F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 6 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM CLIFFORD BRYSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 97-6435
RONALD WARD,
Respondent-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 96-CV-1004)
Don J. Gutteridge, Jr., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Robert L. Whittaker, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division (W.A. Drew
Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma with him on the brief), Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before TACHA , BRISCOE , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
MURPHY , Circuit Judge.
Petitioner William Clifford Bryson, an Oklahoma state prisoner sentenced
to death, appeals from the district court’s denial of his federal habeas corpus
petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On appeal, Bryson asserts the trial
court (1) violated his right to due process under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments when it determined he was competent to stand trial; (2) violated his
rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by excluding from the capital
sentencing proceeding a videotape of his confession to authorities, which he
offered as mitigating evidence; (3) erred in failing to instruct the jury that it had
the option to return a life sentence even if it found that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances; (4) erred in refusing to
instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of second degree murder and first
degree manslaughter; and (5) erred in refusing to give the mitigation instructions
he requested. 1
Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
1
The district court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on the
first two issues. This court granted COA on the other three. Bryson also raised
the following issues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the
jury that it did not have to find the mitigating circumstances unanimously in order
to weigh them against the aggravating circumstances; (2) the aggravating factor
addressing murders committed for remuneration was improperly applied; (3) the
trial court erred in refusing to sever his trial from that of his co-defendant
Marilyn Plantz; (4) he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel due to
actions of his trial counsel and due to governmental interference; and (5) the
aggravating factor that the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel”
was inappropriately applied. We declined to grant COA as to these issues. After
again reviewing the record, Bryson’s arguments, and the relevant law, we confirm
that Bryson has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and is thus not entitled to COA on those issues.
-2-
Bryson first met his co-defendant Marilyn Plantz in late 1987 or early 1988
when he was sixteen and she was in her late twenties and married. In the spring
of 1988, they became romantically involved and sexually intimate. Plantz
allowed Bryson to drive her car, entertained him and his friends at her home
while her husband worked at night, and either provided Bryson with money to
purchase alcohol and crack cocaine or purchased them for him.
Also in the spring of 1988, Bryson became acquainted with co-defendant
Clinton McKimble. Like Bryson, McKimble was a teenager. McKimble knew
that Bryson and Plantz were romantically involved. Bryson and Plantz asked
McKimble to help them kill Mr. Plantz.
Having indicated that Mr. Plantz was abusive and that she wanted to kill
him to obtain life insurance proceeds, Marilyn Plantz initiated several plans to
kill him. She gave Bryson a gun to kill Mr. Plantz, but Bryson either sold or
pawned it. Another time, Marilyn Plantz suggested that she lure her husband
home from work and that Bryson and McKimble ambush him when he arrived.
A third suggestion was that Bryson and McKimble push Mr. Plantz off a boat
while fishing and let him drown. None of these schemes was carried out.
On August 17, 1988, one of Marilyn Plantz’s schemes was carried further
but ultimately failed. Bryson, McKimble, and Rory Jenkins, aided by
Marilyn Plantz, stole a car they planned to use to run Mr. Plantz off the road.
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Although they followed Mr. Plantz from his workplace, they were unable to carry
out the plan because Mr. Plantz took an unexpected route home and Jenkins did
not want to go through with the plan.
McKimble offered Roderick Farris $7000 to help kill Mr. Plantz. Farris
refused the offer. Subsequently, Bryson offered Farris $40,000 if he could kill
Mr. Plantz without Bryson’s involvement. When asked by Farris how he
intended to kill Mr. Plantz, Bryson indicated that he could catch Mr. Plantz
coming home from work, beat him with a bat, and set him on fire in his truck. A
few days later, Bryson introduced Farris to Marilyn Plantz. At that time, Bryson
offered Farris $10,000 to kill the victim. Marilyn Plantz explained that the
killing had to look like an accident. Later that night, Farris was arrested for
unrelated reasons.
On August 25, 1988, Plantz, Bryson, and McKimble were together. She
withdrew money from her bank, purchased crack cocaine and beer for them, and
drove them around until Mr. Plantz had gone to work. The three then went back
to her house. Bryson and McKimble drank the beer, smoked the crack cocaine,
and fell asleep in the front room. The sound of keys in the front door awakened
them. Bryson and McKimble hid in the kitchen with baseball bats supplied by
Marilyn Plantz. When Mr. Plantz entered the kitchen, Bryson struck him on the
back of the head with the bat. McKimble joined in the beating, while Marilyn
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Plantz waited in her bedroom. The two men carried Mr. Plantz to his pickup
truck parked in front of the house and placed him in the truck bed. Marilyn
Plantz told them that Mr. Plantz must be burned to make the death look like an
accident because Mr. Plantz was beaten so badly. At that time, Mr. Plantz was
insured for approximately $299,000.
Bryson and McKimble drove the truck and Marilyn Plantz’s car to an
isolated area. They placed Mr. Plantz’s body in the cab of the truck. McKimble
placed a rag in the truck’s gas tank and lit it, attempting to cause an explosion.
When that did not work, Bryson poured gas in and around the truck and lit it.
The truck and Mr. Plantz ignited. Mr. Plantz was alive, but perhaps unconscious,
when Bryson and McKimble placed him in the truck and ignited it.
Bryson and McKimble returned to the Plantz home and found
Marilyn Plantz cleaning up the blood. The men changed into clothes of
Mr. Plantz and dumped their own bloody clothes and rags into a creek. They
then went to a convenience store and purchased sandwiches and drinks with
money from Mr. Plantz’s wallet.
Over the next two days, Bryson and McKimble told some friends about the
murder. Bryson told one friend that he planned to move out of town with
Marilyn Plantz and purchase a house. McKimble said that he had expected to be
paid for the murder.
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Bryson was interviewed by police detectives two times after the murder.
Although he initially denied involvement, he later confessed. In the second
interview, he admitted his relationship with Marilyn Plantz and his drug habit.
