Attorney for Appellant Attorney for Appellee
John L. Tompkins
Steve Carter
Indianapolis, IN Attorney General of
Indiana
Indianapolis, IN
____________________________________________________________________________
__
In the
Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________
No. 49S02-0312-CR-603
Charles Black,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
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Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49G20-0112CF-225279
The Honorable William Young, Judge
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On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-0207-
CR-548
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June 24, 2004
Sullivan, Justice.
Defendant Charles Black was arrested at an auto repair shop after
having parked and exited his car. A police search of the vehicle yielded
contraband. He contends the search violated his rights under the Fourth
Amendment to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The United
States Supreme Court held in a 1981 decision that when a police officer has
made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile, the Fourth
Amendment allows the officer to search the passenger compartment of that
vehicle as a contemporaneous incident of arrest. New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 460 (1981). In a new decision, the high court has held that
Belton's rule is not limited to situations where the officer makes contact
with the occupant while the occupant is inside the vehicle, but that it
applies as well if the officer first makes contact with the arrestee after
the latter has stepped out of his vehicle. Thornton v. United States, 124
S.Ct. 2127, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3681 (May 24, 2004).
Background
On December 3, 2001, Indianapolis Police Department Narcotics
Detective Anthony Farrell, accompanied by another detective and relying on
information from a third detective that defendant Charles Black was dealing
cocaine from an automobile on a city street, initiated surveillance of the
defendant. Farrell testified as to his observations during the
surveillance:
Mr. Black was standing on the sidewalk, which would be on the
passenger side of the vehicle in question, with anywhere from 2 to 4
other people at various times. On numerous occasions there would be
individuals walk up, separate individuals walk up to Mr. Black. Mr.
Black would speak to them very briefly, he would go over to the
driver’s side of the gold vehicle. He would get inside the vehicle
for a very brief amount of time. He would then step out of the
vehicle. Walk back to the sidewalk. Have a brief exchange with the
individuals who had approached him. And those individuals would
leave.
(R. at 26.)
Farrell had checked defendant’s driver’s license earlier that day and
was aware that it had been suspended for a prior offense.[1] Upon
observing defendant get into his vehicle and drive away, Farrell notified
District Officers Jeff Kelly and Andrew Branham that defendant was driving
on a suspended license and that they should initiate a traffic stop. A
uniformed officer got behind defendant but was unable to make an immediate
traffic stop due to heavy traffic.
Defendant drove on to an auto repair shop's parking lot, got out of
his vehicle, and requested an oil change and the installation of an auto
alarm. Shortly thereafter uniformed officers in marked police vehicles
pulled on to the garage parking lot. When asked, defendant admitted to
Kelley that he had an invalid driver’s license.
Farrell testified that he arrived shortly thereafter, at which time
the officers on the scene had arrested the defendant for driving while
suspended and were placing him in handcuffs. Farrell read defendant his
Miranda warnings. Farrell checked the vehicle’s registration and
discovered that it was registered to defendant.
Two uniformed officers began to search the vehicle, one from the
driver’s side and the other from the passenger’s side. During this cursory
search, the officer on the driver’s side failed to discover any contraband;
the officer on the passenger’s side of the vehicle was still engaged in the
search. Farrell testified that he had “specific knowledge” that defendant
kept his cocaine underneath the steering column or just below the steering
column. Farrell joined the search and immediately found what turned out to
be cocaine.
The State charged defendant with dealing in cocaine, a Class A felony,
possession of cocaine, a Class C felony, and driving while suspended, a
Class A misdemeanor. Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine found in his
car. The trial court denied the motion. On interlocutory appeal, the
Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the denial of defendant’s motion to
suppress, finding that the search of defendant’s car did not violate his
Fourth Amendment rights. Black v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1061, 1066 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003), transfer granted, 804 N.E.2d 760 (Ind. 2003). Judge Riley
dissented.
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals and Judge Riley’s
dissent debate the availability to the State in this case of an “automobile
exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Because a new
decision by the United States Supreme court controls the outcome of this
case, we do not address this issue.
Discussion
The Fourth Amendment provides all citizens with the “right . . . to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures . . .” U.S. Const. Amen. IV. This “fundamental
right” is protected by the requirement that a warrant be issued by a
neutral judicial officer prior to a search being conducted. California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985); Belton, 435 U.S. at 457. In general, the
Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches. Vehorn v. State, 717
N.E.2d 869, 875 (Ind. 1999); Berry v. State, 704 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ind.
1998). There are, however, exceptions to the warrant requirement. Carney,
471 U.S. at 390. If the search is conducted without a warrant, the burden
is upon the state to prove that, at the time of the search, an exception to
the warrant requirement existed. Vehorn, 717 N.E.2d at 875.
Subsequent to our taking jurisdiction and holding oral argument in
this case, the United States Supreme Court decided Thornton v. United
States, 124 S.Ct. 2127, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3681 (May 24, 2004). We find
Thornton dispositive and hold that the present circumstances constitute a
constitutionally valid search incident to a lawful arrest.
A search incident to arrest is a well-recognized exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113
(1998); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); United States v. Edwards,
415 U.S. 800 (1974). In Belton, the Supreme Court held that once a police
officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile,
the Fourth Amendment allows the officer to search the passenger compartment
of that vehicle as a contemporaneous incident of arrest. 453 U.S. at 460.
Unresolved after Belton was whether its rule was limited to situations
where the officer makes contact with the occupant while the occupant is
inside the of all, or whether it applies as well when the officer first
makes contact with the person arrested after the latter has stepped out of
his vehicle.
In Thornton, the court concluded that Belton governed even when a
police officer does not make contact until the person arrested has left the
vehicle. The court explained:
In all relevant aspects, the arrest of a suspect who is next to
a vehicle presents identical concerns regarding officer safety and the
destruction of evidence as the arrest of one who is inside the
vehicle. An officer may search a suspect’s vehicle under Belton only
if the suspect is arrested. A custodial arrest is fluid and “the
danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and
its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty,” … The stress is no
less merely because the arrestee exited his car before the officer
initiated contact, nor is an arrestee less likely to attempt to lunge
for a weapon or to destroy evidence if he is outside of but still in
control of, the vehicle. In either case, the officer faces a highly
volatile situation. It would make little sense to apply two different
rules to what is at bottom, the same situation.
124 S.Ct. 2127, 2131, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3681 at *12-13 (citations omitted,
emphasis appears in original opinion).
In this case, officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant
lawfully because he was operating a motor vehicle while his license was
suspended. Defendant admitted to having an invalid license and does not
challenge the legality of his arrest. The subsequent search of defendant's
vehicle was a contemporaneous incident of his arrest and clearly
permissible under Thornton.
Conclusion
Having previously granted transfer pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule
58(A), we now affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to
suppress.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.
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[1]Defendant does not challenge that his driver’s license was suspended at
that time.