F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 20, 2005
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
JUDITH A. BRYANT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
No. 03-3234
FARMERS INSURANCE
EXCHANGE,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 01-2390-CM)
Michael J. Gallagher, Gallagher & Kaiser, LLP, Kansas City, Missouri, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
James R. Holland II, (Shelley Schiebel Patterson with him on the briefs), Bioff
Finucane Coffey Holland & Hosler, LLP, Kansas City, Missouri, for Defendant-
Appellee.
Before EBEL, BRISCOE and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
This case involves various age and gender discrimination claims brought by
Plaintiff-Appellant Judith A. Bryant (“Bryant”) against her former employer,
Defendant-Appellee Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Farmers”). The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers. On appeal, Bryant raises two
issues: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding portions of
her summary judgment affidavit as inadmissable; and (2) whether there existed a
genuine dispute of material fact regarding the pretextual nature of Farmers’
proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Bryant. As to Bryant’s
affidavit, we hold, inter alia, that so long as the other prerequisites of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(e) are met, it is permissible to submit simple statistical calculations such as
averages without first being designated as an expert witness. Regarding pretext,
we conclude that Bryant’s evidence calling into question the veracity of Farmers’
nondiscriminatory reasons for firing her are sufficient to establish pretext for
summary judgment purposes. Thus, taking jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
we REVERSE.
BACKGROUND
I. The Parties
Bryant is a sixty-one-year-old white female who worked for Farmers in
various capacities from March 1992 until her termination in March 2000. 1
1
The record indicates that Bryant technically worked for a number of
(continued...)
2
Farmers is a large, national insurance exchange based in California that sells a
variety of policies, including coverage for recreational products, the division in
which Bryant worked when she was terminated.
II. Facts
At the time of her termination, Bryant was a claims director within the
Specialty Claims unit of the Western division of Farmers. Specifically, Specialty
Claims handled claims from five types of insurance products: (1) Recreational
Products Insurance (“RPI”); (2) Marine Insurance; (3) Loss Reporting; (4)
Antique Auto; and (5) National Recovery. Each insurance product had its own
individual director of claims.
RPI dealt primarily with recreational vehicles and motorcycles. Within
RPI, there existed two groups of claims adjusters: Liability and Adjusted Property
of Physical Damage (“APD”). The liability section handled third-party claims
where Farmers’ insureds were accused of causing injury to others. APD, on the
other hand, handled first-party claims for property damage to vehicles covered by
RPI policies.
In March 1992, Bryant began working for Farmers as a Regional Marketing
Manager in Denver, Colorado. Over the next few years, Bryant earned a number
of promotions and moved throughout the company. By 1996, Bryant was director
1
(...continued)
Farmers’ predecessor companies during the period from March 1992 to March
2000. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to these predecessor companies
(along with the defendant corporation) collectively as “Farmers.”
3
of claims for RPI.
Along with the directors of claims for the other four insurance products in
Specialty Claims, Bryant answered to Jack Honore, the division claims manager
since 1998. One of Bryant’s subordinate managers was Steve Nagle, who headed
the Liability section of RPI. Nagle, a 35-year-old male, eventually replaced
Bryant after Honore terminated her in March 2000.
A. Farmers’ internal auditing procedure
On January 1, 1998, Farmers instituted a new quality control program that
included the “Balanced Scorecard,” an attempt objectively to measure an office’s
performance in four categories: (1) customer satisfaction; (2) financial
perspective; (3) internal perspective; and (4) organizational learning/innovation.
As part of the Balanced Scorecard evaluation, executives conducted a
“Quality Assurance Review,” which was basically an audit of claims for each
individual insurance product. Under the company procedure, auditors would
review a statistical sample of claims files and measure two factors: “compliance”
and “leakage.”
The “compliance” score measured the thoroughness of the files reviewed.
In other words, the auditors would make sure that each file had the necessary
documentation, claimant contacts, and paperwork. After reviewing the files for
completeness, the auditors assigned a percentage score based on how much of the
4
required information was missing or improperly recorded.
