motion, the

defendants stated that the township’s zoning ordinance is

preempted by federal law. The defendants’ supporting brief

also mentions state law, but the focus of the brief is

likewise on federal law.

The circuit court denied the request for preliminary

injunction and granted the defendants’ motion for summary

disposition.7 The court found that the township’s zoning

ordinance was preempted, though the court noted “certain

important caveats”--
--matters pertaining to public health and

safety are subject to the authority of local government.

In its ruling, the circuit court noted the Michigan

trailways act, which is Part 721 of the Natural Resources and

Environmental Protection Act.8 MCL 324.72101 et seq.; MSA

13A.72101 et seq. However, the court’s opinion reflected the

assumption that the proceedings before the Surface

Transportation Board would lead to federal oversight of the

project.

Several days later, the township filed a motion to

clarify. In response, the circuit court entered a final

judgment declaring that “the Defendants’ proposed trail

construction and operation is not subject to Plaintiff’s

The court discussed the differing standards for

granting motions under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), but did

not explicitly state the paragraph under which the motion was

being granted.

8
MCL 324.101 et seq.; MSA 13A.101 et seq.

zoning code or master plan . . . .”9

After the township filed its claim of appeal in the Court

of Appeals, the Surface Transportation Board ruled that it was

without jurisdiction. This decision was later upheld on

appeal. RLTD, supra.10

In February 1998, the Court of Appeals affirmed the

judgment of the circuit court. 228 Mich App 154, 155; 576

NW2d 731 (1998). The Court of Appeals explained its decision

by noting the Legislature’s strong interest in this sort of

recreational project:

The Legislature has repeatedly exercised its

authority over the development of rail-trails. For

example, in the State Transportation Preservation

Act of 1976, the Legislature expressly stated that

“[t]he preservation of abandoned railroad rights of

way for future rail use and their interim use as

public trails is declared to be a public purpose.”

MCL 474.51(3); MSA 22.180(21)(3). The Legislature

later adopted the Michigan trailways act, MCL

324.72102; MSA 13A.72102, in which it again stated

that the acquisition, development, and maintenance

of Michigan trailways is in the best interest of

the state and is declared to be a public purpose.3

Recently, the Legislature passed an appropriations

bill for the Michigan Department of Transportation

identifying certain rail lines, including the one

at issue here, as “essential corridors” to the

state’s transportation infrastructure. 1995 PA

9
Consistent with its earlier ruling, the court added

that “the Defendants’ proposed trail is subject to other

reasonable regulation in the interest of public health, safety

and welfare.”

10
Perhaps believing that the federal decision undercut

the basis of circuit court’s ruling, the township amended its

zoning ordinance in early 1997. RLTD and the association say

in this Court that setback requirements and other features of

the amended ordinance would have the effect of destroying the

corridor by carving it into small segments. The township says

that its ordinance has been amended again, and would create no

such problem.

133, § 708.

In light of the state’s repeated expression of

intent to establish and maintain such trailways, we

find that giving local authorities the power to

impose their individual zoning schemes over these

interjurisdictional transportation corridors would

frustrate the Legislature’s intent to preserve

essential rail corridors and to allow for rail
trail transformations. Indeed, if every governing

body along a transportation corridor had the right

to exercise its individual zoning authority on the

rail-trail, construction and maintenance of such

transportation corridors would be virtually

impossible. In this conflict between state law and

plaintiff’s effort to zone the property in

question, we hold that plaintiff’s zoning

ordinances are preempted. [228 Mich App 158-159.]

___________________________________________________
3
MCL 324.72102; MSA 13A.72102 provides:

The legislature finds and declares that a

statewide system of trailways will provide for

public enjoyment, health, and fitness; encourage

constructive leisure-time activities; protect open

space, cultural and historical resources, and

habitat for wildlife and plants; enhance the local

and state economies; link communities, parks, and

natural resources; create opportunities for rural
urban exchange, agricultural education, and the

marketing of farm products; and preserve corridors

for possible future use for other public purposes.

Therefore, the planning, acquisition, development,

operation, and maintenance of Michigan trailways is

in the best interest of the state and is declared

to be a public purpose.

__________________________________________________

In a footnote, the Court of Appeals agreed with Judge Rodgers

that the township does retain some authority with regard to

issues of health and safety.11

We agree with the circuit court that

defendants and users of the trailway are subject to

reasonable local regulation which is in the

interest of public health, safety, and welfare.

See MCL 324.72103(1)(b); MSA 13A.72103(1)(b) (To

qualify as a Michigan trailway, “[t]he design and

When the township applied to this Court for leave to

appeal, we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals “to

determine whether and how the regulatory provisions of the

Michigan trailways act, MCL 324.72101 et seq.; MSA 13A.72101

et seq., . . . apply to the land corridor in question.”12 460

Mich 868 (1999).