After his arrest, Bryson twice attempted to commit suicide in jail.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Bryson was found guilty of first degree murder, third degree arson,
solicitation to commit murder, and conspiracy to commit murder. He was
sentenced to death for first degree murder, fifteen years’ imprisonment for third
degree arson, one hundred years’ imprisonment for solicitation to commit murder,
and ten years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to commit murder. 2
In support of the
death penalty, the jury found two aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was
committed for remuneration or the promise of remuneration or another was
employed to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration;
and (2) the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”
On direct appeal, Bryson’s convictions and sentence were affirmed. See
Bryson v. State , 876 P.2d 240 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). The United States
Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari. See Bryson v. Oklahoma ,
2
Marilyn Plantz also was found guilty of the same offenses and
received the same sentences. McKimble pled guilty to first degree murder and
was sentenced to life imprisonment.
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513 U.S. 1090 (1995). Bryson filed an application for post-conviction relief in
the state district court, which denied relief. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed. See Bryson v. State , 903 P.2d 333 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
The Supreme Court again denied a petition for writ of certiorari. See Bryson v.
Oklahoma , 517 U.S. 1144 (1996).
Bryson then filed the present habeas petition in federal district court. His
habeas petition was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), and he does not contest the
applicability of its provisions. Under amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as the
district court correctly recognized, a state prisoner will be entitled to federal
habeas relief only if he can establish that a claim adjudicated by the state courts
“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” Applying this standard, the district court denied relief.
It is from this denial of relief that Bryson now appeals. 3
3
Federal courts of appeals have differed in their interpretation of the
standards of deference afforded state court adjudications under § 2254(d)(1)’s
“contrary to” and “unreasonable application of” language. See, e.g. , Matteo v.
Superintendent , 171 F.3d 877, 885-91 (3rd Cir. 1999), and cases cited therein,
(continued...)
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Competency to Stand Trial
Bryson argues that the trial court violated his right to due process under
the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments when it determined he was
competent to stand trial. He contends the trial court wrongfully used the clear
and convincing standard of proof to determine competency. Also, he contends
the trial court erred in not holding a competency hearing as is required by
Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1175.3.
3
(...continued)
petition for cert. filed , 67 U.S.L.W. 3008 (U.S. June 22, 1999) (No. 98-2050);
Nevers v. Killinger , 169 F.3d 352, 357-62 (6th Cir.), and cases cited therein,
cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 2340 (1999). The United States Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in a case to review the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the
standards. See Williams v. Taylor , 119 S. Ct. 1355 (1999); see also 67 U.S.L.W.
3608 (Apr. 6, 1999) (listing issues presented). Under any possible interpretation
of the standards, the outcome of this appeal will be the same.
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1. Clear and convincing evidence
Bryson argues the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals determined that
the trial court applied the then-existing rule in Oklahoma which placed upon the
defendant the burden of proving his incompetence to stand trial by clear and
convincing evidence. Because the Supreme Court subsequently struck down the
clear and convincing evidence standard in Cooper v. Oklahoma , 517 U.S. 348
(1996), Bryson maintains the determination of his competency was erroneous.
He further argues that application of this erroneous standard is not harmless
error.
Oklahoma law provides for both threshold competency hearings and for
full, “post-examination” competency hearings. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, §§ 1175.2
through 1175.4; see also Cargle v. State , 909 P.2d 806, 815 (Okla. Crim. App.
1995). A trial court holds a threshold hearing to determine whether to order
a competency examination of a defendant by a medical expert. See Okla. Stat.
tit. 22, § 1175.3. The defendant must make a threshold showing of his
incompetency. See Cargle , 909 P.2d at 815. If there is no doubt that the
defendant is competent, the criminal proceedings resume. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22,
§ 1175.3(B), (C). If, however, the trial court has doubt as to the defendant’s
competency, it will order a medical examination. See id. § 1175.3(D). A full,
“post-examination” competency proceeding may then be held. See id. § 1175.4
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(before September 1, 1991, the statute required a hearing; as of September 1,
1991, a hearing is not necessarily required). Formerly, at the “post-examination”
hearing, the defendant was required to prove incompetency by clear and
convincing evidence. See id.
In this case, the trial court held only a threshold competency hearing; it did
not hold a “post-examination” competency hearing. Cooper addressed whether
clear and convincing evidence was the appropriate standard for
“post-examination” competency hearings. See Cooper , 517 U.S. at 350 (citing
§ 1175.4(B)). Although it did not specifically address the proper standard in
threshold competency proceedings under § 1175.3, Cooper held that trying a
defendant who is more likely than not incompetent violates the defendant’s right
to due process. See id. at 350, 369.
Assuming, without deciding, that the holding in Cooper applies to
threshold competency hearings, the record in this case does not show that the trial
court used the clear and convincing evidence standard to determine competency
during its threshold hearing. At no time did the trial court refer to the clear and
convincing standard. Rather, the trial court determined that Bryson was unable
to make a showing of incompetency under § 1175.3 warranting medical
examination and a later full mental competency hearing. Following the language
in § 1175.3, the court found there was no doubt that Bryson was competent to
-10-
stand trial. In so finding, the court apparently believed that under any standard
he was competent.
It is true that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on direct criminal
appeal noted that an accused must prove his incompetency by clear and
convincing evidence. See Bryson , 876 P.2d at 249. In so noting, as the district
court stated, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals was generally reciting the
law and neither that court nor the trial court actually applied the clear and
convincing standard. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals instead
recognized that the trial court “found no reason to question [Bryson’s] mental
competency.” Id.
2. Competency
Bryson next makes both substantive and procedural due process
competency claims. 4
He argues that the trial court violated his substantive due
process rights by determining he was competent to stand trial. He also argues the
4
This court recently pointed out that the distinction between
substantive and procedural due process is significant because courts evaluate the
claims under differing standards. See Walker v. Attorney Gen. , 167 F.3d 1339,
1344 (10th Cir. 1999). Also, this court recognized that the cases occasionally
have blurred the distinctions between the two, especially when both are raised
together. See id. Like Walker , we do not attempt to reconcile any inconsistencies
because Bryson has failed to establish a right to habeas corpus relief under either
the procedural or substantive due process standards.
