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Charles v. United States

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date filed: 1993-11-15
Citations: 7 F.3d 78
Copy Citations
2 Citing Cases
Combined Opinion
                                     United States Court of Appeals,

                                               Fifth Circuit.

                                              No. 92-3651.

                                  Jerry CHARLES, Sr., et al., Plaintiffs,

                                  Jerry Charles, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                                    and

                                 McDermott, Inc., Intervenor-Appellant,

                                                     v.

                      UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

                                              Nov. 15, 1993.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before KING and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges, and COBB*, District Judge.

          EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

          The plaintiff, Jerry Charles, Sr., worked on a painting and sandblasting crew, constructing a

ship for the United States Navy. Charles sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act

("FTCA"), see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988), for injuries he suffered in the course of his employment.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, on

the grounds that the government was Charles's employer, and therefore it was immune from suit

under the Louisiana worker's compensation statute. See La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 23:1032 (West

Supp.1993). Charles appeals,1 and we affirm.

          Charles worked for McDermott, Inc. as a leaderman on a painting and sandblasting crew

which was helping to construct a torpedo test craft for the Navy. As Charles left the vessel and

walked across the shipyard, a Navy employee struck him with a Navy van, seriously injuring him.

Since the accident, Charles has received benefits procured by McDermott pursuant to the Longshore


   *
       District Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
   1
    Intervenor McDermott, Inc. also appeals, adopting the brief submitted by Charles. For the
sake of convenience, we refer only to Charles in discussing the arguments raised on appeal.
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988).

         Charles contends that the government is not entitled to immunity under the Louisiana

worker's compensation statute, and therefore the district court erred by granting summary judgment.

Relying chiefly on our decision in Grantham v. Avondale Industries, Inc., 964 F.2d 471 (5th

Cir.1992), Charles argues that the statutory immunity defense provided by Louisiana is inapplicable

here because he has received benefits under the LHWCA. Charles misconstrues our holding in

Grantham.

       Charles cites Grantham for the proposition that "the statutory employer defense embodied

in Louisiana's worker's compensation law is unavailable to an entity like [the United States] when the

injured plaintiff receives LHWCA benefits from his real employer." Our holding in Grantham was

not so broad. Grantham sued Avondale on account of injuries he suffered while painting and

sandblasting a ship which Avondale was constructing for the Navy. See Grantham, 964 F.2d at 472.

Avondale moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it was Grantham's employer and was

therefore entitled to immunity under the Louisiana worker's compensation law. See id. It was

undisputed that Avondale was entitled to immunity under the Louisiana law. See id. It was also

undisputed that Grantham had received benefits under the LHWCA, and that under the LHWCA

Avondale was not immune. See id. Faced with this conflict between state and federal immunity rules,

the district court applied the state rule, in conformity with decisions of the Louisiana courts,

reasoning that it was bound to do so by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed.

1188 (1938). See Grantham, 964 F.2d at 473. We reversed, holding that "whether the state or

federal rule of immunity applies is a federal question, and the district court was controlled by the

decisions of this court." Id. at 472. Because the decisions of this Court had resolved similar conflicts

by applying the federal rule, see Martin v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 746 F.2d 231, 232 (5th Cir.1984)

(applying LHWCA immunity rule rather than Mississippi worker's compensation rule), the effect of

our holding was that the state law immunity defense was not available to Avondale.

        However, Grantham is distinguishable from this case, and does not support the proposition

that Louisiana's immunity defense is unavailable to the United States here. In Grantham state and
federal immunity rules were in direct conflict, see id. at 473, but no such conflict is presented here.

This lawsuit was brought under the FTCA, and the FTCA expressly requires that the liability of the

United States be determined "in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission

occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988). The law of the place where the act or omission occurred

in this case is the law of the State of Louisiana, see Sanchez v. Rowe, 870 F.2d 291, 295 (5th

Cir.1989); Thomas v. Calavar Corp., 679 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir.1982), and it is undisputed that that

law makes the government immune from suit even though Charles has received benefits under the

LHWCA. See Griffis v. Gulf Coast Pre-Stress Co., Inc., 563 So.2d 1254, 1254-55 (La.App. 1st

Cir.), writ denied, 568 So.2d 1054 (La.1990); Crater v. Mesa Offshore Co., 539 So.2d 88, 90-91

(La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 542 So.2d 1382, writ denied, 543 So.2d 4 (La.), cert. denied, 493

U.S. 905, 110 S.Ct. 264, 107 L.Ed.2d 214 (1989); Lewis v. Modular Quarters, 508 So.2d 975, 980-

82 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 514 So.2d 127 (La.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1226, 108 S.Ct.

