Brothers v. General Motors Corp.

                                                     NO.       82-267

                          I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E S T A T E O F MONTANA

                                                           1983




J E A N B R O T H E R S , KATHY B R O T H E R S ,
a n d S T A T E FARM MUTUAL A U T O M O B I L E I N C . ,
COMPANY,

                                                  P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s ,

             VS.


GENERAL MOTORS C O R P O R A T I O N , a n d
B I L L A T K I N VOLKSWAGEN, I N C . ,

                                                  D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s .




Appeal     from:          D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
                          I n a n d f o r t h e C o u n t y of S i l v e r B o w
                          H o n o r a b l e A r n o l d O l s e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g .

C o u n s e l of       Record:

        For A p p e l l a n t s :

              W e l l c o m e & Frost, Bozeman, M o n t a n a
              A l b e r t Frost argued, B o z e m a n , M o n t a n a

        For R e s p o n d e n t s :

               Poore Law Firm, B u t t e , Montana
               J a m e s P o o r e , I11 a r g u e d , B u t t e ,      Montana




                                                   Submitted:             January 18, 1983

                                                       Decided:           February 18, 1983

Filed:        FEB 1 8 5983


               -----                          --4
                                                   C l e r k
Mr.    J u s t i c e L . C. G u l b r a n d s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .


       P l a i n t i f f s brought          this    action in strict products l i a b i l i t y

and n e g l i g e n c e      for injuries resulting                  from a c a r a c c i d e n t .          The

District         Court         of     the     Second       Judicial        District,           Silver        Bow

County,        granted         summary j u d g m e n t       f o r defendants           and     plaintiffs

appeal.

       On J u n e      22,     1977,        plaintiff      Jean      B r o t h e r s was d r i v i n g       her

1976      Pontiac         LeMans           station     wagon        on     Interstate           90     toward

Missoula,         Montana,           at    about     50 m i l e s    per       hour.      The       road     was
c l e a r and d r y .        Her d a u g h t e r and g r a n d s o n were p a s s e n g e r s i n t h e

car.
       A s s h e was d r i v i n g a r o u n d a g r a d u a l b e n d , J e a n B r o t h e r s f e l t

a tremor         in    the     s t e e r i n g wheel,      t h e n two s h o r t bumps,               and    was

suddenly unable to t u r n t h e wheel.                         The car f a i l e d to go a r o u n d

the     bend,     moving        from        the    right   lane,       into      the    l e f t lane,        and

down i n t o t h e m e d i a n d i t c h .

       The i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r f o u n d n o e v i d e n c e of          d r i v e r error

and d i d n o t        issue a            ticket    t o Mrs.    Brothers.              H e noted       on t h e

a c c i d e n t r e p o r t t h a t t h e c a r ' s l e f t f r o n t t i r e was f l a t and t h a t

its      deflation           may      have        pulled     the       car      off     of      the       road.

       Mrs.      Brothers            and    her     husband      had      purchased           the     car     in

November 1 9 7 6 , from d e f e n d a n t B i l l A t k i n V o l k s w a g e n .             The car was

u s e d , w i t h a n o d o m e t e r r e a d i n g of a b o u t 3 , 5 0 0 m i l e s .        A t the t i m e

of    t h e a c c i d e n t , t h e c a r had b e e n d r i v e n a b o u t 7 , 6 0 0 m i l e s .            The

car's       warranty           history            revealed      no       significant           mechanical

p r o b l e m s or r e p a i r s .
       A mechanic          a t a front-end            r e p a i r shop i n Missoula looked a t

the     front-end         of        the    plaintiff's        car,       but    could        find     nothing

wrong.         The     steering            column was        removed       and    examined           by     Mrs.

B r o t h e r s q s o n who is a m e c h a n i c .         H e f o u n d n o t h i n g wrong.          A pro-

f e s s o r o f m e c h a n i c a l e n g i n e e r i n g examined t h e s t e e r i n g column and

a l s o f o u n d n o t h i n g wrong.             None of      the other potential                   experts

b r o u g h t f o r w a r d by a p p e l l a n t s g a v e t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e car was

defective.
       The      car     was     taken      to     a wrecking           yard      and     has     long     since

disappeared.

       The g e n e r a l i s s u e o f w h e t h e r t h e summary j u d g m e n t f o r d e f e n -

d a n t s was p r o p e r may be b r o k e n down i n t o two s u b s i d i a r y i s s u e s :

       1.      W h e t h e r a p p e l l a n t s m e t t h e i r b u r d e n to show t h a t a d e f e c t

i n t h e car c a u s e d t h e i n j u r y and t h a t t h e d e f e c t was t r a c e a b l e t o

the respondents.

