Carter v. Meadowgreen Associates

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J.

CHEV R. CARTER OPINION BY
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL
v. Record No. 032208 June 10, 2004

MEADOWGREEN ASSOCIATES,
TRADING AS COVENTRY GARDENS
APARTMENTS

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
George F. Tidey, Judge

This appeal turns on the question whether a tenant's

family member, residing in leased property with the consent of

the landlord, succeeds to the tenant's rights upon the death

of the tenant.

The material facts are undisputed. In 1997, Meadowgreen

Associates owned and operated a rental apartment complex in

Henrico County subject to a "Housing Assistance Payments

Contract" between Meadowgreen and the federal Department of

Housing and Urban Development (HUD) pursuant to the federal

"Section 8 housing program," 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437 through 1437z-7

(2000 & Supp. I 2003). The contract provided that apartments

be leased by Meadowgreen directly to tenants on a HUD-approved

form of lease. HUD would then subsidize the rent by paying

Meadowgreen that portion of the contract rent in excess of the

amount the tenant was able to pay, subject to certain

limitations.
 Meadowgreen leased a three-bedroom apartment to Martha

Carter for a one-year term beginning in November, 1997. The

lease provided that it would become a month-to-month lease at

the expiration of the original term, but that Meadowgreen

could not terminate the lease except under specific

circumstances, not pertinent here, or for "other good cause."

The lease further provided that termination for "other good

cause" could only be effective at the "end of any initial or

successive term."

After the expiration of the initial term, Martha Carter

continued to live in the apartment as a month-to-month tenant.

Although she was the sole tenant, her son, Chev R. Carter, who

was 17 years old in 1997, lived there with her and was named

in the lease as one of the tenant's household, along with a

daughter then 14 years old. Martha Carter died on November

30, 2002. The lease was silent as to the effect of a tenant's

death.

Chev Carter reported his mother's death to Meadowgreen on

December 2, 2002. On the same day, Meadowgreen mailed to and

posted on the front door of the apartment a notice addressed

to "Martha Carter (deceased)" stating in part: "Due to the

death of Martha Carter her lease will end on December 31,

2002." Chev Carter, who was then the sole occupant of the

apartment, told Meadowgreen's manager that he would like to

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remain. He was informed that he did not qualify for a three-

bedroom apartment by himself, but that he might apply for a

smaller unit. He filled out an application but Meadowgreen

denied it because of Carter's poor credit reports.

Martha Carter had paid her portion of the rent through

November 2002, but no rent was received from anyone on the

tenant's behalf for the seven months from December 2002

through June 2003. Meadowgreen continued to list Martha

Carter as the tenant during that period and continued to

collect HUD's subsidy for the federal share of her rent.

On January 31, 2003, Meadowgreen filed an unlawful

detainer proceeding in the general district court against

Chev R. Carter. On February 14, 2003, the court entered

judgment for possession. Carter appealed to the circuit

court, where the case was tried to a jury, resulting in a

verdict for Meadowgreen. The court entered judgment on the

verdict, granting Meadowgreen possession, costs, and seven

months accrued rent amounting to $2,105.00, to be paid out of

the bond posted to perfect Carter's appeal from the general

district court.1 We awarded Carter an appeal.

1
The evidence at trial was that Carter remained in
possession of the apartment, but that during his mother's
lifetime he was there "rarely" and that "he comes and goes."

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 Carter contends that he succeeded to his mother's rights

under the lease upon her death, becoming a month-to-month

tenant; that the notice given by the landlord was defective

because it gave him 29 days notice instead of the 30 days

required by the lease; that the notice failed to inform him of

certain rights granted to a tenant under the lease; that the

landlord had waived the right to terminate the lease by

accepting subsidy payments from HUD after Martha Carter's

death and failing to notify HUD of her death; and that the

trial court erred in applying part of his appeal bond to rent

and court costs.

Carter argues that federal law entitles him to succeed to

his mother's rights under the lease. He bases this contention

upon the "Declaration of policy" and the definition of

"families" contained in Subchapter I of Title 42, U.S.C.:

It is the policy of the United States −

(1) to promote the general welfare of the Nation by
employing the funds and credit of the Nation, as
provided in this Act −

(A) to assist States and political subdivisions of
States to remedy the unsafe housing conditions and
the acute shortage of decent and safe dwellings for
low-income families;

(B) to assist States and political subdivisions of
States to address the shortage of housing affordable
to low-income families. . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1437(a) (2000); and

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 When used in this chapter:

. . . .

(3) . . .

(A) SINGLE PERSONS. The term "families" includes
families consisting of a single person in the case
of . . . (iv) the remaining member of a tenant
family. . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(3)(A)(iv) (2000).

Carter contends that, regardless of any state or common

law to the contrary, the foregoing provisions result in the

succession of a "remaining member of a tenant family" to the

rights of a deceased tenant in "Section 8 housing." We do not

agree.

Congress included many provisions in the statutes

governing "Section 8 housing" to regulate landlord-tenant

relationships, but made no express provision for the

devolution of a tenant's leasehold interest upon the tenant's

death. The "Declaration of policy" quoted above sets forth

the constitutional foundation for the decision by Congress to

"employ[] the funds and credit of the Nation . . . to assist

States" for the purposes enumerated. The definition of

"families" sets forth the classes of persons intended to be

benefited by the statutory scheme. Congress did not, however,

undertake a total re-writing of state landlord-tenant law as

it may apply to "Section 8 housing." We may assume that where

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the federal law is silent, the intent of Congress was to leave

the applicable state law undisturbed.2

In Virginia, the death of a tenant for a fixed term does

not terminate a lease in effect at the time of death. The

deceased tenant's interest passes to her estate, and her

personal representative becomes liable for the rent until the

end of the term. Hutchings v. Commercial Bank, 91 Va. 68, 77,

20 S.E. 950, 953 (1895). Therefore, Chev Carter did not

succeed to his mother's rights under the lease and was not

entitled to the notice provisions that the lease afforded to a

tenant. He made no showing of authority to hold the premises

as a subtenant under his mother's estate. Because he

unlawfully detained possession of the apartment for the seven-

month period from December, 2002 through June, 2003, the trial

court correctly applied his appeal bond to the resulting

damages sustained by the landlord. Accordingly, we will

affirm the judgment.

Affirmed.

2
See generally Ayers v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 908
F.2d 1184, 1189 (3rd Cir. 1990) (preemption of state law
occurs in one of three ways: When Congress explicitly states
that it is doing so, when Congress uses language indicating
its intention to completely occupy a field, or when Congress
enacts a law in actual conflict with state law).

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