MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Mar 14 2018, 9:53 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as CLERK
precedent or cited before any court except for the Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Bruce W. Graham Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Graham Law Firm, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana
Laura R. Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Carlvion Dupree Gates, March 14, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
79A02-1703-CR-593
v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe
Superior Court.
The Honorable Randy J. Williams,
State of Indiana, Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No.
79D01-1510-F3-15
Friedlander, Senior Judge
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[1] Carlvion Dupree Gates appeals his convictions of one count of robbery, a Level
1
5 felony; one count of possession of a narcotic drug (Oxycodone) as a Level 3
2
felony; two counts of possession of a narcotic drug (Nucynta and Morphine,
respectively) as Level 4 felonies; one count of possession of a narcotic drug
(Oxymorphone) as a Level 5 felony; two counts of possession of a narcotic drug
(Fentanyl and Methadone, respectively) as Level 6 felonies; and resisting law
3
enforcement by means of a vehicle, a Level 6 felony. We affirm.
[2] In the early morning hours of September 9, 2015, Gates drove Meggan Parker
and Ashley West from Indianapolis to West Lafayette, Indiana. Ashley’s ex-
boyfriend, Jared Cunningham, traveled to West Lafayette at the same time but
in a separate vehicle with another man who is not identified in the record. The
group had discussed robbing a pharmacy in West Lafayette.
[3] Cunningham entered the pharmacy while the others waited outside. He
approached the pharmacy desk and ordered an employee to give him
Oxycodone pills. Cunningham next went behind the desk and ordered the
pharmacist, Kathy Smith, to open the safe where controlled substances were
stored. She complied, and he instructed her to help him empty the contents of
the safe, which included many bottles of different medications, into a large
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (2014).
2
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6 (2014).
3
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1 (2014).
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trash bag. Cunningham also placed several boxes of syringes in the bag before
fleeing the store.
[4] Next, Cunningham approached Gates’ car. Gates took the bag of stolen
medications from Cunningham and put it in the trunk. Cunningham left with
the unidentified man. Meanwhile, Gates, Parker, and West also left West
Lafayette, driving toward Indianapolis. The police located them on an
interstate highway and tried to stop them, but Gates fled. A high-speed chase
ensued, during which Gates drove as fast as ninety miles an hour while weaving
through traffic. West repeatedly asked Gates to stop, but he refused.
[5] During the chase, Parker retrieved the bag of stolen medications from the trunk
through a hatch behind the back seat. She opened some of the bottles and
looked inside, indicating that the pharmacy may have hidden a tracking device
in one of them. Parker and West also consumed Methadone, which was
among the medications Cunningham had stolen.
[6] Eventually, officers used stop sticks to disable the tires on Gates’ car and end
the chase. The officers arrested Gates, Parker, and West, and impounded the
car. During a subsequent search of the car, officers found a variety of
controlled substances in the trunk and in the glove box. The officers
determined those items came from the pharmacy, which later reported that the
stolen controlled substances were valued at $32,325. Cunningham was
apprehended several weeks later.
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[7] The State charged Gates with the offenses set forth above, plus conspiracy to
commit robbery and possession of paraphernalia. Gates was tried by jury, and
West testified for the State. The jury convicted Gates of all charges except
conspiracy to commit robbery and possession of paraphernalia. The trial court
imposed a sentence, and this appeal followed.
[8] Gates raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as:
1. Whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct that
amounted to fundamental error while presenting closing
arguments.
2. Whether Gates’ multiple convictions for possession of a
narcotic drug violate his Indiana constitutional protection
against double jeopardy.
1. Closing Arguments
[9] Gates argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing arguments
by: (1) commenting on Gates’ choice not to testify; (2) commenting on Gates’
choice not to present any evidence; and (3) vouching for his own credibility and
for West.
