F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PU BL ISH
March 9, 2007
UNITED STATES COURT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
EUN ICE CA M PBELL,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v. No. 06-3062
GAM BRO HEALTHCARE, IN C.,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of K ansas
(D.C. No. 04-CV-2416-CM )
Alan V. Johnson, Sloan, Eisenbarth, Glassman, M cEntire & Jarboe, Topeka,
Kansas (Stephen D. Lanterman with him on the briefs), for Plaintiff–Appellant.
John C . Stivarius, Jr., Epstein, Becker, & Green, Atlanta, Georgia (Jack D. Row e
and Sara J. Kagay, Lathrop & G age, Kansas City, M issouri; and Teresa B.
Stivarius and Brenton S. Bean, Epstein, Becker, & Green, Atlanta, G eorgia, w ith
him on the briefs), for Defendant–Appellee.
Before L UC ER O, M cCO NNELL, and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges.
L UC ER O, Circuit Judge.
Eunice Campbell appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Gambro Healthcare, Inc. (“Gambro”) on her claims of race discrimination under
42 U.S.C. § 1981, and interference with and retaliation for taking leave covered
by the Family and M edical Leave Act (“FM LA”) under 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2615(a)(1)–(2). On appeal, Campbell has abandoned her § 1981 race
discrimination claim, and challenges the district court’s judgment only as to her
interference and retaliation claims under the FM LA. W e hold that when the
employer cites only factors predating the employee’s return to work to justify the
adverse action, the claim may be brought under either a retaliation or interference
theory. Evaluating Campbell’s claim under both theories, we exercise jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM .
I
Campbell began working for Gambro as a Patient Care Technician (“PCT”)
in April 2001 at its Atchison, Kansas clinic. 1 Gambro is headquartered in D enver,
Colorado, and operates a national chain of clinics providing end-stage renal
dialysis and related services. The Atchison clinic is relatively small, with an
optimal capacity of 24 to 26 patients; in fact, the clinic treated substantially fewer
patients throughout Campbell’s tenure. As such, the clinic was leanly staffed,
employing a center director (Ilene Dwyer), a registered nurse, and two PCTs, of
which Campbell was one. The clinic employed a second PCT, Pat Jackson, who
had slightly more seniority than Campbell due to prior work experience.
1
Campbell was originally employed by Renal M anagement, Inc. Gambro
purchased Renal M anagement in 2001.
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Campbell’s duties included working under the nurse’s supervision to
provide patient care; operating, cleaning, and inspecting the dialysis machines;
monitoring patients during dialysis; keeping patient records; communicating
patient statuses to the nurse; and performing other functions as necessary. In
addition to these core PCT duties, Campbell served as the clinic’s inventory
technician and unit secretary. As inventory technician, she was responsible for
tracking the clinic’s inventory utilizing an automated physical inventory computer
system (“PICS”), recording inventory receipts, removing expired supplies from
the shelves, and ensuring that the oldest supplies w ere used first. Her primary
duty was to match physical inventory on the shelves w ith inventory as reflected in
the PICS database. As unit secretary, she was responsible for maintaining
accurate patient data, such as by preparing charts for new patients, adding new
data for existing patients, coordinating patient mailings, and archiving old patient
records.
On June 15, 2002, Gambro promoted Campbell to PCT II, a job title that
reflected increased pay but no change in duties. Throughout her employment, and
before taking medical leave, Campbell received high marks from her supervisors
for her job performance.
Beginning in M ay 2003 and extending through the date of Campbell’s
termination, the Atchinson clinic suffered a steady decline in patients, with the
number stabilizing at 13. Rather than lay off either PCT, Gambro asked each to
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accept a reduction in hours, to 24 per w eek, with the option to supplement hours
at neighboring clinics. At a meeting in early August 2003, Richard Pedrick,
Gambro’s Regional Director, met with D wyer, Jackson, and Campbell to discuss
Jackson and Campbell’s options in the face of the dwindling patient count.