2886, 101 L.Ed.2d 920 (1988).2 Because this case presents no conflict between federal and state

immunity rules, our holding in Grantham is inapposite, and Charles's reliance on Grantham is

misplaced.

        Charles also contends that the government is not entitled to immunity because he was not an

employee of the government at the time of the accident. Under Louisiana law, a government agency

for whom a contractor is performing work is the statutory employer of the contractor's employee if

the work in which the employee is engaged is part of the agency's trade, business or occupation. See

Leigh v. Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 860 F.2d 652, 653 (5th Cir.1988) (citing Klohn v.

Louisiana Power & Light, 406 So.2d 577, 580-81 (La.1981)). It is undisputed that on the day of the


   2
    Charles argues that we should reverse the district court's order of summary judgment because
Louisiana's employer immunity law is "a brutal, archaic legal fiction whose ambit has been
extended well beyond the purpose of its enactment years ago." This argument is without merit.
A court applying the FTCA is bound to apply the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred, not "whatever law it [feels] to be most enlightened." Gard v. United States, 594 F.2d
1230, 1234 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866, 100 S.Ct. 138, 62 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979).
Furthermore, the Louisiana courts apparently do not share Charles's view that the statutory
employer immunity defense has been extended beyond its proper boundaries. See Griffis, 563
So.2d at 1254-55 (affirming order of summary judgment on basis of statutory employer
immunity); Crater, 539 So.2d at 90-91 (same); Lewis, 508 So.2d at 980-82 (same).
accident Charles was working on a torpedo test craft which McDermott was constructing for the

Navy. According to the affidavit of a Navy official, vessels of that kind are "essential to the Navy's

mission of constructing and deploying modern weapons systems to defend the United States from

attack, as required by 10 U.S.C. § 7310."3 Nevertheless, Charles points out that he was not on the

Navy vessel at the time of the accident, and he contends that the facts do not show that the Navy

vessel was the only thing he was working on when the accident occurred. However, Charles does

not contend, and the record before us in no way suggests, that Charles was working on anything

other than the Navy's torpedo test craft. The only relevant evidence which appears in the record is

an excerpt from Charles's deposition, in which he states that on the day of the accident he was

working on a ship which was being built for the Navy. Therefore, the record shows that Charles was

doing work which was part of the Navy's trade, business, or occupation, and Charles raises no

genuine issue of fact as to whether the Navy was his statutory employer.4 See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)

(providing for summary judgment where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law").

       Charles also contends that he is not covered by the Louisiana worker's compensation law, and

therefore the government is not entitled to immunity under that law, because he received benefits

under the LHWCA and did not receive Louisiana worker's compensation benefits. Charles relies


   3
   10 U.S.C. § 7310 (West Supp.1993) directs the Navy to "develop plans and programs for the
construction and deployment of weapons systems ... that are more survivable, less costly, and
more effective than those in the Navy on October 20, 1978."
   4
    At oral argument Charles contended that construction of the torpedo test vessel was not part
of the government's business, trade, or occupation. We decline to consider this argument,
however, because it was not briefed. See United States v. Valdiosera-Godinez, 932 F.2d 1093,
1099 (5th Cir.1991) ("[A]ny issues not raised or argued in the appellant's brief are considered
waived and will not be entertained on appeal."), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2369, 124
L.Ed.2d 275 (1993).

               Charles also contends that the district court should have applied Berry v. Holston
       Well Serv., Inc., 488 So.2d 934 (La.1986), which narrowed the category of parties that
       are immunized by Louisiana's worker's compensation law as statutory employers. See id.
       Charles is incorrect. See Leigh v. Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 860 F.2d 652, 653
       (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Berry does not narrow the category of government employers
       immunized by the Louisiana law) (citing Hebert v. United States, 860 F.2d 607, 608 (5th
       Cir.1986)).
upon La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 23:1035.2 (West Supp.1993), which provides that "[n]o compensation shall

be payable in respect to the disability or death of any employee covered by the ... [LHWCA]." Id.

Charles contends that that section "is a clear interpretation by the Louisiana Legislature" that

Louisiana's statutory employer immunity defense "is not available to strip the rights of" plaintiffs who

receive benefits only under the LHWCA. We disagree. Lo uisiana courts apply the state law

immunity rule even where the plaintiff receives benefits only under the LHWCA. See Griffis, 563

So.2d at 1254-55; Crater, 539 So.2d at 90-91; Lewis, 508 So.2d at 980-82. Moreover, since the

passage of § 23:1035.2 in 1989, Louisiana courts have not held that that section counsels in favor of

a different result. Charles's argument is therefore without merit.

        For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.