NUMBER 13-14-00218-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
CHRISTOPHER ROBIN, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 252nd District Court
of Jefferson County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Garza, Benavides, and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza
A jury found appellant, Christopher Wayne Robin, guilty of murder, a first-degree
felony, and sentenced him to fifty-six years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
19.02(b)(2), (c) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S).1 By a single issue, appellant
1 We note that the judgment incorrectly states that the offense is a second-degree felony. The
reporter’s record reflects, however, that the jury was correctly instructed that the offense is a first-degree
contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm as modified.
I. BACKGROUND2
Testimony at trial established the following facts. Detective James Walters, then
a police officer with the City of Port Neches, Texas, testified that he was dispatched to a
Port Neches residence around 3:15 p.m. on the afternoon of November 20, 2007. When
he arrived at the residence, two other officers were already present. Inside, the officers
found the bruised and bloody nude body of Wayne Beavers lying face down on a bed.
Beavers had apparently been beaten to death and strangled. There was a considerable
amount of blood spatter throughout the house—“a very bloody crime scene.” Most of the
blood was dried, however, indicating to Detective Walters that it was “not a fresh crime
scene.” Appellant identified the victim as his roommate. During his investigation,
Detective Walters was told that appellant and Beavers had a sexual relationship.
Appellant acknowledged that Beavers was gay, but denied that he was involved in a
sexual relationship with him. At the time of his death, Beavers was fifty-six years old;
appellant was approximately thirty-three.
The house where Beavers and appellant lived was filthy and in disarray. Trash,
empty beer cans, and discarded pizza boxes were strewn about. Pill bottles were emptied
out on a dresser. Beavers’s cell phone—a “flip” phone—was found broken in half with
the battery out on the bathroom floor near the toilet. DNA tests later determined that a
felony and was correctly instructed as to the punishment range. Accordingly, we modify the judgment to
reflect the offense as a first-degree felony. The rules of appellate procedure provide that an appellate court
may modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm it as modified. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); see Banks v. State,
708 S.W .2d 460, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (holding that when an appellate court has the necessary data
and evidence before it for modification, the judgment and sentence may be modified on appeal).
2This case is before this Court on transfer from the Ninth Court of Appeals in Beaumont pursuant
to an order issued by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West, Westlaw
through 2013 3d C.S.).
2
mixture of Beavers’s and appellant’s blood was found on the cell phone. Appellant told
Detective Walters that seven or eight months earlier, Beavers had suffered severe burns
to his body due to an accident involving a fire in the barbecue pit.
Later that evening, appellant was taken into custody on an unrelated warrant for
possession of marijuana. Detective Walters interviewed appellant at the jail.3 During the
interview, Detective Walters took several photographs of appellant’s hands, which
showed several cuts and abrasions that were consistent with having been in “a fight.”
Appellant also had scratch marks on his upper arms. Appellant explained that he had
recently suffered the injuries to his hands while working on a house renovation. Appellant
stated that he left for work around 7:00 a.m. on the morning of the 20th, and that Beavers
was alive at that time. In the course of his investigation, Detective Walters learned that
there were “a lot of people in and out of that house.” During the interview, Detective
Walters asked appellant about the nature of his relationship with Beavers, and appellant
became “defensive.” Detective Walters identified the clothing that appellant was wearing
on November 20th: black denim pants, a white t-shirt, white socks, and white tennis
shoes. Samples from the clothing and swabs from the shoes were later submitted for
analysis and testing.
Detective Walters learned from appellant that Jimmy Glenn Brown was one of the
persons who had been around the house in the days prior to the murder. According to
appellant, Brown had been at the house, but Beavers had asked him to leave. Appellant
said Beavers dropped Brown off at a bar, but that Brown was arrested shortly after that
for public intoxication. Brown was arrested on November 16, 2007, and was not released
3 An audio recording of the interview was introduced into evidence.
3
until around 10:00 a.m. on the morning of November 20. When Detective Walters talked
to Brown, he noticed that Brown’s hands had no cuts or bruises on them. Investigators
concluded that if Brown committed the murder, he would had to have done so either
before November 16 or during a five-hour window between 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. on
November 20. Investigators therefore eliminated Brown as a suspect.