Jackson and Campbell both chose to work a reduced schedule w ithout seeking to
supplement their hours elsew here. By reducing labor and other costs, Gambro
managed to keep the Atchison clinic afloat during this period, although it suffered
a steep drop in profitability.
On or about October 9, 2003, Dwyer went on vacation, leaving the director
of the nearby St. Joseph clinic, Ruby Thompson, in charge. Three days later,
Campbell slipped and fell at her home, injuring her back and aggravating a
preexisting degenerative back ailment. The record establishes that Campbell did
not call or send a text message to Thompson prior to the start of her shift. Both
parties acknowledge that Gambro policy requires an employee to notify a superior
of her absence prior to the start of her shift.
On October 15 Campbell visited a doctor, who recommended she have
surgery on her back. Surgery was scheduled for N ovember 10, and Campbell
applied for FM LA leave, which was approved from October 13, 2003 through
January 5, 2004. Campbell’s leave was backdated to October 13, the first day she
was absent from work. The next day, after hearing about Campbell’s request for
FM LA leave, Dwyer sent Pedrick an email complaining that Campbell was
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unreliable and had disturbed her vacation on account of her absence. At this
point, Dwyer did not know about Campbell’s fall or the nature of her condition.
During Campbell’s absence a PCT from the St. Joseph clinic, Gaylene
Caples, was brought into the Atchison clinic to assume Campbell’s inventory
duties. Caples immediately discovered major problems with the clinic’s
inventory. M ost significantly, she discovered a $6,500 discrepancy between the
inventory listed in the PICS database and the items physically present on the
shelves. Gambro mandates that items used or delivered be entered into the
computer system on a weekly basis, and that employees perform a physical
inventory every month. Campbell does not dispute that she failed to properly
update the inventory system as required by Gambro policy.
At the same time, another Atchison employee, Cindy Keling, took over
Campbell’s unit secretary duties. Keling noticed that several thousand sheets of
old patient records were piled up in Campbell’s back office. This was also a
violation of Gambro policy, which requires that inactive files be sorted and stored
in file cabinets at the clinic or off-site. Keling spent approximately two months
sorting and processing these records. Campbell testified that the records were not
processed because Dwyer redirected her to other tasks.
On December 26, 2003, just before Campbell was scheduled to return from
FM LA leave, she sent Pedrick and Dwyer an email inquiring about the possibility
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of supplementing her hours at St. Joseph. Pedrick emphatically rejected this idea,
writing, “NOT a good option in my opinion.”
Campbell returned to w ork on January 5, 2004. She learned that her hours
had been reduced to 21 per week from 24, and that she had been stripped of her
unit secretary and inventory technician duties. It is undisputed that Jackson, the
senior PCT, had also had her hours cut back due to a lower patient count.
Campbell received the same hourly wage and benefits she had received before
taking FM LA leave.
During her first day back at work, Dwyer presented Campbell with a
“corrective action form,” stating that Campbell had violated G ambro’s procedure
for providing notice of her absence on O ctober 13, 2003. This was the first
disciplinary action to which Campbell had been subject. The form evidences
Dwyer’s annoyance that Campbell interrupted Dwyer’s vacation and closes as
follows: “It caused a serious situation in the unit due to the other PCT not having
any training with inventory and unit secretary duties. . . . This has caused serious
difficulties in the Atchison unit for getting everything back up to date following
the time span with no one taking care of the filing, etc.” Campbell refused to sign
the form, arguing that she had complied with policy by notifying Thompson of
her absence prior to the start of her shift.
Pedrick sent Campbell an email on January 9, 2004, informing her that
Gambro had decided it could only keep one PCT at the Atchison clinic, and that
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Campbell was being terminated “due to patient census and reimbursement
concerns.” Jackson was selected to remain “[b]ecause of recent performance
concerns” with Campbell. Specifically, the email cites Campbell’s failure to
perform her inventory technician duties and to properly notify Thompson of her
absence on October 13, 2003. Pedrick gave Campbell a choice: She could either
apply for a transfer to another Gambro clinic or resign voluntarily, in w hich case
she would receive six weeks’ severance pay and would be required to sign a
release from legal action. Campbell says she was under the impression that,
pursuant to Gambro policy, she was ineligible to transfer until six months had
elapsed from the corrective action. Gambro admits the existence of the policy,
but Pedrick testified that Gambro was making an exception for Campbell with
regard to the transfer and severance pay policies.
