Legal Research AI

Chamberlain v. Evans

Court: Montana Supreme Court
Date filed: 1979-03-05
Citations: 591 P.2d 237, 180 Mont. 511
Copy Citations
6 Citing Cases
Combined Opinion
                              NO. 14452
             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

                                  1979


CARL B. CHAMBERLAIN and HERTHA A.
CHAMBERLAIN, husband and wife,
                           Plaintiffs and Appellants,


L. E. EVANS et al.,
                           Defendants and Respondents.


Appeal from:       ~istrict Cburt of the Eighth ~udicialDistrict,
                   Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
    For Appellants:
         Stacey and Nye, Billings, Montana
         Jerrold L. Nye argued, Billings, Montana
    For Respondents:
         Swanberg, Koby, Swanberg and Matteucci, Great Falls,
          Montana
         Raymond F. Koby, Jr. argued, Great Falls, Montana


                                Submitted:   February 6, 1979


Filed:
         ;     -    1~33
Mr.    J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .



        T h i s a c t i o n c o n c e r n s a farm l e a s e f i l e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t o f t h e E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County o f Cascade.

Motions and b r i e f s w e r e s u b m i t t e d by b o t h p a r t i e s f o r sum-

mary judgment, and on J u n e 2 3 , 1978, summary judgment was

granted t o t h e defendants.                P l a i n t i f f s appeal.

        I n A p r i l 1971, p l a i n t i f f Chamberlain l e a s e d from
d e f e n d a n t s L.E.    and J o s e p h i n e Evans (Evans) 2 3 0 a c r e s o f

wheat l a n d n e a r Great F a l l s .         The p e r t i n e n t p a r t s of t h e

l e a s e i n t h i s a c t i o n p r o v i d e d t h a t i t r a n t o November 1,

1971, and u n l e s s n o t i c e o f t e r m i n a t i o n w a s g i v e n by e i t h e r
p a r t y , i t would be a u t o m a t i c a l l y renewed f o r e a c h s u c c e e d i n g

year.

        T e r m i n a t i o n c o u l d b e made i n two ways.           I n t h e event

Evans s o l d a l l o r p a r t of t h e l a n d , t h e l e a s e would t e r m i -

n a t e i m m e d i a t e l y a s t o t h e p a r t s o l d and Chamberlain would

become e n t i t l e d t o c e r t a i n payments.           The lease c o u l d a l s o
b e t e r m i n a t e d by nonrenewal, i f n o t i c e o f nonrenewal w a s

g i v e n by e i t h e r p a r t y a t l e a s t 6 0 d a y s p r i o r t o t h e r e n e w a l

d a t e of t h e l e a s e .

        The lease c o n t i n u e d u n t i l A p r i l 1974 t h r o u g h a u t o m a t i c

renewal.        On o r a b o u t A p r i l 1, 1974, however, Chamberlain

r e c e i v e d from Evans a n o t i c e o f t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e l e a s e .

The n o t i c e s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e a s o n f o r t e r m i n a t i o n w a s due t o
s a l e o f p a r t of t h e l e a s e d p r e m i s e s making f u r t h e r f a r m i n g
inconvenient.              The n o t i c e a l s o d i r e c t e d Chamberlain t o do no

summerfallow o r t o p l a n t any of t h e l a n d .
        Evans t h e r e a f t e r e n t e r e d i n t o a c o n t r a c t w i t h   illi ion-

Moore, I n c . ,      t o come o n t o t h e l a n d i n t h e s p r i n g and summer

o f 1974 t o work t h e l e a s e d p r e m i s e s and t o p l a n t i t t o
wheat.        The l a n d under l e a s e was n o t s o l d .              Because o f

Killion-Moore's            o p e r a t i o n s , however, Chamberlain c e a s e d

farming t h e leased land.

         The i s s u e ( s ) on a p p e a l a r e d i s p u t e d by t h e p a r t i e s .