-11-
trial court did not provide the competency hearing required by Oklahoma statute
and did not consider the affidavits of trial counsel or one of his mental health
experts, Dr. Murphy, both indicating that he was incompetent. Bryson further
contends that the trial court’s consideration only of its observation of Bryson at
the motion hearing was an abuse of discretion and denial of a meaningful
hearing. Bryson, rather, contends that the trial court should have examined
Dr. Murphy before making a competency determination. 5
On direct criminal appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding there was no
doubt as to petitioner’s competency. See Bryson , 876 P.2d at 249. On habeas,
the district court thoroughly considered the evidence in the record. The court
concluded the trial court’s finding that petitioner was competent to stand trial and
denial of a full evidentiary hearing on competency “were based upon a reasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.” Dist. Ct. R.
Doc. 27 at 25-26.
Competency to stand trial is a factual question. See United States v.
Boigegrain , 155 F.3d 1181, 1189 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 828
5
Bryson states that Dr. Murphy indicated he was not competent to
stand trial. Dr. Murphy, however, did not actually state that Bryson was
incompetent. Rather, he testified that he had substantial doubt as to Bryson’s
competency and further evaluation was required.
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(1999). A state court’s factual finding of competency is presumed correct.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the
presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See id. A federal
court may not issue a writ of habeas corpus unless the state courts’ competency
decisions were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence. See id. § 2254(d)(2).
It is settled that trying an incompetent defendant violates due process.
See Cooper , 517 U.S. at 354. The test for determining competency is whether
a defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding–and whether he has a rational as well
as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United
States , 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (quotation omitted); see also
Walker , 167 F.3d at 1343.
In determining whether a full hearing on competency is required, a trial
court considers evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his courtroom
demeanor, and any medical opinion bearing on competency. See Drope v.
Missouri , 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975). A trial court may rely on its own
observations of the defendant’s comportment. See Boigegrain , 155 F.3d at 1189.
Defense counsel is often in the best position to determine whether a defendant’s
competency is questionable. See Watts v. Singletary , 87 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th
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Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, the concerns of counsel alone are insufficient to
establish doubt of a defendant’s competency. See Reynolds v. Norris , 86 F.3d
796, 800 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Drope , 420 U.S. at 177 n.13 (although trial
court need not accept counsel’s representations regarding defendant’s
competency without question, court should consider such representations as a
factor). A full competency determination is necessary only when a court has
reason to doubt a defendant’s competency. See Godinez v. Moran , 509 U.S. 389,
401 n.13 (1993); see also Drope , 420 U.S. at 180 (“no fixed or immutable signs
which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to
proceed”).
The record in this case reflects that trial was scheduled to start on a
Monday. 6 On the preceding Friday, Bryson filed an application for determination
of competency. 7
He alleged only the following:
1) [Bryson] is currently incompetent to undergo further
proceedings in the above-styled action;
2) That the following facts are sufficient to raise a doubt as to
the competency of [Bryson];
6
The trial was later continued to Wednesday.
7
One month before filing the motion for a competency determination,
Bryson’s counsel had filed a motion requesting that he be allowed to personally
participate at trial. In that motion, counsel represented that Bryson had the
general competence necessary to participate in his defense.
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3) [Bryson] is unable to comprehend his attorney or to
meaningfully assist in the defense of his case;
4) [His] mental state and communication abilities are such
that they seriously interfere with the understanding of the
proceedings against him and with his capability of aiding his
attorney in preparation for trial.
Original R. Vol. 2 at 576.
At a hearing held that day, counsel stated that based upon her personal
observations, as well as the opinions of mental health experts, she believed that
Bryson may be incompetent. She responded vaguely to the court’s questions,
failing to give specific reasons why she believed Bryson was incompetent. See
Motions Hr’g of Mar. 10, 1989 at 288-90 (counsel indicated that she wanted an
ex parte hearing to avoid disclosure of privileged information). Although she
indicated that she wanted to submit affidavits of the mental health experts in an
ex parte hearing, she admitted that these experts had not examined Bryson for
competency to stand trial.
The trial judge examined Bryson at the hearing. The judge advised Bryson
that he would not question him about the charged crimes and that Bryson should
not provide information about them. Bryson indicated that he understood these
instructions. In response to the judge’s questions, Bryson indicated that he knew
his name, his age, his date of birth, the last year he attended school, the last
school he attended, his parents’ names and address, he and his co-defendants
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were charged with murder, the date his trial was to start, who his attorney was
and her name, he could receive the death penalty, and he would have a jury trial.
He denied, and perhaps was confused about, being questioned by police officers
in the Oklahoma City Jail. He did not know what crimes he had been charged
with other than murder. See id. at 300 (Bryson stated that he knew he was
charged with “killing somebody”). He admitted at times he had trouble
understanding his attorney, but he did not know if he had problems making her
understand him. Also, he did not know if he had given her the information he
thought she needed for the case. 8
Bryson was unaware that execution occurred
by lethal injection.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge stated that based on his
observations of Bryson and Bryson’s answers to his questions, he had no reason
to question Bryson’s mental competency to stand trial or to assist his counsel.
In a written order, the trial court stated there was no doubt that Bryson was
competent. The court found that Bryson understood the nature of the charges and
proceedings brought against him and he was able to effectively and rationally
assist his attorneys.
8
Counsel objected to the trial court’s further attempts to question
Bryson about his ability to communicate with counsel on the basis that the court
might inquire into confidential communications.
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Bryson subsequently requested a jury trial on the issue of competency and
an ex parte hearing before the trial court in order to submit the affidavits of
two mental health experts. He sought an ex parte hearing because the affidavits
allegedly presented material protected under the attorney-client privilege and
attorney work-product doctrine. To support this motion, Bryson’s attorney
submitted her own affidavit indicating that the mental health experts’ affidavits
had not been available for the Friday hearing. Counsel again indicated her belief
that Bryson was incompetent was based not only upon the opinions of the mental
health professionals, but also upon her personal observations. According to
counsel, Bryson “has begun to make statements that can only be classified as
delusional. He does not seem to be able to differentiate fact from fiction and in
this regard cannot rationally and meaningfully assist his attorneys with his
defense.” Original R. Vol. 2 at 598. It does not appear that the trial court
specifically addressed this subsequent request.
The record before the district court and before this court includes only
the affidavit of Dr. Murphy. 9
He stated that although he did not conduct his
interviews and testing to determine Bryson’s mental competency at that time, it
9
According to the district court’s order, the affidavit of the other
mental health expert is no longer available. Bryson does not make any arguments
on appeal with respect to this expert.