Michelle Smith, who was thirty-nine when Beavers was murdered, testified that
she had been friends with Beavers since she was seventeen. Smith said that many
friends had lived with Beavers over the years because “[h]e helped anyone that needed
it.” There were several people who lived at the house in 2007, including Donald Church
and his girlfriend, Mike Church, and Jason Jimenez. On November 20, police came to
Smith’s home asking if she knew Brown. Smith said she did not know Brown. The police
said that appellant had suggested that they look for Brown at Smith’s house. Smith
learned of Beavers’s death by listening to the 10:00 p.m. news on the night of November
20. She went to Beavers’s home and told Officer Robert Simon that she believed
appellant had committed the crime. When Officer Simon asked her why she believed
appellant was responsible, Smith said that appellant had tried to kill Beavers on a prior
occasion by setting him on fire. Smith said that based on her knowledge as a friend of
Beavers, appellant and Beavers had “a very violent relationship.”
On cross-examination, Smith admitted that she had not witnessed the incident
when Beavers was burned. She stated that there was a “revolving door” aspect to
Beavers’s house, with numerous friends and acquaintances coming and going.
Dr. Tommy J. Brown, then a forensic pathologist at the Jefferson County morgue,
testified that he performed an autopsy on Beavers at 8:00 a.m. on November 21, 2007,
4
the day after the body was discovered. Dr. Brown estimated the time of death as within
twenty-four to thirty-six hours or less of the time of the autopsy. Dr. Brown stated that
Beavers was apparently “stomped to death.” Dr. Brown stated that Beavers’s chest was
crushed in, his skull was fractured from blunt force trauma, and he had been manually
strangled—any or all of these could have caused his death. On cross-examination, Dr.
Brown surmised that Beavers “might have been stomped to death, then maybe he was
kicked in the head or stomped on the head . . . .”
Steve Mayes, a forensic scientist with the Jefferson County Crime Lab, testified
that he participated in the gathering of evidence from the crime scene. Mayes identified
various items that were collected and analyzed, including the pieces of the cell phone,
appellant’s tennis shoes (a pair of white Reeboks, size 6 ½), a pizza box with a bloody
shoe impression on it, swabs from the bathroom sink and the kitchen sink, fingernail
scrapings from Beavers, appellant’s black jeans, and a red shirt and a tan shirt that
belonged to Jimmy Brown.
Stacey Shettle, a lab technician with the Jefferson County Crime Lab, testified that
she transported the evidence to the DPS crime lab in Houston. Fayth Davis, then a
forensic scientist with the DPS Crime Lab in Houston, testified that she analyzed
appellant’s Reebok tennis shoe and compared it to the bloody imprint on the pizza box at
the crime scene. Davis stated that the bloody imprint was made by appellant’s shoe.
Andrew McWhorter, a forensic scientist from the DPS Crime Lab in Houston,
testified that he prepared State’s Exhibits 114 and 115, a “Serology/DNA Report” and
“Supplemental Serology/DNA Report,” respectively. McWhorter’s findings in the
“Serology/DNA Report” were as follows. Blood was found on the cell phone swabs,
5
appellant’s black jeans, white t-shirt, and shoes, swabs from the front bedroom door,
bathroom faucet, and kitchen sink, and Jimmy Brown’s red shirt and tan shirt. The DNA
on appellant’s black jeans and his white t-shirt was consistent with appellant’s own DNA
profile. A mixture of appellant’s and Beavers’s DNA was found on the cell phone,
appellant’s tennis shoe, and the scrapings from Beavers’s fingernails. 4 Jimmy Brown’s
red shirt and tan shirt contained a mixture of Beavers’s DNA and that of an unknown
individual; appellant was excluded as a contributor to that DNA profile.5 In the
“Supplemental Serology/DNA Report,” the following results were found: (1) appellant’s
DNA was found on the light switch to appellant’s bedroom where the body was found; (2)
Beavers’s DNA was found in a swab from the right hallway wall; (3) a mixture of
appellant’s and Beavers’s DNA was found in a swab from the right hallway wall, the
hallway wall off the kitchen, the back bedroom door, and the outside bathroom door knob.
