F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
July 27, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
JOHN ALBERT BOLTZ,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 04-6134
MIKE MULLIN, Warden, Oklahoma
State Penitentiary,
Respondent - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D. Ct. No. CIV-99-156-M)
James L. Hankins, The Coyle Law Firm, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, appearing for
Appellant.
Preston Saul Draper, Assistant Attorney General (W.A. Drew Edmondson,
Attorney General, with him on the brief), Office of the Attorney General for the
State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, appearing for Appellee.
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, O’BRIEN, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit
Judges.
TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Petitioner-Appellant John Albert Boltz of first-degree
murder in the stabbing and decapitation death of his stepson, Doug Kirby, and
sentenced him to death in 1984. In 1991, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals (“OCCA”) affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Mr.
Boltz then filed an application for post-conviction relief in the District Court of
Pottawatomie County, Oklahoma on July 2, 1992, which was denied and
subsequently affirmed by the OCCA. On September 9, 1999, Mr. Boltz filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Relief was denied
on all grounds on March 25, 2004. Mr. Boltz then sought a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) with the District Court, which granted the certificate as to
Mr. Boltz’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court also granted a
COA with respect to two other claims raised by Mr. Boltz: that the evidence was
insufficient to establish the “continuing threat” aggravating factor found by the
jury, and that his right to due process was violated when the court failed to
instruct the jury on heat of passion manslaughter. We take jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253 and AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 18, 1984, Pat Kirby, who was then married to Mr. Boltz, left
work in Shawnee, Oklahoma and drove to Stroud to meet her friend and former
boss, Duane Morrison. Mr. Boltz was suspicious that his wife was having an
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affair with Mr. Morrison and followed her there dressed in combat fatigues and
dark glasses. When he saw that Ms. Kirby was meeting Mr. Morrison, he flew
into a rage, swearing at Mr. Morrison and telling him that he was going to cut his
head off. Mr. Boltz then exclaimed that he had killed men, women, and children
during the Korean War and killing “didn’t faze him,” and that he had cut off
people’s heads in the war for less serious infractions.
After this altercation, Ms. Kirby returned alone to the trailer home she and
Mr. Boltz shared in Shawnee. There, she wrote a note to her husband telling him
that their marriage was over. She then packed some clothes, called her twenty-
two-year-old son, Doug Kirby, to ask for help moving some of her things into his
home, and went to her mother’s house.
During this time, Mr. Boltz was drinking at the VFW hall. When he
returned to the trailer, he found the note and drove to his mother-in-law’s home
to see if his wife was there. Once there, he forced his way in and yelled and
swore at Ms. Kirby. Ms. Kirby then called the Shawnee Police Department and
asked them to remove Mr. Boltz from the premises. Mr. Boltz left shortly
thereafter, and Ms. Kirby went to her son’s house.
Mr. Boltz, who had returned to his trailer, then made the first of three
phone calls to Doug Kirby’s residence. In the first, Mr. Kirby answered the
phone and spoke with Mr. Boltz for a few minutes. A few minutes later, Mr.
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Boltz placed the second call. Again, Mr. Kirby answered and had a very short
conversation with Mr. Boltz. After these two calls, Mr. Kirby did not appear
upset, but he told his mother that he was going over to Mr. Boltz’s trailer to
speak with him. After he left, Mr. Boltz called Mr. Kirby’s residence a third
time. This time, Ms. Kirby answered. Mr. Boltz told her that he was “going to
cut [her] loving little boy’s head off.” He also said that he was going to kill Ms.
Kirby herself within the hour.
After hanging up with her husband, Ms. Kirby placed another call to the
Shawnee Police Department. This phone call was recorded and played to the jury
during the State’s case-in-chief:
DISPATCHER: Shawnee Police Department, Cheryl.
MS. KIRBY: Cheryl, this is Pat again. I hate—I hate to
keep calling, but John just now called and
said he was going to cut my son’s head off,
and my son is over there in the trailer park,
and John is over there at the trailer. That
was Lot 119.
Ms. Kirby then drove to Mr. Boltz’s trailer searching for her son. When
she arrived, she found her son’s body laying outside his car. He had suffered
eight stab wounds to the neck, chest and abdomen, and his neck had been cut
three times. His neck was injured so severely that both carotid arteries had been
severed, the voice box and esophagus were cut, and the spinal column was
damaged. One of the stab wounds pierced through his back. Blood stains were
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discovered leading from the front porch to the driver’s side door of Mr. Kirby’s
car as well as inside the vehicle. A .22 caliber revolver was recovered from the
passenger seat; the gun had no blood on it although the seat was splattered with
blood.
After the killing, Mr. Boltz drove to the American Legion in Midwest City,
where he told some friends that he had killed Mr. Kirby and that he had
“probably cut his head off.” The police were called and Mr. Boltz was arrested
without incident. Thereafter, he confessed to the killing but did not elaborate on
the circumstances leading up to it.
Mr. Boltz was charged with first-degree murder. After refusing to plead
guilty to voluntary manslaughter, Mr. Boltz went to trial. At trial, Mr. Boltz did
not dispute the State’s contention that he stabbed Mr. Kirby to death. Rather, his
strategy was to present a self-defense theory. He testified that Mr. Kirby had
called him that evening and threatened to kill him. Mr. Boltz claimed that when
Mr. Kirby arrived at his trailer, he kicked in the front door and as he went for a
gun, Mr. Boltz stabbed him twice, but did not remember anything after that point.
The jury convicted Mr. Boltz of first-degree murder.
During the penalty phase, the State contended that two aggravating
circumstances—that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, and that
Mr. Boltz constituted a continuing criminal threat to society—warranted a
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sentence of death. In his defense, Mr. Boltz argued that he had no prior criminal
record and referenced the testimony of three character witnesses who had
testified on his behalf in the guilt phase. The jury imposed the death penalty.
