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Brownsburg Community School Corp. v. Natare Corp.

Court: Indiana Supreme Court
Date filed: 2005-03-17
Citations: 824 N.E.2d 336
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12 Citing Cases

Attorneys for Appellant                            Attorney for Appellee
James S. Stephenson                                Thomas A. Pastore
Wayne E. Uhl                                       Indianapolis, Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
____________________________________________________________________________
_

                                   In the
                            Indiana Supreme Court
                      _________________________________

                            No. 49S02-0409-CV-406

Brownsburg Community School
Corporation,
                                             Appellant (Defendant below),

                                     v.

Natare Corporation,
                                             Appellee (Plaintiff below).
                      _________________________________

        Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49D05-0305-PL-906
                     The Honorable Gary L. Miller, Judge
                      _________________________________

 On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-0310-
                                   CV-871
                      _________________________________

                               March 17, 2005

Boehm, Justice.

      We hold that the Indiana Antitrust Act does not create a civil  treble
damage remedy against an arm of government.


















                      Factual and Procedural Background


      The following facts are alleged in the complaint.   We  take  them  as
true for purposes of this interlocutory appeal of the denial of a motion  by
a defendant for judgment on the pleadings.[1]


      The School Corporation undertook a  building  project  for  Brownsburg
High School that included a fine arts addition and  a  swimming  pool.   The
School Corporation hired Schmidt Associates as its  architect,  and  Schmidt
retained Spear Corporation as a pool consultant.   Spear  is  a  distributor
for   Myrtha   Pools   USA,   which   manufactures   prefabricated    pools.
Specifications were published for general contractors to bid on  the  entire
project.  Included were specifications derived  from  language  provided  by
Spear calling for a concrete  and  tile  cast-in-place  pool  and  alternate
specifications  for  a   prefabricated   pool   tank.    Plaintiff,   Natare
Corporation, a  supplier  of  prefabricated  pools  based  in  Indianapolis,
claims  that  the  specifications  included  language  that  only  a  Myrtha
prefabricated  pool  could  meet.   In  addition  to  the  pool  tank,   the
specifications also called for a moveable bulkhead. Natare claims  that  the
bulkhead specifications were based on a Myrtha design and excluded  Natare’s
product from  consideration.   The  School  Corporation  responds  that  its
specifications were drawn to get the best product at the  lowest  cost.   We
of course express no opinion on the validity of either party’s  allegations.



      The bid documents contemplated submission of proposals  that  did  not
meet the specifications, but only  if  any  variations  from  specifications
were approved by the architect.[2]  Natare attempted  to  gain  approval  of
its products, including its prefabricated pool tank and  moveable  bulkhead,
as meeting this “or equal” requirement.   Schmidt  responded  that  Natare’s
prefabricated pool tank with a  PVC  liner  system  was  not  equal  to  the
specified panelized heat bonded PVC laminated system.   Schmidt  also  noted
that Natare  had  not  identified  any  completed  projects  using  Natare’s
proposed system.  Schmidt  ultimately  also  rejected  the  Natare  bulkhead
design, which utilized foam materials  in  the  buoyancy  chambers,  as  not
equal to  the  specified  stainless  steel  movable  bulkhead.   After  this
exchange, three general contractors submitted bids for the  entire  project.
Each relied on bids for the pool from either a local contractor or Spear.


      In March 2003 Natare sued the School Corporation, Schmidt, and  Spear,
alleging that the three had conspired to exclude Natare  from  consideration
as a supplier for the pool and bulkhead in violation  of  the  provision  of
the Indiana Antitrust Act prohibiting combinations in  restraint  of  trade,
Indiana Code section 24-1-2-3 (2004).  Natare alleged that  the  wording  of
the specifications unreasonably limited  competition  by  requiring  bidding
contractors to use Myrtha Pool materials and equipment  supplied  by  Spear,
and that Spear had a significant role in determining whether other  products
were “equal.”  Pursuant to Indiana  Code  section  24-1-2-7,  the  complaint
sought treble damages, costs,  and  attorney  fees  for  violations  of  the
Indiana Antitrust Act.


      The School Corporation answered the complaint and moved  for  judgment
on the pleadings under Indiana Trial Rule 12(C), alleging that it was not  a
“person” as that term is used in the Indiana Antitrust Act, and,  therefore,
was not an entity subject to the civil treble  damages  remedy  provided  by
that statute.  The trial court denied the  motion  but  granted  the  School
Corporation’s petition to certify the order for interlocutory  appeal.   The
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a school corporation is  a  “person”
who can sue and be sued under the Indiana Antitrust Act.   Brownsburg  Cmty.
Sch. Corp. v. Natare Corp., 808 N.E.2d 148, 154 (Ind. Ct.  App.  2004).   We
granted transfer.  Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Natare  Corp.,  2004  Ind.
LEXIS 786 (Ind. Sept. 9, 2004).


                            I.  Public Purchasing


      The Public Purchasing laws include provisions addressing contracts  by
school corporations,  and  requiring,  inter  alia,  that  the  contract  be
awarded to “the lowest responsible and responsive bidder.”[3]  Ind.  Code  §
5-22-7-8 (2004).  Only a  citizen  or  a  taxpayer  of  a  municipality  may
challenge  the  award  of  a  government  contract  under  Indiana’s  Public
Purchasing Statute.  See All-Star Constr. & Excavating, Inc. v. Bd. of  Pub.
Works, 640 N.E.2d 369, 370 (Ind. 1994); Shook Heavy & Envtl.  Constr.  Group
v. City of Kokomo, 632 N.E.2d 355, 358 (Ind. 1994).   Natare  is  neither  a
citizen nor a taxpayer of Brownsburg, and therefore has no claim under  that
statute.  However, this Court  has  observed  that  “[o]ne  need  not  be  a
citizen or a taxpayer of the municipality . . . to maintain  an  action  for
fraud or collusion in the award of a contract.  Ind. Code § 24-1-2-7.”  All-
Star, 640 N.E.2d at 370.  Accord Shook, 632 N.E.2d at  358.   The  statutory
reference is to the treble damages provision in the Indiana  Antitrust  Act.



