F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 24 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-4065
(D.C. No. 93-CV-67-G)
TIM GIL DURON, BRIAN COY, (D. Utah)
individually, and in their capacity
as Logan City Police Officers;
SCOTT L. WYATT, in his capacity
as Logan City Prosecutor; JOHN AND
JANE DOE I through XX, designated
as unknown defendants,
Defendants,
and
LEM R. EARL, individually, and
in his capacity as a Logan City
Police Officer; KENT HARRIS,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , ANDERSON , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
I. Background
Plaintiff David Craig Carlsen, appearing pro se , appeals from a judgment
entered for the defendants-appellees, police officers in Logan City, Utah,
following a bench trial of his civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendant Kent Harris and another Logan City police officer, Bryan Low, who is
not a defendant, stopped Carlsen in his automobile at approximately 1:20 a.m. on
September 13, 1992, while he was driving through downtown Logan City toward
his home. Officers Harris and Low testified that Carlsen made a wide right hand
turn in violation of Utah Stat. § 41-6-66(1); was driving 20 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h.
speed zone; and tapped on his brakes twice to slow, even though there was no
stop sign or other reason to brake. The officers testified that these actions caused
them to suspect the driver was intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol.
Officers Harris and Low pulled Carlsen over. Officer Harris testified
Carlsen was smoking a cigarette and appeared tired or groggy. Carlsen produced
his drivers’ license and registration. Officer Harris asked him if he had been
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drinking. The officers testified that in response, Carlsen got angry, got out of his
vehicle and demanded he be given a breathalyser test. Officer Harris first
administered field sobriety tests, which Carlsen failed according to Officers
Harris and Low. Defendant Lem R. Earl, a supervising police officer, and two
other Logan City police officers were present as observers during portions of the
traffic stop.
At the conclusion of the field sobriety tests, Carlsen was handcuffed and
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. He was taken to the county
jail, and immediately given a breathalyser test. This test indicated he had a blood
alcohol level of zero percent. The officers released Carlsen from handcuffs;
drove him back to his vehicle; returned his drivers’ license and registration and
did not issue him any traffic or other citation.
At trial, Carlsen denied that he made a wide right turn, testified that he was
driving 25 to 30 m.p.h. and said he braked twice to slow on a slight decline in the
road. He denied that he volunteered or demanded to take a breathalyser test prior
to his arrest and denied that he failed any of the field sobriety tests. He testified
that he has complained in the past about Logan City police officers harassing him,
and that the Logan City Police Department is hostile toward his family.
The trial court, however, credited all of the police officers’ testimony, and
found that they had probable cause to stop Carlsen, to administer the field
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sobriety tests, and to arrest him for driving under the influence of alcohol. The
district court further found that Carlsen feigned intoxication in order to provoke
the defendants into arresting him. The district court ruled that the defendants did
not violate any of Carlsen’s constitutional rights.
On appeal, Carlsen contends that several of the district court’s factual
findings are not supported by the evidence; that the defendants lacked probable
cause to stop his vehicle; that the stop was an unconstitutional pretext stop; and
that his continued detention to perform field sobriety tests exceeded the original
scope of the traffic stop. He also challenges several pretrial rulings.
II. Analysis
A. The Traffic Stop and Arrest
We review de novo the district court’s determination of probable cause
and reasonable suspicion, see Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996),
while reviewing its underlying findings of historical fact for clear error.
See United States v. Barron-Cabrera , 119 F.3d 1454, 1457 (10th Cir. 1997).
To determine the reasonableness of an investigative vehicle stop, “we make a dual
inquiry, asking first ‘whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception,’
and second ‘whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place.’” United States v. Hunnicutt ,
135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 20
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(1968)). “[A]n investigative detention must ‘last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop.’” United States v. Patten , 183 F.3d 1190, 1193
(10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). It must be
temporary, and its scope “must be carefully tailored to its underlying
justification.” United States v. Gutierrez-Daniez , 131 F.3d 939, 942 (10th Cir.