[10] We evaluate a properly preserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct using a
two-step analysis, considering (1) whether the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct, and if so, (2) whether the misconduct, under the circumstances,
placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he or she otherwise
would not have been subjected. Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831 (Ind. 2006). A
prosecutor has the duty to present a persuasive final argument and thus placing
a defendant in grave peril, by itself, is not misconduct. Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d
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663 (Ind. 2016). The gravity of peril is measured by the probable persuasive
effect of the misconduct on the jury’s decision rather than the degree of
impropriety of the conduct. Cooper, 854 N.E.2d 831. One relevant factor is
whether the alleged misconduct was repeated such that it appears that the
prosecutor engaged in a deliberate attempt to improperly prejudice the
defendant. Watkins v. State, 766 N.E.2d 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.
[11] To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must request an
admonishment of the jury at the time the misconduct occurs, and if further
relief is desired, move for a mistrial. Ryan, 9 N.E.3d 663. Gates did not request
an admonishment or mistrial at any point during the prosecutor’s closing
arguments, and as a result he has procedurally defaulted his claims.
[12] A defendant may present procedurally defaulted claims of prosecutorial
misconduct on appeal, but in that circumstance the defendant must establish
not only that misconduct occurred but also that the misconduct amounted to
fundamental error. Id. The doctrine of fundamental error is an extremely
narrow exception to the waiver rule. Id. Error is fundamental when it
represents a “blatant violation of basic principles.” Ortiz v. State, 766 N.E.2d
370, 375 (Ind. 2002). Stated differently, a fundamental error is error that is so
prejudicial to the defendant’s due process rights as to make a fair trial
impossible. Id.
[13] The doctrine of fundamental error is meant to permit appellate courts a means
to correct the “most egregious and blatant trial errors that otherwise would have
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been procedurally barred,” not to provide a second bite at the apple for defense
counsel who ignorantly, carelessly, or strategically fail to preserve an error.
Ryan, 9 N.E.3d at 668. Our task here is to look at the alleged misconduct in the
context of all that happened and all relevant information given to the jury-
including evidence admitted at trial, closing argument, and jury instructions-to
determine whether the alleged misconduct had such an unfairly prejudicial
effect on the jury’s decision that a fair trial was impossible. Id.
[14] We start with Gates’ claim that the prosecutor improperly commented on his
choice not to testify. The Fifth Amendment to the United State Constitution
and article 1, section 14 of the Indiana Constitution protect a defendant’s right
to remain silent at trial. Boatright v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1038 (Ind. 2001). A
prosecutor may not make a statement that the jury may reasonably interpret as
an invitation to draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s silence. Id.
(quotation omitted). If the prosecutor’s comment is addressed in its totality to
other evidence rather than the defendant’s failure to testify, the comment is not
grounds for reversal. Id.
[15] During Gates’ closing argument, he noted that Cunningham did not testify and
argued the prosecutor “was going to show us all this stuff [Cunningham] was
going to say; you heard the list of witnesses, where were they?” Tr. Vol. 2, p.
176. Gates later asked the jury to consider “Where was Cunningham? Where’s
the star witness?” Id. at 177. During the State’s rebuttal argument, the
following exchange occurred:
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[Prosecutor]: Another mis-direct [sic] where is Jared
Cunningham. Here’s the thing folks, I don’t want a witness. Mr.
McCoy has every right to call the defendant as I do. And you
heard from Detective Townsend’s testimony, how would you
describe your dealings with Mr. Cunningham? Not cooperative
and hostile. There you go. So, Mr. McCoy where is Jared
Cunningham?
[Gates]: Objection Judge.
[The Court]: Sustained.
[Prosecutor]: It’s a mis-direct [sic]. Why do I need to bring in
the guy that robbed the place when that’s not an issue in this
case?
Id. at 188.
[16] The prosecutor apparently misspoke, referring to “the defendant” during a
discussion of Cunningham’s testimony. We cannot conclude this isolated
reference amounted to misconduct, let alone fundamental error. Gates had
raised the absence of Cunningham’s testimony, and the prosecutor’s comments
in their totality were addressed to Cunningham’s absence rather than Gates’
choice not to testify. The misstatement did not amount to misconduct and was
not so prejudicial as to render a fair trial impossible.
