Northville Charter Township v. Northville Public Schools

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C h i e f J u s ti c e J u s t ic e s
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh

Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

FILED JULY 31, 2003

CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF NORTHVILLE,

Plaintiff,

and No. 120213

HEATHER SCHULZ, JEFFREY SCHULZ;
MARY LOWE, GEORGE LOWE; ERIC
HANPETER, LAURA HANPETER; FRANK
CORONA, MARCELLA CORONA; DAVID
MALMIN, LEE ANN MALMIN; JOHN
MILLER, DEBRA MILLER; TOM
CONWELL, EVY CONWELL; MARY BETH
YAKIMA, DAN YAKIMA; RICHARD LEE,
PATTY LEE; BETH PETERSON, RICK
PETERSON; JOHN BUCHANAN; KEN
BUCHANAN; LARRY GREGORY, NANCY
GREGORY; K. MAUREEN WYNALEK,
JAMES WYNALEK; HAROLD W. BULGER
and SANDRA A. BULGER.

Intervening-Plaintiffs,
Appellants,

NORTHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
SUPERINTENDENT OF NORTHVILLE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, and NORTHVILLE
BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Defendants-Appellees.
___________________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE COURT

TAYLOR, J.

We granted leave to appeal to determine whether local

school districts, which are required to submit building plans

to the state superintendent of public instruction for approval

pursuant to MCL 380.1263(3), must also comply with township

zoning and planning ordinances pursuant to the Township Zoning

Act, MCL 125.271 et seq., and the township planning act, MCL

125.321 et seq. We conclude that because the text of MCL

380.1263(3) grants the state superintendent sole and exclusive

jurisdiction over local school district construction and site

plans, it immunizes school districts from local zoning

ordinances affecting those functions. However, a majority

declines to address whether this is an impermissible

delegation of legislative power because the state

superintendent is not a party to this suit.

Accordingly, a majority affirms in part and vacates in

part the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Before beginning construction of a new high school in

Northville Township, the Northville Board of Education met

with township officials to discuss the effect of local zoning

ordinances on its site plan. Although somewhat productive,

conflicts remained and the township sought to enjoin

construction.1 The trial court denied a stay, but allowed

nearby landowners to intervene as plaintiffs. After

discovery, the township and intervening plaintiffs moved for

summary disposition. The circuit court denied the motion on

the basis of the text of MCL 380.1263(3), which grants sole

and exclusive jurisdiction over school site plans to the state

superintendent.

The intervenors appealed, and the Court of Appeals

affirmed, holding that the text of the revised school code,

MCL 380.1263(3), conveys a clear intention to grant “sole and

exclusive jurisdiction” over site plans to the state

superintendent. The Court also rejected intervenors’ claim

that the Legislature unconstitutionally delegated legislative

authority to the state superintendent, concluding that the

statute provides sufficient construction and design

standards.2

We granted intervenors’ application for leave to appeal.3

1
After reviewing defendant’s site plans, the township

provided over ninety zoning-related recommendations.

Defendant school district addressed each concern and complied

with all but a handful of recommendations.

2
Although the township also appealed separately, it then

settled with the school district and that appeal was

dismissed.

3
467 Mich 896 (2002).

We review de novo decisions on summary-disposition

motions. Stanton v Battle Creek, 466 Mich 611, 614; 647 NW2d

508 (2002). Similarly, we review de novo questions of

statutory interpretation. In re MCI, 460 Mich 396, 413; 596

NW2d 164 (1999).

III

To determine whether local school districts are subject

to township zoning and planning ordinances, we must examine

the authority of the school district to develop school

construction and site plans, with the approval of the state

superintendent, under MCL 380.1263(3).

MCL 380.1263(3) states:

The board of a school district shall not

design or build a school building to be used for

instructional or noninstructional school purposes

or design and implement the design for a school

site unless the design or construction is in

compliance with [MCL 388.851 to 388.855a]. The

superintendent of public instruction has sole and

exclusive jurisdiction over the review and approval

of plans and specifications for the construction,

reconstruction, or remodeling of school buildings

used for instructional or noninstructional school

purposes and of site plans for those school

buildings. [MCL 380.1263(3) (emphasis supplied).]