The “leakage” score measured the percentage of overpayments. There were
two components to this score: hard leakage and soft leakage. Hard leakage
referred to objective overpayment. These were amounts that absolutely should
not have been paid because, for example, the policy did not cover the injury or
because the claim exceeded the policy limit. Soft leakage was a more subjective
determination. It was the amount of overpayment on a claim based on the
auditor’s evaluation of the claim’s worth. Thus, if the adjuster paid out $5,000 on
a claim that the auditor felt was worth only $4,500, this would represent $500 in
soft leakage. The hard and soft leakage amounts were totaled up and measured
against the total payments of all files reviewed in order to determine the overall
percentage of leakage for the reviewed files.
B. Events leading up to Bryant’s termination
From the time Farmers implemented the Quality Assurance Review in 1998
to the time Honore terminated Bryant in 2000, RPI was audited five times—three
times by the home office and twice by Honore. 2 Three of these audits took place
2
The parties’ factual assertions about the results of these audits and the
prescribed goals for RPI are often inconsistent with the record. What’s worse, the
documents in the record are not exactly clear and often contradict each other.
The main area of disagreement is what the “target” numbers for these audits
were. Bryant claims that the standard for “passing” each audit was a compliance
score of 90%, a 2% leakage for APD claims, and a 2.5% leakage for liability
(continued...)
5
in the twelve months preceding Bryant’s termination. 3
1. January 1998 Audit
RPI’s first audit was intended to serve as a baseline reading for the
department’s compliance with new protocols and standards implemented by the
company. RPI’s compliance score was 85.16%; it had no hard leakage, but soft
leakage came in at 97.9%. For this audit, RPI’s goal was 91% compliance and
7.5% total leakage.
2. September 1998 Audit
Farmers once again audited RPI after it had been given a few months to get
oriented to the new quality control standards. RPI scored 84.88% compliance and
5.18% in overall leakage. As before, RPI’s goal was 91% compliance and 7.5%
2
(...continued)
claims. Farmers, on the other hand, agrees that a 90% compliance score was
needed but claims that leakage requirements were different. According to
Farmers, to pass an audit RPI needed to obtain a hard leakage of 2% or below,
and a soft leakage of 2% or below.
Neither party is completely correct. Farmers’ position is based on vague
admissions that Bryant made (in response to leading questions) during a
particularly confusing part of her deposition. Looking more carefully at the
original documents, it appears that Bryant’s position is closer to the truth,
particularly for the audits Honore conducted. However, Bryant is incorrect in
stating that the “passing” scores were the same for all five audits. The record
indicates that the earlier audit goals were more lenient.
3
Bryant claims that RPI was audited four times over this period. This is
because she counts a “mini-audit” that Honore conducted in August 1999 as a
separate audit. In fact, Honore conducted two “mini-audits” in August and
September 1999 and reported the combined results. Thus, we have treated the
August and September “mini-audits” as one audit for the purposes of this opinion.
6
total leakage. One month after this Audit, Farmers hired Jack Honore to
supervise Bryant. In her declaration before the district court, Bryant claims that
Honore was immediately hostile to her, and that he suggested Bryant move to
another position or quit her job.
At about the same time, a director from the Farmers home office ordered
Bryant to hire 35-year-old Steve Nagle to run the Liability department of RPI.
According to other employees in RPI, however, the understanding was that Nagle
was brought in to replace Bryant. Nagle allegedly admitted to another employee
that he had been picked to come to Kansas City to replace Bryant. In fact, Nagle
eventually replaced Bryant as director of claims for RPI after Bryant’s
termination.
Honore gave Bryant a negative performance evaluation for 1998, citing her
failure to meet required Balanced Scorecard standards.
3. June 1999 Audit
Despite Bryant’s negative performance evaluation, RPI’s numbers did not
increase significantly. During the June 1999 Audit, RPI scored 88.46% for
compliance and 7.88% in total leakage. Both parties agree that the “target” for
compliance under the June 1999 audit was 90 percent. However, the record is not
clear as to what the target leakage score was. Thus, we cannot say for certain
whether RPI “failed” the June 1999 audit, but what is certain is that it did not
7
meet the compliance goals for the audit.
After the audit, Honore informed Bryant in a formal written warning that if
her department’s numbers did not improve, he would take corrective action
(including the possibility of termination). Honore also told Bryant that he would
personally conduct an audit of RPI’s files over the next 90 days.