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was his opinion that there was a “substantial doubt” that Bryson was competent
to stand trial and that further testing was required to “remove the doubt as to his
ability to meaningfully and rationally assist his counsel with his defense.”
Affidavit of Philip J. Murphy at 2.
It appears, as the district court noted, that the trial court may not have
considered Dr. Murphy’s affidavit. Nevertheless, a state court can find a
defendant competent without ordering an evidentiary hearing even if there is
psychiatric testimony indicating that he is incompetent. See Carter v. Johnson ,
131 F.3d 452, 461 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 1567 (1998). Here,
Dr. Murphy did not state Bryson was incompetent. He merely indicated that
Bryson might be incompetent. Also, Dr. Murphy admitted that he had not
examined Bryson to determine his competency.
While it may have been preferable for the trial court to have expressly
indicated that it had considered and rejected Dr. Murphy’s affidavit, failure to
do so was not error. This evidence, viewed objectively, did not raise either
a bona fide or real, substantial or legitimate doubt as to Bryson’s competency.
See Walker , 167 F.3d at 1343-44 (standards applicable to procedural and
substantive due process claims). Furthermore, the transcript of the hearing shows
that Bryson responded rationally, coherently, and lucidly to the trial court’s
questions. He communicated effectively and answered only the questions asked
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without providing extraneous information. His answers also indicated that he
understood the factual nature of the proceedings against him and the possible
penalty for conviction and was able to assist counsel. See Godinez , 509 U.S.
at 401 n.12, 402. Although there is no precise quantum of proof for establishing
sufficient doubt, see Branscomb v. Norris , 47 F.3d 258, 261 (8th Cir. 1995), the
record does not contradict the trial court’s assessment, after observing Bryson,
that there was no doubt Bryson was competent, see United States v. Newman ,
733 F.2d 1395, 1401 (10th Cir. 1984).
Thus, the trial court’s finding that Bryson’s testimony established he was
competent and had a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings
against him is entitled to a presumption of correctness. Bryson points to no
evidence, other than conclusory assertions of incompetency, to rebut this
presumption. He has therefore failed to rebut the presumption by clear and
convincing evidence. On these facts, the trial court was not required to hold a
full competency hearing. See Godinez , 509 U.S. at 401 n.13.
Also, Bryson did not make a sufficient showing that the trial court should
have held an ex parte hearing. There is no Oklahoma statutory authority for an
ex parte hearing. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1175.3. Furthermore, Bryson failed
to show that confidential information actually was at stake, thus requiring an
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ex parte hearing. See Wise v. Bowersox , 136 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied , 119 S. Ct. 560 (1998).
Bryson’s counsel continued to question his competency immediately before
the start of trial and during the guilt and sentencing phases of trial; she indicated
that Bryson would not testify due to his incompetency. See Trial Tr. Vol. I at 3-4
(during hearing on pretrial motions counsel sought reconsideration of Bryson’s
competency); id. Vol. V at 1449 (counsel states Bryson will not testify at trial
because he is not competent based upon unexplained “things” he told counsel);
id. Vol. VI at 1688 (counsel states that Bryson will not testify at sentencing
because he is delusional, is incapable of testifying, and would not make sense),
id. at 1690 (counsel asserts, without further explanation, that Bryson has changed
“dramatically”). Counsel’s statements regarding competency, however, were
general and vague.
“[A] trial court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change
that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to
stand trial.” Drope , 420 U.S. at 181. Here, however, nothing in the record
indicates that Bryson engaged in any irrational or unusual behavior during the
trial which would lead the trial court to change its decision and to question
Bryson’s competency. See Nguyen v. Reynolds , 131 F.3d 1340, 1346 (10th Cir.
1997), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 128 (1998).
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Likewise, at his sentencing, it appeared that Bryson was competent and
understood the nature of the proceedings. He testified that he recalled the jury’s
verdict. He indicated that he desired to appeal and wanted court-appointed
counsel to do so. Except for indicating he did not understand 1) that an appellate
court would decide if he was to be executed, and 2) how he could pay a fine if he
was executed, Bryson stated he understood all of the questions the court asked.
His failure to understand the first does not indicate incompetency and the district
court stated that his failure to understand the second was more likely sarcasm
than a lack of understanding.
The record from the state trial court indicates that its competency decision
was not based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented to it. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Also, the trial court did
not err in failing to hold a competency hearing. See Sena v. New Mexico State
Prison , 109 F.3d 652, 655 (10th Cir. 1997).
B. Exclusion of Mitigating Evidence
Bryson argues that the trial court violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments by excluding a videotape of his confession, which he sought to
admit at the sentencing proceeding as mitigating evidence. The Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals held that, while the trial court’s exclusion of this mitigating
evidence was constitutional error, it was, nonetheless, harmless. See Bryson,
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876 P.2d at 256-57. Respondent does not dispute that the trial court erred in
refusing to admit the videotape.
Clearly established Supreme Court precedent provides that a capital
sentencer may not refuse to consider, nor be precluded from considering, as
a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any
circumstance of the offense which the defendant proffers as a basis for the
imposition of a sentence less than death. See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina,
476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 114
(1982), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality)). The Court,
however, has never specifically addressed whether the erroneous exclusion of
mitigating evidence can ever be harmless. Cf. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S.
393, 398-99 (1987) (granting habeas relief, after noting government made no
attempt to argue that sentencer’s improper refusal to consider nonstatutory
mitigating factors was harmless error); Skipper, 476 U.S. at 7-8 (refusing to deem
erroneously excluded mitigating evidence as only cumulative and its exclusion
harmless). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ application of a harmless
error analysis to the improper exclusion of this mitigating evidence, therefore,
was not “contrary to . . . clearly established” Supreme Court precedent. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
-22-
Nor was the state court’s application of a harmless error analysis an
unreasonable application of general Supreme Court principles. This court has
previously applied a harmless error analysis to the exclusion of mitigating
evidence. See Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 601 & n.8 (10th Cir. 1987)
(reh’g en banc) (determining exclusion of mitigating evidence was not harmless).