A swab taken from the back door knob showed a mixture of DNA, appellant’s and an
unknown person.6
On cross-examination, McWhorter agreed that if a person lives in a house, that
person’s DNA will be found in the house. At the conclusion of McWhorter’s testimony,
the State rested.
The defense presented the testimony of Dan Hellwig, the laboratory director of
Sorenson Forensics, a private DNA testing laboratory. Hellwig testified that the red shirt
4 The report notes that “apparent blood” was detected on the cell phone swabs and on appellant’s
shoes. It notes that portions of the swabs “were extracted by a method that yields DNA from tissue such
as blood, sweat or saliva.” It notes that the fingernail clippings “were swabbed for potential DNA.”
5 Because no DNA sample was collected from Brown, it was not possible to compare the unknown
DNA profile to Brown’s.
6 All of these findings were derived from blood evidence.
6
belonging to Jimmy Brown contained a mixture of DNA that was Beavers’s and an
unknown individual’s. The tan shirt that belonged to Jimmy Brown contained a mixture
of DNA that was Brown’s and possibly Beavers’s. The DNA from the tan shirt matched
Brown’s DNA profile via a DNA Database.
The defense next called Bradley Farr, who lived next door to appellant and
Beavers in 2007. Farr testified that he was sitting on his front porch with his laptop on the
afternoon of November 20, 2007. Appellant, who appeared to be “shook up,” ran up and
said he needed to use the phone to call 911 because “something bad” had happened to
his roommate. Farr called 911. An audiotape of the call was introduced into evidence.
Farr testified that appellant looked “buffed up” and was nervous. Farr noticed that
appellant had a cut on his hand. Farr stated that a day or two earlier, a man had come
to his door asking for Beavers. Farr said that the man was acting “kinda goofy” and that
Farr “wanted him off [his] property.”
Henry Russell Robin, appellant’s father, testified that he is a truck driver and also
does general carpentry and home repair work. Two of his sons, appellant and Thomas,
do the same type of work and work with him. On the morning of November 20, 2007, he
picked up appellant shortly after 7:00 a.m. and drove to a remodeling worksite in Vidor,
Texas about thirty minutes away. When Henry arrived to pick up appellant, appellant was
returning from a store across the road. Appellant had purchased a couple of beers for
Beavers, as he did every morning. Appellant took the beers in the house and immediately
came back out. Henry testified that he, Thomas, appellant, and a couple of other men
worked on the site all day. He stated that appellant had cut his hand the day before on
the job. Appellant often suffered minor cuts while working, and used black electrical tape
7
or duct tape as a bandage. Around 10:00 a.m., appellant drove the truck to a nearby
lumberyard to pick up some materials. He was gone about thirty-five to forty minutes.
The police investigation revealed that the lumberyard and paperwork associated with the
sale confirmed that appellant made the purchases at the stated time. Henry testified that
blood was found on the passenger side of the truck where appellant sat. He stated that
the blood likely came from the work-related cut on appellant’s right hand. The owner of
the house that they were working on came by the job site several times a day. Later that
night, appellant called to tell him that he had found Beavers’s body and that he was being
questioned on unrelated charges.
Thomas Robin, appellant’s brother, testified that appellant was working at the
remodeling site on November 20, 2007. He stated that his hands and appellant’s hands
were frequently cut up because of the nature of the work they were performing.
Arthur Martin testified that he owned a rental property and had hired Henry Robin
to work on the property. He testified that he dropped in to check on the progress of the
work on a daily basis. When he dropped by on the afternoon of November 20, 2007,
Henry, Thomas and appellant were there. He stated they were “wrapping up” and
planning to leave around 3:00 p.m.
