This is the second appearance of this case in this court. For a statement of the nature of the case, see Summer v. Boyd, 208 Ga. 207 (66 S. E. 2d 51). On the second trial a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff as follows: “We the jury find E. P. Summer insane at the time the deed was made,” and further found in favor of the defendant for a money judgment in the sum of 82,000, which by the decree of the court was made a special lien against the property described in the deeds. To the judgment denying his motion for a new trial, based on the general grounds and three special grounds, the defendant excepts. Held:
1. While the evidence is in conflict, there is sufficient evidence to authorize the verdict, and the general grounds of the motion for a new trial are without merit.
2. The plaintiff’s petition alleged in paragraph 2 that Summer, the grantor in the deeds executed in 1930 and 1934, and sought to be set aside, “is insane, having been so adjudged by the Court of Ordinary of Hall County, Georgia, on November 1, 1924, January 19, 1937, September 10, 1947, and, by virtue of the last named judgment, is presently confined at the Milledgeville State Hospital, a Georgia facility for insane persons.” There was no demurrer to these allegations, but the defendant by his answer denied the allegations of paragraph 2, “except defendant is advised that said E. P. Summer is now confined in the State Hospital at Milledgeville, but further understands that said commitment was for
The admission in evidence of these proceedings was not harmful error as to the defendant for the following reasons:
(a) The proceeding dated January 15, 1937, while alleged in the first ground of the amended motion to be an adjudication of the insanity and a commitment of Summer to the State Hospital, and seems to have been so dealt with by counsel for both plaintiff and the defendant, as well as the witnesses who testified with respect thereto, the copy attached to this ground of the motion as an exhibit, and the copy attached to the brief of evidence, show that in the proceeding dated January 15, 1937, Summer was adjudged by the commission “not to be a lunatic and not a fit subject for the Milledgeville State Hospital,” and the judgment of the ordinary was that “Summer is not a person of unsound mind, and that as such he be not committed to the Milledgeville State Hospital.” Such being the case, the evidence was beneficial and not harmful to the defendant.
(b) The defendant’s answer having alleged that Summer was sane, “both before and after said transaction complained • of,” and having admitted his confinement in the Millegeville State Hospital, but having alleged that the confinement “was for chronic alcoholism, rather than a psychotic condition,” the lunacy proceeding dated September 10, 1947, was admissible upon the issue thus made by the defendant’s pleadings. Nugent v. Watkins, 129 Ga. 382 (2) (58 S. E. 888); Shadburn v. Tapp, 209 Ga. 887 (3) (77 S. E. 2d 7).
(c) Even if otherwise inadmissible, the admission of these proceedings was not harmful error as against the defendant in the instant case, for the reason that the oral testimony of George Bishop and Mrs. Ernest Summer, to the effect that Summer had been adjudged insane and committed to the hospital on these three occasions, was admitted without objection In Baldwin v. Davis, 188 Ga. 587 (4) (4 S. E. 2d 458), it is held: “The exception to the admission of written evidence shows no harmful error, since oral testimony as to the contents of the writings was admitted without objection.” See also Seymour v. State, 210 Ga. 21 (4) (77 S. E. 2d 519); Bell v. Bell, 210 Ga. 295 (4) (79 S. E. 2d 524); Horton v. Freeman, 210 Ga. 298 (2) (79 S. E. 2d 537); Smith v. State, 210 Ga. 713 (4) (82 S. E. 2d 507).
3. The third ground of the amended motion (numbered 6) is as follows:
Judgment affirmed.