4. September 1999 Audit
Honore’s September 1999 Audit was really a combination of two “mini-
audits.” RPI achieved a compliance score of 87.36% and an overall leakage score
of 8.01%. Honore also broke down the score in terms of the two component
departments of RPI: Liability and APD. APD had a 92.59% compliance score and
a 1.53% leakage score. Liability, on the other hand, had a 76.90% compliance
score and a 15.4% leakage score. For this audit, RPI’s “target” appears to be a
90% compliance score, a 2% APD leakage, and a 2.5% liability leakage.
These numbers indicate that RPI’s APD division was performing up to
standards but that its Liability division, headed by Steve Nagle (Bryant’s eventual
replacement), was causing RPI to fail the audits. In January 2000, Honore again
gave Bryant a negative performance evaluation, stating:
[Bryant] has not demonstrated imagination in identifying problems or
developing solutions to solve the problems. The lack of leadership
and her apparent management style of complete delegation have led
to morale problems particularly with other members of the
management team. [Bryant] is reactive rather than proactive. It was
very apparent after the September 1998 audit that much had not been
8
done to improve the results since the Jan. 98 audit. Again in June of
1999 most of the same problems were still there. While there has
been some improvement since June 1999, the results are still
unacceptable.
Honore placed Bryant on probation and stated that he would return to the office in
thirty days to conduct a final audit. He warned Bryant that if RPI’s results were
not up to standards, she would be terminated.
5. March 2000 Audit
As promised, Honore conducted another audit in March 2000. RPI scored
87.71% in overall compliance and 4.92% in overall leakage. As for the specific
divisions, APD scored 88.78% compliance and 3.96% leakage. Liability scored
85.41% compliance and 5.79% leakage. Like the September 1999 Audit, RPI
needed an overall compliance score of 90% or more, a liability leakage of less
than 2.5%, and an APD leakage of less than 2% to pass the audit.
Figure 1: Summary of RPI Audit Results
Audit Compliance Compliance Leakage Leakage
Score Goal Goal
January 85.16% (O) 91% (O) 0 % (H) 7.5% (O)
1998 97.9% (S)
September 84.88% (O) 91% (O) 5.18% (O) 7.5% (O)
1998
June 1999 88.46% (O) 90% (O) 7.88 (O) unknown
9
Audit Compliance Compliance Leakage Leakage
Score Goal Goal
September 87.36% (O) 90% (O) 8.01% (O)
1999 92.59% (A) 1.53% (A) 2% (A)
76.90% (L) 15.4% (L) 2.5% (L)
March 2000 87.71% (O) 90% (O) 4.92% (O)
88.78% (A) 3.96% (A) 2% (A)
85.41% (L) 5.79% (L) 2.5% (L)
O = Overall result H = Hard leakage
A = Result for APD division S = Soft Leakage
L = Result for Liability division
Although the myriad facts and figures described above can be somewhat
confusing, what is clear is that in the five audits prior to Bryant’s termination,
RPI failed to meet the stated expectations for either compliance or leakage each
time.
Two days after the completion of the final March 2000 audit, Farmers
terminated Bryant for poor performance.
C. Procedural history
On March 13, 2002, Bryant filed suit in the district court alleging federal
age and gender discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq., and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. In addition, Bryant
10
brought age and gender discrimination claims under Kansas state law. After
extensive discovery, Farmers moved for summary judgment on all claims.
In response, Bryant provided an affidavit stating that she had personally
reviewed 103 audit reports from several other Farmers claims offices throughout
the country. These audits, conducted in 2000 and 2001, listed each office’s
compliance and leakage scores. Bryant compiled this data into a spreadsheet and
calculated the average compliance and leakage scores. Both the spreadsheet and
the audit data were attached to Bryant’s affidavit. Bryant’s analysis revealed the
following: (1) Compliance scores for the 103 offices ranged from 72.17% to
96.23%, with an average score of 87.73%; (2) Leakage scores for the 103 offices
ranged from 0.1% to 24.0%, with an average score of 3.39%.