And, although not controlling here, several other circuits have also applied
a harmless error analysis in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Boyd v. French,
147 F.3d 319, 322, 327-28 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1050 (1999);
Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1158-59 (8th Cir. 1997) (in dicta), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1197 (1998); see also Knight v. Dugger, 863 F.2d 705, 710 (11th Cir.
1988), and cases cited therein (noting harmless error analysis applies to Lockett
errors, but that precise guidelines of analysis are unsettled). See generally
O’Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 20-21, 25, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1998) (federal case
law, inferior to Supreme Court precedent, may serve as guide in determining
reasonableness of state court’s application of Supreme Court law). The state
court’s application of a harmless error analysis to the trial court’s erroneous
exclusion of the videotape, therefore, was not “an unreasonable application
of[] clearly established” Supreme Court precedent, § 2254(d)(1).
Further, we agree with the district court that the exclusion of the videotape
did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
-23-
jury’s verdict,” and was, therefore, harmless error. Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776
(1946)). 10 More specifically, although it would have taken only a single juror to
preclude imposition of the death sentence, we hold that no reasonable juror
would have considered the excluded videotape sufficiently mitigating to warrant
a penalty less than death. See Boyd, 147 F.3d at 328; cf. Moore, 153 F.3d at
1110 (addressing whether erroneous denial of mental health expert at capital
sentencing proceeding was harmless; determining whether this court “harbor[ed]
a significant doubt that this evidence would have caused at least one juror to
choose life rather than death”) (quotation omitted).
Bryson argues that the videotape would have shown his remorse,
demeanor, state of mind, and motive for the killing, as well as explained the
nature and extent of his relationship with Marilyn Plantz. The videotaped
confession does not tend to show any remorse. Further, despite the exclusion of
the videotape, Bryson was able to present other evidence concerning these
mitigating factors. The excluded videotape did not tend to establish any facts
concerning Bryson’s relationship with Plantz that had not already been presented
10
The Brecht standard in this setting is more rigorous than the
determination under the AEDPA of whether the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals unreasonably applied the otherwise more rigorous standard in Chapman
v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). We, therefore, need not address, and do not
decide, whether the district court erred in applying Brecht in an AEDPA case.
-24-
to the jury. In addition, the record, even without the videotape, contains
evidence regarding the victim’s alleged abuse of Marilyn Plantz, which Bryson
asserts was his motivation for the killing. The erroneous exclusion of the
videotape, therefore, was harmless. See Boyd, 147 F.3d at 328; Sweet, 125 F.3d
at 1158-59.
C. Option to Return a Life Sentence
Bryson argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it had
the option to return a life sentence even if it found the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals rejected this argument, and held that there is no entitlement to such an
instruction. See Bryson , 876 P.2d at 262-63. On habeas, the district court
determined that the “instructions fairly and adequately charged the jury that
imposition of the death penalty was not required even if the aggravating
circumstances were found.” Dist. Ct. R. Doc. 27 at 93.
Instruction No. 12 provided that
Should you unanimously find that one or more aggravating
circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt, you would be
authorized to consider imposing a sentence of death.
If you do not unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt
that one or more of the aggravating circumstances existed, you
are prohibited from considering the penalty of death. In that event,
the sentence must be imprisonment for life or imprisonment for life
without parole.
-25-
Original R. Vol. 2 at 675; Trial Tr. Vol. VI at 1744.
This court has upheld this instruction in cases raising the same argument
Bryson raises here. See Johnson v. Gibson , 169 F.3d 1239, 1254 (10th Cir.
1999); Duvall v. Reynolds , 139 F.3d 768, 789-91 (10th Cir.), cert. denied ,
119 S. Ct. 345 (1998); see also Cooks v. Ward , 165 F.3d 1283, 1290-91 (10th
Cir. 1998) (rejecting same argument for substantially similar jury instruction),
petition for cert. filed , (U.S. May 14, 1999) (No. 98-9420). In Duvall , this court
held that this particular instruction contains “permissive language, which informs
the jury that they were not required to impose the death penalty upon a finding of
an aggravating circumstance.” See Duvall , 139 F.3d at 790. Rather, it
“authorized [the jury] to consider imposing a sentence of death” if it found
unanimously that one or more aggravating factors existed. Original R. Vol. 2 at
675 (emphasis added); Trial Tr. Vol. VI at 1744 (same). Neither this instruction
nor any other instruction precluded the jury from considering mitigating
evidence. Furthermore, the trial court did not instruct the jury that it was
required to impose the death penalty if it found the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances. See Duvall , 139 F.3d at 790.
Instruction No. 12 is, therefore, constitutionally permissible. See id.
It effectively instructed the jury of its discretion to decline to impose the death
penalty, “including by implication the option to impose life imprisonment even if
-26-
the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating.” See id. at 790 & n.8;
see also Buchanan v. Angelone , 522 U.S. 269, 277 (1998) (approving instruction
providing that when aggravating circumstance exists beyond reasonable doubt,
jury “may” impose death penalty); Coleman v. Saffle , 869 F.2d 1377, 1394
(10th Cir. 1989) (requiring instructions to preserve jury’s responsibility and
authority to exercise discretion in sentencing determination).
Bryson relies upon the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction Criminal
Second (OUJI-CR 2d) adopted in 1994. OUJI-CR 2d 4-80 expressly instructs
a jury that if aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, it
may impose either a life sentence or a life sentence without parole. Bryson
contends Duvall is not controlling because it did not consider OUJI-CR 2d 4-80
and that the instructions given did not set forth existing Oklahoma law.
This uniform instruction clearly sets forth the settled law. Under Duvall
and Johnson , however, the failure expressly to give such an instruction is not
constitutional error.
-27-
D. Lesser Included Offenses
Bryson asserts that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on only
the capital murder charge and refusing to instruct further on the lesser included,
non-capital offenses of second degree murder and first degree manslaughter,
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Beck v. Alabama,
447 U.S. 625, 627 (1980) (capital defendant is entitled to jury instruction on
lesser included, noncapital offense, supported by evidence); see also Hopper v.
Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 610-12 (1982); Hooks v. Ward, No. 98-6196, 1999 WL
502608, at *17-*24 (10th Cir. July 16, 1999); Stouffer v. Reynolds, 168 F.3d
1155, 1170-71 (10th Cir. 1999); Walker, 167 F.3d at 1349. The state trial and
appellate courts determined that the evidence did not support giving these
instructions. See Bryson, 876 P.2d at 254-55. We afford this factual
determination a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See
Hooks, 1999 WL 502608, at *35 (Anderson, J. and Tacha, J., concurring); Boyd
v. Ward, No. 98-6309, 1999 WL 370418, at *9 (10th Cir. June 8, 1999) (to be
reported at 179 F.3d 904); Newsted v. Gibson, 158 F.3d 1085, 1091 (10th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1509 (1999); Lujan v. Tansy, 2 F.3d 1031, 1035
-28-
(10th Cir. 1993). 11 After reviewing the trial record, we agree that the evidence
did not support instructions on either of these lesser included offenses.
1. Second degree murder
Oklahoma defines second degree murder, in relevant part, as a homicide
“perpetrated by an act imminently dangerous to another person and evincing
a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without any premeditated
design to effect the death of any particular individual.” Okla. Stat. tit. 21,
§ 701.8(1). “A design to effect death is inferred from the fact of killing unless
the circumstances raise a reasonable doubt whether such design existed.”
Hammon v. State, 898 P.2d 1287, 1308 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
Subsequent to the state appellate court’s decision in this case, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that second degree “depraved mind”
murder is not a lesser included offense of first degree malice murder. See
Willingham v. State, 947 P.2d 1074, 1081 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 2329 (1998). It could be argued, therefore, that Beck does not apply.
See Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 118 S. Ct. 1895, 1898 (1998). This court
11
Although this court decided both Newsted and Lujan under the law
existing prior to AEDPA’s enactment, a federal habeas court is required to afford
a presumption of correctness to a state court’s factual determinations under both
pre- and post-AEDPA law. See Williamson v. Ward , 110 F.3d 1508, 1513 & n.7
(10th Cir. 1997). Nothing in AEDPA changes this determination from a question
of fact to one of law.
-29-
need not decide that issue, however, because even if Beck did apply, the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support instructing the jury on this offense
under the pre-Willingham definition.
The evidence overwhelmingly established that Bryson and Marilyn Plantz
plotted to kill the victim for approximately one month prior to the murder. They
contacted a number of people in an effort to get someone either to kill the victim
or to help them carry out the murder. They also devised a variety of murder
schemes and attempted to carry out several of those plans prior to the actual
murder. The evidence, therefore, overwhelmingly establishes that this murder
was intentional and premeditated.
Bryson argues that he did not have the requisite intent necessary for first
degree malice murder because he was intoxicated at the time of the crime and
was acting under the influence of Marilyn Plantz. Although the evidence
indicates Bryson and McKimble each ingested a $20 rock of crack cocaine and a
quart of beer between 10:00 P.M. and 11:30 P.M. the night preceding the murder,
McKimble testified that they committed the murder the next morning, between
4:00 A.M. and 5:15 A.M., because it was part of the plan. Moreover, both
Bryson and McKimble were subsequently able to relate to others the details of
the crime. See generally Charm v. State, 924 P.2d 754, 761 (Okla. Crim. App.
1996) (determining jury instruction on voluntary intoxication defense was not
-30-
warranted by evidence, when defendant was subsequently able to describe murder
in detail). Finally, there was uncontradicted trial testimony that smoking crack
produces an immediate rush or high, lasting only a very short period of time,
perhaps thirty seconds, followed by a quick return to normalcy that would be
complete within one hour.
Further, although the evidence indicates that it was Marilyn Plantz’s idea
to murder her husband in order to collect the insurance money, and that she was
the one who devised most of the schemes to murder him, there is no evidence that
Bryson’s will was overborne by her or that he was acting other than in a
voluntary and intentional manner when he killed the victim. Because the
evidence does not suggest anything other than a premeditated design to kill the
victim, Bryson was not entitled to a jury instruction on second degree murder.
See Douglas v. State, 951 P.2d 651, 672 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997); see also, e.g.,
Stouffer, 168 F.3d at 1171; Duvall, 139 F.3d at 785-87.
2. First degree manslaughter
Oklahoma defines first degree manslaughter, in pertinent part, as
a homicide “perpetrated without a design to effect death, and in a heat of
passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner, or by means of a dangerous weapon.”
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 711(2). The requisite elements for heat of passion are:
1) adequate provocation; 2) passion or emotion such as anger, rage, fear, or
-31-
terror; 3) a homicide occurring during a state of passion; and 4) the existence
of a causal connection between the provocation, passion and homicide.
See Fairchild v. State, 965 P.2d 391, 399 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998). The requisite
“passion” must be “so great as to render the mind incapable of forming a design
to effect death,” see Charm, 924 P.2d at 760 (quotations omitted), and is
measured by an objectively reasonable standard, see Cheney v. State, 909 P.2d
74, 90 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). Further, the murder must occur before the
murderer has a reasonable opportunity to cool down. See Lewis v. State,
970 P.2d 1158, 1166 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (further defining third element
of offense).
As adequate provocation justifying the murder, Bryson asserts that the
victim had been abusing Marilyn Plantz. There is evidence Marilyn Plantz had
told Bryson, during the month preceding the murder, that the victim abused her,
but there is no evidence of any abusive incident immediately preceding the
murder to establish adequate provocation. See id. (insufficient provocation
existed to warrant instructing jury on first degree manslaughter when provoking
event did not occur in close proximity to killing, and defendant had reasonable
opportunity to cool down). Instead, the evidence establishes that they were
motivated to kill the victim to collect his life insurance proceeds. In light of
these facts, Bryson was not entitled to a jury instruction on first degree
-32-
manslaughter. See Turrentine v. State, 965 P.2d 955, 969-70 (Okla. Crim. App.
1998) (defendant was not entitled to have jury instructed on first degree
manslaughter when there was no evidence that he committed murder without
design to effect death, but instead when evidence indicated he intended to kill
victim); see also Stouffer, 168 F.3d at 1171; Walker, 167 F.3d at 1349-50;
Charm, 924 P.2d at 760.