Campbell turned in her keys to Dwyer on January 14. Dwyer testified that
Campbell’s relinquishment of the keys signaled her resignation, and that
Campbell had asked for the six weeks’ severance pay, but refused to sign a
release. Campbell maintains that she never told Dwyer she wanted to accept the
severance pay and testified that she turned in her keys because her shift had been
changed and she did not want to be questioned about being on the premises during
off-hours. On January 14 Pedrick sent Dwyer an email instructing her to “start
the process of ending [Campbell’s] employment.” Two days later, Campbell
showed up for work for the final time, when Dwyer again offered her the option
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of taking severance pay or seeking a transfer to another Gambro clinic. Campbell
refused to sign any paperwork memorializing her termination and disputes
Dwyer’s characterization of their January 16 conversation.
Campbell subsequently filed suit against G ambro in federal district court in
Kansas, alleging that Gambro racially discriminated against her in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981, interfered with her right to take FM LA leave in violation of 29
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), and retaliated against her for taking FM LA leave in violation
of § 2615(a)(2). The district court granted summary judgment to Gambro on all
claims, from which order Campbell appeals.
II
Campbell appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Gambro only as to her interference and retaliation claims. W e review the district
court’s summary judgment decision de novo to determine whether a genuine issue
of material fact exists, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Campbell.
Garrett v. Hew lett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002).
A
Campbell asserts two alternate claims under the FM LA: (1) that Gambro
interfered with her right to take FM LA leave, in violation of 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615(a)(1); and (2) that, upon returning to work, Gambro retaliated against her
for taking FM LA leave, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). The two theories
require different showings and differ w ith respect to the burden of proof.
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To establish an interference claim, Campbell must show: “(1) that [s]he
was entitled to FM LA leave, (2) that some adverse action by the employer
interfered with h[er] right to take FM LA leave, and (3) that the employer’s action
was related to the exercise or attempted exercise of h[er] FM LA rights.” Jones v.
Denver Pub. Sch., 427 F.3d 1315, 1319 (10th Cir. 2005). To make out a prima
facie retaliation claim, Campbell must show that: “(1) she engaged in a protected
activity; (2) [Gambro] took an action that a reasonable employee would have
found materially adverse; and (3) there exists a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse action.” M etzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of
Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1171 (10th Cir. 2006). W e have characterized the
showing required to satisfy the third prong under a retaliation theory to be a
showing of bad intent or “retaliatory motive” on the part of the employer. Id. at
1171 (quotation omitted). Notably, we interpret retaliation claims under the
burden-shifting architecture of M cDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-04 (1973), whereas the employer bears the burden of proof on the third
element of an interference claim once the plaintiff has shown her FM LA leave
was interfered with. See M etzler, 464 F.3d at 1170. Due to this difference in
where the burden lies with respect to the third element of each theory, it is not
unusual for a plaintiff to pursue an interference theory while the defendant argues
that the evidence may only be analyzed under a retaliation theory.
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Beyond differences in the elements and burdens of proof, the two claims
differ with respect to the timing of the adverse action. In order to satisfy the
second element of an interference claim, the employee must show that she was
prevented from taking the full 12 weeks’ of leave guaranteed by the FM LA,
denied reinstatement following leave, or denied initial permission to take leave.