Over the course of several years, Mr. Boltz filed a direct appeal, an
application for state post-conviction relief, and a federal petition for habeas relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, all of which were denied. Most recently, the District
Court rendered an exhaustive eighty-page opinion thoroughly reviewing each of
Mr. Boltz’s habeas claims. He now timely appeals the District Court’s denial of
his federal habeas petition on the three grounds for which a COA has been
issued. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Mr. Boltz argues on appeal: (1) that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) that the evidence was insufficient
to support the continuing threat aggravating circumstance; and (3) that the jury
should have been instructed on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter.
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A. Standard of Review
Mr. Boltz first argued to the OCCA in his direct appeal that his trial
counsel, Duane Miller, had been ineffective; the OCCA, however, refused Mr.
Boltz’s request for an evidentiary hearing on the matter and dismissed Mr. Boltz’s
claim. Mr. Boltz similarly requested permission to conduct discovery in his
application for post-conviction relief filed in the District Court of Pottawatomie
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County, Oklahoma, which was also denied and then affirmed by the OCCA. The
United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma subsequently
held its own evidentiary hearing, see § 2254(e)(2), while reviewing Mr. Boltz’s
§ 2254 petition and thereafter refused to grant relief. 1
Because the OCCA made no substantive determination on Mr. Boltz’s
ineffective assistance claim, this Court does not apply the deferential standard of
review mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1215-16
(10th Cir. 2003). Instead, we review the District Court’s determination under the
standard laid out in Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 1998). In
Miller, we stated that
[I]neffective assistance claim[s] present[ ] a mixed question of law and
fact. Because our analysis of this claim primarily involves consideration of
legal principles, we review this claim de novo. Further, we note that
because the state court did not hold any evidentiary hearing, we are in the
same position to evaluate the factual record as it was. Accordingly, to the
extent the state court’s dismissal of [petitioner’s ineffective assistance
claim] was based on its own factual findings, we need not afford those
findings any deference.
Miller, 161 F.3d at 1254 (internal citations omitted). In other words, this Court
1
Neither Mr. Boltz nor the respondent question the propriety of the District
Court’s decision to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding Mr. Boltz’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel; therefore, we do not address that question and
will assume the District Court’s decision was appropriate. As a result, we will not
address the standard preliminary issues of exhaustion and procedural bar.
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accepts the District Court’s factual findings so long as they are not clearly
erroneous and reviews de novo whether Mr. Miller’s assistance was ineffective as
a matter of law. See Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1216.
B. Merits
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed under the standard
originally set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). That
standard requires Mr. Boltz to make two separate showings. “First, the defendant
must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
To establish deficiency, a “defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. This is a heavy
burden, as we presume that counsel’s actions constituted sound strategy. Id. at
689.
“Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”
Id. at 687. To establish prejudice, Mr. Boltz must demonstrate there is a
“reasonable probability” that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial
would have been different. Id. at 694. When deficiencies occur during the
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sentencing stage in a capital case, the more focused inquiry is “whether there is a
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have
concluded that the balance of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances did
not warrant death.” Id. at 695. “A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. We review the
totality of the evidence, including all evidence presented by the State, in
determining whether there is prejudice. Id. at 695. Finally, “[t]his Court may
address the performance and prejudice components in any order, but need not
address both if [petitioner] fails to make a sufficient showing of one.” Cooks v.
Ward, 165 F.3d 1283, 1292–93 (10th Cir. 1998).
In his § 2254 petition before the District Court, Mr. Boltz pointed to
seventeen instances of Mr. Miller’s alleged ineffectiveness during both the guilt
and sentencing phases of trial. The District Court applied Strickland and
determined in each instance that Mr. Miller’s performance was not deficient, was
not prejudicial, or was neither deficient nor prejudicial. On appeal, Mr. Boltz
contests the District Court’s conclusions as to fourteen of the seventeen
instances. We agree with the District Court that none of Mr. Miller’s acts rise to
the level necessary to justify granting Mr. Boltz’s habeas petition under
Strickland.
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1. Counsel’s Illness During Trial
Mr. Boltz first contends that Mr. Miller was physically ill on the day of
Mr. Boltz’s trial and that this illness rendered him ineffective. We agree with the
District Court that the record indicates Mr. Miller was sick that day. Indeed, Mr.
Miller testified in the evidentiary hearing before the District Court that he felt as
though he had the flu and had trouble breathing, which interfered with his
concentration. Mr. Boltz does not argue, however, that Mr. Miller’s illness,
standing alone, entitles him to relief. Instead, Mr. Boltz simply contends that it
should be considered during the review of his specific claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. This Court has done so.
2. Inadequate Pretrial Investigation
Mr. Boltz also argues that Mr. Miller’s assistant in preparing the defense,
Michael Esche, was not qualified. Mr. Boltz points out that Mr. Esche was not a
licensed investigator, only attended college for a short time, and was hired by Mr.
Miller as a favor to a family friend. Like his argument concerning Mr. Miller’s
illness, Mr. Boltz does not argue that Mr. Miller’s reliance on Mr. Esche in and
of itself entitles him to habeas relief. We also note that the record makes clear
that Mr. Esche acted only at the direction of Mr. Miller. Therefore, we consider
Mr. Boltz’s argument concerning Mr. Esche’s investigation and qualifications in
the context of Mr. Boltz’s specific claims that Mr. Miller failed to investigate
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particular issues, which we address below.