Eddie Thomas Oliver III testified that he owned Spanky’s Liquor Store in Port
Neches, Texas from 2002 to December 2007. Beavers was a regular customer who
came in five to six times a day, each time purchasing a single sixteen-ounce Busch beer.
Appellant usually came into the store a couple of times per week. Oliver testified that he
opened the store at 10:00 a.m. and Beavers was always his first or second customer.
Oliver stated that on the morning of November 20, 2007, Beavers came in the store as
8
usual shortly after 10:00 a.m. and bought a beer. Oliver did not see him again that day.
On cross-examination, Oliver stated that he had given a statement to the police
stating that he had seen appellant that day between 10:15 a.m. and noon, but was not “a
hundred percent sure” that it was the same day. In his statement to police, Oliver stated
that he saw appellant twice that day, once before noon and again around 3:00 p.m. or so.
Oliver testified that he was certain about Beavers being there, however, because “he was
there every single day every single morning” “like clockwork.”
Appellant testified that he grew up in Port Neches and dropped out of school in the
tenth grade. He obtained a G.E.D. and did mechanic work and carpentry work. He met
Beavers in December 2005 and moved into the house in early 2006. Appellant denied
that he was involved in a sexual relationship with Beavers and stated that Beavers’s
sexual orientation was “about the only thing I didn’t really care for him.” There was no
bed in Beavers’s room; he slept on a recliner. Appellant stated the electricity worked in
only a few places in the house: a couple of wall sockets in Beavers’s room, one socket in
appellant’s room, and the bathroom; there was no electrical power in the kitchen. The
front door of the house was inoperable; the only entry to the house was through the back
door. Appellant stated that he did not know Michelle Smith, but knew “of her.” He said
that Michelle had heard that he set Beavers on fire from “people talking and drinking” and
spreading rumors. He said that Michelle came around to visit Beavers maybe twice in
the last year and a half. On one occasion, appellant said that Beavers sent him outside
to tell Michelle that he was not home because she was always asking Beavers for money.
Appellant testified that Beavers suffered severe burns several months earlier due
to an accident. Appellant was lighting some charcoal in the barbeque pit, but had trouble
9
getting a fire started. He took gasoline from the lawnmower and put it into the bottle
containing charcoal lighter fluid. The plastic top to the bottle was cracked. After starting
the coals, appellant closed the lid to the pit and went to the store. When appellant
returned, he saw Beavers standing next to the barbeque pit with a blanket around his
shoulders. Beavers opened the pit and squirted gasoline on the coals. Some of the
gasoline spilled onto the blanket, engulfing the blanket in flames. Appellant put the flames
out and tried to get Beavers to go to the hospital immediately for treatment, but he refused.
Beavers was treated at the hospital for the burns several days later.
Appellant stated that he did not own a cell phone; the only phone in the house was
Beavers’s cell phone. On a typical workday, appellant said his father picked him up to go
to work around 7:00 or 7:30 a.m. Typically, Beavers was awake and drinking in his
recliner. When he returned from work, appellant usually bought two beers at Spanky’s,
one for Beavers and one for himself. Appellant stated that he first met Jimmy Brown at
Beavers’s house.
On the morning of November 20, 2007, appellant’s alarm clock did not go off. He
was awakened when Beavers threw a shoe against the wall to wake him up. The shoe
was appellant’s, and he had to go into Beavers’s room to retrieve it. Appellant stated that
he wears a size nine or nine-and-a-half shoe. Appellant’s shoes were in Beavers’s room
because he and Beavers had watched a movie and drank beer the night before. That
morning, appellant helped Beavers get up out of the recliner and get to the restroom.
Appellant stated that Beavers did not eat much and “more or less lived off beer.”