                         II.  Indiana Antitrust Act


      Because Natare has no claim for damages under  the  Public  Purchasing
Statute, it seeks to bring its claim under the Indiana Antitrust Act.   Ind.
Code § 24-1-2-1—12 (2004).  The principal issue is  whether  a  governmental
entity is  subject  to  the  private  treble  damages  remedy  provided  for
violation of the antitrust act.


      A.  The Statutory Framework


      Sections 1 and 2 of the Indiana Antitrust Act,  I.C.  §  24-1-2-1,  et
seq., are comparable to the federal Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.  sections  1  and
2, respectively.  Like section 1 of the Sherman Act,  Indiana  Code  section
24-1-2-1 addresses combinations in restraint of trade.   Similarly,  section
2 of the Sherman Act and  Indiana  Code  section  24-1-2-2  both  deal  with
monopolization.  Indiana has two additional provisions for  which  there  is
no  federal  counterpart.   Section  3,  I.C.  §  24-1-2-3,  prohibits   the
restraint of bidding for letting of contracts  whether  public  or  private,
and Section 4, I.C. § 24-1-2-4, addresses remedies for “collusion or  fraud”
among contract bidders.  Specifically, Section 4 of  the  Indiana  Antitrust
Act provides that in cases of “collusion or fraud . . .  among  the  bidders
at the letting of any contract or work as provided in [Section 3] . . .  the
principal who lets the contract . . . shall not be liable for  such  letting
or on account of said contract . . .”  Section 4 thus  frees  the  principal
who lets a contract tainted by  “collusion  or  fraud”  among  bidders  from
liability on the contract.  By its terms, Section 4 applies  only  if  there
is “collusion or fraud . . . as provided in [Section 3].”  It thus does  not
prohibit any conduct.  Rather, it deals  with  remedies  for  violations  of
Section 3.


      Section 3  of  the  Indiana  Antitrust  Act  does  not  use  the  term
“collusion or fraud,” but does prohibit certain conduct.  It provides:

      A person who engages  in  any  scheme,  contract,  or  combination  to
      restrain or restrict bidding for  the  letting  of  any  contract  for
      private or public work, or restricts free competition for the  letting
      of any contract  for  private  or  public  work,  commits  a  Class  A
      misdemeanor.

I.C. § 24-1-2-3.  Natare alleges that the defendants violated Section  3  by
denying Natare’s  products  “equal”  status  under  the  specifications  and
thereby  restraining  Natare’s  ability  to  bid.   The  School  Corporation
responds that because it is a governmental entity  it  not  subject  to  the
Indiana Antitrust Act’s criminal and civil penalties.


      B.  Indiana Case Law


      Three appellate decisions have referred to  the  treble  civil  damage
provision of the Indiana Antitrust Act in the context of a claim  against  a
governmental entity, but none was faced with the question whether or  not  a
remedy existed against the entity itself.


      In City of Auburn v. Mavis, 468 N.E.2d 584, 585 (Ind. Ct. App.  1984),
the Court of Appeals affirmed a jury award of treble  damages  and  attorney
fees against the City of Auburn.  Mavis was a losing  bidder  for  a  public
contract to provide  radio  communications  equipment  to  the  Auburn  Fire
Department and brought an action against the City and D & L  Communications,
Inc. for violation of Section 3, which makes unlawful acts which operate  to
restrain open and free  competition  in  bidding  to  obtain  contracts  for
private or public work.  Id.  At  trial  the  City  of  Auburn  and  D  &  L
conceded that they violated this statute  when  they  contrived  to  develop
specifications favoring equipment sold by D & L before  the  City  solicited
bids.  Id. at 586.  On appeal, the City did not contend that it  was  immune
from treble damages under the Indiana  Antitrust  Act.   The  issue,  though
assumed, was not debated in either the trial court or the Court of Appeals.


      In Shook Heavy & Environmental Construction Group v. City  of  Kokomo,
632 N.E.2d 355 (Ind. 1994), an unsuccessful bidder claimed that the City  of
Kokomo violated Indiana’s Public Purchasing Statute by failing to award  the
contract  to  the  lowest  bidder.   Kokomo  had  solicited  bids  for   the
construction of a municipal sludge composting facility.  When the bids  were
opened,  Kokomo  awarded  the  contract  to  the  lowest   responsible   and
responsive bidder.   Shook  Heavy  &  Environmental  Construction  Group,  a
losing bidder, filed suit in federal court  seeking  an  injunction  against
the award of the contract on the basis that deficiencies in the bid  of  the
apparent low bidder caused that bidder’s bid to not be lower  than  Shook’s.
Id. at 357.  In response to a certified question from the  federal  district
court, we held that because Shook was not a citizen or taxpayer  of  Kokomo,
Shook could not challenge the award under  the  Public  Purchasing  Statute.
Id. at 358.   Citing  Auburn,  we  noted  that  Section  7  of  the  Indiana
Antitrust Act allows an unsuccessful bidder to  challenge  the  award  of  a
contract by the city if the plaintiff alleges “collusion or fraud.”  Id.