Because t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d Evans summary judgment,

t h e i s s u e a s d e f i n e d by him i s p r o b a b l y more c o r r e c t l y

stated:

        Whether t h e r e was a n i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t , t h e

e x i s t e n c e of which would p r e c l u d e summary judgment, and i f

n o t , whether t h e movant s h o u l d p r e v a i l a s a m a t t e r of law?

        Chamberlain more c i r c u i t u o u s l y s t a t e s t h e i s s u e s a s :

        1.     Whether a n a d m i t t e d i n t e r f e r e n c e by Evans w i t h

C h a m b e r l a i n ' s r i g h t s t o t h e e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n and q u i e t

enjoyment o f t h e l e a s e h o l d d u r i n g t h e t e r m of t h e l e a s e g a v e

r i s e t o f a c t u a l and l e g a l q u e s t i o n s of damages?

        2.     Whether t h e n o t i c e of t e r m i n a t i o n which s t a t e d a n

u n t r u e r e a s o n f o r t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e l e a s e i n a n a t t e m p t t o

d e p r i v e Chamberlain of h i s t e r m i n a t i o n r i g h t s was f r a u d o n

the plaintiffs?

        Both p a r t i e s moved f o r summary judgment i n t h e c o u r t

below.       The o r d e r of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e a d s i n p e r t i n e n t

part:

          . . .       i t appearing t o t h e Court t h a t , a s t o
          l a i n t i f f s ' motion t h e r e remain g e n u i n e i s s u e s
          f m a t e r i a l f a c t on q u e s t i o n s of l i a b i l i t y , b u t
        t h a t as t o d e f e n d a n t s ' motion, t h e r e i s no gen-
        u i n e i s s u e of any m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h a t d e f e n -
        d a n t s a r e e n t i t l e d t o judgment as a m a t t e r o f
        law,

        " I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , h e r e b y ORDERED t h a t p l a i n t i f f s '
        motion f o r p a r t i a l summary judgment b e and i t i s
        h e r e b y d e n i e d , and t h a t d e f e n d a n t s ' motion f o r
        summary judgment i n t h e i r f a v o r b e and i t i s
        hereby granted."

        Chamberlain c a n b r i n g no c h a l l e n g e t o t h a t p a r t of t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r d e n y i n g him p a r t i a l summary judgment.
A l a r g e p a r t of h i s o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t and b r i e f on a p p e a l

i s d e v o t e d t o a d i s c u s s i o n of how Evans a l l e g e d l y f r a u d u -
l e n t l y terminated t h e lease.              By s t a t u t e , f r a u d i s a l w a y s a

q u e s t i o n of f a c t .   S e c t i o n 13-310, R.C.M.          1947, now s e c t i o n

28-2-404       MCA.      T h e r e f o r e , Chamberlain h i m s e l f w a s n o t

e n t i t l e d t o summary judgment.

        The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d g r a n t Evans' motion f o r summary
judgment, however.               On r e v i e w , t h i s C o u r t must merely d e t e r -

mine whether t h e r e e x i s t s a g e n u i n e i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t

and whether t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o a judgment as a

m a t t e r of l a w .    Rule 5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P.

        The t e r m i n a t i o n p r o v i s i o n of t h e lease r e a d s :

        "2.       TERM OF LEASE:           T h i s agreement s h a l l be f o r
        a t e r m commencing on t h e d a t e h e r e o f and ter-
        m i n a t i n g o n November 1, 1971, PROVIDED HOWEVER,
        t h a t t h i s agreement s h a l l b e renewed a u t o m a t i c a l l y
        from y e a r t o y e a r f o r o n e y e a r terms commencing
        November 1st of e a c h y e a r and t e r m i n a t i n g on
        November 1st of t h e n e x t y e a r , u n l e s s o n e p a r t y
        g i v e t o t h e o t h e r p a r t y n o t i c e of t e r m i n a t i o n o f
        t h e s a m e a t least s i x t y (60) days p r i o r t o t h e
        t e r m i n a t i o n d a t e i n any g i v e n y e a r , i n which e v e n t
        t h i s agreement s h a l l t e r m i n a t e November 1st f o l -
        lowing t h e g i v i n g o f n o t i c e o f t e r m i n a t i o n . "