E. Failure to Give Requested Mitigation Instructions
Bryson argues the trial court erred in refusing to give his requested
mitigation instructions. Bryson requested an instruction that the jury consider the
following mitigating factors: 1) one or both of the co-defendants exerted
considerable influence over him; 2) Marilyn Plantz led him to believe that the
victim was beating and raping her; 3) he acted in defense of his lover; and
4) Marilyn Plantz provided alcohol and crack cocaine to him. Recognizing that
the jury could consider all of the evidence it heard, Bryson argues that without
specific reference to the four alleged mitigating circumstances the jury may have
believed that it could only consider the factors listed in the instructions. Bryson
argues that failure to allow the jury to consider all mitigating evidence is not
harmless error. On direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held
that the instructions allowed the jury to consider fully any relevant mitigating
-33-
evidence. See Bryson , 876 P.2d at 257, 258. The district court, on habeas,
agreed.
It is settled that a jury may not be precluded from considering any
“constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence.” Buchanan , 522 U.S. at 276;
see Johnson v. Texas , 509 U.S. 350, 361 (1993). “[T]he state may shape and
structure the jury’s consideration of mitigation so long as it does not preclude the
jury from giving effect to any relevant mitigating evidence.” Buchanan , 522 U.S.
at 276; see Johnson , 509 U.S. at 362. In shaping consideration of mitigating
evidence, a jury instruction may list specific mitigating circumstances if it also
indicates that the jury may consider any other mitigating evidence. See Blystone
v. Pennsylvania , 494 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1990).
These standards were met in this case. Instruction No. 15 listed, among
others, the following mitigating circumstances: 1) the age of Bryson at the time
of the offense; 2) his age when he first met Marilyn Plantz; 3) the crime was the
idea of a co-defendant; 4) Bryson had been consuming alcohol and crack cocaine
before the murder; 5) Bryson had a neuropsychological deformity made worse by
drug use; 6) Bryson’s emotional and intellectual development made him
susceptible to the suggestions of an older person; and 7) Bryson was less able
than an emotionally and chronologically mature adult to make responsible
decisions and consider consequences. Additionally, Instruction No. 13 directed
-34-
the jurors that they were to determine the mitigating circumstances under the
facts and circumstances of the case.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals and the district court correctly
determined that the instructions sufficiently encompassed Bryson’s first requested
mitigating circumstance that one or both of his co-defendants exerted
considerable influence over him. Those courts also correctly determined that no
evidence supported the third requested mitigating circumstance that Bryson was
acting in defense of his lover at the time of the murder.
Instruction No. 15 did not specifically mention the alleged rape and abuse
of Marilyn Plantz by the victim or that it was Marilyn Plantz who provided
alcohol and crack cocaine to Bryson. There was, however, evidence presented to
support these alleged mitigating circumstances. Even though these mitigating
circumstances were not listed in the jury instructions, the jurors were instructed
that they were to determine the mitigating circumstances under the facts and
circumstances of the case. The instructions therefore did not foreclose the jury’s
consideration of this or any other mitigating circumstances. See Buchanan ,
522 U.S. at 277.
Although it may have been preferable for the trial court either to have
listed these two as mitigating circumstances or to have specifically instructed the
jury that it could consider mitigating factors other than those listed in Instruction
-35-
No. 15, the instructions as a whole, considered along with the trial record, did not
preclude the jury from giving effect to any mitigating circumstances. Cf. Estelle
v. McGuire , 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (ambiguous instruction considered in context
of instructions as whole and trial record). It cannot be concluded that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the mitigating instructions such that
they prevented consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. See Boyde v.
California , 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990). Thus, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals decision was not contrary to, or did not involve an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
IV. CONCLUSION
After carefully considering each of Bryson’s claims, we conclude there was
no constitutional error. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment
denying Bryson a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
-36-
No. 97-6435, Bryson v. Ward
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in the disposition of this case, but write separately to express my
disagreement with the majority’s handling of two issues.
I.
In deciding whether the trial court’s exclusion of proffered mitigating
evidence was harmless, the majority cites Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619
(1993), a pre-AEDPA case holding that a federal habeas court need only
determine whether such exclusion had a substantial and injurious effect or
influence on determining the jury’s verdict. In my view, the Brecht standard of
review is inapplicable to post-AEDPA cases such as this one. Instead, our proper
function is to determine whether the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’
disposition of this issue “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). More specifically, we must determine
whether the Court of Criminal Appeals reasonably applied the harmless error
standard outlined in Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (requiring
government to prove a constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt).
Curiously, the majority suggests “[t]he Brecht standard in this setting is
more rigorous” than the new AEDPA standards of review. I question if we have a
basis for this conclusion. Until the meaning of the new AEDPA standards of
review are sufficiently fleshed out by the Supreme Court, we have no basis for
concluding whether one or the other is “more rigorous.” In any event, I believe
the majority’s practice is dangerous because it effectively invites federal habeas
courts to “pick and choose” from pre- and post-AEDPA standards of review.
Applying the standard of review set forth in § 2254(d)(1), I conclude the
Court of Criminal Appeals’ resolution of this issue was neither “contrary to” nor
“an unreasonable application of” Chapman . More specifically, I believe the Court
of Criminal Appeals properly concluded “there [wa]s no reasonable probability
that the error might have contributed to the imposition of [Bryson’s] death
sentence.” Bryson v. State , 876 P.2d 240, 257 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
II.
In addressing Bryson’s claim that he was entitled to jury instructions on the
lesser-included offenses of second degree murder and first degree manslaughter,
the majority correctly notes “[t]he state trial and appellate courts determined that
the evidence did not support giving these instructions.” The majority goes on,
however, to characterize the state courts’ decisions as “factual determinations”
entitled to a “presumption of correctness” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Although it is not outcome determinative in the case before us, the majority’s
characterization of these decisions is, in my view, clearly flawed.
-2-
Federal habeas courts are required, under both pre- and post-AEDPA law,
to afford a presumption of correctness to any “determination of a factual issue
made by a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (outlining post-AEDPA
standards); see Thompson v. Keohane , 516 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1995) (discussing
pre-AEDPA standards); Case v. Mondragon , 887 F.2d 1388, 1392-93 (10th Cir.