Bryant then calculated the average audit score for RPI from June 1999 to
March 2000 and came up with 88.70% compliance and 5.36% leakage. 4 Bryant
noted that RPI had a higher-than-average compliance score and that 47 offices
scored lower than RPI in compliance. As for leakage, Bryant stated that most of
4
Bryant’s calculation of RPI’s “average” compliance and leakage scores is
suspect. Bryant calculated the average compliance and leakage scores for all RPI
audits conducted between June 1999 and March 2000. However, Bryant averages
four audit scores when in fact there were only three. As noted earlier, the
September 1999 audit was actually a combination of two “mini-audits,” but
Bryant counts the August audit separately because it artificially boosts RPI’s
scores. In addition, Bryant omitted from her calculation the results from the
September 1998 audit, which would have likely lowered the average scores for
both compliance and leakage.
11
her department’s higher-than-average leakage scores were attributable to the poor
performance of the Liability department, headed by Nagle (Bryant’s eventual
replacement). Removing those scores, RPI would have had a lower-than-average
leakage score, and 54 other offices would have scored lower than RPI in leakage.
In addition to the analysis of other offices’ audit scores, Bryant submitted
several other pieces of evidence for the court’s consideration. For example, Jeff
Salsbury, a former RPI employee, testified in an affidavit that Nagle and Honore
conspired to manipulate the audit data by artificially inflating the Liability
department’s compliance and leakage figures. This was done by removing files
which would pass the audit, thus leaving a skewed sample for the auditor.
In resolving the summary judgment motion, the district court applied the
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-04 (1973). The court first ruled that Bryant had established a prima facie
case of age and gender discrimination. It then concluded that Farmers had
proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Bryant’s termination: failure
to meet established performance criteria. Finally, the court concluded that Bryant
had not established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether this legitimate
reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. In discussing pretext, the court
excluded large portions of Bryant’s affidavit as inadmissable under the Federal
12
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Judgment was
entered against Bryant, and the instant appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Issue 1: Whether the district court properly excluded portions of
Bryant’s affidavit when considering Farmers’ motion for summary
judgment.
In its order granting summary judgment, the district court, acting sua
sponte, excluded as inadmissable the portions of Bryant’s affidavit (1) alleging
that certain audit results were attributable to Nagle’s performance; (2) alleging
that the audit performance standards were not intended to be mandatory; and (3)
containing the statistical analysis of the 103 audit reports from other claims
offices. The court concluded that these portions of Bryant’s affidavit were not
based upon her personal knowledge and constituted improper opinion testimony.
A. Standard of review
We review a district court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an
abuse of discretion. Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 160 F.3d 625, 629 (10th
Cir. 1998). Under this standard, a trial court’s decision will not be reversed
unless “the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that the lower court
made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in
the circumstances.” Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir. 1994)
(quoting McEwen v. City of Norman, 926 F.2d 1539, 1553-54 (10th Cir. 1991)).
13
B. Legal standards for admissibility
At the summary judgment stage, the parties need not submit evidence in a
form admissible at trial; however, the content or the substance of the evidence
must be admissible. Hardy v. S.F. Phosphates Ltd., 185 F.3d 1076, 1082 n.5
(10th Cir. 1999). For instance, a witness to a car accident could not submit his
testimony at trial via affidavit because that statement would be hearsay.
However, at the summary judgment stage, the affidavit is proper because its
content—the eyewitness account of the affiant—is admissible.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) further governs the admissibility of affidavits at the
summary judgment stage:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of
all papers . . . referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or
served therewith.
Thus, it is clear that (1) the content of summary judgment evidence must be
generally admissible and (2) if that evidence is presented in the form of an
affidavit, the Rules of Civil Procedure specifically require a certain type of
admissibility, i.e., the evidence must be based on personal knowledge.
A summary judgment affidavit may not contain expert testimony unless the
affiant has first been designated an expert witness under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
Parker v. Cent. Kan. Med. Ctr., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1210 (D. Kan. 2001), aff’d,
14
57 Fed. Appx. 401, 404 (10th Cir. 2003). Otherwise, any non-expert testimony in
the form of opinions or inferences must be “(a) rationally based on the perception
of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or
the determination of the fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge.” Fed. R. Evid. 701.