See, e.g., id. at 1181 (holding that second element is satisfied when “FHLB
interfered with [M etzler’s] right to take up to the twelve weeks to which she was
entitled under § 2612(a)(1) and denied her the right to be reinstated to her former
position or an equivalent one upon her return to full-time work”); 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.216(a)(1). In contrast, a retaliation claim may be brought when the
employee successfully took FM LA leave, was restored to her prior employment
status, and was adversely affected by an employment action based on incidents
post-dating her return to work. See, e.g., Doebele v. Sprint/U nited M gmt. Co.,
342 F.3d 1117, 1136-38 (10th Cir. 2003) (analyzing Doebele’s FM LA claim
under a retaliation theory when she was restored to her prior position, but soon
terminated for alleged attendance problems following her return).
The district court found an interference theory to be inappropriate on these
facts, finding instead that Campbell’s “claims are more properly analyzed as a
single retaliation claim – not as separate interference and retaliation claims.” W e
disagree. W hen, as is the situation before us, the employer cites only factors
predating the employee’s return to work to justify the adverse action, the plaintiff
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is not foreclosed from bringing an interference claim. To hold otherwise would
create a perverse incentive for employers to make the decision to terminate during
an employee’s FM LA leave, but allow the employee to return for a brief period
before terminating her so as to insulate the employer from an interference claim.
Although it vacillated on this point at oral argument, Gambro’s “final
explanation” of Campbell’s termination is limited to factors predating her return
to work. By fall of 2003, the declining patient census allowed for only one PCT
to continue employment; as between Jackson and Campbell, Gambro chose
Jackson due to her seniority and Campbell’s inadequate performance as unit
secretary and inventory technician. Pedrick, who was responsible for setting
staffing levels at the Atchison clinic, had concluded by the end of 2003 that the
clinic could only support one PCT. Although in August 2003 Pedrick chose to
allow the two PCTs to work reduced hours rather than to terminate either one, he
stated in his affidavit that by July 2003 “it was determined that it [might] be
necessary to lay off one of the PCTs, unless one of the PCTs w ould work part-
time at another clinic.” Tellingly, Pedrick did not increase Jackson’s hours to
compensate for Campbell’s absence, but instead reduced Jackson’s hours from 24
to 21.
Gambro does not argue that any new facts regarding staffing needs at the
Atchison clinic came to light during the period after Campbell returned to work.
Nor does it argue that its understanding of Campbell’s failures as unit secretary or
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inventory technician changed meaningfully between Campbell’s return to w ork
and her termination. Although the record shows that Pedrick and Dwyer offered
Campbell the opportunity to explain those problems after she returned, it would
be a synthetic view of the facts to interpret Gambro’s decision to terminate her as
motivated by the inadequacy of her explanations. Rather, it was the fact of her
poor performance as unit secretary and inventory technician, discovered in late
October 2003, that partly motivated Gambro to choose Jackson over Campbell as
the clinic’s sole PCT. Accordingly, Campbell’s termination was a foregone
conclusion by the time she returned to work, and her “restoration” to her prior
duties during the period of January 5-14, 2004 was illusory; on these facts,
Campbell has satisfied the second element of her interference claim, and may
proceed on that claim irrespective of whether she was, in fact, restored to her
prior duties.
B
W e now turn to the question of whether the district court properly denied
Campbell summary judgment on her FM LA claim under an interference theory.
As Campbell has satisfied the first two elements, we must determine w hether,
viewing the record in the light most favorable to Campbell, a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether “the employer’s action was related to the
exercise or attempted exercise of [Campbell’s] FM LA rights.” Jones, 427 F.3d at
1319. Once a plaintiff has proved that her employer has interfered with her right
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to take FM LA leave, the employer bears “the burden of proving that an employee,
laid off during FM LA leave, would have been dismissed regardless of the
employee’s request for, or taking of, FM LA leave.” Smith v. Diffee Ford-
Lincoln-M ercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 963 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing 29 C.F.R. §
825.216(a)(1)). However, we have held that “an employee who requests FM LA
leave would have no greater protection against his or her employment being
terminated for reasons not related to his or her FM LA request than he or she did
before submitting the request.” Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d
1253, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998).