On the morning of November 20, appellant picked up Beavers’s cell phone to call his
father, but the battery was dead. Appellant went to the Mobil store across the street,
10
bought two beers and cigarettes for Beavers, and called his father. Appellant stated that
the back door to the house was usually left open so the two dogs could go in and out of
the house. Two days before the 20th, appellant had cut his thumb working on some
flashing. During the workday on the 20th, the cut opened up several times and was
bleeding on and off throughout the day.
Appellant stated that after working in Vidor, his father dropped him off at the house
around 3:00 p.m. or so. Appellant heard the dogs barking inside the house, which was
unusual; normally the dogs were outside in the back yard. The back patio door, which
was usually left open, was closed and locked. Appellant opened the door with a key that
was hidden nearby. The dogs seemed overly excited to be let out. Appellant put his tools
down and went to Spanky’s and bought two beers. Appellant set the beers down.
Appellant noticed that when the dogs were jumping on him, his hand was “busted open
again” and he could feel the blood running down his hand. He went to the bathroom sink
to wash the blood off, then went into his bedroom because there was no towel in the
bathroom. The room was dark, but he saw what appeared to be Beavers lying face down
on the bed. He thought Beavers was passed out drunk, so he kicked the mattress a
couple of times; Beavers did not move. He grabbed Beavers by the shoulder and noticed
that he had blood all over the back of his head. Beavers felt “cold” and “wasn’t moving at
all.” Appellant said he was “shocked” and looked for the phone in Beavers’s room, but it
was not there. Appellant had noticed Farr sitting on his front porch, so he ran next door
and asked Farr to call 911. The 911 operator instructed appellant to go back in the house
to determine if Beavers was still breathing. Appellant leaned over the bed, touched the
body with his right hand, and determined that Beavers was not breathing. Appellant then
11
went back to Farr’s house. Soon, the police and paramedics arrived. When appellant
left the house that morning, his pills were in pill bottles and the dresser drawers were in
the dresser. After he found the body, he noticed the pills were spilled out and the drawers
were pulled out and on the floor. When the officers arrived, appellant walked back in the
house to show the officer the location of Beavers’s body.
On cross-examination, appellant stated that, at the time of the murder, only he and
Beavers were living in the house. He stated that he did not approve of Beavers’s
homosexual lifestyle. Appellant said that Beavers slept most of the day and drank most
of the night. According to appellant, there were people in and out of the house all the
time, and he did not know most of them. Appellant explained that the story that he had
set Beavers on fire got started when there were four or five people at the house drinking.
Someone joked that appellant set Beavers on fire because Beavers “made a move” on
appellant, which angered appellant. According to appellant, everyone knew that it was a
joke. Appellant said that the blood on his t-shirt that day was his own blood from his cut
hand. Appellant initially disputed that the white size six-and-a-half shoes without laces
were his, insisting that he wears a size nine-and-a-half and that the shoes he wore that
day had laces. After the prosecutor pointed out that the shoes had paint stains on them,
appellant admitted that they were probably his shoes. The prosecutor noted that the shoe
print matched the impression on the pizza box. Appellant agreed with the prosecutor that
the impression on the pizza box could only have been made when the blood was still wet.
Appellant responded that his hand was bleeding so much, it could have been his blood
that was responsible for the shoeprint on the pizza box. When asked about the swelling
and bruising on his hands, appellant said the bruises were caused by rubbing up against
12
a wall at work and rubbing against brick. Appellant denied that he was involved in any
way with Beavers’s murder.
After deliberating for slightly less than three hours, the jury returned a verdict of
guilty. Following the punishment phase, the jury imposed a sentence of fifty-six years’
imprisonment. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
In a sufficiency review, courts examine the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict to determine whether “any rational fact finder could have found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plural. op.) (“[T]he Jackson legal-sufficiency
standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether
the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.”). This standard requires reviewing courts
to resolve any evidentiary inconsistencies in favor of the judgment, keeping in mind that
the jury is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight
to give their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.04 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (“The jury, in all cases, is the exclusive
judge of the facts proved, and of the weight to be given to the testimony. . . .”). Appellate
courts do not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence; they only ensure that
the fact finder reached a rational decision. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009). A fact finder may support its verdict with reasonable inferences drawn
from the evidence, and it is up to the fact finder to decide which inference is most
reasonable. Id. at 523.