1997)). “A variety of factors may contribute to the formation of an objectively
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.” Hunnicutt , 135 F.3d at 1349.
1. Credibility Determinations
Carlsen first asserts that several of the district court’s factual findings were
clearly erroneous, including its finding that he failed the field sobriety tests and
that he feigned intoxication in order to mislead the officers. We review the
district court’s findings of fact for clear error, giving “due regard . . . to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge [ ] the credibility of the witnesses.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). “A finding of fact is not clearly erroneous unless it is
without factual support in the record, or if the appellate court, after reviewing all
the evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.” Las Vegas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Far West Bank , 893 F.2d 1182,
1185 (10th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted). After thorough review of the record,
we conclude that the district court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous.
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2. The Initial Stop
Because the trial court credited Officers Harris’ and Low’s testimony that
they observed Carlsen make an improper, wide right turn, in violation of a Utah
traffic law, the initial stop of Carlsen’s car was reasonable and supported by
probable cause. See Hunnicutt , 135 F.3d at 1348. Moreover, Carlsen’s lane
violation, slow driving and braking provided Officer Harris with reasonable
suspicion that he was driving while under the influence of alcohol, also
a violation of Utah law.
Our cases make clear that the government need not show a violation
actually occurred to justify an initial traffic stop. An initial traffic
stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment not only if based on an
observed traffic violation, but also if the officer has a reasonable
articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has
occurred or is occurring.
Id.
Because Officer Harris observed the lane violation and had reasonable
articulable suspicion that Carlsen might be driving impaired, he was justified
in questioning Carlsen and detaining him to determine whether he had been
drinking.
Carlsen argues Officer Harris lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle
because he was never actually given a traffic ticket for the wide turn violation.
The officers’ observation of Carlsen’s traffic violation was, however, sufficient
grounds to stop his vehicle, even though they did not ultimately issue Carlsen
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a ticket for the violation. See United States v. Dhinsa , 171 F.3d 721, 725-26
(2d Cir. 1998) (observation of traffic violation justifies stop even though the
observation did not motivate the stop and no traffic summons was issued);
see also Hunnicutt , 135 F.3d at 1348 (noting that the government need not show
a violation actually occurred).
Carlsen also cites to Sandy City v. Thorsness , 778 P.2d 1011, 1012-13
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), which held that driving on the inside lane, at 20 m.p.h. in
a 40 m.p.h. speed zone at 1:30 a.m. does not constitute reasonable suspicion to
believe the driver is under the influence of alcohol. Unlike the facts in Sandy
City , Officer Harris did observe a traffic violation, which provided an
independent and adequate basis to stop Carlsen.
3. Pretext
Carlsen claims that the stop was an unconstitutional pretext stop. However,
Officer Harris did have reasonable, articulable suspicion that a traffic violation
had occurred. “It is irrelevant that the officer may have had other subjective
motives for stopping the vehicle.” Hunnicutt , 135 F.3d at 1348. “[T]he
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops [does not] depend[ ] on the actual
motivations of the individual officers involved.” Whren v. United States ,
517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
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4. Field Sobriety Tests
Carlsen contends that Officer Harris violated his Fourth Amendment rights
by detaining him beyond the scope of the initial stop by requiring him to submit
to field sobriety tests. However, Officer Harris’ initial stop was based in part
upon his reasonable suspicion that Carlsen was driving under the influence of
alcohol. Thus, the officer was justified in detaining Carlsen in order to ascertain
whether he was impaired. Carlsen’s angry response to Officer Harris’
questioning, coupled with his earlier traffic violation, slow driving and braking,
did provide the requisite level of suspicion for Officer Harris to conduct field
sobriety tests. See Rogala v. District of Columbia , 161 F.3d 44, 52 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (holding that only reasonable suspicion is required to conduct a field
sobriety test because it is such a minimal intrusion on the driver); see Hunnicutt ,
135 F.3d at 1348 (weaving across traffic lanes provided reasonable suspicion that
defendant had violated statutes governing proper use of lanes or was driving
under the influence of alcohol, to support traffic stop).