Of importance is that this subsection vests design and

construction oversight authority over the district’s decision

in the state superintendent, who has “sole and exclusive

jurisdiction . . . .”

The first step in construing a statute is to discern

legislative intent. To do this requires review of the

statutory text adopted by the Legislature. House Speaker v

State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 567; 495 NW2d 539

(1993). If unambiguous, the Legislature will be presumed to

have intended the meaning expressed, and the courts enforce

that meaning without further judicial construction or

interpretation. Grievance Administrator v Underwood, 462 Mich

188, 193-194; 612 NW2d 116 (2000). These rules control the

disposition of this matter.

We determine that the statute here is unambiguous. It

grants sole and exclusive jurisdiction to the state

superintendent to review and approve plans and specifications

of school buildings and site plans for those buildings. Thus,

what the state superintendent approves is immune from the

provisions of local zoning ordinances.

In Dearden v Detroit, 403 Mich 257, 264; 269 NW2d 139

(1978), a case concerning the authority of the Department of

Corrections to locate prisons without regard to local zoning,

in which the department was given exclusive jurisdiction

concerning location, we found the words “exclusive

jurisdiction” indicative that the department had, not

surprisingly, exclusive jurisdiction. In later cases,

apprehensive that this may have suggested a need for

“talismanic words,” and that a court, not finding any, might

conclude that the state agency was not immune from local

zoning, we indicated in Burt Twp v Dep’t of Natural Resources,

459 Mich 659, 669; 593 NW2d 534 (1999), that even in the

absence of talismanic words the state agency may be immune if

the Legislature’s intent to immunize was otherwise clear. The

thrust of this was that a court should look to the intent of

the Legislature and not just do a word search. We recently

discussed this again in Pittsfield Charter Twp v Washtenaw Co,

468 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2003). We now come full circle.

The fact that the Legislature does not have to use talismanic

words does not mean that, if it does, they are to be

disregarded. That is, Burt Twp, et al., should correctly be

understood as recognizing an enlarged target for the

Legislature, but it should not be read to say a bull’s eye no

longer counts. With that in mind, as explained below, we

conclude that “sole and exclusive jurisdiction” means, again

we hope not surprisingly, sole and exclusive jurisdiction.

We find the dictionary definitions dispositive. “Sole”

means “[b]eing the only one; existing or functioning without

another or others; only.” The American Heritage Dictionary of

the English Language (1981). Similarly, “exclusive” is

defined as “not divided or shared with others [or] single or

independent; sole.” Id. The Legislature’s choice of

modifiers reflects its intention to unambiguously vest

“jurisdiction,” i.e., “the general power to exercise

authority,” in the state superintendent. Black’s Law

Dictionary (7th ed).

This leaves to be determined the definition of “site

plan.” The dictionary defines “site” as “The place where

something was, is, or is to be located,” The American Heritage

Dictionary of the English Language (1982), or similarly,

“[T]he area or exact plot of ground on which anything is, has

been, or is to be located . . . .” Random House Webster’s

College Dictionary (1997). “Plan” is defined as “A detailed

scheme, program, or method worked out beforehand for the

accomplishment of an object . . . . A proposed or tentative

project or goal . . . .” The American Heritage Dictionary of

the English Language (1982). Thus, it is apparent that the

meaning of “site plan,” with no qualifying modifiers, is the

plan for everything on the property, i.e., the entire project.

This definition is consistent not only with the common

understanding of the phrase but also with the Legislature’s

use of the term “site plan” in both the Township Zoning Act

and the township planning act. The Township Zoning Act states

that the proposal for the individual “site plan” of a property

owner or user must be “in compliance with local ordinances and

state and federal statutes.” MCL 125.286e(1). If it is, the

township zoning authorities have the duty to approve it.