13
Sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined
by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). “Such a
charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not
unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's
theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the
defendant was tried.” Villarreal, 286 S.W.3d at 327; see Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240. As
authorized by the indictment in this case, the State was required to show that appellant
(1) intended to cause Beavers serious bodily injury and (2) caused Beavers’s death (3)
by choking him with appellant’s hands. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(2).
“A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect . . . to a result of his conduct
when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.”
Id. § 6.03(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). Murder is a “result of conduct”
offense. Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). “That is, the
accused must have intended the result, death, or have been aware that his conduct was
reasonably certain to cause that result.” Guzman v. State, 20 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 85 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
It is not necessary that the evidence directly proves the defendant's guilt;
“[c]ircumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of the
actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Hooper v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see Kuciemba v. State, 310 S.W.3d 460,
462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A defendant's intent, in particular, may be inferred from his
words, acts, and conduct. Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
14
In other words, intent and knowledge are fact questions and are almost always proven
through evidence of the circumstances surrounding the crime. Robles v. State, 664
S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Both the identity of the accused and the corpus
delicti of an offense may be proven by circumstantial evidence. See Earls v. State, 707
S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Clark v. State, No. 13–10–00496–CR, 2011 WL
3821055, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 25, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Wheeler v. State, 35 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2000, pet. ref'd).
III. DISCUSSION
Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
Specifically, appellant maintains that he had “logical and reasonable explanations”
refuting the State’s evidence that he murdered Beavers. Appellant notes that he had “an
undisputed alibi” because he was at work from the last time Beavers was seen alive until
his body was discovered on the afternoon of November 20, 2007. Appellant argues that
“[t]he mere possibility of guilt or even a strong suspicion is not sufficient to support a
murder conviction.”
We disagree. The jury heard the following evidence: (1) a mixture of Beavers’s
and appellant’s DNA profile was found on Beavers’s broken cell phone found on the
bathroom floor, appellant’s white Reebok tennis shoe, the left hallway wall, the hallway
off the kitchen, the back bedroom door, the outside bathroom doorknob, and the
scrapings from Beavers’s fingernails; (2) after initially denying that the white Reebok
tennis shoes were his, appellant admitted that the bloody shoe impression on the pizza
box came from his shoe; (3) Davis testified that the bloody impression on the pizza box
15
was made by appellant’s shoe; (4) Detective Walters testified that when Beavers’s body
was discovered after 3:00 p.m., much of the blood was dried and that the crime scene
was not fresh, which is inconsistent with appellant’s testimony that Beavers was alive on
the morning of November 20; and (5) Smith testified that appellant and Beavers had a
“violent relationship” and that appellant had previously set Beavers on fire.7 Although
Oliver, the owner of Spanky’s, testified that Beavers was in the store around 10:15 a.m.
on the morning of November 20, the jury could have believed that he was mistaken. See
Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc) (noting that
the jury is entitled to reconcile conflicts in the evidence and can choose to believe all,
some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties). “Each fact need not point
directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of
all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Hooper v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Appellant argues that the absence of evidence in this case is “similar” to the lack
of evidence in Morales v. State, 466 S.W.2d 293, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (op. on
reh’g), and Nathan v. State, 611 S.W.2d 69, 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). In Morales, the
evidence showed that three co-defendants were convicted in a joint trial for murder. 466
S.W.2d at 295. It was undisputed that Israel Morales killed the decedent with a knife. Id.
The issue before the court of criminal appeals, on rehearing, was whether the evidence
was sufficient to support one of the co-defendants, Juan Morales’s conviction as a
principal to murder with malice. 466 S.W.2d at 302. The court found the evidence
7Although Smith clarified that her beliefs were “based on what [she knew] from being friends with
[Beavers],” and was hearsay, we nonetheless consider it. Appellant does not challenge the admission of
the evidence on appeal.