5. Probable Cause to Arrest
Carlsen argues that the police officers lacked probable cause to arrest him
for driving under the influence of alcohol. In determining whether probable
cause exists to make an arrest, the court examines whether the totality of the
circumstances would lead a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been
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committed. See United States v. Vazquez-Pulido , 155 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.
1998). Carlsen notes that he did not smell of alcohol, did not slur his speech or
otherwise behave intoxicated and denied that he had been drinking. Carlsen also
challenges the admissibility and reliability of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagamus
(HGN) field sobriety test and the reliability of the nine-step walk sobriety test.
Carlsen did not challenge the admissibility of the HGN before the district
court, nor do we find that the district court committed clear error in admitting
evidence of this test. “The trial judge has broad discretion . . . to determine
reliability [of evidence] in light of the particular facts and circumstances of the
particular case.” United States v. Charley , 189 F.3d 1251, 1266 (10th Cir. 1999)
(quotation omitted), cert. denied , 120 S. Ct. 842 (2000). The district court heard
evidence concerning the administration of all of the field sobriety tests, and did
not conclude that any of the tests were unreliable.
Although Carlsen denied that he had been drinking and the police did not
detect any odor of alcohol, the district court did make the factual findings that he
did make an improper lane change, drive in an unusual manner, become angry
with the police, and fail the field sobriety tests. We conclude the totality of these
circumstances was sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest Carlsen for
driving under the influence. See United States v. Barry , 98 F.3d 373, 377
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(8th Cir. 1996) (finding probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the
influence due to his erratic driving and failure to pass field sobriety tests).
B. Jury Trial
Carlsen next contends the district court erred in denying his Fed. R. Civ. P.
39(b) motion for a jury trial. Rule 39(b) permits the district court, in its
discretion, to order a jury trial notwithstanding the moving party’s failure to make
a timely jury demand. A district court does not abuse its discretion by denying
a Rule 39(b) motion when the “failure to make a timely jury demand results from
nothing more than the mere inadvertence of the moving party.” Nissan Motor
Corp. v. Burciaga , 982 F.2d 408, 409 (10th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Here,
Carlsen offered no excuse or explanation for his untimely request for a jury trial,
nor did he make any attempt to demonstrate that his untimely jury demand was
due to anything other than inadvertence or oversight. Accordingly, the district
court’s denial of the Rule 39(b) motion was not an abuse of discretion.
C. Recusal
Carlsen contends the district court prejudged the issues and facts and,
therefore, erred in not sua sponte disqualifying himself from presiding over this
case under 28 U.S.C. § 455. Section 455(a) provides that a federal judge must
recuse himself in any proceeding where “his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned,” even in the absence of a motion. Carlsen’s allegations are primarily
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based on the district court’s prior grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendants. Prior adverse rulings alone do not constitute grounds for
disqualification. See Green v. Branson , 108 F.3d 1296, 1305 (10th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Cooley , 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993). The judge’s comments
during the summary judgment proceedings and other pretrial proceedings do not
“display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible,” and, therefore, do not rise to the level of possible disqualification.
Liteky v. United States , 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); see also United States v.
Young , 45 F.3d 1405, 1415 (10th Cir. 1995).
D. Motion to Amend Complaint
Carlsen contends the district court erred in denying his motion seeking to
substitute Officer Low as a named defendant in place of the name “John Doe I.”
This motion was filed on the eve of trial, six years after Carlsen initiated this
lawsuit. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying this motion
because the record indicates that Carlsen was aware of Officer Low’s identity as
one of his arresting officers at least as long ago as September 1994, and Carlsen
did not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah
is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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