1989) (same). For this purpose, “factual issues” are defined as “basic, primary, or
historical facts: facts ‘in the sense of a recital of external events and the
credibility of their narrators.” Townsend v. Sain , 372 U.S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963)
(quoting Brown v. Allen , 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953)). Typically, when resolving
factual issues, the factfinder must either choose between or among two or more
conflicting versions of the facts or, where a fact is uncontested, make a finding
based upon the uncontroverted evidence. As courts of review, appellate courts
review fact findings by reviewing the record to determine whether the fact
findings are supported by the record. This appellate function does not involve
fact finding in the first instance, but rather a review of the record to determine
whether the factfinder had an evidentiary basis for its rulings which would satisfy
the legal standard in question. Notably, “mixed questions of fact and law, which
require the application of a legal standard to the historical-fact determinations,
are not facts in this sense” and are not entitled to the presumption. Id. at 309 n.6;
Case , 887 F.2d at 1393 (presumption of correctness does not attach “to legal
-3-
conclusions or determinations on mixed questions of law and fact”). Thus, our
characterization of a state court determination as one of fact or law has critical
implications, for it controls the standard of review we apply.
The question here is how to characterize the state courts’ determinations
that Bryson was not entitled to any lesser included offense instructions. This task
is easy because the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has already
characterized such determinations as issues of law. Hooks v. State , 862 P.2d
1273, 1280 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (“it is the duty of the trial court to determine
as a matter of law whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to justify
the submission to the jury of instructions on lesser included offenses”), cert.
denied , 511 U.S. 1100 (1994). I note this characterization is consistent with the
one we have implicitly adopted in direct criminal appeals. See , e.g. , United
States v. Abeyta , 27 F.3d 470, 473 (10th Cir. 1994) (reviewing as a mixed
question of law and fact the trial court’s decision not to give a lesser included
offense instruction). Further, I believe this characterization is entirely reasonable.
In deciding whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to warrant the
giving of a particular instruction, a court is not deciding basic, primary, or
historical facts, nor is its predominant function to make credibility findings.
-4-
Precisely how the state courts’ determination of this legal issue in Bryson’s
case can now be transformed into a “factual determination” for purposes of
federal habeas review is not explained by the majority. Instead, the majority cites
four habeas cases from this circuit: Hooks v. Ward , 1999 WL 502608 (10th Cir.
July 16, 1999); Boyd v. Ward , 1999 WL 370418 (10th Cir. June 8, 1999);
Newsted v. Gibson , 158 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 1509
(1999), and Lujan v. Tansy , 2 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 510 U.S.
1120 (1994).
Addressing these cases in reverse order, I turn first to Lujan , a pre-AEDPA
case brought by a New Me xico state prisoner convicted of first degree murder.
The petitioner argued the trial court erred in refusing to give diminished capacity
instructions (which would have allowed the jury to determine whether the
petitioner “had the ability to form the deliberate intention to take away the life of
another”). The Lujan panel began its analysis of this claim by noting the New
Mexico Supreme Court had rejected the claim on the grounds there was
“‘evidence in the record that the [petitioner] was able to form a deliberate
intention, with no evidence to the contrary.’” 2 F.3d at 1035 (quoting State v.
Lujan , 608 P.2d 1114, 1115 (1980)). With no explanation or citation, the Lujan
panel characterized the New Mexico Supreme Court’s conclusion as a “factual
finding” entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (the
-5-
pre-AEDPA provision that afforded deference to state court factual findings). Id.
at 1035. In my view, Lujan is not controlling here. Aside from the fact that the
Lujan panel’s characterization appears to ignore New Mexico state law, see , e.g. ,
State v. Vallejos , 924 P.2d 727, 734 (N.M. App. 1996) (determination of whether
there is some evidence to establish defense and require jury instructions is a
question of law), it is not controlling here, where we are characterizing what the
Oklahoma state courts did when they applied Oklahoma state law.
In Newsted , another pre-AEDPA case, an Oklahoma state prisoner
convicted of first degree murder sought federal habeas relief on the ground that
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a heat of passion
manslaughter instruction. In analyzing this claim, the Newsted panel began by
noting the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had summarily rejected the
claim. The Newsted panel then stated, without explanation or citation, that the
Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision “necessarily encompassed factual findings
about the evidence in th[e] case.” 158 F.3d at 1091. It is not clear what the
Newsted panel meant by this latter language. To the extent it was only meant to
indicate the Court of Criminal Appeals made findings of historical fact about
what evidence was properly admitted at the petitioner’s trial, I can agree with that
proposition. However, to the extent it was intended to suggest the Court of
Criminal Appeals made factual findings based upon the evidence properly
-6-
admitted at trial, I cannot agree. Because of the vague language employed, as
well as the lack of supporting citation, I believe it is appropriate to narrowly
interpret the above-quoted language in Newsted .
Having distinguished Newsted and Lujan , I turn to Boyd and Hooks , two
post-AEDPA habeas cases from Oklahoma. In each case, the petitioner argued he
was deprived of his right to lesser included offense instructions (in Boyd , the
challenge was asserted via an ineffective assistance of trial counsel “gateway”).
With no citation or analysis, the panels in both cases appear to have concluded the
state courts’ decisions that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to
warrant the giving of lesser included instructions were “factual determinations”
entitled to a presumption of correctness under § 2254(e)(1). Hooks , 1999 WL
502608 at *25; Boyd , 1999 WL 370418 at *9; but see White v. Scott , 141 F.3d
1187, 1998 WL 165162 (10th Cir. 1998) (table) (concluding “the [state] trial
judge’s determination not to give a self-defense instruction” was a “mixed
question of law and fact”).
Assuming, arguendo, the panels in Hooks and Boyd intended to reach these
conclusions, I acknowledge we are bound by them. Fortunately, resolution of this
issue does not affect the outcome of Bryson’s case since he is not entitled to
habeas relief regardless of how the Oklahoma courts’ decision on the lesser
included offense issue is characterized. However, since this issue has potential
-7-
ramifications for future habeas cases, it is an issue that should be addressed at
some point by the en banc court.
-8-
Bryson v. Ward
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 1999-08-06
Citations: 187 F.3d 1193
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion