Where a creditor, acting as an attorney in fact for its debtor, attempts to exercise a power of sale for cash, which it is authorized but not required to make for the purpose of applying the proceeds on a debt of the debtor, the fact that by reason of failure of the purchaser at public auction to comply with his bid a cash sale is not completed, for which failure the attorney in fact is not responsible either because of fraud, collusion, negligence, or otherwise, does not render the attorney in fact liable to the debtor for the amount of the bid; especially so where it does not appear that the debtor was in any way prejudiced by the attempted sale.
The security deed authorized (but did not require) Union Central Life Insurance Company to sell the property conveyed as *Page 161 security at public outcry for cash and to apply the proceeds to the debt. Under the circumstances the postponement of the collection of the bid did not amount to an extension of credit (Willbanks v. Untriner, 98 Ga. 801, 25 S.E. 841); nor was it the assumption of an obligation to enter into a contract other than as attorney in fact. There was no voluntary agreement on the part of the company to postpone the time of payment, which would render it liable for the amount of the bid, even if such an agreement would have bound it under Willbanks v. Untriner, supra. Brooke has not been prejudiced in any way. He still holds the same rights in the land that he held before the attempted sale, and it is still as much subject to the debt as it was before the attempted sale. There was no evidence of negligence, fraud, collusion, or bad faith of any kind on the part of his creditor. There was no completed cash sale which would require the credit contended for. See Simmons v. Cook, 109 Ga. 553 (34 S.E. 1033) and Dwelle v. Blackshear Bank, 115 Ga. 679 (42 S.E. 49). The court did not err in overruling the motion for new trial.
Judgment affirmed. Stephens, P. J., and Sutton, J., concur.