[17] Gates further argues the State improperly attempted to shift the burden of proof
to him by telling the jury that he did not call Cunningham to testify. We
disagree. Prosecutors are permitted to respond to allegations and inferences
raised by the defense even if the prosecutor’s response would otherwise be
objectionable. Dumas v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1113 (Ind. 2004). Gates repeatedly
pointed out to the jury during his closing argument that Cunningham had not
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testified and argued that his absence showed weakness in the State’s case. The
prosecutor was entitled to remind the jury on rebuttal that a police officer had
determined Cunningham was hostile and uncooperative. Further, the trial
court instructed the jury that during preliminary and closing instructions that
Gates was “not required to present any evidence to prove his innocence or to
prove or explain anything.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 79, 102. Any harm
by the prosecutor’s comments did not rise to the level of fundamental error. See
Chubb v. State, 640 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. 1994) (prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s
failure to call witnesses was de minimus impropriety, at best, and was cured by
jury instructions).
[18] Next, Gates claims the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by vouching for his
own credibility and by vouching for State’s witness Ashley West. Prosecutors
must avoid describing themselves to the jury as having higher ethical
responsibilities than defense counsel, because “such comments might
improperly sway a jury in favor of conviction.” Coy v. State, 720 N.E.2d 370,
373 (Ind. 1999). In addition, a prosecutor may not personally vouch for a
witness. Ryan, 9 N.E.3d 663. Instead, he or she may comment on a witness’s
credibility if the comments are based on reasons that arise from the evidence.
Id. (quotation omitted).
[19] During Gates’ closing argument, he implied the State prosecuted him with
dishonorable motives, characterizing the State’s case as “a shell game” and
claiming the State pursued a case against him despite “a lack of evidence” “just
because [the prosecutor and police] want him convicted.” Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 183-
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84. Gates further attacked West’s credibility, accusing her of changing her story
and testifying pursuant to a plea agreement to a “version of the story” the police
wanted her to tell. Id. at 181.
[20] On rebuttal, the prosecutor presented the following argument as to the State’s
motives and West’s truthfulness:
Now, [West] literally has no reason to lie. She is serving her
time. For someone that didn’t go actually into the CVS and
someone who wasn’t driving the car, she got hit pretty hard.
This is not - how is this a self-serving statement? She pled guilty
...
****
Self serving statement. That’s not a self serving statement, she’s
in the DOC. She got hit hard. There is no reason to doubt her
credibility. Not to mention her phone, the lack of evidence on it
coooberates [sic] what she said. All the places they stopped
coooberates [sic] with what she says. It just makes sense. And
here’s the thing he wants to say that we got what we wanted
here, that’s not my job. My job is very different from [defense
counsel’s], my job is [to] search the truth. If I think someone is
not guilty of a crime, I can’t charge ‘em, I have to dismiss it
based upon the evidence. I didn’t ask Ashley to give up Carlvion
Gates, her plea agreement said tell the truth and that’s what she
did. Ladies and gentlemen I’d love to get, you know, go a little
further with this, but I think you get the picture. I think we’ve
picked this apart pretty well. Look at the facts and don’t listen to
the bluster. Look at the facts and find Carlvion Gates guilty as
charged in all counts. Thank you.
Id. at 193-94.
[21] The prosecutor made these remarks in rebuttal to Gates’ attacks on the State’s
motive for prosecuting him and on West’s credibility. The prosecutor did not
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denigrate Gates’ attorney but rather explained that he can pursue only those
cases that are supported by the evidence. In addition, the prosecutor’s
comments on West’s credibility were based on the evidence. He encouraged
the jury to conclude she was being truthful based on the evidence, not merely
on the prosecutor’s opinion. Even if the prosecutor’s statements as to
credibility were inappropriate, none of them rose to the level of fundamental
error. See Brown v. State, 746 N.E.2d 63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (prosecutor did
not engage in misconduct during closing argument; the prosecutor’s remarks
were made in response to the defendant’s allegation of prosecutorial
misconduct).