       2.      W h e t h e r r e s i p- s -a- -l -o -- u i --u r s h o u l d be a p p l i e d t o t h i s case.
                                  -                  q - t --

       A p p e l l a n t s a r g u e t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y o f Mrs. B r o t h e r s and h e r

d a u g h t e r , as w e l l as t h e good c o n d i t i o n of t h e c a r , is s u f f i c i e n t

e v i d e n c e t o make a p r i m a -a- i- c a s e i n s t r i c t p r o d u c t s l i a b i l i t y .
                                     f c e

According to a p p e l l a n t s ,           t h i s evidence raises t h e i n f e r e n c e t h a t

the vehicle's             s t e e r i n g mechanism was d e f e c t i v e i n e i t h e r d e s i g n

o r manufacture.              W e do n o t a g r e e .

       I n a p r o d u c t s l i a b i l i t y a c t i o n , t h e p l a i n t i f f m u s t show t h r e e

things:            1)     the plaintiff            was i n j u r e d b y t h e p r o d u c t ;          2) the

i n j u r y occurred because                t h e p r o d u c t was d e f e c t i v e and          unreason-

a b l y d a n g e r o u s ; and 3 ) t h e d e f e c t e x i s t e d when i t l e f t t h e h a n d s

of     the     particular         defendant.            Duncan v .           Rockwell Manufacturing

Co.     ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 3 Mont.         382,     567 P.2d          936;     Barich v.          Ottenstror

(1976)         1 7 0 Mont. 3 8 , 5 5 0 P.2d             3 9 5 , c i t i n g P r o s s e r on T o r t s ( 4 t h

ed.)         103.

       Circumstantial evidence,                     as w e l l a s d i r e c t e v i d e n c e , may be
used      to    show      a defect.             Brandenburger            v.    Toyota        Motor       Sales,

U.S.A.         Inc.     ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 2 Mont.       506,      5 1 3 P.2d       268.        A plaintiff

does         not      meet      his      burden         of     proof,         however,          by      merely

e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t an a c c i d e n t occurred.             Brown v. N o r t h A m e r i c a n

Manufacturing             Co.      (1978),        176      Mont.       98,     576      P.2d      711.       In

               b--
B.- a- n d e n -- u r g e r , w e a d o p t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a n d a r d of p r o o f
  r                                                                                                    to show

a d e f e c t i n a manufacturer's product:

                "The n a t u r e and q u a l i t y o f e v i d e n c e used i n
                p r o d u c t s l i a b i l i t y c a s e s t o show t h e d e f e c t
                a n d t h e n e x u s b e t w e e n t h e d e f e c t and t h e acci-
                dent naturally varies.                      The most c o n v i n c i n g
                e v i d e n c e is a n e x p e r t ' s p i n p o i n t i n g t h e d e f e c t
                a n d g i v i n g h i s o p i n i o n on t h e p r e c i s e c a u s e of
                t h e a c c i d e n t af ter a thorough i n s p e c t i o n .              If
                an accident s u f f i c i e n t l y destroys the product,
                o r the c r u c i a l p a r t s , then an e x p e r t ' s opinion
                on t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s t h a t a d e f e c t caused t h e
                a c c i d e n t would be h e l p f u l .         I f no s u c h o p i n i o n
                i s p o s s i b l e , a s i n t h e p r e s e n t case, t h e
                u s e r ' s t e s t i m o n y on what h a p p e n e d is a n o t h e r
                method o f p r o v i n g t h a t t h e p r o d u c t was d e f e c -
                tive.           I f t h e u s e r is u n a b l e t o t e s t i f y , as
                w h e r e t h e a c c i d e n t k i l l e d him o r i n c a p a c i t a t e d
                h i m , no o t h e r w i t n e s s was p r e s e n t a t t h e t i m e
                of        the       accident,           and     the     product         was
                d e s t r o y e d , t h e f a c t o f t h e a c c i d e n t and t h e
                p r o b a b i l i t i e s are a l l t h a t remain f o r t h e
                p a r t y seeking recovery.                     A t t h i s point the
                p l a i n t i f f c a n a t t e m p t t o n e g a t e t h e u s e r as
                t h e c a u s e and f u r t h e r n e g a t e o t h e r c a u s e s n o t
                a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t . These k i n d s of
                p r o o f i n t r o d u c e d a l o n e or c u m u l a t i v e l y a r e
                e v i d e n c e which h e l p e s t a b l i s h t h e p r e s e n c e of
                a d e f e c t as t h e c a u s e o f t h e damage."                     513
                P.2d         at      275,        quoting      Stewart      v.    Budget
                Rent-A-Car             ( 1 9 7 0 ) r 5 2 Haw. 7 1 , 470 P.2d 240,
                243.
      T h i s f l e x i b l e s t a n d a r d o f c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e c a n be m e t

by proof of           t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e a c c i d e n t , s i m i l a r o c c u r r e n -
ces u n d e r s i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and e l i m i n a t i o n of          alternative
causes.         Brown, s u p r a ; B r a n d e n b u r g e r ,
                --                                                supra.

      Under Rule 5 6 ,            M.R.Civ.P.,           the p a r t y opposing a motion f o r
summary         judgment       must      present        facts       of      a    substantial        nature.
S p e c u l a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t to r a i s e a g e n u i n e i s s u e

o f material f a c t .          B a r i c h , s u p r a ; Duncan, s u p r a .
      The a p p e l l a n t s h e r e h a v e f a i l e d t o meet t h e f l e x i b l e s t a n d a r d
s e t down i n B r a n d e n b u r g e r .          T h e r e was no a t t e m p t to            introduce

evidence         of     similar        occurrences           under        similar       circumstances.
M o r e o v e r , and p e r h a p s more i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e p l a i n t i f f s f a i l e d to
eliminate          alternative            causes        of       the     accident.             While       the

p l a i n t i f f s ' own c o n d u c t may n o t h a v e b e e n a c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r ,
t h a t i s n o t t h e o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e c a u s e t h a t s h o u l d be e l i m i n a t e d .
A l t e r n a t i v e c a u s e s i n c l u d e t i r e f a i l u r e , l o s s o f h y d r a u l i c power-
steering,          improper        maintenance,            abuse       by       the   prior     owner,       or

foreign         objects         in     the       steering         mechanism,            among       others.
      Because t h e a l l e g a t i o n s r a i s e d by p l a i n t i f f s are s o specula-

tive,     t h e y c a n n o t be c o n s i d e r e d g e n u i n e i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t .

      A p p e l l a n t s n e x t claim t h a t         t h e e v i d e n c e was s u f f i c i e n t f o r
a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e d o c t r i n e of - - l o q u i t u r .
                                                   res i p s a                           Such a n a r g u -

ment,      on     its     face,      seems      incorrect.               Generally,        res i p s a
                                                                                           - -               is
applied          to    human      conduct,        not     defective            products.                     It    is   the
d r i v e r o f a v e h i c l e or a p i l o t of a n a i r p l a n e who may be s u b j e c t

t o t h e r--- ---s- p r e s u m p t i o n .
           es i p a
            -.                                         S e e W h i t n e y v . N o r t h w e s t Greyhound

Lines,      Inc.           ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 1 2 5 Mont.      528,         242     P.2d           257;       Knowlton        v.
Sandaker          ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 0 Mont.        438,      436        P.2d        98;        and       Tompkins        v.

N o r t h w e s t e r n Union T r u s t Co.          (1982),        -- .        Mont          .   - --   -   ,   6 4 5 P.2d


       I n T o m p k i n s , w e q u o t e d t h e R e s t a t e m e n t ( S e c o n d ) of T o r t s , 5

328D,      as      properly         stating       the     doctrine             of    res i p s a l o q u
                                                                                     - - -itur:        -
                 " (1) I t may be i n f e r r e d t h a t harm s u f f e r e d b y
                 t h e p l a i n t i f f is c a u s e d by n e g l i g e n c e of t h e
                 d e f e n d a n t when
                 " ( a ) t h e e v e n t is o f a k i n d w h i c h o r d i n a r i l y
                 d o e s n o t o c c u r i n t h e a b s e n c e of n e g l i g e n c e ;

                 " ( b ) other responsible causes, including the
                 c o n d u c t o f t h e p l a i n t i f f and t h i r d p e r s o n s ,
                 are s u f f i c i e n t l y e l i m i n a t e d by t h e evidence;
                 and
                 " ( c ) t h e i n d i c a t e d negligence is w i t h i n the
                 scope      of     the        defendant's   duty    to     the
                 plaintiff.
                 " ( 2 ) I t is t h e f u n c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t t o
                 d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e i n £ e r e n c e may r e a s o n a b l y
                 be drawn by t h e j u r y , o r w h e t h e r it must
                 n e c e s s a r i l y be drawn.
                 " ( 3 ) I t is t h e f u n c t i o n o f t h e j u r y to d e t e r -
                 m i n e w h e t h e r t h e i n f e r e n c e is to be drawn i n
                 a n y c a s e w h e r e d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n s may
                 r e a s o n a b l y be r e a c h e d."    6 4 5 P.2d a t 406.
       While          we     have      stated       that       exclusive                 control             over       the

s i t u a t i o n is n o t a n e c e s s a r y e l e m e n t of a -- - c a s e , w e h a v e
                                                                  res i p s a
nevertheless                acknowledged           that      exclusive                   control             helps       to
e s t a b l i s h t h e p r o b a b l e c a u s e of      the accident.                       Tompkins, s u p r a .
       Here, t h e c o n t r o l e x e r c i s e d by d e f e n d a n t s , G e n e r a l Motors and

Bill     A t k i n Volkswagen,              is so remote               t h a t any c a u s a l               connection
b e t w e e n t h e i r d u t y and t h e p l a i n t i f f s '          i n j u r i e s has been broken.
Moreover     ,     as s t a t e d     e a r l i e r , because           a p p e l l a n t s have             failed      to

eliminate other reasonable causes,                               t h e i r a l l e g a t i o n s are p u r e l y

speculative.                I n s u c h a c a s e , no r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e - of n e g l i -
                                                                                                        //
gence      may        be     made     and    res
                                             -       - sa
                                                     ip
                                                      -        l
                                                               -   oquitur           is           not    applicable.
       The summary j u d g m e n t is a f f i r m e d .
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