      The unsuccessful  bidder  in  Shook  sought  only  an  injunction  and
asserted its claims  under  the  Public  Purchasing  Act.   In  making  this
passing reference to remedies under Section 7, we were not  faced  with  the
question of who among  the  potential  defendants  might  be  subject  to  a
“challenge” under this section.  Nor were we concerned with  precisely  what
form that challenge  might  take.   A  combination  in  restraint  of  trade
necessarily involves at  least  two  parties.   Lawrence  Anthony  Sullivan,
Antitrust 323 (West 1976).  And  an  entity  cannot  combine  with  its  own
employees or subsidiaries.  See Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. Am., 677  F.2d  946,
953 (2d Cir. 1982) (“collaborative action  between  a  corporation  and  its
employees, or among employees within  a  corporation,  is  not  regarded  as
joint action within the meaning of § 1” of  the  Sherman  Act);  Univ.  Life
Ins. Co. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846,  852  (7th  Cir.  1983)  (conspiracy
between a corporation and its officers not actionable  under  Section  1  of
the Sherman Act).   Cf. Copperweld Corp. v.  Independence  Tube  Corp.,  467
U.S. 752, 778 (1984) (A parent corporation and its wholly  owned  subsidiary
are incapable of conspiring with each other for  purposes  of  §  1  of  the
Sherman Act.); Rep. of the Attorney  General’s  Nat’l  Comm.  to  Study  the
Antitrust Laws, 30-36 (1955).  Accordingly,  at  least  one  nongovernmental
entity will ordinarily be a party to a combination in which  a  governmental
entity is also a player.  In short, Shook was not faced with,  and  did  not
consider, whether all parties, including the governmental entity,  could  be
held liable for treble damages under the antitrust law.


      Shook took its reference to Section 7 remedies directly from  All-Star
Construction & Excavating, Inc. v. Board of Public  Works,  640  N.E.2d  369
(Ind.  1994).   Like  Shook,  All-Star  merely  observed  that  some  remedy
existed, without exploring  precisely  what  remedy  was  available  against
which entities.  In All-Star,  the  lowest  bidder  for  construction  of  a
city’s economic development project sued when the city awarded the  contract
to  a  competitor  because  it  was  “a  local  contractor  and  a  minority
contractor.”  640 N.E.2d at 370.  We held that there was  no  evidence  that
the City was engaged in “collusion or fraud,”  and  the  constructive  fraud
claim failed for that reason.  Id.


      In sum,  the  issue  in  this  case,  whether  a  local  or  municipal
government is susceptible to a claim for treble damages under  Indiana  Code
section 24-1-2-7, is a matter of first impression.

      C.  Criminal Liability of Governmental Entities

      By their terms, the only portions of the Indiana  Antitrust  Act  that
contain substantive prohibitions are Sections 1, 2, and 3.   These  sections
are framed similarly to provisions of the Criminal Code and provide that  it
is a Class A Misdemeanor to engage in the actions prohibited.  We think  the
legislature, when writing this  statute  in  1907,  did  not  contemplate  a
governmental entity as a potential violator of its prohibitions.  First,  on
the only  occasion  where  the  issue  has  been  addressed  by  an  Indiana
appellate court, the Court of Appeals held  that  the  State  could  not  be
criminally responsible, even where the statute prohibited acts by  “persons”
and defined “person”  to  include  “governmental  entities.”   In  State  v.
Ziliak, 464 N.E.2d 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), landowners alleged  that  state
employees committed criminal property  offenses  when  the  state  employees
entered upon the landowners’ property and removed certain  Indian  artifacts
without permission.   The  landowners  sought  damages  under  Indiana  Code
section 34-4-30-1, which provides civil remedies to crime  victims.[4]   The
Court of Appeals  held:   “A  criminal  offense  is  an  offense  against  a
sovereign state.”  Id. at 930 (citing Reed v. Carrigan,  190  Ind.  29,  129
N.E. 8 (1920)); 8 I.L.E. Criminal Law § 2 (1971); 21 Am.  Jur.  2d  Criminal
Law § 1 (1981); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1 (1961).  “A crime is said  to  be
an offense against the sovereignty.”  21  Am.  Jur.  2d  Criminal  Law  §  1
(1981).  “Because a crime  is  an  offense  against  the  sovereign,  it  is
axiomatic that the sovereign cannot commit a crime.”  Ziliak, 464 N.E.2d  at
930.  The court noted that the criminal code,  I.C.  §  35-41-1-22,  defined
“person”  as  “a  human  being,  corporation,  partnership,   unincorporated
association, or governmental entity.”  Id. (emphasis in original).   Despite
this definition, the Court  of  Appeals  concluded  that  the  State  was  a
“person” as that term  is  used  in  the  Indiana  Criminal  Code  only  for
purposes of its status as a victim.


      Natare argues, and  the  Court  of  Appeals  agreed,  that  Ziliak  is
inapposite here because it dealt with a claimed crime by the  State  itself,
and did not address whether a  subdivision  of  the  State  could  commit  a
crime.  Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Natare  Corp.,  808  N.E.2d  148  153
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003).  We find no authority supporting such  a  distinction.
For the reasons expressed below we believe neither the State nor  any  other
governmental entity is subject to criminal provisions  of  Indiana  statutes
without the legislation making that result absolutely clear.


      Indiana law as reflected in Ziliak is  consistent  with  other  United
States jurisdictions  in  rejecting  the  possibility  of  a  crime  by  the
government.  Relevant federal cases  and  statutory  authority  are  sparse.
One federal statute  carrying  criminal  penalties  (regulating  prices  and
profits for commodities in emergencies) defines “person” as “an  individual,
corporation, partnership, association,  or  any  other  organized  group  of
persons . . . and includes the United States or any agency thereof,  or  any
other government, or any of its political subdivisions,  or  any  agency  of
the foregoing.”  Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, c. 26,  Title  III,  §
302(h), c. 26, 56 Stat. 36.  Section 205 of the Act provides for  injunctive
remedies and criminal fines and imprisonment for convictions.  However,  the
definition of person also explicitly states that:  “no  punishment  provided
by this Act shall apply to the United States, or to any [federal, state,  or
local] government, political subdivision, or agency.”  Id.  This  definition
has been interpreted to mean that governmental agencies are exempt from  the
act’s criminal liabilities, but  not  necessarily  its  remedial  sanctions.
See 1 Working Papers of the Nat’l Comm. on Reform of Fed. Criminal Laws  175
(1970), typically known as the Brown Commission.  The Brown Commission  also
noted that though the Emergency Price Control Act specifically extended  its
prohibitions to governmental entities, “no case has been found  in  which  a
court has held  such  an  agency  subject  to  the  Act.”   Id.   The  Brown
Commission concluded by recognizing that although “there is nothing  in  the
nature of a municipal corporation which would make it  inherently  incapable
of committing a crime, there does not appear to be a Federal case holding  a
governmental entity as such criminally liable.”  Id. at 176.


