The Legislature in 1872 — 73, made the failure* to list polls for taxation a misdemeanor, and intended to make-file offence cognizable before a Justice of the Peace; but by-
And now the plaintiff, who is the Clerk of the Court, brings ¿this action against the county for his fees, notwithstanding the Act provides that no part of the cost shall be taxed against the county,- because, he says,
I. That the Act is prospective only.
It is true, that statutes are to be construed as prospective •only, unless the contrary clearly appears. Here the contrary ■does clearly appear. The Act in express terms refers to “ pending indictments.”
II. That he had performed the services before the Act was passed, therefore his right to his fees was ves-ed, and the Legislature could not deprive him of it.
It is true that the plaintiff’s fees were fixed by law, and when he rendered the services he liad the right to expect pay. But from whom? If for any prrxon, then from that person. If for the /State, then from the State. If for a covvty, then from the county. C. C. P., sec.. 555. Here the services were rendered for the ¡State. and are to be “ paid for by the State, as other claims against it are.” C. C.. P., sec. 555. I leave •out of view the question of the power of the State to change or abolish the fees of the officers.
It is also true, that the- legislature has the- power to pre- , scribe that the counties shall pay the costs of State criminal prosecutions. And the plaintiff says:
It is true, that before and at the time the plaintiff rendered the services, our statute did provide that “ in all State eases, where there shall be a voile p--os qu> entered, &c., the county shall pay the Clerks, &e., half their fees.” Bat. Rev., chap.’ 105, sec. 32. And here there were “ State cases” and “ nolle prosequi,^ But then the act of 1874 — 75, clap 200, sec. which provides “ that no part of the costs upon any of the indictments, under consideration, shall be taxed against the county,” does, as to these indictments, repeal the general law making the counties liable. And so the ease stands as if there never liad been any law making the counties liable. So that there vras not only no rompulsion. upon the county to pay, but an express prohibition.
The only thing that can be urged against this view, is the argument, that at the time the services were rendered, the county was bound under the general law. No. The county was not bound until a noli*, pru.sequi should be entered. And before that was done, the act of 1874 — 75, repealed the general law as to these eases. So that, the case stands thus : The State, as wre wdll suppose, is like any other party, liable for its costs. It relieves itself from that liability in certain cases, and puts it upon the counties, which are parts and parcels of the State, to pay, upon the happening of certain contingencies. Before the contingencies happens, the State relieves the counties from liability, there can be no objection to that. No contract of the cow-ties is thereby impaired. A owes B, and directs his agent to pay it; before C does pay it, or assumes any personal responsibility, A withdraws-his authority, and directs C not to pay it. After this, C is neither bound nor authorized to pay it. Dixon & Davidson v. Pace, 73 N. C. Rep. 603.
We do not mean to pass upon the liability of the State to pay this claim. All that vTe decide is, that the county is not bound..