[22] Finally, Gates argues that even if each of the prosecutor’s statements do not
require reversal of the verdict, then all the statements, taken together, amount to
fundamentally erroneous prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree. The
statements that Gates challenges were raised on rebuttal, after Gates had
questioned the State’s motives in bringing the case, the absence of testimony by
Cunningham, and West’s credibility. In addition, the trial court’s preliminary
and final jury instructions informed the jury how to assess witness credibility
and reminded the jury Gates was not obligated to present any evidence.
[23] Finally, the evidence against Gates was substantial. He did not dispute fleeing
from the police, and large quantities of controlled substances were found in the
glove box and trunk of the car he was driving. We conclude that the
prosecutor’s statements did not amount to misconduct and were not so unfairly
prejudicial as to render a fair trial impossible. See Ryan, 9 N.E.3d 663
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(defendant’s claim of cumulative error in jury arguments was without merit; the
jury instructions and evidence, taken as a whole, overcame the prosecutor’s
misconduct and there was no fundamental error).
2. Double Jeopardy
[24] The jury determined Gates was guilty of six counts of possession of a narcotic
drug. He claims these convictions violate the Indiana Constitution’s ban on
double jeopardy because he only committed one act of possession. Gates does
not raise a claim under the federal Double Jeopardy Clause.
[25] Article 1, section 14 of the Indiana Constitution provides, in relevant part, “No
person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” Whether a
conviction violates the prohibition against double jeopardy is an issue of
statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Taylor v. State, 929 N.E.2d
912 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. The Indiana Supreme Court has
explained that two or more convictions violate section 14 “if, with respect to
either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence
used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish
the essential elements of another challenged offense.” Richardson v. State, 717
N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999).
[26] We start with the “statutory elements” test. Id. at 50. As our Supreme Court
has explained:
The objective of this test is to determine whether the essential
elements of separate statutory crimes charged could be
established hypothetically. In this test, the charged offenses are
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identified by comparing the essential statutory elements of one
charged offense with the essential statutory elements of the other
charged offense. Inspecting the relevant statutes and the
charging instrument to identify those elements which must be
established to convict under the statute, this review considers the
essential statutory elements to determine the identity of the
offense charged, but does not evaluate the manner or means by
which the offenses are alleged to have been committed, unless
the manner or means comprise an essential element. Once the
essential elements of each charged offense have been identified,
the reviewing court must determine whether the elements of one
of the challenged offenses could, hypothetically, be established by
evidence that does not also establish the essential elements of the
other charged offense.
Id. at 50 (footnotes omitted).
[27] The statute that defines the offense of possession of a narcotic drug provides:
(a) A person who, without a valid prescription or order of a
practitioner acting in the course of the practitioner’s professional
practice, knowingly or intentionally possesses cocaine (pure or
adulterated) or a narcotic drug (pure or adulterated) classified in
schedule I or II, commits possession of cocaine or a narcotic
drug, a Level 6 felony, except as provided in subsections (b)
through (d).
(b) The offense is a Level 5 felony if:
(1) the amount of the drug involved is at least five (5) but less
than ten (10) grams; or
(2) the amount of the drug involved is less than five (5) grams
and an enhancing circumstance applies.
(c) The offense is a Level 4 felony if:
(1) the amount of the drug involved is at least ten (10) but less
than twenty-eight (28) grams; or
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(2) the amount of the drug involved is at least five (5) but less
than ten (10) grams and an enhancing circumstance applies.
(d) The offense is a Level 3 felony if:
(1) the amount of the drug involved is at least twenty-eight (28)
grams; or
(2) the amount of the drug involved is at least ten (10) but less
than twenty-eight (28) grams and an enhancing circumstance
applies.
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6 (2014).