On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed. 237 Mich

App 538; 603 NW2d 795 (1999). It found that the Michigan

trailways act does apply. 237 Mich App 543-546. From there,

the Court explained that the trailways act preempts local

zoning control of a “Michigan trailway.” 237 Mich App 546

552. In that fashion, the Court reached this conclusion:

The MTA anticipates a process in which a

trailway becomes a designated “Michigan trailway.”

maintenance of the trailway and its related

facilities [must] meet generally accepted standards

of public safety”). These regulations may, for

example, provide for the enforcement of criminal

and civil laws, construction and maintenance of

fencing, and limitation of noise. We further note

that the Michigan Trailways Act repeatedly

emphasizes the Legislature’s desire that the public

purpose in a statewide system of trailways be

balanced with the interests of surrounding

landowners and residents. See, e.g., MCL

324.72103(1)(j); MSA 13A.72103(1)(j), MCL

324.72103(3); MSA 13A.72103(3). We strongly

encourage the parties to work together to meet

these common goals. [228 Mich App 159, n 4.]

12
Our order also directed the Court of Appeals “to

determine whether and how the regulatory provisions of the

. . . State Transportation Preservation Act, MCL 474.51 et

seq.; MSA 22.180(21) et seq., apply to the land corridor in

question.” On remand, the Court of Appeals found that the

STPA did not apply because the land is not owned by the

Department of Transportation. 237 Mich App 542-543. Neither

side has appealed that determination, and so the applicability

of this act is no longer at issue.

During this process, local zoning cannot be

permitted to frustrate the Legislature’s clearly

expressed intent to encourage the development of

such interjurisdictional trailways. Accordingly,

we conclude, as we did in our original opinion,

that “[i]n this conflict between state law and

plaintiff’s effort to zone the property in question

. . . plaintiff’s zoning ordinances are preempted.”

Bingham Twp, supra [228 Mich App] 159. [237 Mich

App 552-553.]

For a second time, the township applied to this Court,

and we granted leave to appeal. 462 Mich 902 (2000). In our

order, we invited briefing on “the issue of whether and how

the Michigan trailways act, MCL 324.72101 et seq.; MSA

13A.72101 et seq., or local zoning ordinances apply to

abandoned railroad corridors.”

As indicated, the circuit court did not state whether it

granted the defendants’ motion for summary disposition under

MCR 2.116(C)(8) or (10). However, “summary disposition under

either MCR 2.116(C)(8) or (10) will always present an issue of

law for our determination . . . .” and thus “[w]e review a

trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition de

novo.” Straus v Governor, 459 Mich 526, 533; 592 NW2d 53

(1999).

This case also presents a question of statutory

interpretation, which we likewise decide de novo. Kent Co

Deputy Sheriffs Ass’n v Kent Co Sheriff, 463 Mich 353, 357,

n 8; 617 NW2d 533 (2000); Howell Twp v Rooto Corp, 463 Mich

347, 352, n 10; 617 NW2d 533 (2000).

III

As stated above, the holding of the Court of Appeals that

the township’s zoning authority is preempted is grounded in

its determination that the Michigan trailways act applies to

the disputed trail.

In turn, that determination was reached after reference

to the statutory definitions of a “trailway”:

“Trailway” means a land corridor that features

a broad trail capable of accommodating a variety of

public recreation uses. [MCL 324.72101(f); MSA

13A.72101(f).]

and “Michigan trailway”:

“Michigan trailway” means a trailway

designated by the commission[13] pursuant to section

72103. [MCL 324.72101(e); MSA 13A.72101(e).]

The Legislature has, in this definition, clearly provided

that a Michigan trailway is a trailway designated by the

Commission of Natural Resources under MCL 324.72103; MSA

13A.72103. That provision outlines both a process that

includes a public hearing14 and a wide variety of substantive

requirements for a proposed trailway.15 237 Mich App 543-545.

13
“[T]he commission” is the Commission of Natural

Resources. MCL 324.301(a); MSA 13A.301(a).

14
MCL 324.72103(2); MSA 13A.72103(2).

Upon petition by any person or on its own

motion, the commission may designate a trailway in

this state as a “Michigan trailway.” The petition

or motion shall propose permitted uses of the

trailway. The commission shall not designate a

trailway as a Michigan trailway unless it meets, or

will meet when completed, all of the following

requirements:

(a) The land on which the trailway is located

is owned by the state or a governmental agency, or

otherwise is under the long-term control of the

state or a governmental agency through a lease,

easement, or other arrangement. If the land is

owned by a governmental agency, the commission

shall obtain the consent of the governmental agency

before designating the land as part of a Michigan

trailway.