3. Calling Ralph Robertson as a Witness
Mr. Boltz’s first specific claim of ineffective assistance is that Mr. Miller
should not have called Ralph Robertson to testify. Mr. Robertson was a friend of
Mr. Boltz’s and claimed to be a criminal investigator. As the defense’s first
witness, he testified that he went to Mr. Boltz’s trailer the day after the killing to
investigate the scene on behalf of his friend and found a book with a bullet hole
through it in the trailer. He also found a bullet slug near the book which was
admitted into evidence. The implication of Mr. Robertson’s testimony was that
Mr. Kirby had fired a gun at Mr. Boltz, which tended to bolster Mr. Boltz’s claim
that he was acting in self-defense.
On cross-examination, however, Mr. Robertson testified that he was not a
ballistics expert and had not compared the slug he claimed to have found with the
bullets from the gun in Mr. Kirby’s car. Moreover, the state later called the lead
investigator in the case to the stand. He testified that he had test-fired the gun
found in Mr. Kirby’s car and examined the slug Mr. Robertson allegedly found;
he stated that the bullets were clearly not the same. In his § 2254 petition, Mr.
Boltz claims that Mr. Miller’s decision to call Mr. Robertson as a witness
constituted deficient performance and that this error effectively destroyed the
credibility of the defense from the outset of the trial. The District Court did not
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decide whether Mr. Miller’s conduct constituted deficient performance. Instead,
it held that Mr. Boltz had failed to demonstrate prejudice from any error. We
agree.
We first note that Mr. Boltz insisted that Mr. Robertson testify. Moreover,
when we consider the overwhelming evidence against Mr. Boltz—including Mr.
Boltz’s confrontation with his wife and Mr. Morrison earlier on the day of the
killing, Mr. Boltz’s statement to Mr. Morrison that he had cut off heads in the
war and had not been afraid to do so, his finding the note from Ms. Kirby saying
the marriage was over, his subsequent threat to Ms. Kirby that evening that he
was going to cut off her son’s head, the recorded phone call played to the jury in
which Ms. Kirby told the police about that threat, and the fact that Mr. Boltz
admitted to stabbing Mr. Kirby a short time later—we cannot say that there is a
reasonable probability that had Mr. Robertson not testified, the jury would have
found Mr. Boltz not guilty of first-degree murder.
4. Failure to Demonstrate that Mr. Boltz Did Not Plant the Gun Found
in Mr. Kirby’s Car
At trial, the State contended that Mr. Boltz planted the .22 caliber pistol
found in Mr. Kirby’s car in order to claim self-defense. Eyewitness Vita Witt,
who was in a home nearby looking out the window during the killing,
corroborated the State’s theory by testifying at trial that she saw Mr. Boltz put
the gun in Mr. Kirby’s car. In his § 2254 petition, Mr. Boltz argues that Mr.
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Miller should have ordered the transcript of the preliminary hearing because had
he done so, he would have realized that Ms. Witt testified in that hearing that Mr.
Boltz did not put the gun in the car and could have impeached her testimony at
trial. The District Court determined that Mr. Miller was deficient in not ordering
the transcript but held there was no prejudice. We agree.
Mr. Boltz’s only argument that he was prejudiced by Mr. Miller’s failure to
order the transcript is that had Mr. Miller ordered the transcript, he would have
elicited testimony from Ms. Witt that Mr. Boltz did not plant the gun. This
contention, however, fails to address the prejudice component as defined by
Strickland—namely, that but for counsel’s error, there is a reasonable probability
that the jury would have returned a different verdict. We seriously question
whether impeaching Ms. Witt on this point would have led the jury to conclude
that Mr. Boltz did not plant the gun because the State introduced photographs
showing that the gun had no blood on it even though it was resting on the car
seat atop of a pool of blood—evidence that strongly supports the State’s theory
that someone put the weapon in the car after the killing. Moreover, impeaching
Ms. Witt’s testimony that she saw Mr. Boltz plant the gun could not have
reasonably undermined the evidence of premeditation—namely, Mr. Boltz’s
statement to Ms. Kirby that he was going to cut off Mr. Kirby’s head just minutes
before he nearly did so—that was obviously crucial to the jury’s verdict of first-
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degree murder. Finally, given that Ms. Witt also testified she saw Mr. Boltz
astride Mr. Kirby—whom she described as looking as motionless as a “rag
doll”—stabbing him repeatedly while calling him a “son of a bitch” and smiling
when he finished, we conclude that Mr. Boltz was not prejudiced by Mr. Miller’s
error in not ordering the transcript from the preliminary hearing so that he could
have impeached Ms. Witt’s statement that she saw Mr. Boltz plant the .22 pistol
in Mr. Kirby’s car.
5. Failure to Introduce Evidence of Bruises on Mr. Boltz’s Arm
During his opening statement, Mr. Miller promised the jury that the
defense would present evidence that Mr. Kirby, while initiating a life-threatening
attack, grabbed Mr. Boltz by the arm and bruised him. Mr. Miller did not put on
any such evidence, forgetting to ask Mr. Boltz and witnesses Mr. Robertson and
Mr. Thompson about it. The District Court concluded that this constituted
deficient representation. Nonetheless, it held that Mr. Boltz was not prejudiced.
Again, we agree that Mr. Boltz has failed to demonstrate that there is a
reasonable probability that the jury would have returned any other verdict if Mr.