Review ing the record as a whole, w e determine that Gambro has met its
burden on the third element, and that no genuine issue of material fact exists w ith
respect to its reasons for terminating Campbell. Ample undisputed evidence
points to Gambro’s difficulties maintaining the profitability of the Atchison clinic
as the patient census declined. Pedrick discussed the possibility of reducing
staffing with Dwyer, Jackson, and Campbell in A ugust 2003, well before
Campbell took leave. It is undisputed that the profitability pressures persisted
through the duration of Campbell’s leave. Nor does Campbell contest that she
was responsible for problems with inventory and patient records discovered
during her absence, except to say that she had a valid explanation for some of the
inventory problems.
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M ost of Campbell’s brief attacks the admittedly ham-handed manner in
which Gambro appears to have handled her termination. Although Pedrick told
Campbell he would seek to place her with another clinic, evidence suggests such
a placement may have been infeasible. In addition, he offered Campbell
severance pay without clearly explaining that this was an exception to G ambro’s
normal termination policy. Although Gambro might have handled her termination
in a different manner, such as by firing her soon after the unit secretary and
inventory technician problems w ere discovered, this fact is immaterial to
Campbell’s interference claim, because it does not establish a causal connection
between her termination and her FM LA leave.
Campbell cites to three pieces of evidence in the record that she argues
could be construed to tie her termination to her taking of FM LA leave: (1)
Dwyer’s email of O ctober 16, 2003, expressing frustration with Campbell’s
unexpected absence and complaining that it had interrupted her vacation, (2) the
corrective action form presented to Campbell on January 5, 2004, and (3)
Pedrick’s email to Campbell of January 9, 2004. Even viewing the record in the
light most favorable to her, we hold that no reasonable jury could, on the basis of
this evidence, find for Campbell. Nowhere does Pedrick’s email reference
Campbell’s FM LA leave – rather, it clearly implicates Campbell’s demonstrated
failure to notify Thompson of her absence on October 13, 2003.
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In contrast, although it is not the most evident reading of either, both the
Dwyer email and corrective action form can be read to (negatively) reference
Campbell’s FM LA leave. Dwyer’s email was sent after Pedrick had informed her
that Campbell “needs immediate medical leave through December,” and states: “I
can’t depend on some folks. Eunice has always thought she could take time off
but I couldn’t.” Although the corrective action form states that the “nature of the
problem” is “incorrect procedure for calling in for STD,” some of the body text
refers to longer-term difficulties associated with finding staff to fill in for
Campbell w hile she was on leave.
Nevertheless, even if we assume the email and corrective action form
support an inference of D wyer’s bad intent, there is no evidence in the record
demonstrating that Dwyer played a role in the termination decision. Rather, the
evidence shows that Pedrick was the decisionmaker, came to his own independent
conclusion with respect to the termination, and was not a “rubber stamp” for
Dwyer. See Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th
Cir. 2000) (holding, in the § 1981 discrimination context, that a subordinate’s bad
motive may only be imputed to the decisionmaker if evidence suggests the
decisionmaker w as a rubber stamp for the subordinate’s prejudice). M oreover,
the fact that Dwyer presented Campbell with the corrective action form, together
with other evidence in the record, shows that she did not anticipate Campbell’s
termination, much less agitate in favor of terminating her. Accordingly, Dwyer’s
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email and the corrective action form are insufficient to create a material dispute
of fact with respect to the third element of Campbell’s interference claim.
C
Campbell also challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Gambro on her retaliation claim. As discussed supra, the burden of proof for
retaliation claims differs from interference claims – the third element of a
retaliation claim is evaluated under the M cDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framew ork. M etzler, 464 F.3d at 1172. The parties concede that Campbell has
established a prima facie case of retaliation, and that Gambro has articulated a
nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. The burden thus shifts to Campbell
to “show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to w hether [G ambro’s]
reasons for terminating her are pretextual.” Id. Campbell may meet this burden
by demonstrating “such w eaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for
its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unw orthy of
credence.” M organ v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotation
omitted).
