That the appellant, when he declared under oath that he was a freeholder of the county of Jefferson and worth $10,000, over and •above all his debts and liabilities, committed a deliberate and willful falsehood, is too clearly established to admit of discussion; that such false swearing was committed for the express purpose of deceiving the court and inducing it to adopt a course of procedure which would not otherwise have been adopted, is equally plain; and it having been adjudged by the court at Special Term that this misconduct upon the part of the appellant was of such character as to ■defeat, impair, impede or prejudice a right or remedy of a party to •a civil action or special proceeding, it follows that he has been guilty ■of a civil contempt, which subjects him to punishment and requires •■that he be dealt with as summarily as a proper regard for legal procedure will permit. (Code Civ: Proc. §§ 14, 2266, 2267; Boon v. McGucken, 67 Hun, 251; Matter of Hay Foundry & Iron Works, 22 App. Div. 87; Socialistic Co-op. Pub. Assn. v. Kuhn, 51 id. 583.)
With the preliminary feature of the case thus disposed of, it remains only to determine whether the punishment inflicted by the ■court below is within the rule prescribed by the law of this State.
In passing to a consideration of this question, it is to be noted that it is a. civil and not a criminal contempt of which the. contemner in the present instance has been found guilty, and while in either ■case the court is interested in dealing summarily with those who •defy its authority or change the course of its procedure by any fraudulent device or scheme, yet in a proceeding for a civil contempt the party more immediately concerned is the one who has ¡suffered some injury or loss by reason of such misconduct. It is mainly for his protection and indemnity that the punishment is inflicted, and it was doubtless with this design that the Legislature ■enacted section 2284 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that “If an actual loss or injury has been produced to a party to an action or special proceeding by reason of the misconduct proved against the offender, and the case is not one where it is specially prescribed by law, that an action may be maintained to recover damages for the loss or injury, a fine sufficient to indemnify the
This provision, therefore, must be our guide in determining the question under consideration.
In view of the undisputed facts of the case it will not, we assume, be seriously contended that the contemner’s misconduct has. not resulted in some actual loss or injury to the plaintiff in the action and to the petitioner, as its assignee. In the most favorable view which can possibly be taken of Moffett’s conduct it must-be admitted that it caused a delay in the sale of the mortgaged premises of more than fourteen months, which circumstance of itself, it is fair to infer, had something to do with the .amount of the deficiency which subsequently arose. There was also the additional expense incidental to the appeal, and which in all probability would not have been incurred but for the- stay of proceedings which the under^ taking in question made possible, so that it is apparent that this is not a case which calls simply for a. fine of’ $250 and costs as provided in -the last clause of the section above quoted. On .the contrary, it necessarily follows, as we think, that with the contempt established, the only fine which could have been legally imposed Was one Which should be sufficient in amount to fully indemnify the aggrieved party for the actual loss or injury sustained by him, or' at least for such portion thereof as was embraced within and covered'"by the condition of the bond.. The Special Term has found that such loss was the amount of the deficiency arising upon the- sale of the- mortgaged premises, and this finding, subject to the modification hereinafter mentioned, meets with our approval.
In proceedings of-this nature it is not always easy to ascertain the actual-loss ’sustained in consequence of the misconduct of a party which amounts to::and has been adjudged to be a contempt of court ; but, like any otheibclaim for damages, it is. .something which must be established ■’ by proof. (Moffat v. Herman, 116 N. Y. 131; Dejonge v. Brenneman, 23 Hun, 332.)
By some process which is not made entirely clear to us, the court below reached the conclusion that Moffett’s misconduct resulted in a loss or damage to the petitioner of at least $6,000, and it consequently imposed a fine for that amount. We are inclined to think that this was error, but inasmuch as a reduction of the fine may undoubtedly be made in appropriate cases by the appellate court (Clark v. Bininger, 75 N. Y. 344; Dejonge v. Brenneman, supra),
This is not a case in which the court should struggle to relieve The appellant from the difficulty in which he has placed himself. "The contempt with which he stands charged was flagrant in the «extreme, and without any mitigating circumstances. As was said by Ingraham, J., in a somewhat similar case: “ It is time that parties "who engage in such an attempt as this to deceive the court, and induce it to adopt a course which results in defrauding one whom the court is bound to protect, should be summarily dealt, with, and taught that, if, such a scheme is successful, it involves consequences much more serious than the payment of the amount of which a party is defrauded.” (Matter of Hay Foundry & Iron Works, supra)
This language, is not inappropriate to the case in hand.
Order modified by reducing the amount of the fine imposed to the slim of $5,121.82, and as thus modified affirmed, without costs of this appeal to either party.
McLennan, Spring and Hisoook, JJ., concurred; Williams, J., dissented in an opinion.