C. Analysis
Based on the foregoing, there are two potential evidentiary problems with
Bryant’s declaration: (1) it might not be based upon personal knowledge; and (2)
it might be improper opinion testimony. An individual analysis of each objection
to the instant facts is warranted.
1. Lack of personal knowledge
In holding Bryant’s declaration inadmissible, the district court stated,
“[p]laintiff has not shown that she has personal knowledge of the matters she
alleges: that certain audit results should be attributed to Mr. Nagle, that the
standards set forth by defendant were not intended to be mandatory, or of the data
upon which her statistics are based.”
As to the allegations about Mr. Nagle and the mandatory standards, the
district court is incorrect. Although Bryant does not give the source for her
allegations, as supervisor of the RPI department, Bryant would have had personal
knowledge of the fact that the audits were never intended to be used to dismiss
15
employees and the fact that the poor audit results should be attributed to Nagle’s
performance.
Similarly, the audit data should not have been excluded on the basis of lack
of personal knowledge by Bryant. Bryant states in her declaration that she
reviewed all of the records of audits performed in 2000 and 2001, and she also
states that the audits were prepared in a format familiar to her. Thus, insofar as
her declaration repeats the reported results of those audits as she reviewed them,
it cannot be said that she lacked personal knowledge of those reports.
In exploring this point, it is helpful to look at Fed. R. Evid. 602, which
requires a witness’ testimony to be based upon personal knowledge. The advisory
committee notes to that rule state: “This rule does not govern the situation of a
witness who testifies to a hearsay statement as such, if he has personal knowledge
of the making of the statement. . . . This rule, would, however, prevent him from
testifying to the subject matter of the hearsay statement, as he had no personal
knowledge of it.”
The case at bar presents a similar situation. Here, Bryant attached a spread
sheet with results from 103 audits. If she were to take the stand and individually
read the results, the objection would not be that she lacked personal knowledge of
the reports. Since she personally examined these audit reports, she had personal
knowledge of their content. The proper objection would be hearsay, as the
16
documents are out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). However, if offered at trial, these documents would be
admissible under either Rule 801(d)(2)(A) (statement by a party offered against
that party) or Rule 803(6) (business records exception).
Both the district court and Farmers complain that Bryant lacks personal
knowledge because she does not know how these audits were performed, who
performed the audits, or the methodology used in conducting these audits.
However, these objections go to the weight of her testimony, not its admissibility.
There is no dispute that the reviewed documents are authentic, a point bolstered
by the fact that the documents were prepared on company letterhead and produced
during discovery. See Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1423
(10th Cir. 1991) (finding, in context of plain-error review, document to be
authentic under similar circumstances). There is also no dispute that Bryant
actually looked at the documents. As a result, the portions of her declaration
which repeat the results of the audits are based on Bryant’s personal knowledge.
2. Opinion testimony
As noted above, an affidavit may not contain expert testimony unless the
affiant has first been designated as an expert under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). In
this case, no such designation was made. Thus, we must determine whether the
conclusions and opinions offered in Bryant’s declaration are properly
17
characterized as expert opinions under Fed. R. Evid. 702 or lay opinions under
Rule 701.
Bryant maintains that the mere calculation of an average of 103 numbers is
not the sort of statistical determination which requires the special “knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education” prescribed by Rule 702. We agree. The
Federal Rules of Evidence clearly permit the contents of voluminous writings to
be presented in the form of a “chart, summary, or calculation.” Fed. R. Evid.
1006 (emphasis added). Taking a simple average of 103 numbers, though
technically a statistical determination, is not so complex a task that litigants need
to hire experts in order to deem the evidence trustworthy. A mathematical
calculation well within the ability of anyone with a grade-school education is, in
our opinion, more aptly characterized as a lay opinion under Fed. R. Evid. 701.
Accordingly, we conclude that Bryant’s declaration was improperly
excluded from the summary judgment evidence before the court.
II. Whether Bryant submitted sufficient evidence of pretext to create a
genuine issue of material fact for trial.
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and
must apply the same legal standard used by the district court. Simms v. Okla. ex
rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th
Cir. 1999). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment is only appropriate if
18
the pleadings and admissible evidence produced during discovery, together with
any affidavits, show that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” When applying
this standard, we must view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Simms, 165 F.3d at
1326.
B. Applicable law
Where, as here, a plaintiff puts forth circumstantial evidence of age or
gender discrimination, we evaluate the case using the burden-shifting framework
of McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04. See also MacDonald v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying McDonnell Douglas in
the ADEA context). 5 Under McDonnell, the plaintiff must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. 411 U.S. at 802. The burden of production then
shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the adverse employment action. Id. Once this is done, the presumption of
discrimination established by the prima facie showing “simply drops out of the
picture.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). The plaintiff
then carries the full burden of persuasion to show that the defendant discriminated
Here, the district court ruled there did not exist a genuine issue of material
5
fact as to discriminatory intent, and Bryant has not appealed that ruling. Thus, we
limit our analysis only to Bryant’s indirect evidence of discrimination.
19
on the illegal basis of age or gender. See Ingels v. Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616,
621 (10th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds, Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d
1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003). The plaintiff may do so by showing that the
proffered reason is pretextual. Ingels, 42 F.3d at 621.
Here, neither party disputes the district court’s ruling that Bryant has
established a prima facie case of both age and gender discrimination, and we see
no need to disturb that conclusion. Further, Farmers met its burden by asserting
that it terminated Bryant because she failed to meet the performance criteria
established for her position. Poor performance is a quintessentially legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reason for termination. See, e.g., Garrett v. Hewlett Packard
Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1218 (10th Cir. 2002).
Thus, this case hinges upon whether Bryant has put forth evidence
establishing a dispute of fact as to whether Farmers’ stated reason for terminating
her was pretextual. Under Tenth Circuit precedent, pretext may be shown by
“such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence
infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.”
Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Olson v.
Gen. Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1996)). A plaintiff can
20
make a showing of pretext with evidence that the defendant’s stated reason for
termination was false. Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220,
1230 (10th Cir. 2000).
Our precedent does not require a plaintiff to offer any evidence of actual
discrimination when attempting to show pretext. See Ingels, 42 F.3d at 621.
Evidence tending to show pretext permits an inference that the employer acted for
discriminatory reasons. Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1323. “Thus, a factfinder may, but
is not required to, find discrimination when a plaintiff presents evidence that the
defendant’s proffered reasons are unworthy of credence.” Ingels, 42 F.3d at 621-
22. But, as in Ingels, this case arrives to us at the summary judgment stage. See
id. at 622.
At that stage, if a plaintiff advances evidence establishing a prima
facie case and evidence upon which a factfinder could conclude that
the defendant’s alleged nondiscriminatory reasons for the
employment decisions are pretextual, the case should go to the
factfinder.
Id.
In short, at the summary judgment stage, the inference of discrimination
permitted by evidence of pretext must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. See
Simms, 165 F.3d at 1326. Thus, once a plaintiff presents evidence sufficient to
create a genuine factual dispute regarding the veracity of a defendant’s
nondiscriminatory reason, we presume the jury could infer that the employer acted
21
for a discriminatory reason and must deny summary judgment. See Morgan, 108
F.3d at 1323; Ingels, 42 F.3d at 621-22.
C. Analysis
After reviewing Bryant’s summary judgment evidence, we are convinced
that she has established a genuine factual dispute regarding pretext. Bryant’s
affidavit and accompanying statistical summary of audit results indicate that
RPI’s audit scores were not substantially deficient when compared to other claims
offices. This evidence also indicates that her department’s poor performance was
due—in large part—to the performance of the very person who replaced her,
Nagle. In addition, Bryant raises doubts as to the accuracy and reliability of the
audit data. Nine months before Bryant’s termination, Nagle allegedly admitted to
Jeff Salsbury, a claims representative in the liability department, that he was
brought in to take Bryant’s place as claims director of RPI. Salsbury also
testified that:
I personally observed some manipulation of the audit files before the
files were audited. Steven Nagle came to others and me with a list of
files which were to be audited and instructed us to pull the files,
which would pass. Then he took the files we selected as ones which
would pass. I don’t know what he did with the files, but I thought it
was strange that we were directed to pick-out the “good” files from
the list of files to be audited. Handpicking the files made me feel
very uneasy.