        The n o t i c e o f t e r m i n a t i o n s e n t t o Chamberlain by Evans

stated:

        "NOTICE of TERMINATION o f F R LEASE CONTRACT
                                       AM
        between L. E . Evans and J o s e p h i n e Evans (Owners)
        and C a r l V . Chamberlain and H e r t h a A. Chamberlain
        (Operators).

        "Due t o t h e s a l e o f a c r e a g e on t h i s farm and s e l l -
        i n g o f a c r e a g e i n v a r i o u s p a r t s o f t h i s farm makes
        i t v e r y i n c o n v e n i e n t t o farm. T h e r e f o r e , a s o f
        A p r i l 1, 1974, t h e O p e r a t o r s a r e t o do no s p r i n g
        p l a n t i n g o r summerfallowing e x c e p t f o r r e s e e d i n g
        i n s p o t s o n w i n t e r wheat.
        "The O p e r a t o r s w i l l h a r v e s t t h e w i n t e r wheat c r o p
        now i n , a s s p e c i f i e d i n t h e C o n t r a c t . "
        I t i s c l e a r from t h e t e r m i n a t i o n p r o v i s i o n t h a t n e i t h e r

p a r t y w a s r e q u i r e d t o s t a t e any r e a s o n f o r t h e t e r m i n a t i o n

a s l o n g a s n o t i c e of t h e t e r m i n a t i o n was g i v e n s i x t y d a y s
p r i o r t o t h e November 1 t e r m i n a t i o n d a t e i n any y e a r .             Evans
g a v e (and Chamberlain r e c e i v e d ) t h i s n o t i c e on o r a b o u t

A p r i l 1, a f u l l s e v e n months b e f o r e t h e s p e c i f i e d t e r m i n a -

tion date.          T h i s n o t i c e complied f u l l y w i t h t h e l e t t e r and

s p i r i t of t h e lease.         Chamberlain a p p a r e n t l y r e c o g n i z e d t h i s

f a c t and d i d n o t a t t e m p t t o t a l k t o Evans a b o u t t h e matter

a f t e r A p r i l 1.    I n s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s , any c l a i m by Chamber-

l a i n t h a t Evans f r a u d u l e n t l y s t a t e d t h e r e a s o n s f o r t e r m i n a -

t i n g t h e lease are g r o u n d l e s s f o r t h e s i m p l e r e a s o n t h a t

Evans was n o t r e q u i r e d t o s t a t e any r e a s o n a t a l l f o r t e r m i n a -

t i n g t h e lease.        S e e Shanahan v . U n i v e r s a l Tavern Corp.

(1978) 1     - Mont.                ,   585 P.2d 1314, 1317, 35 S t - R e p . 1585,

1589.      Evans f o l l o w e d t h e t e r m s o f t h e lease i n t e r m i n a t i n g

i t and i s now e n t i t l e d t o summary judgment as a matter of

law.

        Chamberlain's claim i n h i s o r i g i n a l complaint t h a t he

i s e n t i t l e d t o a s h a r e o f t h e 1975 c r o p i s a l s o g r o u n d l e s s .

S e c t i o n s 67-702,     -703,       R.C.M.   1947, now s e c t i o n 70-26-206,

MCA.     H e n e i t h e r planted, c u l t i v a t e d , nor harvested these

crops.       I n any e v e n t , w e have s t a t e d under v e r y s i m i l a r

circumstances:

        "The r e c o r d i s c l e a r t h a t p l a i n t i f f knew when h e
        a c c e p t e d t h e t e r m s o f October 2 , 1961, t h a t h i s
        t e r m ended November 1, 1962. A s a matter of f a c t
        h e b r o u g h t t h i s a c t i o n on May 1 5 , 1962, even be-
        f o r e t h e t i m e f o r summer-fallow.             Treating the
        m a t t e r i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o p l a i n t i f f ,
        t h a t a lease f o r o n e y e a r e x i s t e d b e c a u s e of t h e
        l e t t e r of September 27, and t h e addendum of Oc-
        t o b e r 2, t h e t e r m s a r e p l a i n , and under s u c h
        c o n d i t i o n s t h e r e i s no b a s i s f o r any t h e o r y o f
         'away g o i n g ' c r o p .