16
insufficient to convict Juan Morales as a principal where there was no evidence that he
knew Israel was armed or knew of Israel’s intent to kill the victim. Id. at 303. Thus, the
sufficiency analysis in Morales focused entirely on the absence of evidence necessary to
find Juan Morales guilty as a principal. Id. It provides no guidance as to sufficient
circumstantial evidence to support a conviction for murder.
In Nathan, the court of criminal appeals found the evidence insufficient to support
appellant’s conviction for murder where the victim disappeared in 1972 and his skeletal
remains were found in 1977. 611 S.W.2d at 70. The evidence showed that: (1) the victim
was last seen with appellant; (2) appellant called his place of employment and said he
could not come to work on the afternoon the victim disappeared; (3) appellant gave
conflicting stories as to the presence of blood stains in his car; and (4) he paid some debts
with cash shortly after the victim disappeared. Id. at 76–77. The blood stains in the
appellant’s car were not analyzed for blood type and therefore it could not be determined
if the stains were the same blood type as the deceased. Id. at 77. In contrast, in the
present case, there was a mixture of Beavers’s and appellant’s DNA found in numerous
places: on appellant’s tennis shoes, Beavers’s cell phone, the left hallway wall, the
hallway off the kitchen, the back bedroom door, and the outside bathroom doorknob. In
addition, appellant admitted that the dried bloody shoeprint from his shoe on the pizza
box must have been made when the blood was wet. We are unpersuaded that the
evidence in this case is “similar” to the evidence in Nathan.
We find the Fourteenth Court of Appeals’ decision in Owolabi v. State to be
instructive. 448 S.W.3d 148, 152–53 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). In
Owolabi, three individuals forced open the back door to Ranulfo Lopez’s house where
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Lopez and the victim were selling marijuana. Id. at 149–50. Lopez saw that one of the
individuals had a gun, ran out the front door, and hid in some bushes. Id. A short time
later, he returned to the house and found the victim bleeding on the floor. Id. About the
same time, the appellant sought treatment at a nearby hospital for a bullet wound to his
cheek. Id. Evidence showed that bullets at the crime scene were fired by two different
weapons. Id. at 151. A twenty-dollar bill found on the appellant contained a blood stain
that was consistent with the victim’s blood. Id. at 152. Also, a blood stain on the
appellant’s shirt was consistent with the victim’s blood. Id. Moreover, blood consistent
with the appellant’s blood was found on the butt of a magazine found at the crime scene,
on the floor of the breakfast area in Lopez’s house, the laundry room, on the washing
machine, on the driveway, and on a nearby road. Id. Another witness testified that
appellant had confessed that he had been involved in a “robbery that went bad.” Id.
Although the court ultimately determined that the evidence was sufficient to support the
appellant’s conviction as a conspirator—eliminating the need to determine if the evidence
was sufficient to convict as a principal—it noted that the jury was entitled to resolve any
conflicts in the testimony in favor of the prosecution. See id. at 153.
We also find the present case similar to Wilson v. State, No. 05-11-00176-CR,
2012 WL 2149406, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). In Wilson, the Dallas Court of Appeals found the evidence sufficient to
support the appellant’s conviction for murder where the evidence showed that: (1) blood
found on the appellant’s pants, shirt, keys, and shoes matched the blood of the victims;
(2) a bloody shoe print found on one of the victim’s bodies matched appellant’s shoes;
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and (3) appellant’s cell phone records showed that he was near the crime scene instead
of at his place of employment at the time he claimed. Id. at *4.
Under the Jackson standard, we must defer to the jury’s credibility and weight
determinations, and we will not disturb those findings here. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319. We hold that reasonable jurors could have found appellant guilty of murder beyond
a reasonable doubt, and that the evidence is therefore sufficient to support appellant’s
conviction. See id. We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.
DORI CONTRERAS GARZA,
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
21st day of May, 2015.
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