      State law also finds the concept of a crime by the sovereign to be  an
alien notion.  We have found no criminal code in this country  that  imposes
criminal liability on the sovereign and only one that would  permit  a  fine
on an arm of the government.[5]  The Model Penal Code specifically  excludes
from its definition of “corporation”  any  entity  “organized  as  or  by  a
governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program.”   American
Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 2.07(4)(a) (P.O.D. 1962).  The  commentary
to section 207(4)(a) observes that “[l]iability in  such  cases  would  seem
entirely  pointless,  although  of  course  the  liability  of   individuals
involved in criminal activity is  preserved.”   1  American  Law  Institute,
Model Penal Code § 207(5)(a), at 345 (1985).   At  least  five  states  have
adopted a version of 2.07(4)(a).[6]  Most  states,  however,  like  Indiana,
contain no express treatment of the issue in their  general  criminal  laws.
In the absence of specific legislative direction,  we  think  the  Court  of
Appeals  correctly  concluded  in  Ziliak  that  the  legislature  did   not
contemplate a violation of a criminal prohibition by a governmental entity.


      D.  Specific Provisions of the Indiana Antitrust Act


      Natare claims a violation of Section 3, and seeks treble  damages  for
its lost time in preparing a useless bid and attorney fees, under Section  7
of the Indiana Antitrust Act.[7]  That section, tracking section 15  of  the
Clayton Act, provides treble damages and attorneys fees  for  those  injured
in their “business or property” by a  violation  of  the  Indiana  Antitrust
Act.  This section purports to  give  a  right  to  treble  damages  to  any
“person” injured by any “person” doing “any thing forbidden or  declared  to
be unlawful” by any of the first three sections  of  the  Indiana  Antitrust
Act.[8]  Consistent with the usual legislative silence  on  the  application
of criminal  laws  to  governmental  entities,  the  Indiana  Antitrust  Act
neither defines “person” to include a governmental entity  nor  specifically
excludes the possibility of a crime by such an entity.


      The School Corporation argues that it is not a “person” as  that  term
is defined in the antitrust act.  Indiana Code  section  24-1-2-10  provides
definitions similar to those found  in  the  Sherman  Act,  15  U.S.C.  §  7
(2000):

      The words “person” or “persons” whenever used in this chapter shall be
      deemed  to  include  corporations,  associations,  limited   liability
      companies, joint stock companies, partnerships, limited or  otherwise,
      existing under or authorized by the laws of the state of  Indiana,  or
      of the United States, or of any state, territory, or district  of  the
      United States, or of any foreign country.

I.C. § 24-1-2-10.  Natare argues that the School Corporation can  be  liable
for treble damages and attorney fees because  “person”  is  defined  by  the
statute  to  include  “corporations,”  and  school  corporations   are   not
explicitly exempt from this definition.  School corporations,  like  general
business corporations, are creatures of statute.   In  the  case  of  school
corporations, they are created pursuant  to  Indiana  Code  section  20-4-1.
Reflecting that statute, the Brownsburg School  Corporation  uses  the  term
“corporation” as a part of its legal name.  The Court of Appeals found  this
persuasive and agreed with Natare that a school corporation  is  a  “person”
subject to the treble damages remedy provided  by  the  antitrust  act.   We
disagree for reasons grounded in the text of the Antitrust Act  as  well  as
the  general  assumption  that  criminal  laws   are   not   applicable   to
governmental entities.


      The School Corporation first argues that  the  term  “corporation”  is
ambiguous and that the General Assembly did not intend the term  to  include
governmental entities.  As originally enacted in 1907, the  antitrust  law’s
definition   of   “person”   included,    “corporations,”    “associations,”
“companies” and “partnerships.”  The School Corporation points out that  the
other entities included in this definition  as  “persons”  are  all  private
business entities, and argues that this implies all “persons” are  from  the
private sector.  Moreover, in contrast to the silence of the  Antitrust  Act
on this point, the School Corporation offers a number of statutes where  the
General  Assembly  has  treated  political  subdivisions  as  distinct  from
“corporations” and subjected public bodies to the same treatment as  private
corporations by express language.[9]


      We do not believe the definition of person is  the  central  issue  in
determining whether the School Corporation, or any  arm  of  government,  is
susceptible to a claim  for  treble  damages.   Although  we  recognize  the
maxims of statutory  construction  involved  here,  we  find  them  at  best
suggestions, and not directives.  It would be anomalous indeed if a  private
business overcharged as a result of price fixing can recover treble  damages
but a school corporation cannot.  We agree that municipal  corporations  are
“persons” as  that  term  is  used  in  the  Indiana  Antitrust  Act.   They
therefore can  sue  under  Section  7  if  injured  in  their  “business  or
property” by an antitrust violation.  But it does not follow that  they  are
also potential treble damage defendants.  In order to be sued under  Section
7, a “person” must have done something “forbidden by” the Indiana  antitrust
law.  The substantive prohibitions of the antitrust  laws  are  criminal  in
nature.  Accordingly, we think  the  legislation  did  not  contemplate  the
possibility of a governmental entity engaging in an action forbidden by  the
statute.  Rather, as Section 4  reflects,  the  statute  views  governmental
entities as victims, not  perpetrators,  and  explicitly  relieves  them  of
liability from a contract that was the result of collusive bidding.


      Natare also asserts that when the General Assembly first  enacted  the
statute that created school corporations, I.C. § 20-4-1-26.1 (formerly  I.C.
§ 20-4-1-26), it expressly included a  provision  that  school  corporations
could sue and be sued.  We think this  is  of  no  relevance  to  the  issue
before us.  The power to sue  and  be  sued  simply  confers  general  legal
capacity on the entity.  It says nothing  about  what  kinds  of  suits  the
entity may bring or what liabilities it may incur.  Natare also  points  out
that the Antitrust Act was amended by the General Assembly in  1986  and  in
1993 and did not exempt  municipal  corporations  form  the  act.[10]   From
this, Natare reasons that the General Assembly legislatively  acquiesced  in
the municipal corporation’s liability  to  suit.   These  amendments  merely
provided updated and uniform terms.  They do not suggest  that  the  General
Assembly revisited the liability of municipal or local government entities.


      E.  Governmental Immunity


      Rejecting a treble damage remedy  against  a  governmental  entity  is
fortified by the fact that  at  the  time  the  Indiana  Antitrust  Act  was
enacted there  was  no  prospect  of  civil  liability  on  the  part  of  a
governmental  entity.   Indiana  recognized  the  common  law  doctrine   of
sovereign immunity until 1972, when this Court abolished sovereign  immunity
in most areas.  Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 61-62, 284 N.E.2d 733,  736-
37 (1972).  In response  to  Campbell,  in  1974,  the  Indiana  legislature
enacted  the  Indiana  Tort  Claims  Act,  which  identified   a   list   of
governmental activities that are immunized by statute from  tort  liability.
See I.C. § 34-13-3-3.


      Natare argues that the  Court  of  Appeals  correctly  concluded  that
because the General Assembly has “increasingly allowed the government to  be
sued for wrongdoing” the 1907  presumption  of  immunity  has  been  eroded.
Brownsburg Comty. Sch. Corp., 808 N.E.2d at 152-53.  The  Court  of  Appeals
noted that since 1974, the Tort Claims Act permits  public  entities  to  be
held liable for negligence, I.C. §§ 34-13-3-1—25   (formerly  I.C.  §  34-4-
16.5-1).  The School Corporation points out  that  in  the  late  nineteenth
century it was presumed that school  corporations  were  immune  from  suit.
Freel v. Sch. City of Crawfordsville, 142 Ind. 27,  28,  41  N.E.  312,  312
(1895) (“where subdivisions of the state are organized solely for  a  public
purpose, by a general law,  no  action  lies  against  them  for  an  injury
received by a person on account of the negligence of the  officers  of  such
subdivision, unless a right of action is expressly given by  statute”).   “A
statute in derogation of the common law  is  presumed  to  be  enacted  with
awareness of the common law.”  Cook v.  Whitsell-Sherman,  796  N.E.2d  271,
275 (Ind. 2003).  In the legal environment of 1907  there  was  no  need  to
provide explicitly that governmental entities  could  not  be  subjected  to
treble damages.  It was  assumed  they  were  immune  from  suit.   And,  as
explained by Part G, at that time the federal antitrust laws,  which  served
as the prototype for the Indiana law, made the same assumption.


      F.  Public Policy


       Public policy considerations support  our  reading  of  the  statute.
This Court has recognized  that  treble  damages  are  punitive  in  nature.
Obremski v. Henderson, 497 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind.  1986)  (referring  to  the
treble damages remedy for crime victims provided by Indiana Code section 34-
4-30-1 (now I.C. § 34-24-3-1)).  The Tort Claims Act prohibits an  award  of
punitive damages  against  a  governmental  entity.   I.C.  §  34-13-3-4(b).
Courts have also been reluctant to impose  punitive  damages  on  government
entities  in  part  because  the  penalty  falls  ultimately   on   innocent
taxpayers.  See State v. Carter, 658 N.E.2d 618, 624 (Ind.  Ct.  App.  1995)
(sanction of attorney fees against  State  disfavored  “because  it  is  the
citizen taxpayers who would bear the burden of this punitive  award”);  City
of Gary v. Falcone, 169 Ind. App. 295, 297, 348 N.E.2d 41,  42  (1976)  (“if
punitive damages were allowed against municipalities, the  group  for  whose
protection  such  damages  were  purportedly  awarded,  the   citizens   and
taxpayers, would be the identical group who would bear  the  burden  of  the
award.  Such a result is anomalous, indeed.”).  Moreover, “it  is  far  from
clear that municipal officials . . . would be deterred  from  wrongdoing  by
the knowledge that large punitive awards could  be  assessed  based  on  the
wealth of their municipality.”  City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,  453
U.S. 247, 268 (1981); see also Gares v. Willingboro Township, 90  F.3d  720,
736 (3d Cir. 1996)   (“the  reasoning  that  punitive  damages  serve  as  a
deterrent becomes less sensible when applied to a municipality”).


      It is one thing to visit civil penalties on  individuals  who  violate
the law.  And if a private  organization  employs  persons  who  transgress,
imposing penalties  on  the  organization  places  the  loss  on  those  who
voluntarily associated themselves with it.  In  the  case  of  a  for-profit
organization, those individuals within the organization ordinarily stood  to
gain  from  the  illegal  activity.   But  imposing  treble  damages  on   a
governmental  entity  visits  the  loss  on   wholly   innocent   taxpayers.
Moreover, the treble damages remedy under the antitrust law is  designed  to
deter unlawful competitive activity presumably  undertaken  to  enhance  the
profits of the violators.  But in this case of a violation of the  antitrust
laws by a governmental entity, the government will typically  be  a  victim,
not a beneficiary.   That  is  the  situation  presented  here  if  Natare’s
allegations are correct.  For these reasons as  well,  we  conclude  that  a
governmental entity was not contemplated as a  defendant  under  Section  7,
and hold that the School  Corporation  cannot  be  held  liable  for  treble
damages.