Campbell alleges that five pieces of evidence in the record collectively
establish that Gambro’s stated reasons for terminating her are pretextual: (1) the
close temporal proximity between her return from FM LA leave and her
termination; (2) a pattern of retaliatory employment actions following her return
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from leave, including Dwyer’s corrective action form, the removal of her
inventory technician and unit secretary duties, the reduction in her weekly hours,
and, finally, her termination; (3) her prior history of excellent evaluations and
Gambro’s failure to subject her to discipline prior to her taking leave; (4) the
issuance of a corrective action form after only one unscheduled absence; and (5)
the falsity of G ambro’s explanations for its actions.
Taking these in turn, we have never allowed “even very close temporal
proximity [taken alone] to operate as a proxy for the evidentiary requirement that
the plaintiff demonstrate pretext.” M etzler, 464 F.3d at 1172 (quotations omitted).
Rather, to show pretext Campbell “must . . . present evidence of temporal
proximity plus circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive.” Id. Campbell’s
argument with respect to alleged retaliatory employment actions could potentially
preclude summary judgment, see M arx v. Schnuck M arkets, Inc., 76 F.3d 324, 329
(10th Cir. 1996), but in this case the cited actions do not “giv[e] rise to an
inference of retaliatory animus.” M etzler, 464 F.3d at 1173. There is no evidence
that Campbell received the corrective action form or had her unit secretary and
inventory technician duties removed in retaliation for taking FM LA leave.
Instead, those actions were taken in response to her undisputed violations of
Gambro policy, which came to light while she was on leave, whereas the
termination itself was clearly motivated by the reasons discussed in analyzing
Campbell’s interference claim. Campbell’s reduction in hours cannot be termed
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retaliatory, because it is undisputed that Jackson, the clinic’s other PCT, also had
her hours cut back due to the reduced patient census. Campbell’s hourly wage and
benefits remained the same.
Evidence of discrepancies between an employer’s prior treatment of a
plaintiff and its treatment of her following her return from leave may be used to
demonstrate pretext. See Jaramillo v. Colo. Jud. Dept., 427 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th
Cir. 2005). Yet here, where Gambro’s decision to discipline Campbell was
informed by her demonstrated failures to abide by Gambro policy or adequately
perform her unit secretary and inventory technician duties, there is no ground for
deeming such discrepancies retaliatory. Fourth, Campbell argues that Gambro
misapplied its own policy in issuing her a corrective action form. An employer’s
failures to follow written or unwritten policy may support a showing of pretext,
particularly if other similarly-situated employees were treated differently. See
Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1232. W ith respect to the corrective action form, however,
its issuance was explicitly permitted by written Gambro policy, and it responded to
Campbell’s demonstrated violation of that policy. As such, it cannot be used to
show pretext. M oreover, there is no evidence in the record that Jackson or any
other similarly-situated employee was treated differently under similar
circumstances. Nor could Pedrick’s deviation from normal Gambro severance
policy be termed retaliatory – just the opposite, in fact, as it represented a partly
botched attempt to ameliorate Campbell’s termination. Finally, Campbell argues
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that the reasons Gambro cites in support of its disciplinary actions are not worthy
of credence, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), but this argument must fail for the
same reasons discussed above. Hence, a reasonable jury could not infer a
retaliatory motive therefrom. See M etzler, 464 F.3d at 1178.
In sum, the record in this case indicates that Campbell was fired due to the
declining patient census at the Atchison clinic, coupled with her poor performance
of her unit secretary and inventory technician duties. None of the evidence cited
by Campbell demonstrates that Gambro’s stated justifications for her termination
“are so weak, implausible, inconsistent, incoherent, or contradictory as to support
a reasonable inference that [Gambro] did not act for those reasons.” Id. at 1179.
Accordingly, we conclude that Campbell has failed to meet her burden to
demonstrate pretext.
III
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRM ED.
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Campbell v. Gambro Healthcare, Inc.
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2007-03-09
Citations: 478 F.3d 1282
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