        " I n H a l l v . H i l l i n g , s u p r a , t h e r u l e i s announced
        t h a t when a l e a s e , e x p r e s s l y o r by i m p l i c a t i o n ,
        r e c o g n i z e s t h e r i g h t of a t e n a n t t o sow i n t h e
        l a s t y e a r of h i s t e r m , t h e t e n a n t h a s a r i g h t t o
        h a r v e s t t h e away-going c r o p a t t h e e x p i r a t i o n of
        h i s l e a s e , where t h e lease i s s i l e n t a s t o who i s
        e n t i t l e d t o t h e crop. This general proposition
        d o e s n o t a i d a p p e l l a n t , s i n c e as we have p r e v i -
        o u s l y d i s c u s s e d , under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s h e r e ,
        t h e v e r y b a s i s f o r h i s l e a s e r i g h t , whether i t
        was a l e a s e a t w i l l o r f o r one-year p e r i o d , was
        t o the contrary.              The o t h e r a u t h o r i t i e s a r e e i t h e r
        n o t i n p o i n t o r support our holding here.

        "Summarizing t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s h e r e , t h e a p p e l l a n t
        knew when h e a c c e p t e d t h e t e r m s o f -e l a s t l e a s e
        ---                                           - th -
        t h a t h i s t e r m ended November - -
        ---                                        1, 1962. H e - - i t
                                                                   - knew
        would -t-e e x t e n d e d .
                 no b                     The l e a s e d i d n o t r e q u i r e
        him t o do any summer-fallowing i n 1962, and i f
        h e c h o s e t o do any t h a t he would b e p a i d .

        "Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was
        correct       . . ."   Johnson v. Anderson Ranch Co.
        ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 142 Mont. 251, 254-55, 384 P.2d 271, 272-
        73.      (Emphasis added. )

        I n f a c t , t o a c c e p t C h a m b e r l a i n ' s t h e o r y of t h e c a s e

would b e t o r e q u i r e i n e f f e c t a o n e y e a r and s i x t y day

n o t i c e of t e r m i n a t i o n p e r i o d b e c a u s e t h e t e n a n t would a l w a y s

be e n t i t l e d t o t h e crops harvested t h e year following h i s

r e c e i p t of n o t i c e of t e r m i n a t i o n .    This c l e a r l y contravenes

t h e l e a s e provisions.

        F i n a l l y , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l , Chamberlain

a s s e r t s t h a t h i s c l a i m a l l a l o n g h a s been f o r b r e a c h of h i s

r i g h t t o q u i e t enjoyment of t h e l e a s e d p r e m i s e s .           The r e c o r d

does n o t support t h i s a s s e r t i o n .            I n t h e main p a r a g r a p h and

p r a y e r o f h i s c o m p l a i n t , Chamberlain s t a t e d :