      G.  Federal Antitrust Liability of Governmental Entities


      We also find instructive the history of government liability under the
federal antitrust laws.  It too points in the direction of nonliability.


      The Clayton Act allows any “person” to be a plaintiff.   The  term  is
defined  to  include  “corporations  and  associations  existing  under   or
authorized by” federal, state or foreign law.  15 U.S.C. § 12.  As early  as
1906 it was held that a municipality  could  be  a  plaintiff.   Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. City  of  Atlanta,  203  U.S.  390,  396  (1906)  (a
municipality is a “person” entitled to sue under § 7 of  the  Sherman  Act).
Chattanooga did not address, and apparently was not presented  with  any  of
the issues discussed in Parts C, E, and F of this opinion.  Similar  rulings
as to states and foreign nations followed.  See Pfizer,  Inc.  v.  Gov’t  of
India, 434 U.S. 308, 320 (1978) (“a foreign  nation  otherwise  entitled  to
sue in our courts is entitled to sue for treble damages under the  antitrust
laws to the same extent as any other plaintiff”); Georgia v. Pa.  R.R.  Co.,
324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945) (State of Georgia was a “person”  within  provision
of § 26 of the Clayton Act authorizing any  person  to  sue  for  injunctive
relief and to recover damages).


      Whether an entity of local government could be sued for damages  under
the Sherman Act did not arise until many years  later.   In  1978,  a  four-
Justice plurality of the Supreme Court held that a municipal utility,  which
had brought a treble damage claim against a competitor, could be subject  to
a counterclaim for treble damages.  City of Lafayette v. La. Power  &  Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412-13 (1978).  The plurality concluded that “the  Parker
doctrine exempts only anticompetitive  conduct  engaged  in  as  an  act  of
government by the State as sovereign or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to  a
state policy to displace competition  with  regulation  or  monopoly  public
service.”  Id. at 413.  Chief  Justice  Burger  agreed  that  the  municipal
utility could be sued for treble  damages  but  based  his  opinion  on  the
nature of the entity as a competitor in a market place, not  on  its  status
as an arm of government.  Id. at 419.  Four Justices dissented  specifically
complaining that exposure to  treble  damages  could  be  ruinous  to  local
governments.  Id. at 440.  The dissenters took the view  that  a  state  can
authorize its arms of government as  it  chooses,  and  the  “state  action”
doctrine announced in Parker  v.  Brown[11]  should  exempt  any  government
actor from the antitrust law.  Shortly after City of  Lafayette,  the  Court
held that Parker immunity extended to a municipality  only  if  its  actions
were in furtherance of a “clearly articulated and  affirmatively  expressed”
state policy.  Cmty. Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40,  51
(1982).  The general grant of authority under Home  Rule  legislation,  such
as Indiana’s, codified  at  Indiana  Code  section  36-1-3-1—9,  was  not  a
sufficiently articulated state policy to guarantee immunity.


      Although no treble  damage  award  had  yet  been  entered  against  a
governmental entity, after City of  Lafayette  and  City  of  Boulder,  that
result was seen as a realistic possibility.  Congress promptly responded  to
these decisions by enacting the Local  Government  Antitrust  Act  of  1984,
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36.  That  statute  left  governmental  entities
subject to injunctive or  declaratory  relief  but  prohibited  recovery  of
antitrust damages “from  any  local  government,  or  official  or  employee
thereof acting in an official capacity.”[12]  15 U.S.C. § 35(a).   A  “local
government” within the meaning  of  the  Act  includes  any  “city,  county,
parish, town, township, village or any other general  function  governmental
unit established by state  law,”  and  also  “a  school  district,  sanitary
district, or any other special function  governmental  unit  established  by
State law.”  15  U.S.C.  §  34(1)(A)-(B).   The  House  Judiciary  Committee
pointed out that City of Lafayette and  City  of  Boulder  “appear  to  have
limited the extent that antitrust immunity  applicable  to  States  will  be
accorded to local governments” and these decisions “could undermine a  local
government’s ability to govern in the public interest.  Most  of  the  suits
instituted  by  private  parties  have  sought  treble  damages  from  local
governments.”  5 U.S. Code Congressional & Administrative News 98  Cong.  2d
1984 at  4603  (1985).   The  purpose  of  the  Act  was  to  “clarify”  the
application of the Clayton Act to the official conduct of local  governments
and eliminate “antitrust damage liability for official conduct  of  a  local
government and its officials.”  Id.  Congress was also concerned that  local
taxpayers, the very persons the antitrust laws are designed to protect,  are
called  upon  to  pay  treble  damage  judgments  rendered   against   local
governments.  Irving Scher, Antitrust Adviser § 7.09 at 43 (Vol. 2, 4th  ed.
2003).


       Indiana  courts  have  generally  followed   federal   precedent   in
interpreting the  Indiana  Antitrust  Act.   E.g.  Berghausen  v.  Microsoft
Corp., 765 N.E.2d 592, 594-96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Mavis, 468  N.E.2d  584,
585-86; Rumple v. Bloomington Hosp., 422  N.E.2d  1309,  1313-14  (Ind.  Ct.
App. 1981); Citizens Nat’l Bank of Grant  County  v.  First  Nat’l  Bank  in
Marion, 165 Ind. App. 117, 125, 331  N.E.2d  471,  476  (1975).   Consistent
with that approach, a few states have followed City of  Lafayette  and  City
of Boulder.[13]  We do not join them.  Where the government activity is  not
competition with private  enterprise,  even  the  City  of  Lafayette  Court
lacked a majority for subjecting the municipality  to  treble  damages.   In
any  event,  we  think  the  rapid  congressional  removal  of  exposure  of
potential  liability  of  municipalities  under  the  antitrust  laws   also
indicates that liability was simply not contemplated  by  federal  antitrust
legislation.   When  the  implications  of  this  potential  liability  were
explored, it was promptly and soundly rejected.