Similarly, in the township planning act, the site plan must

“comply with the [township’s basic development] plan adopted

under this section.” MCL 125.326(4). If the site plan does

comply, it is to be approved by the planning authorities.

Thus, in both these acts the site plan, i.e., what is to be

undertaken on the site, is presented to the appropriate zoning

and planning authorities and, if consistent with the ordinance

and plan, it is to be approved.

In a fashion similar to the procedure followed by

individuals who wish to have their site plans approved by the

zoning and planning authorities discussed above, the school

district, under MCL 380.1263(3), must present its site plan to

the state superintendent for approval. Just as the township

zoning authorities have duties to accept or reject the

individual homeowner’s site plan, so the state superintendent

has similar duties to “review and approv[e]” the school

district’s site plans.

This understanding of MCL 380.1263(3) makes clear that

the state superintendent’s power is unaffected by any zoning

or planning rules or ordinances regarding what goes on within

the site itself. While this may appear to be an extensive

grant of authority, it is, in our view, no more so than, and

indeed of a piece with, the authority given to the ultimate

reviewing authorities by the Township Zoning Act and the

township planning act.

We also note that this interpretation is in harmony with

the general structure of MCL 380.1263(3), in which the state

superintendent is given distinct duties regarding both

construction and site plans. Because the state superintendent

must approve construction plans and, as a separate matter,

approve site plans, we are led to the conclusion that the

Legislature considered these two types of plans as not being

identical. Thus, we conclude that it was the Legislature’s

view that “site plans” would not be coterminous with

“construction plans.” Our interpretation of the statute is

consistent with this.

Further, it is important that neither the Township Zoning

Act nor the township planning act by its terms requires school

district compliance with zoning ordinances. Intervening

plaintiffs correctly note that MCL 125.273 and 125.327(2)(a)

clarify that township zoning ordinances and plans should be

drafted to accommodate a community’s educational needs.

However, it does not necessarily follow that local school

districts must comply with all township land-use controls

prescribed by ordinance.4

4
Intervening plaintiffs also assert that the Legislature,

by not expressly exempting school districts from zoning

(continued...)

Intervenors further argue that “site plans” cannot extend

beyond the construction of school buildings because the state

superintendent’s agents testified in the matter that they have

no published standards for site design and do not review site

plans for land-use matters. This argument has no merit. The

purported failure to act on the part of the state

superintendent’s agents is not indicative of the Legislature’s

intent and cannot control the meaning of the statutes at

issue. The intervenors’ claim in this regard would be better

understood as precipitating challenges to the administration

of the statute rather than its meaning.

After considering all the above arguments and applying

Dearden, it is our view that the Legislature clearly evidenced

an intention to grant “sole and exclusive jurisdiction” over

school construction and site plans to the state

superintendent, thereby immunizing local districts from

township zoning ordinances as they affect the content of the

site plan itself. MCL 380.1263(3). Because nothing in either

(...continued)
regulations, as it had regarding certain gas and oil

operations and electric transmission lines, should be held to

have not intended to exempt school districts from zoning. MCL

125.271(1). However, as we noted in Pittsfield Charter Twp v

Washtenaw Co, slip op at 13, this reads too much into these

existing exceptions, which, by the nature and timing of their

enactment, were the Legislature’s attempt to coordinate other

statutes with the Township Zoning Act, not to identify the

only possible exceptions to a township’s zoning authority.

the Township Zoning Act or the township planning act suggests

an intent to usurp the state superintendent’s “sole and

exclusive jurisdiction” over design, construction, and siting

requirements, we must conclude that local school districts for

their site plans must seek only the state superintendent’s

approval and need not have the approval of township zoning and

planning authorities.

