(after stating the facts as above). [1] The enormous record in the case, consisting as it does of about 25,000 printed pages, renders it wholly impracticable to review the evidence in detail. We have, however, given the record the careful consideration the importance of the case demands and deserves. Upon every essential point relied upon by the complainant the evidence is conflicting in the extreme sense. We regret that it is not practicable to set forth examples of this, and, indeed, undertook to do so, but found that it could not be done with any reasonable limit to the opinion. We shall •therefore confine ourselves to a brief statement of the reasons upon which we base our judgment. While there is much evidence on behalf of the complainant tending to sustain his allegations in respect to the damage done to his land and stock by emanations from the defendants’ smelter, as well as to that of many farmers within that, portion of Deer Lodge Valley referred to as the “Smoke Zone,” and as to the alleged continuing and destructive effect of such emanations, there is also a large amount of testimony and other evidence tending to show that since the remodeling of the Washoe Smelter, in 1903, no appreciable damage has been done by its operations either to the land or stock of the complainant, or.to that of the farmers within the zone in question. Under such circumstances, we do not think an appellate court can be reasonably expected to reverse the findings of fact made by the trial judge, substantially confirming those made by the standing master of the court, who had the benefit of seeing the witnesses on the stand, and
In Crawford v. Neal, 144 U. S. 585-596, 12 Sup. Ct. 759, 762 (36 L. Ed. 552) the Supreme Court said:
“The causé was referred to a master to take testimony therein, ‘and to report to this court his findings of fact and his conclusions of law thereon.’ This lie did, and the court, after a review of the evidence, concurred in his findings and conclusions. Clearly, then, they are to be taken as presumptively correct, and unless some obvious error has intervened in the application ol’ the law, or some serious or important mistake has been made in the consideration of the evidence, the decree should be permitted to stand.”
To the same effect are the cases of Camden v. Stuart, 144 U. S. 104, 12 Sup. Ct. 585, 36 L. Ed. 363; Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U. S. 136, 8 Sup. Ct. 894, 31 L. Ed. 664; Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U. S. 512, 9 Sup. Ct. 355, 32 L. Ed. 764; Evans v. State Bank, 141 U. S. 107, 11 Sup. Ct. 885, 35 L. Ed. 654; Furrer v. Ferris, 145 U. S. 132, 12 Sup. Ct. 821, 36 L. Ed. 649; Davis v. Schwartz, 153 U. S. 631, 15 Sup. Ct. 237, 39 L. Ed. 289. Especially should this rule he adhered to where, as in the present case, the trial judge, as well as the master, had the benefit of a personal inspection of the premises. McCarthy v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining Co., 164 Fed. 927-940, 92 C. C. A. 259.
.The fairness of the trial judge, as well as of the master, in the trial and decision of the case, is vigorously challenged by the counsel for the appellant, and they urge upon us to protect the farmers in their homes and rights against what they assert to be the wrongs and oppressions of wealthy mining corporations. This court is always ready and willing to do that in all proper cases. The writer is himself a farmer, and has been for more than 40 years; but the fact must be recognized that there are two sides to almost every case — certainly there are two sides to this one — both of which must be carefully considered in order to reach a just result. That, we think from the record, was carefully and impartially done by the learned judge of the court below, as shown by his opinion rendered in the cause. There is nothing in the record tending to show any unfairness either on his part or on the part of the master, and, regarding the former, his fairmind-edness and high personal character are well known to us from association with him while he was upon the federal bench in this circuit. The record shows that so anxious was the trial judge to do exact justice between the parties, that after announcing his conclusion that the injunction should be denied, thinking it might be possible for the defendant companies, by the construction of some additions to their plant, or that some new method might be devised and put into effect by which the slight damage which he found to exist from its operation might be reduced or entirely overcome, the court retained the cause for the purpose of taking further testimony in respect to that matter, giving each party an opportunity to present such evidence as they might be able to obtain within a stated time, and after hearing such evidence as ivas presented by the defendants — the complainant failing to produce any — found that the defendants had taken every precaution possible to prevent any deleterious effects from the operation of their plant, and accordingly entered final judgment.
“A. The volume of smoke was determined by inserting into the stack, to a distance exactly equal to the distance we inserted the sampling tube — two iron pipes 'leading to what is known as ‘Pitot tube.’ This Pitot tube has one aperture directed downward in the opposite direction to the smoke stream, two other apertures, which are slits inside of the tube, lateral to the smoke stream, and thus connected separately to a glass U-tube carrying ether, and, by using- this maometer, we measured the change, for in the ether column "we had a measure of the pressure of the moving mass of gas. By using a •formula proved to be correct, we converted pressure into terms of velocity feet per second, and then a mathematical calculation based on the temperature of the stack gives the feet per second-passing at the point in the stack opposite our apparatus. A simple calculation also gives us the volume per '24 hours thrown out.”
He gave as the diameter of the tube through which the smoke was-drawn as 3/16 of an inch, and the diameter of the stack as 33% feet.
"When the smoke would be distributed over the Deer Lodge Valle;,-, so as to envelop the same with tlie trioxide of arsenic ingredients contained^ in it, which you have testified to, what, in your opinion, would be the effect or condition arising from the smoke as it passed over and enveloped the Deer Lodge Valley — in so far as this arsenic* or trioxide of arsenic is concerned?” :
He answered:
“A. I would expect a partial deposition of the solid substance.
“Q. On the lands?
“A. On the surface exposed.
“Q. Well, do yon mean by that. Doctor, that a part of the solid bodies? and trioxide of arsenic, in whatever form it might be, would remain continuously in the atmosi>here, or would it finally all be deposited somewhere?
“A. That Is not a reasonable assumption, I think, to believe; that it would be permanently suspended; but no man has a measure of the rate of (leposi-iion of the finely divided solid particles from the atmosphere.
“Q. Then yonr opinion would be that sooner or later it was all to be deposited somewhere; that is, precipitated?
“A. That is a perfectly sound and reasonable assumption.”
[2] Taking the testimony of Dr. Swain, regardless of that of the expert witnesses of the defendants on the same subject, we think it far too indefinite and uncertain to overcome the findings of the court to the effect that since the remodeling of the smelter in 1903 the emanations have only affected the property of the complainant and the other farmers within the “Smoke Zone” in a very slight degree. Accepting those findings, as we must, we think the judgment denying the injunction prayed for and remitting the complainant to an action at law for such damages as he has really sustained should be affirmed, under the established doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States and of this court to the effect that in such cases it is proper to consider all of the facts and circumstances of the case in order to determine the equities, including comparative damages, where, as in the present case, it is sought to enjoin a lawful business, and to withhold the writ where it appears that it will necessarily operate contrary to the real justice of the ease. See Parker v. Winnipiscogee Lake & Woolen Co., 67 U. S. 545-552-553, 17 L. Ed. 333; New York City v. Pine, 185 U. S. 93, 22 Sup. Ct. 592, 46 L. Ed. 820; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 655, 51 L. Ed. 956; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, 27 Sup. Ct. 618, 51 L. Ed. 1038; Mountain Copper Co. v. United States, 142 Fed. 625, 73 C. C. A. 621; McCarthy v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Min. Co., 164 Fed. 927, 92 C. C. A.
The judgment is- affirmed.
In view of the importance of the case and the size of the record, we direct'that our mandate be stayed for six months to enable the appellant to apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari should he so desire.