[28] In the current case, all six of Gates’ convictions for possession of a narcotic
drug necessarily arise from the same statute. When the statute is examined in
conjunction with the charging information, the essential elements for each
offense are different because the offenses, as charged, address possession of
different narcotics in varying weights:
Charge Controlled Substance Amount
IV – Level 3 felony Oxycodone 28 or more grams
V – Level 4 felony Tapentadol a/k/a at least 10 but less than
Nucynta 28 grams
VI – Level 4 felony Morphine at least 10 but less than
28 grams
VII – Level 5 felony
4
Oxymorphone at least 5 but less than
10 grams
4
The charging information listed this offense as a Level 4 felony, but the amount of narcotic alleged indicates
that it was a Level 5 felony. The trial court instructed the jury to consider the offense as a Level 5 felony and
entered a judgment of conviction for this offense as a Level 5 felony.
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VIII – Level 6 felony Fentanyl not stated (pursuant to
statute, must be less
than 5 grams)
IX – Level 6 felony Methadone not stated (pursuant to
statute, must be less
than 5 grams)
Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 28-39.
[29] Pursuant to the governing statute and the charging information, the essential
elements of each of the offenses could not, hypothetically, be established by
evidence that also establishes the essential elements of the other charged
offenses. We conclude Gates’ convictions for possession of a narcotic drug do
not violate the statutory elements test.
[30] Next, we turn to the “same evidence” test. Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 53. As
our Supreme Court has explained:
Even if the first consideration, the statutory elements test, does
not disclose a double jeopardy violation, the actual evidence test
may. Under this inquiry, the actual evidence presented at trial is
examined to determine whether each challenged offense was
established by separate and distinct facts. To show that two
challenged offenses constitute the ‘same offense’ in a claim of
double jeopardy, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable
possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to
establish the essential elements of one offense may also have
been used to establish the essential elements of a second
challenged offense.
Id.
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[31] Here, the State presented evidence to support each of the six counts of
possession of a narcotic drug. Officer Aaron Thompson of the West Lafayette
Police Department searched Gates’ car at the police department, taking photos
as he worked. The jury heard his testimony and saw his photographs. The
photos show bottles of Oxycodone and Methadone, as well as Fentanyl
patches, among many other bottles and loose pills in the trunk and the glove
box. The jury also received Thompson’s written report, in which he identified
the bottles and boxes of controlled substances by their labels, including
Fentanyl, Oxycodone, Morphine, and Methadone.
[32] The State also presented to the jury a detailed theft report from the pharmacy,
which listed the stolen controlled substances by name and amount, including
Oxycodone, Nucynta, Morphine, Oxymorphone, Fentanyl, and Methadone.
Finally, Forensic Drug Chemist Kristen B. Sturgeon from the Indiana State
Police Lab testified about her examination of loose pills the police found in
Gates’ car. She identified one pill of Morphine, one pill of Oxycodone mixed
with Acetaminophen, two pills of Oxycodone, and two pills of Methadone.
[33] Thus, the State presented detailed evidence as to each of the controlled
substances that supported each of the charges of possession of a controlled
substance. The jury was instructed which controlled substance supported
which charge. We conclude Gates has failed to show a reasonable possibility
that the same facts used to support one offense could have been used to support
other offenses. See Walton v. State, 81 N.E.3d 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (two
convictions of possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon did not violate
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the same evidence test; each conviction was based on a different firearm
possessed by defendant); cf. Bookwalter v. State, 22 N.E.3d 735 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014) (convictions for dealing in narcotic drug and possession of narcotic drug
violated same evidence test because the same quantity of the same drug (heroin)
was cited to support both convictions), trans. denied.
[34] Gates cites three cases, Duncan v. State, 274 Ind. 457, 412 N.E.2d 770 (1980),
Martin v. State, 176 Ind. App. 99, 374 N.E.2d 543 (1978), and Bates v. State, 178
Ind. App. 153, 381 N.E.2d 552 (1978), in support of his claim that possessing
multiple types of controlled substances simultaneously must be considered as
only one offense of possession of a controlled substance. We conclude those
cases are distinguishable because they predate the Indiana Supreme Court’s
analysis set forth in Richardson v. State. Further, none of the three cases
addresses Indiana’s constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy.
[35] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[36] Judgment affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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