Miller had put on evidence of the bruises. With respect to the second prong of
the Strickland test, Mr. Boltz argues only that Mr. Miller “made promises to the
jury and then failed to deliver” and that “this allowed the State to further impugn
the integrity of the defense through yet more rebuttal witnesses.” While we agree
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that the omitted evidence could tend to corroborate Mr. Boltz’s version of events,
given the overwhelming evidence of premeditation, Mr. Boltz has not
demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for Mr. Miller’s failure to
introduce such evidence, “the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
6. Failure to Present Evidence of Mr. Kirby’s Glasses
Mr. Kirby’s glasses were found in the front passenger seat of his car, and
Mr. Boltz argues that Mr. Miller should have pointed this out to the jury. He
maintains that there was testimony at trial that Mr. Kirby drove his car to a
“screeching halt” in front of Mr. Boltz’s trailer, and that evidence of Mr. Kirby
leaving his prescription glasses in the passenger seat further demonstrates that he
got out of the car intending to confront Mr. Boltz physically. The District Court
concluded that Mr. Miller’s failure to introduce this evidence did not meet either
prong of the Strickland test. We agree that trial counsel was not deficient in this
regard.
Evidence at trial established that Mr. Kirby often did not wear his glasses.
Indeed, Mr. Kirby’s ex-wife testified that he did not wear them every day. Mr.
Kirby’s brother also testified that Mr. Kirby did not wear his glasses often and
that they may simply have been reading glasses. Moreover, as Mr. Miller put it,
“[t]he fact that the glasses were out in the car didn’t prove . . . whether that made
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him the aggressor or not.” Indeed, as the State contends, the jury could just as
easily have inferred that the glasses, which were not folded closed and were
splattered with blood, fell off Mr. Kirby’s head during the attack by Mr. Boltz.
Given these circumstances, failing to raise the issue of the glasses falls within the
realm of strategic choice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
7. Failure to Present Evidence that Mr. Kirby Knew Mr. Boltz Had
Accused Ms. Kirby of Adultery
Ms. Kirby testified at trial that her son knew nothing about her marital
problems with Mr. Boltz. In support of his petition for habeas relief, Mr. Boltz
argues that Mr. Miller should have impeached Ms. Kirby’s trial testimony with
her preliminary hearing testimony. According to Mr. Boltz, Mr. Miller’s failure
to demonstrate that Mr. Kirby knew that Mr. Boltz had accused his wife of
having an affair left the jury without a reason why Mr. Kirby would want to kill
Mr. Boltz.
We agree with the District Court that Mr. Miller’s failure to impeach Ms.
Kirby on this point did not prejudice him. Even if the jury believed that Mr.
Kirby was angry with Mr. Boltz for accusing his mother of adultery and drove to
Mr. Boltz’s home to confront him about it, the fact remains that after Mr. Boltz
informed Mr. Kirby of the alleged affair, Mr. Boltz phoned Ms. Kirby and told
her he was going to cut off Mr. Kirby’s head. That is to say, this impeachment
simply does not speak to the issue of premeditation, on which the State presented
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overwhelming evidence. Hence, there is no reasonable probability that the jury
would have returned a different verdict had Mr. Miller impeached Ms. Kirby on
this issue.
8. Failure to Investigate Mr. Kirby’s Violent Nature
Mr. Boltz next argues that Mr. Miller failed to investigate Mr. Kirby’s
propensity for violence but nonetheless attempted to show that Mr. Kirby was a
violent person at trial; this, Mr. Boltz contends, only opened the door for the
State to present evidence of Mr. Kirby’s peacefulness. Further, Mr. Boltz argues,
because Mr. Miller had not investigated Mr. Kirby’s propensity for violence, Mr.
Miller had no evidence to rebut the State’s evidence of Mr. Kirby’s peaceful
nature.
Mr. Boltz fails to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test. First, as
the District Court exhaustively details, the potential testimony from witnesses
who would have testified that Mr. Kirby had a violent nature is far from ideal.
Moreover, we simply cannot conclude that had Mr. Miller investigated Mr.
Kirby’s propensity for violence and presented such evidence to the jury, the jury
would have returned a different verdict given the overwhelming evidence of
premeditation in this case.
9. Failure to Present Evidence that Mr. Kirby Attacked Mr. Boltz
Inside the Trailer
The State’s theory of the case was that Mr. Boltz phoned Mr. Kirby and
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asked him to drive out to his trailer. When Mr. Kirby pulled up, the State
contended, Mr. Boltz met him on his front porch and stabbed him with
premeditation repeatedly as Mr. Kirby retreated toward his car. In accordance
with this theory, the State told the jury that Mr. Kirby never stepped inside the
trailer—and therefore was not the initial aggressor—and that the police found no
blood stains inside the trailer. In his § 2254 petition, Mr. Boltz argues that Mr.
Miller should have called three witnesses who would have rebutted the State’s
assertion that he essentially ambushed Mr. Kirby on the porch by testifying about
blood spatter they saw inside the living room.
We agree with the OCCA, Boltz, 806 P.2d at 1126, and the District Court
that Mr. Miller’s actions were not deficient. First, as the District Court
thoroughly illustrated, Mr. Boltz’s proposed witnesses’ testimony is not
compelling. Second, photographs taken by investigators revealed no blood in the
trailer. Third, Mr. Miller himself surveyed the scene the day after the killing and
found no evidence of a struggle inside. Fourth, Ms. Witt, the eyewitness to the
killing, testified that she saw Mr. Boltz standing over Mr. Kirby just outside his
car—not on the porch—when Mr. Boltz was stabbing Mr. Kirby and cutting his
throat. Finally, as Mr. Miller elaborated during his testimony at the habeas
evidentiary hearing, given these circumstances whether Mr. Kirby entered the
house or not was simply not relevant to Mr. Boltz’s self-defense theory. As such,
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we conclude that failure to present evidence of an indoor attack was a legitimate
strategic choice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
10. Failure to Call Mr. Morrison to Testify
Mr. Boltz next argues that Mr. Miller should have called Mr. Morrison to
testify about the circumstances that would have led a reasonable person in Mr.