(b) The design and maintenance of the trailway

and its related facilities meet generally accepted

standards of public safety.

for its designated recreation uses.

(d) The trailway is available for designated

recreation uses on a nondiscriminatory basis.

(e) The trailway is a multiuse trail suitable

for use by pedestrians, by people with

disabilities, and by other users, as appropriate.

(f) The trailway is, or has potential to be, a

segment of a statewide network of trailways, or it

attracts a substantial share of its users from

beyond the local area.

(g) The trailway is marked with an official

Michigan trailway sign and logo at major access

points.

(h) The trailway is not directly attached to a

roadway, except at roadway crossings.

(i) Where feasible, the trailway offers

adequate support facilities for the public,

including parking, sanitary facilities, and

emergency telephones, that are accessible to people

with disabilities and are at reasonable frequency

along the trailway.

(j) Potential negative impacts of trailway

development on owners or residents of adjacent

property are minimized through all of the

following:

(i) Adequate enforcement of trailway rules and

regulations.

As counsel for RLTD and the association conceded at oral

argument, the former rail line has never been designated a

“Michigan trailway.” Indeed, no such petition has ever been

filed.16

Notwithstanding the lack of designation, the Court of

Appeals found the statute applicable on the ground that the

statutory language reveals that “the Legislature has

contemplated an ongoing process by which trailways are

developed and eventually obtain ‘Michigan trailway’ status.”

237 Mich App 545. The Court noted that the Legislature

permitted a “Michigan trailway” designation to be applied if

the trailway “meets or will meet when completed” the

requirements set forth in MCL 324.72103(1)(a)-(k); MSA

13A.72103(1)(a)-(k).

The Court of Appeals is correct that the Legislature has

anticipated that the requirements for designation as a

(ii) Continuation of access for trailway

crossings for agricultural and other purposes.

(iii) Construction and maintenance of fencing,

where necessary, by the owner or operator of the

trailway.

(iv) Other means as considered appropriate by

the commission.

(k) Other conditions by the commission. [MCL

324.72103(1); MSA 13A.72103(1).]

16
Counsel explained, from his clients’ perspective, the

reasons for not filing. They related to perceived

difficulties in gaining the support of other townships for the

formation of a “Michigan trailway management council,” MCL

324.72106; MSA 13A.72106, and the prospects for achieving

governmental control of the pathway, as required by MCL

324.72103(1)(a); MSA 13A.72103(1)(a).

“Michigan trailway” might not be met all at once, and that

they need not have been met at time of the petition or even at

the time of designation. However, that sort of flexible

approach--
--a legislative recognition that fulfillment of the

requirements can be a long process--
--does not mean that the

Legislature made the statute applicable to pathways that lack

the designation. Indeed, the legislation anticipates the

opposite. By permitting designation before the statutory

requirements are met and before the trailway is completed, the

Legislature removed any need to offer special protection to

undesignated trailways.

The Court of Appeals said that, though the corridor had

not yet received the “Michigan trailway” designation, “it is

making progress toward this goal, and thus it is appropriate

to apply the regulatory provisions contained in the [statute]

to the trailway.” 237 Mich App 546. That is not what the

legislation provides. The Legislature has made the “Michigan

trailway” designation broadly available--
--even to incomplete

trailways that will later meet statutory requirements--
--and we

find in the language of the statute no basis for applying the

statute to a trailway that has not received the designation.17

17
In summary, the association has neither applied for nor

achieved trailway designation; no government entity has yet

accepted or indicated a willingness to accept the property

proposed for the trailway, a precondition upon which

designation depends; there is no apparent support among the

relevant jurisdictions for the formation of the necessary

“trailway management council”; there have been no public

hearings to determine the extent to which the proposed

trailway can satisfy such statutory requirements as those

relating to public safety, designated recreation uses, and

Because the statute is not applicable, there is no need

to determine whether it preempts the zoning authority of the

township. Neither must we address alternative theories

advanced by the parties and the amici curiae in support of

their respective views of local zoning authority over this

former rail corridor.

For these reasons, we reverse the judgments of the Court

of Appeals and the circuit court, and we remand this case to

the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. MCR 7.302(F)(1).

CORRIGAN , C.J., and CAVANAGH , WEAVER , KELLY , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and

MARKMAN , JJ., concurred.

adequate support facilities; there have been no public

hearings to determine how the proposed trailway can best

minimize any adverse impact upon adjoining property owners and

agriculture; and the Commission of Natural Resources has had

no opportunity to determine whether there are any “other

conditions” that ought to be satisfied in the course of

designating the trailway.