In evaluating this evidence, the district court found that any allegation of a
conspiracy remained “highly speculative” because Salsbury could not state with
22
certainty what happened to the pulled files.
Certainly it is possible that Nagle could have asked for the good files to be
pulled so that he could “boost” the results of the audits by making sure they were
included. Another, equally credible possibility is that he removed the files in
order to artificially lower the scores. It is not possible from the record to tell
which of these two scenarios is the truth. But a plaintiff facing summary
judgment does not have to conclusively establish the truth. She must only
establish that there is a genuine factual dispute with regard to the truth, and in
this she has succeeded. Choosing between these two possibilities is exactly the
type of determination a jury is empowered to make. When viewed in a light most
favorable to Bryant, Salsbury’s personal observations of file manipulation,
combined with Nagle’s alleged admissions and the undisputed fact that Honore
selected Nagle to replace Bryant, raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the audit results accurately reflected Bryant’s performance. As such,
Farmers’ reliance—in part—on those audit results as grounds for termination may
have been pretextual.
It is true that the poor audit scores were not the sole reason for Bryant’s
termination. In his final letter to Bryant, Honore cited a number of other
performance deficiencies, including failure to completely and successfully
implement a new company program, failure to ensure that subordinate employees
23
were properly licensed, and failure to complete certain course work. Bryant has
not offered any evidence tending to show that these other deficiencies in her
performance were false in any way. As a general rule, an employee must proffer
evidence that shows each of the employer’s justifications is pretextual. Tyler v.
RE/MAX Mountain States, Inc., 232 F.3d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 2000). However,
we recognize that “when the plaintiff casts substantial doubt on many of the
employer’s multiple reasons, the jury could reasonably find the employer lacks
credibility. Under those circumstances, the jury need not believe the employer’s
remaining reasons.” Id. (citations omitted); accord Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d
759, 764 n.7 (3d Cir. 1994).
It is true that in the instant case, Bryant has only cast doubt on one of the
proffered reasons for her termination: failure to meet internal audit standards.
But it is also clear that Bryant’s failure to meet audit standards was the dominant
reason put forth by Farmers to justify her termination. Bryant’s failure to address
the other, less consequential reasons for her termination does not entitle Farmers
to summary judgment. It is not simply a question of how many of the defendant’s
reasons a plaintiff has refuted, but rather a question of whether casting doubt on a
particular justification necessarily calls into doubt the other justifications. See
Tyler, 232 F.3d at 814. Where, as here, one of the stated reasons for termination
predominates over the others, demonstrating that reason to be pretextual is
24
enough to avoid summary judgment. 6
CONCLUSION
Because Bryant has raised a genuine factual issue regarding whether
Farmers’ stated reason for her termination was false, summary judgment was
inappropriate. Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court.
6
This court’s recent decision in Jaramillo v. Colorado Judicial Dep’t, 427
F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2005), further supports our conclusion. In Jaramillo, this
court held that “[i]n some cases, . . . a successful attack on part of the employer’s
legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation is enough to survive summary
judgment even if one or more of the proffered reasons has not been discredited.”
Id. at 1310. This court then listed five circumstances when “[s]omething less than
total failure of the employer’s defense is sufficient to create a genuine issue of
fact.” Id. This case falls directly into the third circumstance listed in Jaramillo,
where “the employer offers a plethora of reasons, and the plaintiff raises
substantial doubt about a number of them.” Id. (citing Tyler, 232 F.3d at 814).
As we have noted, Farmers asserted several reasons why it fired Bryant.
The predominant reason, however, was that she had failed to meet internal audit
standards. Bryant has asserted sufficient evidence indicating that that dominant
reason was pretextual to submit that question to a jury. That is sufficient in this
case for Bryant to survive summary judgment. The pretext inquiry about whether
a plaintiff raises “substantial doubt about a number of [the employer’s reasons]”
is not limited to just a numeric quantitative assessment of the proffered reasons,
but also includes a qualitative assessment that takes into account which reasons
dominated the employer’s decisionmaking process. Here, the failure to meet the
internal audit was the dominant reason advanced, and hence putting on evidence
that it was pretextual satisfies the third circumstance listed in Jaramillo.
25
Bryant v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2005-12-20
Citations: 432 F.3d 1114
Copy Citations