Boltz’s position to believe Ms. Kirby was having an affair. He also argues that
Mr. Morrison’s testimony would have demonstrated that he did not feel
threatened by Mr. Boltz’s statement about cutting off heads in the war.
To begin, whether Mr. Boltz reasonably believed his wife was having an
affair is not relevant to this case. 2 Therefore, Mr. Boltz has failed to show that
Miller’s decision not to call Mr. Morrison to the stand “fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness” under the first prong of Strickland. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688. As to his second argument, Mr. Boltz was not prejudiced by Mr.
Miller’s failure to call Mr. Morrison to the stand in order to testify that he did not
perceive Mr. Boltz’s statements as threats. The overwhelming evidence of
premeditated murder in this case does not cause us to question the jury’s verdict
based on the absence of Mr. Morrison’s testimony on this point.
2
To the extent it could be argued that such evidence is relevant to Mr.
Boltz’s claim that the jury should have been instructed on heat of passion
manslaughter, because we conclude below that the evidence did not support such
an instruction, this argument does not warrant relief. See infra Part IV.
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11. Deborah Gregg’s Testimony Regarding Motive
At trial, Deborah Gregg, an office deputy with the Pottawatomie County
Sheriff’s Office, testified that while she was booking Mr. Boltz into jail, she
allowed him to make a telephone call and overheard him say to the recipient,
“You damn right I killed him. I’d do it again if I had to. He took my life, he
took my wife, my family, and he took my church.” Although there is some
dispute between Mr. Boltz and the State as to whom Mr. Boltz called that night,
the District Court determined on the basis of phone records that the call was
placed to Earline Thompson, Mr. Boltz’s ex-wife. After a review of the record,
we accept this factual determination because it is not clearly erroneous. See
Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1216.
In support of his petition for habeas relief, Mr. Boltz argues that Mr.
Miller should have impeached Officer Gregg’s testimony by calling Ms.
Thompson to testify about the statement; 3 she apparently would have testified
that Mr. Boltz never made the statement. 4 Assuming Ms. Thompson would have
3
Mr. Boltz also argues that the phone call might have been placed to Cedric
James, and that Mr. James should also have been called to testify about the
statement. Because the District Court found that Mr. Boltz called Ms. Thompson
only, this contention is without merit.
4
At the evidentiary hearing held nearly eighteen years after Mr. Boltz’s
trial, Ms. Thompson testified that she does not remember ever hearing Mr. Boltz
utter the words attributed to him by Officer Gregg; she also testified, however,
that she does not remember receiving a phone call from Mr. Boltz from jail the
(continued...)
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testified to this effect, Mr. Boltz has not shown how this testimony would have
changed the outcome of the trial. Evidence that Mr. Boltz had seen Ms. Kirby
and Mr. Morrison together the day of the killing and that Ms. Kirby wrote him a
note telling him their marriage was over supplied the motive for murder to the
same extent as Officer Gregg’s unrebutted testimony; therefore, even if Ms.
Thompson had testified that Mr. Boltz never made the statement attributed to him
by Officer Gregg, we are confident the jury would have still returned a guilty
verdict of first-degree murder.
12. Failure to Pursue an Intoxication Defense
“Voluntary intoxication can reduce homicide from murder in the first
degree to manslaughter in the first degree, provided it rendered the defendant
incapable of entertaining a necessary specific intent to effect death.” Brogie v.
State, 695 P.2d 538, 546 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). Mr. Boltz claims to have
ingested prescription medication with a large amount of alcohol the day of the
killing and that Mr. Miller should have investigated this and brought it to the
jury’s attention. Mr. Boltz argues he was prejudiced by this alleged error because
evidence of intoxication “makes a much more compelling case for either a
defense to the crime or a lesser included offense.”
4
(...continued)
night he was arrested.
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Contrary to Mr. Boltz’s assertion, he was not prejudiced by Mr. Miller’s
failure to develop an intoxication defense because the jury would have returned
the same verdict even had such evidence been before it. “When voluntary
intoxication is relied upon as an affirmative defense, the defendant must
introduce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to his ability to form
the requisite criminal intent.” Brogie, 695 P.2d at 546. As the District Court
reasoned, however, Mr. Boltz “cannot escape the fact the jury was informed he
had stated to Pat Kirby shortly before the murder that he was going to cut off her
son’s head. Shortly thereafter, in addition to other multiple stab wounds, [Mr.
Boltz] nearly decapitated the victim with his knife.” In other words, the evidence
clearly shows Mr. Boltz had formed the specific intent to kill Mr. Kirby; indeed,
he informed his wife of that intention. Because testimony that Mr. Boltz had
been drinking heavily while on prescription drugs earlier in the day would in no
way call that evidence into question, habeas relief on this ground is denied.
13. Failure to Rebut the Burglary Allegation
During the penalty phase of the trial, the State offered evidence that Mr.
Boltz broke into Mr. Kirby’s home looking for Ms. Kirby after killing her son but
before going to the American Legion, in order to establish the aggravating
circumstance that there was a probability Mr. Boltz would commit criminal acts
of violence constituting a continuing threat to society. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
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21, § 701.12(7). Specifically, the State put on testimony that the morning after
Mr. Kirby’s death, police discovered the door to his home splintered as a result
of forcible entry. Although nothing was missing, a picture on the floor was
shattered. Mr. Boltz argues that Mr. Miller was ineffective because he did not
rebut the State’s allegation by putting on evidence that it would have been
impossible for Mr. Boltz to have committed the burglary and still arrive at the
American Legion when he did.