Intervening plaintiffs also argue that this act is

unconstitutional because it is an impermissible delegation of

legislative power to the state superintendent. For us to

address whether this statute effects an impermissible

delegation of legislative authority, it would have been

necessary for the state superintendent to have been joined as

a party pursuant to MCR 2.205(A). Because this did not take

place, the issue is not properly before us and we decline to

address the matter further. Similarly, the matter was not

properly presented to the Court of Appeals and that Court’s

opinion, to the extent that it considered this issue, must be

vacated.

As we read Justice Cavanagh’s opinion, he agrees with us

that MCL 380.1263(3) granted the state superintendent

authority superseding township zoning ordinances for what goes

on within the site itself. He would go further however,

understanding the statute to mean that

there is no reason to presume the state

superintendent’s review power over local school

districts is necessarily limited to activities

contained within the site itself. (Post at 4).

Thus, he concludes that

it would be inappropriate to suggest that, even in

some limited fashion local school districts should

be subject to township zoning authorities. (Post

at 5).

Justice Weaver concurs with our approach to the authority

of the superintendent stating that

the text of MCL 380.1263(3) evidences a legislative

intent to subject local school districts to the

authority of the superintendent of public

instruction, thus immunizing districts from

township zoning ordinances. (Post at 2).

Thus a clear majority of the Court agrees that the

authority of the state superintendent pursuant to MCL

380.1263(3) is at least as broad as set forth in this opinion.

Justice Markman disagrees with us. Under Justice

Markman’s interpretation of MCL 380.1263(3) the words “sole

and exclusive jurisdiction” do not convey that the

jurisdiction is sole and exclusive. His view, we believe, is

inconsistent with the Legislature’s grant of “sole and

exclusive jurisdiction over the review and approval” of the

site plans as well as, were it the majority, an effective

overruling of the line of cases commencing with Dearden and

including Burt Twp, Byrne v Michigan, 463 Mich 652; 624 NW2d

906 (2001), and most recently, Pittsfield Twp.5

As for plaintiffs’ claim that MCL 380.1263(3) is

unconstitutional because it is an inappropriate delegation of

legislative power to the state superintendent, Justice

Markman, while otherwise dissenting as we have mentioned,

concurs with our position that to reach this issue the state

superintendent should have been joined as a party. Justice

Cavanagh, in his concurrence, only briefly addresses this

issue without stating a preference for its resolution.

5
Moreover, with respect to Justice Markman’s concern that

unfortunate consequences may flow from the state

superintendent having such power, we do not share his

apprehensions. Regarding the prospect of a school district

recommending, and the state superintendent approving, plans

that are in conflict with a community’s interests, it is, of

course, possible, but seems unlikely when one recalls that the

local school district, the generator of the site plan, is

controlled by a locally elected board. We believe they, as

other unnamed elected officials in whom Justice Markman seems

to have more confidence, can be expected to be sensitive to

the local community interests. If they are not, there are the

usual political remedies. In any event, assuming this is

insufficiently reassuring, we fail to see why, as a general

matter, these elected officials would be inherently less

sensitive to local concerns than would be an appointive (that

is, unelected) zoning board or planning commission. Further,

reinforcing our conclusion in this regard is the fact that the

state superintendent serves at the pleasure of yet another

elected body, the State Board of Education. Thus, we believe

the statute, as we have construed it, will produce fewer

discordant outcomes with local wishes than can be expected

under Justice Markman’s approach. If, however, this is not

the case, it is within the Legislature’s power to simply

change the process to have ultimate authority rest with

appointed zoning boards and planning authorities.

Justice Weaver, however, reaches the delegation question and

finds no improper delegation. Accordingly, with others

joining this plurality, a clear majority of the Court agrees

that the failure to join the state superintendent as a party

precludes us from resolving the claim that MCL 380.1263(3) is

an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

In the present case, the Legislature vested “sole and

exclusive jurisdiction” over school construction and site

plans in the state superintendent of public instruction, who

has the approval authority for school construction and site

plans submitted by the local school districts. This

unambiguous language, when viewed in light of the zoning

authority granted to townships in the township zoning and

planning acts, indicates an intention to immunize school

districts from local ordinances as they affect the content of

a school site plan. Further, the issue of delegation of

legislative authority to the state superintendent is not

properly before us, and a majority declines to consider it.