      We do not agree that federal precedent is appropriate  in  considering
whether  governmental  immunity  is  available  to   municipal   and   local
government units under state antitrust laws.  Parker and its progeny  turned
significantly on the relationship between the  federal  government  and  the
states as dual sovereignties.  Municipal and local government units, on  the
other hand, are creatures of the State.  As such there is  no  consideration
of comity or deference.  The only  issue  is  the  intention  of  the  state
legislature to impose or  withhold  liability.   See  Freitas  v.  City  and
County of San Francisco, 92 Cal. App.  3d  913,  917  (1979);  Fine  Airport
Parking, Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 71 P.3d 5, 11 (Ok.  2003)  (“The  principles
of federalism that govern the relationship between the two  sovereigns,  the
federal and state governments, do not apply to the  relationship  between  a
state and a  municipality  acting  pursuant  to  state  law  .  .  .  .  The
principles of federalism supporting the Parker doctrine are  meaningless  in
an analysis of municipal liability”); Town of Hallie  v.  City  of  Chippewa
Falls, 314 N.W.2d 321,  324  (Wis.  1982)  (“The  relationship  between  the
federal government and the  states  is  not  parallel  to  the  relationship
between the state government and the cities.”).   For  the  reasons  already
given, we do not read our  statute  to  provide  liability  of  governmental
agencies.  In this conclusion we join Massachusetts,  New  Jersey,  Oklahoma
and New York in rejecting the federal state action immunity  doctrine  under
state antitrust law.  Monsanto Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Utils., 586 N.E.2d  982,
983 (Mass. 1992); Fanelli v. City of Trenton, 641  A.2d  541,  547-49  (N.J.
1994); City of Tulsa, 71 P.3d at 12; Capital Tel. Comp.  v.  New  York  Tel.
Comp., 540 N.Y.S.2d 895, 896-99 (1989).