Assuming Mr. Miller should have pursued this line of attack—which,
given the testimony of Officer Moody and the other witnesses at the American
Legion Hall, is a dubious assumption at best—we are not convinced that the
burglary was essential to the jury’s finding of the continuing threat aggravating
circumstance. Ms. Kirby testified that after Mr. Boltz told her he was going to
kill her son, he told her that he would also kill her. Mr. Boltz subsequently
carried through on the first threat. Even if the jury did not believe that Mr. Boltz
broke in to Mr. Kirby’s home looking for Ms. Kirby the night of the killing, the
fact remains that Mr. Boltz threatened Ms. Kirby’s life shortly before he killed
her son. As the State stated during the penalty phase, “the Defendant appears to
harbor extreme ill will towards the mother of the victim, and . . . she is still
alive.” Therefore, in light of that evidence, we are unpersuaded that had Mr.
Miller demonstrated that Mr. Boltz did not burglarize Mr. Kirby’s residence, the
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jury might have found that Mr. Boltz was not a continuing threat to society.
14. Penalty Phase Mitigation Witnesses
Mr. Boltz’s final contention with respect to his ineffective assistance claim
is that Mr. Miller should have conducted a proper investigation of possible
mitigation witnesses and then called such witnesses to testify during the penalty
phase.
To begin, we note that Mr. Miller made a record at trial that Mr. Boltz did
not want him to present mitigation witnesses:
MR. MILLER: I want the record to show that Mr. Boltz has advised
me that he does not wish to present any additional evidence to this
jury during the punishment stage, with the exception of a stipulation
that the District Attorney and the defense are entering into; and that
stipulation being, that Mr. Boltz has no prior criminal record, which
is not to say that we aren’t going to present argument, and that sort
of thing. But we intend to offer no other evidence.
And that’s your—your instructions to me; is that correct? Would you
say “Yes”—
MR. BOLTZ: Yes.
...
THE COURT: All right.
Trial Tr. at 687–88.
Instead, Mr. Miller incorporated the testimony of four character witnesses
who appeared in the guilt phase of the trial. Moreover, Mr. Miller testified at the
evidentiary hearing that he conducted an investigation into possible mitigation
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evidence, but ultimately did not call witnesses—including members of Mr.
Boltz’s church—in part because they either did not know Mr. Boltz well, were
unwilling to testify, or had criminal records or other problems that would
undermine their efficacy as a mitigation witness. Indeed, Mr. Miller testified that
his investigation produced “very few people that would be willing to offer any
kind of evidence in mitigation for Mr. Boltz.”
Mr. Boltz argues, however, that had Mr. Miller conducted an adequate
investigation, he would have discovered many helpful witnesses. The District
Court examined the proffered testimony of these witnesses during the evidentiary
hearing and concluded that they would have testified in the same manner as the
character witnesses in the guilt phase of the trial—namely, “that [Mr. Boltz] was
a good guy, honest and likable”—and that, given the nature of the crime, there
was not a possibility that their cumulative testimony would have altered the
jury’s decision to impose death. 5
Upon a review of the record, we agree. The State presented two possible
aggravating circumstances: that the killing was “especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel,” and that Mr. Boltz was a continuing threat to society. The fact that these
5
Moreover, the District Court concluded, and we agree, that the value of
some of the witness’ testimony is debatable due to lengthy periods of time since
they had last interacted with Mr. Boltz and due to the limited nature of their
relationships.
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witnesses considered Mr. Boltz to be a good person would not have supported the
notion that the crime was not committed in a heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner.
Additionally, the fact that Mr. Boltz threatened to kill Ms. Kirby shortly before
he killed her son provides more than adequate support for finding the continuing
threat aggravating circumstance, even if witnesses testified that Mr. Boltz was
generally an upstanding citizen. Accordingly, habeas relief is denied as to this
claim.
In sum, because we conclude that Mr. Miller’s performance either was not
deficient or not prejudicial, we conclude that his conduct did not rise to the level
of ineffective assistance of counsel; therefore, habeas relief is not warranted. 6
III. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE “CONTINUING
THREAT” AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
A. Standard of Review
Mr. Boltz next argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because the
evidence was not sufficient to support the jury’s finding of the aggravating
circumstance that there was a probability he would commit criminal acts of
violence constituting a continuing threat to society. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21,
§ 701.12(7). In contrast to Mr. Boltz’s first claim for relief, the OCCA decided
Mr. Boltz does not raise the issue of cumulative error. See United States
6
v. Toles, 297 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir. 2002). Nonetheless, we have reviewed the
issue and conclude that it does not provide a basis for relief in this case.
-26-
this issue on the merits and rejected it. Therefore, under AEDPA, we review the
OCCA’s determination and may not issue a writ of habeas corpus unless that
decision:
(1) . . . was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or
(2) . . . was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). In addition, we presume that the OCCA’s factual
determinations are correct, and Mr. Boltz has the burden to rebut that
presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Our case law is unclear whether a sufficiency of the evidence claim
presents a question of law that is reviewed under § 2254(d)(1) or a question of
fact reviewable under § 2254(d)(2). See Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181,
1197 (10th Cir. 2004); Hogan v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 1297, 1306 (10th Cir.1999);
Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1176 (10th Cir. 1999). Nonetheless, we need
not decide this issue because the OCCA’s determination is neither contrary to
clearly established federal law nor based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts.
B. Merits
In this case, the OCCA concluded that evidence showing that Mr. Boltz
lured Mr. Kirby to his trailer, called Ms. Kirby and told her he was going to kill
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her son, told Ms. Kirby he would also kill her within the hour, entered Mr.