For these reasons, with others joining this plurality, the

Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing

the intervening plaintiffs’ appeal after the denial of their

motion for summary disposition and the Court vacates those

portions of the opinion of the Court of Appeals that address

the issue of delegation of legislative authority to the state

superintendent of public instruction.

Clifford W. Taylor

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF NORTHVILLE,

Plaintiff,

and No. 120213

HEATHER SCHULZ, JEFFREY SCHULZ;

MARY LOWE, GEORGE LOWE; ERIC

HANPETER, LAURA HANPETER; FRANK

CORONA, MARCELLA CORONA; DAVID

MALMIN, LEE ANN MALMIN; JOHN

MILLER, DEBRA MILLER; TOM

CONWELL, EVY CONWELL; MARY BETH

YAKIMA, DAN YAKIMA; RICHARD LEE,

PATTY LEE; BETH PETERSON, RICK

PETERSON; JOHN BUCHANAN; KEN

BUCHANAN; LARRY GREGORY, NANCY

GREGORY; K. MAUREEN WYNALEK,

JAMES WYNALEK; HAROLD W. BULGER

and SANDRA A. BULGER.

Intervening-Plaintiffs,

Appellants,

NORTHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

SUPERINTENDENT OF NORTHVILLE

PUBLIC SCHOOLS, and NORTHVILLE

BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

___________________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).

I agree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that an

evaluation of MCL 380.1263(3)1 indicates a legislative intent

to subject local school districts to the authority of the

state superintendent, thereby immunizing districts from

township zoning ordinances. However, I must concur in the

result only.

Above all, I am troubled by the lead opinion’s suggestion

that the state superintendent’s power to review a local school

district’s site plan is limited to “what goes on within the

site itself.” Ante at 7. In drafting MCL 380.1263(3), the

Legislature indicated no such restriction on the

superintendent’s authority. As the lead opinion clearly

states, the statute provides the state superintendent with

“sole and exclusive jurisdiction” over “site plans.” MCL

380.1263(3).

This interpretation accords with the events leading up to

the statute’s revision. In response to several Court of

1
Portions of the school construction code, MCL 388.851

et seq., have been revised by 2002 PA 628. Without amending

the grant in MCL 380.1263(3) of “sole and exclusive

jurisdiction over . . . site plans” to the superintendent of

public instruction, the act transfers the authority to enforce

construction codes from one state entity, the superintendent,

to the Department of Consumer and Industry Services. Because

this case arose before 2002 PA 628 was enacted, we need not

decide whether the revisions alter the scope of the

superintendent’s authority.

Appeals cases mandating local school district compliance with

township ordinances,2 the Legislature amended subsection

1263(3) and extended state oversight authority to include

“site plans for those school buildings.” 1990 PA 159.

Interpreting the 1990 amendment in a manner that gives a

distinct meaning to “site plans” requires an acknowledgment

that “site plans” contain data other than that strictly

necessary for “the construction of . . . school buildings

. . . .”

Further, although the term “site plans” is not defined in

the revised school code, the Legislature’s practice of

employing the term in zoning statutes suggests its utility as

a tool to measure compliance with land-use regulations.3

2
Lutheran High School Ass’n v Farmington Hills, 146 Mich

App 641; 381 NW2d 417 (1985) (subjecting private school to

local zoning ordinances); Cody Park Ass’n v Royal Oak School

Dist, 116 Mich App 103; 321 NW2d 855 (1982) (holding that the

power of a school district to acquire property did not exempt

it from local zoning ordinances).

3
MCL 125.286e(1) provides:

As used in this section, "site plan" includes

the documents and drawings required by the zoning

ordinance to insure that a proposed land use or

activity is in compliance with local ordinances and

state and federal statutes.