                                 Conclusion


      The order  of  the  trial  court  denying  the  motion  of  Brownsburg
Community School Corporation for judgment  on  the  pleadings  is  reversed.
This case is remanded with  direction  to  grant  the  School  Corporation’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ. concur.
-----------------------
[1] Under Trial Rule 12(C), motion for judgment on the pleadings  is  to  be
granted ‘“only where it is clear from the face of the complaint  that  under
no  circumstances  could  relief  be   granted.”’    Forte   v.   Connerwood
Healthcare, Inc., 745 N.E.2d 796,  801  (Ind.  2001)  (quoting  Culver-Union
Township Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 629 N.E.2d 1231, 1235  (Ind.  1994)).
When reviewing a 12(C) motion, the reviewing court accepts as true the well-
pleaded material facts alleged  in  the  complaint,  and  bases  its  ruling
solely on the pleadings.  Noblesville Redevelopment  Comm’n  v.  Noblesville
Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 674 N.E.2d 558, 562 (Ind. 1996).
[2] Paragraph 3.3.1 of  AIA  Document  A701-1997,  Instructions  to  Bidders
provided:
      The  materials,  products  and  equipment  described  in  the  bidding
      documents  establish  a  standard  of  required  function,  dimension,
      appearance and  quality  to  be  met  by  any  proposed  substitution.
      Whenever possible and without prejudice to price,  quality,  or  other
      considerations, local sources of labor, materials and  services  shall
      be given preference.  Generally, where  words  “or  equal”  appear,  a
      product of another  manufacturer  will  be  acceptable,  but  only  if
      approved in writing by the Architect prior to  bidding  in  accordance
      with the  provisions  stated  in  the  Contract  Documents  and  these
      Instructions to Bidders.
[3] The public bidding statute, as applied to school corporations,  provides
the  school  corporation  the  discretionary   power   to   determine   “the
responsible offeror” that is “most advantageous to  the  governmental  body,
taking into consideration price and the other evaluation factors  set  forth
in the request for proposals.”  Ind. Code § 5-22-9-7(a) (2004).  The  school
corporation must have its purchase or lease available for the public.   I.C.
§ 5-22-18-5(b)(3).  A citizen or taxpayer of that school district  may  then
seek to  enjoin  a  contract  attempted  to  be  entered  into  pursuant  to
competitive bidding where the award is arbitrary,  corrupt,  or  fraudulent.
Budd v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of St. Joseph County,  216  Ind.  35,  37,  22
N.E.2d 973, 975 (1939); Bd. of Comm’rs of Henry County v. Gillies, 138  Ind.
667, 673, 38 N.E. 40, 42 (1894).
[4] In Ziliak it was agreed that the acts  of  state  employees  constituted
violations of  Indiana  Code  section  35-43-2-2  (criminal  trespass),  and
Indiana Code section 35-43-1-2 (criminal  mischief).   464  N.E.2d  at  930.
The Ziliaks sought damages provided in the section now codified  at  Indiana
Code section 34-24-3-1 (2004), which provided for a civil action for  treble
damages and attorneys fees  for  violations  ofIndiana  Code  section  35-43
among others.
[5] See City of Ludlow v. Commonwealth, 56 S.W.2d 958 (Ky. 1933), where  the
city built an  allegedly  defective  sewer  that,  when  it  rained,  caused
backups in the basements  of  several  residences,  “producing  an  odor  so
noisome, offensive, and sickening that the occupants  of  the  houses  could
not eat or sleep.”  Id. at 958.  The  state  prosecuted  and  the  City  was
convicted of maintaining a  common  nuisance  and  fined  $1,500.   Id.   It
appealed.  The court of appeals cited three earlier Kentucky cases in  which
cities had been held criminally liable for maintaining  a  public  nuisance.
The court reversed and remanded for a new trial  on  the  grounds  that  the
$1,500  fine  imposed  on  the  City  violated   Kentucky’s   constitutional
prohibition of excessive fines.  Id. at 968-69.
[6] See Haw. Rev. Stat. §  702-229(1)  (2003);  N.J.  Stat.  §  2C:2-7(b)(1)
(2004); N.D.  Cent.  Code  §  51-08.1-01  (2003);  Ohio  Rev.  Code  Ann.  §
2901.23(D) (2004); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 307(F) (2004).
[7] Unlike the federal antitrust laws and those of most states, the  Indiana
Antitrust Act does not explicitly provide an injunctive remedy.  Whether  an
injunctive remedy is available under the Indiana Antitrust Act,  and  if  so
whether it lies against a unit of local government are issues not  presented
in this case and we express no opinion on them.
[8] “Any person who shall be injured in his  business  or  property  by  any
person or corporation by reason of the doing by any  person  or  persons  of
anything forbidden or declared to  be  unlawful  by  this  chapter  may  sue
therefor . . . and shall recover a penalty of threefold  the  damages  which
may be sustained, together with the costs of suit,  including  a  reasonable
attorney’s fee.”  I.C. § 24-1-2-7.
[9] The minimum wage law defines an employer as “any . . . corporation, .  .
. the state, or other governmental agency or political  subdivision.”   I.C.
§ 22-2-2-3.  The Health provisions of the Code define “person” as “. .  .  a
governmental entity,  or  a  corporation.”   I.C.   §  16-18-2-274(a).   The
School Corporation also refers  to  a  number  of  schemes  where  different
definitions of “person” expressly include or  exclude  government  entities.
E.g.,  I.C.  §  4-2-6-1(11)  (Ethics  &  Conflicts  of  Interest  for  State
Officers) (‘“person’ means any . . . corporation, . . .  or  a  governmental
agency or political subdivision”); I.C. § 5-14-1.5-2(k)  (Public  Records  &
Meetings) (‘“person’ means . . . a corporation, .  .  .  or  a  governmental
entity”); I.C. § 5-16-8-1 (Steel Procurement for Public  Works)  (separately
defining “persons”  as  including  a  corporation  and  “public  agency”  as
including local government units); I.C. § 8-1-22.5-1(e)-(f) (Utilities:  Gas
Pipeline  Safety)   (defining   “person”   to   include   corporations   and
“municipality” as a city, county,  “or  any  political  subdivision  of  the
state”); I.C. §  8-21-3-1(12)  (Aeronautics:  Aircraft  Finance)  (‘“person’
means . . . corporation, . . . or body politic”);  I.C. § 9-13-2-124  (Motor
Vehicles); I.C. § 13-29-1-2(p) (Environment:  Low-Level  Radioactive  Waste)
(defining “person” to include a corporation  and  “any  other  legal  entity
either public or private,” and separately  stating,  “Person  also  includes
the United States, states, political subdivisions  of  the  state,  and  any
department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States  or  a  state”);
I.C. § 14-8-2-202(d) (Natural Resources Dept.) (“person”  means  “.  .  .  a
corporation,  or  a  governmental  entity”);  I.C.  §  22-9-1-3   (Labor   &
Industrial Safety: Civil Rights) (separate definitions); I.C.  §  22-12-1-18
(Labor and Industrial Safety:  Fire Safety & Building  Equipment)  (defining
person to include a “corporation . . . or governmental entity”).
[10] In 1986 the  General  Assembly  amended  the  Indiana  Antitrust  Act’s
internal references to refer to “chapters” rather  than  “acts”.   Pub.  Law
No. 152-1986, Sec. 12.  In 1993 the General Assembly amended the  definition
of “person” to include limited liability companies, a  then  novel  form  of
organization.  Pub. Law No. 8-1993, Sec. 335.  Neither of  these  amendments
effected any substantive change relevant here.
[11] Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.  341  (1943),  dealt  with  a  complaint  for
injunctive  relief  against  enforcement  of  a  state  statute   regulating
agricultural output.  Actions pursuant to a  state  regulatory  scheme  were
held to be exempt from  federal  antitrust  laws  as  “state  action.”   The
Supreme Court found “nothing in the language of the Sherman Act  or  in  its
history which suggests that its purpose was  to  restrain  a  state  or  its
officers or its agents from activities directed by  its  legislature.”   Id.
at 350.  As a result of this holding, “state action” was expressly  declared
to be a defense for a wide variety of acts by  governmental  regulators  and
private citizens  if  done  pursuant  to  state  law,  even  if  they  might
otherwise have violated federal antitrust laws.
[12] It has been noted that  the  statutory  immunity  of  the  nonsovereign
“local governments” exceeds the  nonstatutory  immunity  of  the  sovereigns
that created them.  ABA Antitrust  Section:   Monograph  No.  15,  Antitrust
Federalism:  The Role of State Law at 72 n. 508 (1988).  “The immunity  from
damages granted to local governments under the Act is  absolute.   The  Act,
however, does not immunize local governments from  injunctive,”  enforcement
procedures by the Department of Justice, or actions  by  the  Federal  Trade
Commission.  Id. at 72.
[13] See Neyens v. Roth, 326 N.W.2d 294, 298 (Iowa 1982); Byre  v.  City  of
Chamberlain, 362 N.W.2d 69, 74  (S.D.  1985).   Those  jurisdictions  afford
immunity  only  if  the  municipal  action  is  “clearly   articulated   and
affirmatively expressed as state policy.”