Kirby’s home looking for Ms. Kirby after he killed her son, and had bragged
about killing before, combined with the sheer callousness in the manner the
murder was committed, sufficiently supported the jury’s finding of the continuing
threat aggravator. See Boltz, 806 P.2d at 1125. Mr. Boltz does not argue that the
OCCA’s determination of these facts is unreasonable; therefore, we presume
them to be correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Hence, we find there is a clear
basis for the OCCA’s factual determinations; as such, habeas relief is not
warranted under § 2254(d)(2). Therefore, we turn to Mr. Boltz’s specific
arguments and analyze whether the OCCA’s upholding of the jury’s finding is
contrary to clearly established federal law.
1. Evidence
First, Mr. Boltz contends that the introduction of an unadjudicated
offense—namely, the burglary of Ms. Kirby’s home—during the sentencing phase
in a capital case is a violation of due process; he argues that due process is
satisfied only when there is sufficient “indicia of reliability” supporting the claim
that the defendant committed the offense. He argues that no such indicia of
reliability exist here, pointing out that his appellate counsel’s investigator drove
the route between Mr. Boltz’s trailer, Mr. Kirby’s house, and the American
Legion, and concluded that it would have been impossible for Mr. Boltz to have
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committed the burglary in the time frame alleged by the State.
The Supreme Court has emphasized the “‘need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.’”
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 (1985) (vacating sentence where
prosecution misled jury into believing that responsibility for determining the
appropriateness of a death sentence lies with the appellate court which will
review the jury’s decision, rather than with the jury itself) (quoting Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion)). Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court itself has never indicated, as is required for Mr. Boltz to obtain
relief, see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000), that only those
unadjudicated offenses which are supported by sufficiently reliable evidence may
be introduced in the sentencing phase of a capital case. To the contrary, in
Williams v. New York, the Court held that due process is not implicated when the
sentencing judge imposes death based in part on evidence of the defendant’s
unadjudicated offenses that were not introduced at trial and which were therefore
not subject to cross-examination by the defendant. 337 U.S. 241, 250–52 (1949);
see also Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747–48 (1994) (citing Williams
and stating that “[s]entencing courts have not only taken into consideration a
defendant’s prior convictions, but have also considered a defendant’s past
criminal behavior, even if no conviction resulted from that behavior.”). And,
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following Williams, this Court has flatly held that “the admission of evidence of
unadjudicated offenses at a sentencing proceeding does not violate due process.”
Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1465 (10th Cir. 1995). Therefore, the OCCA
did not act contrary to clearly established federal law when it determined that
evidence that Mr. Boltz burglarized Mr. Kirby’s home could properly be
presented to the jury.
Mr. Boltz next argues that a nonviolent crime, such as the alleged burglary,
is insufficient to support a finding of a probability of future criminal acts of
violence. While it is true that under Oklahoma law, a nonviolent crime standing
alone cannot be the basis for finding the continuing threat aggravator, see Torres
v. State, 962 P.2d 3, 23 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998), neither Oklahoma nor the
United States Supreme Court has ever prohibited a jury from considering the
defendant’s nonviolent offenses in conjunction with other factors when
determining whether the defendant poses a future risk to society. Because the
OCCA affirmed the jury’s finding based on facts other than simply the
burglary—namely, that Mr. Boltz had talked about killing people and how it did
not bother him to do so, and that he had threatened to kill Ms. Kirby later on in
the evening (a threat that was directly linked to his forced entry of Mr. Kirby’s
home)—the OCCA did not act contrary to federal law when it accounted for the
burglary in its analysis of the continuing threat aggravator.
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Finally, Mr. Boltz contends that allowing the continuing threat aggravator
to be supported only by the callous nature of the murder violates the Eighth
Amendment under clearly established law because every first-degree murder is
“callous.” See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994) (explaining that
an aggravating circumstance “must apply only to a subclass of defendants
convicted of murder.”); Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 (1993) (“If the
sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every
defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally
infirm.”). We disagree.
First, and most important, Mr. Boltz mischaracterizes the OCCA opinion.
It did not rest its determination on callousness alone. As that court held:
The record reveals that appellant lured the victim to his trailer, and
while he was en route, appellant called Ms. Kirby to tell her that he
was going to kill Doug and threatened to kill her within the hour.
There was further evidence that appellant had attempted to enter
Doug’s house in an attempt to find her. Other testimony revealed
that appellant had bragged about killing before. These facts
combined with the sheer callousness in which this murder was
committed amply support the jury’s finding of this aggravating
circumstance.
Boltz, 806 P.2d at 1125. Moreover, Mr. Boltz fails to satisfy the demanding
§ 2254(d)(1) standard here. It is far from clearly established that every first-
degree murder is callous, thereby making callousness an impermissible basis for
the imposition of the death penalty. Therefore, because we cannot conclude that
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the OCCA’s conclusion is contrary to clearly established federal law as
established by the Supreme Court or an unreasonable application of Supreme
Court precedent, we must deny habeas relief on this ground as well.
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Having determined that the OCCA did not act contrary to clearly
established federal law when it relied on the foregoing evidence in considering
the jury’s finding of the continuing threat aggravating factor, we turn now to
whether it acted contrary to clearly established federal law when it concluded that
the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding. Sufficiency of the
evidence claims are reviewed under the “rational fact-finder” standard announced
in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), and require appellate courts to
determine, after reviewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most
favorable to the government, whether any rational trier of fact could have found
the aggravating circumstance existed beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard
is based on our system’s longstanding principle that it is the province of the jury
to evaluate the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from trial testimony.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Our review under Jackson is “sharply limited, and a
court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences
must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the
trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must
-32-
defer to that resolution.” Turrentine, 390 F.3d at 1197 (quotations and
alterations omitted). We must accept the jury’s determination as long as it is
within the bounds of reason. Messer v. Roberts, 74 F.3d 1009, 1013 (10th Cir.
1996). Our review is even more limited given that AEDPA governs this issue.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
In this case, evidence of Mr. Boltz’s comments to Mr. Morrison about
killing people and cutting off their heads, in conjunction with Mr. Boltz’s threat
to Ms. Kirby that he would kill her after he finished killing her son, and evidence
that Mr. Boltz entered Mr. Kirby’s home looking for Ms. Kirby after the killing,
is more than sufficient for a rational factfinder to find that there was a probability
that Mr. Boltz would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society. Mr. Boltz contends that these statements were only
“false braggadocio.” He points out that he had no prior criminal record at the
time and many character witnesses testified that he was a peaceful and law-
abiding citizen. Even if Mr. Boltz’s implied threats were empty, however, a
rational juror could conclude that he was telling the truth and was threatening
similar action in the future. This is all that is necessary under Jackson, and Mr.
Boltz’s argument that he had not in fact killed anyone in Korea does not prevent
the jury from coming to its own reasonable conclusion about Mr. Boltz’s intent in
making the statements. Therefore, the OCCA did not act contrary to Jackson or
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other clearly established federal law in upholding the jury’s finding of this
aggravating circumstance. Accordingly, habeas relief is not warranted on this
issue.
IV. FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF
HEAT OF PASSION MANSLAUGHTER
Mr. Boltz’s final basis for relief is that the trial court should have
instructed the jury on the offense of heat of passion manslaughter. 7 The OCCA
rejected this argument because it found that the evidence at trial did not support
such an instruction.
A. Standard of Review
Because the OCCA decided this issue on the merits, AEDPA applies.
Therefore, as discussed above, we will not reverse the OCCA’s determination
unless it was contrary to clearly established federal law or was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). Again, this
Court has not decided whether a question concerning the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the giving of a lesser included offense instruction is a matter
of law or fact, and therefore reviewable under § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See,
Under Oklahoma law, there are three types of first-degree manslaughter:
7
heat of passion manslaughter, manslaughter while committing a misdemeanor,
and manslaughter while resisting an attempt by the person killed to commit a
crime. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 711. The trial judge ultimately instructed
on manslaughter while resisting an attempt by the person killed to commit a
crime—the crime ostensibly being assault.
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e.g., Turrentine, 390 F.3d at 1197. Because we hold that the OCCA’s rejection
of Mr. Boltz’s argument was neither contrary to federal law nor involved an
unreasonable determination of the facts, we do not grant relief on this issue.
B. Merits
First, the OCCA’s legal decision to reject Mr. Boltz’s claim because the
evidence did not support a heat of passion manslaughter instruction was not
contrary to clearly established federal law. Due process requires a judge to give a
lesser included offense instruction “only when the evidence warrants such an
instruction.” Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982) (emphasis omitted).
Therefore, the OCCA did not err, in light of clearly established federal law, when
it reasoned that the trial court must have heard evidence supporting the instruction
before it could have given such an instruction.
Second, the OCCA’s determination that the actual evidence at trial did not
support the instruction was not based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts. Heat of passion manslaughter is defined, in part, as a homicide “perpetrated
without design to effect death.” Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 711(2); see also
Walker v. State, 723 P.2d 273, 283–84 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986). Under
Oklahoma law, a “design to effect death” means “an intent to kill.” Walker v.
Gibson, 228 F.3d 1217, 1238 (10th Cir. 2000) abrogated on other grounds by
Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044, 1057 n.5 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc footnote);
-35-
Smith v. State, 932 P.2d 521, 532–33 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996). In support of its
determination that the evidence did not warrant a heat of passion instruction, the
OCCA found that “the evidence clearly showed [Mr. Boltz] had a design to effect
death.” Boltz, 806 P.2d at 1124.
Although the OCCA did not state the facts on which it relied in making this
specific determination, based on our review of the evidence at trial, the OCCA
could conclude that Mr. Boltz lured Mr. Kirby to his home, after which he phoned
Ms. Kirby and told her that he was going to decapitate her son, and then did so
after stabbing him multiple times. Indeed, the OCCA found these same facts in
relation to Mr. Boltz’s argument concerning the continuing threat aggravating
circumstance that we analyzed above. See Boltz, 806 P.2d at 1125. We conclude
that the OCCA’s finding that Mr. Boltz clearly intended to kill Mr. Kirby is an
entirely reasonable determination of the facts—even in light of Mr. Boltz’s
testimony that he was not in a rational frame of mind on the night of the killing
and had a prior history as a law-abiding citizen—and is more than sufficient to
support the OCCA’s finding that the evidence did not support giving a heat of
passion instruction. See also United States v. Chapman, 615 F.2d 1294, 1298
(10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973), and
holding that a lesser included instruction must be given only “‘if the evidence
would permit a jury rationally to find [the defendant] guilty of the lesser offense
-36-
and acquit him of the greater.’”). Therefore, under the highly deferential standard
of review set forth in both § 2254(d)(1) and § 2254(d)(2), we hold that the
OCCA’s determination that the evidence did not support a heat of passion
instruction was not unreasonable in light of the law or the facts. Habeas relief on
this issue is denied.
V. CONCLUSION
Mr. Miller’s performance at both the guilt and sentencing phases of Mr.
Boltz’s trial does not cause us to question either the jury’s verdict or its decision
to impose the death penalty; therefore, habeas relief based on Mr. Boltz’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is not warranted. In addition, the OCCA did not
act contrary to clearly established federal law or base its decision on an
unreasonable determination of the facts when it concluded that the evidence
supported the jury’s finding of the continuing threat aggravating circumstance and
when it concluded that Mr. Boltz was not entitled to an instruction on heat of
passion voluntary manslaughter. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the District Court’s
denial of Mr. Boltz’s habeas petition.
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Boltz v. Mullin
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2005-07-27
Citations: 415 F.3d 1215
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