        " 2 . T h a t , o n o r a b o u t March 27, 1974, Defendants
        g a v e n o t i c e of t e r m i n a t i o n o f lease a l l e g i n g s a l e
        and u s e a s a n i n d u s t r i a l p a r k , made i t i n c o n v e n i e n t
        t o farm. T h a t P l a i n t i f f s r e l i e d upon Defendants
        r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and c e a s e d t o f a r m , a l t h o u g h under
        s a i d l e a s e , t h e y were e n t i t l e d t o summerfallow and
        farm t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l ground f o r 1975. T h a t t h e
        r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of Defendants were f a l s e and f r a u d u -
        l e n t and made f o r t h e p u r p o s e of d e c e i v i n g P l a i n -
        t i f f s , with t h e i n t e n t t h a t P l a i n t i f f s r e l y thereon
        t o t h e i r d e t r i m e n t . P l a i n t i f f s r e l i e d t h e r e o n and
        s u f f e r e d d e t r i m e n t i n t h e l o s s o f t h e i r 1975 c r o p
        s h a r e . That t h e reasonable v a l u e of P l a i n t i f f s '
        s h a r e o f t h e 1975 c r o p i s t h e sum of TWENTY SEVEN
        THOUSAND SIX H N R D AND N0/100 DOLLARS ( $ 2 7 , 6 0 0 . 0 0 ) .
                                    U DE

        "WHEREFORE, P l a i n t i f f s p r a y judgment a s f o l l o w s :

        " 1 . For TWENTY SEVEN THOUSAND SIX H N R D AND
                                             U DE
        N0/100 DOLLARS ($27,600.00) "                 .
        T h a t t h i s s t a t e s t h e o r i e s of r e c o v e r y based on f r a u d o r

on e n t i t l e m e n t t o a n "away-going"          crop share i s supportable;

t h a t i t s t a t e s a t h e o r y o f b r e a c h o f q u i e t enjoyment i s n o t .

        I t h a s l o n g been t h e r u l e t h a t a p a r t y may n o t change

h i s t h e o r y on a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t from t h a t advanced i n t h e

t r i a l court:

        "Under t h e well-known r u l e c o u n s e l o u g h t n o t now
        t o p r e s e n t a d i f f e r e n t t h e o r y from t h a t upon
        which h e t r i e d t h e c a s e i n t h e c o u r t below.             'The
        r u l e i s s e t t l e d i n t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n t h a t when a
        p a r t y h a s a d o p t e d o n e t h e o r y upon t h e t r i a l of h i s
        c a s e he may n o t change t h e t h e o r y on a p p e a l . (Gay
        v . Lavina S t a t e Bank, 6 1 Mont. 449, 1 8 A.L.R.                      1204,
        202 Pac. 7 5 3 . ) '         (O'Hanlon v . Ruby Gulch M. Co.,
        64 Mont. 318, 209 Pac. 1062; P a t t e r s o n v . Law,
        78 Mont. 221, 254 Pac. 412.)"                       United S t a t e s Build-
        i n g & Loan A s s ' n v . Burns ( 1 9 3 1 ) , 90 Mont. 402,
        420, 4 P.2d 703, 707.

Accord, W i l l i a r d v. Campbell ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 91 Mont. 493, 503, 11



       Even i f w e assume t h a t C h a m b e r l a i n ' s c l a i m a l l a l o n g

h a s been f o r b r e a c h o f q u i e t enjoyment, he would s t i l l have

no c l a i m f o r r e l i e f a s t h e r e was no b r e a c h .       Chamberlain

would b e e n t i t l e d t o a s h a r e o f t h e 1974 c r o p h a r v e s t e d

b e f o r e t h e end o f t h e l e a s e .     A s i n d i c a t e d by t h e t e r m i -

n a t i o n n o t i c e and t h e r e c o r d , t h i s i s e x a c t l y what he d i d

receive.       Nothing Evans o r Killion-Moore d i d i n 1974 i n t e r -

f e r e d with Chamberlain's r i g h t t o h a r v e s t t h i s crop.                 Chamber-

l a i n ' s f l a t a s s e r t i o n t h a t h e i s e n t i t l e d t o some b r o a d e r

d e g r e e o f p o s s e s s i o n o f t h i s farm l a n d when h e would n o t be

e n t i t l e d t o any of t h e f r u i t s of t h e l a n d h a r v e s t e d a f t e r

t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e lease i s i n s u f f i c i e n t grounds on

which t o deny Evans' motion f o r summary judgment.

        The judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d .



                                                ,'      Justice
                                            /
                                            '
We concur: