Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 04-1145

CITIZENS AWARENESS NETWORK, INC.,

Petitioner,

and

NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWER CENTER ET AL.,

Intervenors,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,

Respondents,

and

NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, INC.,

Intervenor.

_______________

No. 04-1359

PUBLIC CITIZEN CRITICAL MASS ENERGY
AND ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,

Respondents.
 PETITIONS FOR REVIEW OF A RULEMAKING OF THE
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before

Selya, Lipez and Howard,

Circuit Judges.

Jonathan Mark Block for petitioner Citizens Awareness Network.
Stephen M. Kohn on brief for intervenors National
Whistleblower Center and Committee for Safety at Plant Zion.
Michael T. Kirkpatrick, with whom Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer and
Scott L. Nelson were on brief, for petitioners Public Citizen
Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program and Nuclear
Information and Resource Service.
Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General (Massachusetts), and Nora
J. Chorover, Assistant Attorney General (Massachusetts), on brief
for Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and New
York, amici curiae.
Steven F. Crockett, Special Counsel, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, with whom Thomas L. Sansonetti, Assistant
Attorney General, Greer S. Goldman and Lisa E. Jones, Attorneys,
Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States
Department of Justice, Karen D. Cyr, General Counsel, John F.
Cordes, Jr., Solicitor, E. Leo Slaggie, Deputy Solicitor, and
Shelly D. Cole, Attorney, United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, were on brief, for respondents.
Ellen C. Ginsberg, with whom Robert W. Bishop and Michael A.
Bauser were on brief, for intervenor Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc.

December 10, 2004
 SELYA, Circuit Judge. Disenchanted with its existing

procedural framework for the conduct of adjudicatory hearings, the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) promulgated new

rules designed to make its hearing processes more efficient. These

new rules greatly reduce the level of formality in reactor

licensing proceedings but, at the same time, place certain

unaccustomed restrictions upon the parties. The petitioners and

petitioner-intervenors are public interest groups. Supported by

the Attorneys General of five states (who have filed a helpful

amicus brief), they claim that the new rules violate a statutory

requirement that all reactor licensing hearings be conducted in

accordance with sections 554, 556, and 557 of the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556 & 557.1 In the

alternative, they claim that the Commission has not put forth an

adequate justification for so substantial a departure from prior

practice and that, therefore, the new rules must be set aside as

arbitrary and capricious. Fully cognizant of the gravity of our

task, we have studied the complex statutory and regulatory

framework and scrutinized the plenitudinous administrative record.

After completing that perscrutation and grappling with an

antecedent jurisdictional question, we find that the new procedures

in fact comply with the relevant provisions of the APA and that the

1
In the pages that follow, we use the modifiers "on the
record" and "formal" interchangeably to refer to adjudications
conducted in accordance with sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA.

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Commission has furnished an adequate explanation for the changes.

Consequently, we deny the petitions for review.

I. BACKGROUND

The NRC is the federal agency charged with regulating the

use of nuclear energy, including the licensing of reactors used for

power generation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2201. The Atomic Energy Act

requires the Commission to hold a hearing "upon the request of any

person whose interest may be affected," id. § 2239(a)(1)(A), before

granting a new license, a license amendment, or a license renewal.

The NRC's predecessor agency, the Atomic Energy

Commission (AEC), originally interpreted this provision as

requiring on-the-record hearings in accordance with the APA. See

Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Legislation, Joint Committee on

Atomic Energy, 87th Cong. 60 (1962) (letter of AEC Commissioner

Loren K. Olsen). These hearings closely resembled federal court

trials, complete with a full panoply of discovery devices and

direct and cross-examination of witnesses by advocates for the

parties. Such hearings proved to be very lengthy; some lasted as

long as seven years.

In 1982, the NRC relaxed its approach for certain types

of licensing proceedings. See, e.g., In re Kerr-McGee Corp., 15

N.R.C. 232, 235 (1982) (determining that formal hearings are not

necessary in materials licensing cases). Although the results were

heartening, the Commission nevertheless retained the full range of

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trial-like procedures for reactor licensing cases. The passage of

time brought further changes: faced with the prospect of hearings

on many license renewal applications in the near future — a large

number of reactors were initially licensed in the decade from 1960

to 1970 and the standard term for such licenses was forty years —

the Commission began to reassess its adjudicatory processes,

focusing particularly on the procedures used in reactor licensing

cases. The NRC's issuance, in 1998, of a policy on the conduct of

adjudicatory proceedings, 63 Fed. Reg. 41,872 (Aug. 5, 1998),

marked the inception of this process. This policy statement

reiterated the NRC's commitment to expeditious adjudication and

urged hearing officers to employ a variety of innovative case-

management techniques in order to improve hearing efficiency.

While encouraging better utilization of existing

procedures, the Commission also began pondering possible procedural

revisions. In January of 1999, the NRC's general counsel drafted

a legal memorandum concluding that the Atomic Energy Act did not

require reactor licensing hearings to be on the record and,

accordingly, that the Commission had the option of replacing the

existing format with a truncated regime. Later that year, the

Commission held a widely attended workshop on hearing procedures.

Building on this foundation, the Commission published a notice of

proposed rulemaking on April 16, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 19,610,

suggesting a major revision of its hearing procedures. In an

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accompanying statement, the Commission took the position that

section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2239, does not

require reactor licensing proceedings to be on the record.

On January 14, 2004, the NRC published a final rule,

along with a response to the comments that the proposed rule had

generated. See 69 Fed. Reg. 2,182. With minor exceptions, the

final rule replicated the proposed rule. The statement of

considerations for the final rule reiterated the Commission's view

that reactor licensing hearings may be informal.

The new rules took effect on February 13, 2004. Although

they apply to all adjudications conducted by the NRC, the

petitioners only challenge their application to reactor licensing

proceedings. We therefore confine our ensuing discussion to that

aspect of the new rules.

Under the old protocol, all reactor licensing hearings

were conducted according to the procedures outlined in 10 C.F.R.

part 2, subpart G. The subpart G rules resemble those associated

with judicial proceedings.2 They include a complete armamentarium

of traditional discovery devices (e.g., requests for document

production, interrogatories, and depositions). 10 C.F.R. § 2.705.

The parties may make motions for summary disposition (although the

hearing officer is not required to entertain them). Id. § 2.710.

2
Subpart G was amended by the new rules, but the changes to it
are not pertinent here.

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There is an evidentiary hearing at which testimony is presented

through direct and cross-examination of witnesses by the parties.

Id. § 2.711.

Under the new rules, reactor licensing hearings are, for

the most part, to be conducted according to a less elaborate set of

procedures described in 10 C.F.R. pt. 2, subpart L.3 The new

subpart — which differs materially from the old subpart L — limns

a streamlined hearing procedure. Unlike subpart G, subpart L does

not provide for traditional discovery. 10 C.F.R. § 2.1203.

Instead, parties in hearings governed by subpart L are required to

make certain mandatory disclosures (akin to "open file" discovery)

anent expert witnesses, expert witness reports, relevant documents,

data compilations, and claims of privilege. Id. § 2.336.

The hearings themselves also differ. Under subpart L,

the presumption is that all interrogation of witnesses will be

undertaken by the hearing officer, not the litigants. Id. §

2.1207. Parties are allowed to submit proposed questions in

advance of the hearing, but the presiding officer is under no

compulsion to pose them. Id. Parties are not allowed to submit

3
We say "for the most part" because there are exceptions. The
new rules still provide for the use of subpart G procedures for,
inter alia, reactor licensing hearings if the presiding officer
finds that the "contested matter necessitates resolution of issues
of material fact relating to the occurrence of a past activity,
where the credibility of an eyewitness may reasonably be expected
to be at issue, and/or issues of motive or intent of the party or
eyewitness [are] material to the resolution of the contested
matter." 10 C.F.R. § 2.310.

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proposed questions during the hearing unless requested to do so by

the presiding officer. Id. Cross-examination is not available as

of right, although a party may request permission to conduct cross-

examination that it deems "necessary to ensure the development of

an adequate record for decision." Id. § 2.1204. A party seeking

leave to conduct cross-examination must submit a cross-examination

plan, which will be included in the record of the proceeding

regardless of whether the request is allowed. Id.

The petitioners — we use that phrase broadly to include

the petitioner-intervenors — took umbrage at these changes and

brought these petitions for judicial review. Their primary claim

is that the Commission erred in its determination that reactor

licensing proceedings do not have to be fully formal adjudications.

In their view, the new rules do not comply with the APA's

requirements for on-the-record adjudication and, therefore, cannot

stand. As a fallback, the petitioners assert that even if the new

rules are not ultra vires, they must be set aside as arbitrary and

capricious.

II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION

The parties have operated on the assumption that this

court has first-instance jurisdiction to hear and determine their

petitions for judicial review. We are not so sanguine — and we are

cognizant that, as a court of limited jurisdiction, subject-matter

jurisdiction will not accrete to us either by the parties'

-8-
acquiescence or by their consent. Espinal-Dominguez v. Puerto

Rico, 352 F.3d 490, 495 (1st Cir. 2003). Consequently, we asked

the parties to address what we perceived to be a thorny question

relating to our authority to entertain these petitions. Before

proceeding to the merits of the petitioners' asseverational array,

we must resolve that question.

The facts are as follows. The petitioners premise

jurisdiction on the Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C. §§

2341-2351, better known as the Hobbs Act. In pertinent part, that

statute confers original jurisdiction on the courts of appeals to

hear petitions for judicial review of "all final orders of the

[NRC] made reviewable by section 2239 of title 42." Id. at §

2342(4). In turn, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(b) makes reviewable, inter

alia, "[a]ny final order entered in any proceeding of the kind

specified in subsection (a) of this section." The proceedings

enumerated in that subsection include those for "the granting,

suspending, revoking, or amending of any license or construction

permit, or application to transfer control, and in any proceeding

for the issuance or modification of rules and regulations dealing

with the activities of licensees." Id. § 2239(a).

Read literally, these interlocking statutes would not

seem to grant jurisdiction to this court. After all, the

petitioners are challenging a rule, not an order. The APA, which

is made applicable to the Commission by 42 U.S.C. § 2231, defines

-9-
an order as "the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether

affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an

agency in a matter other than rule making . . . ." 5 U.S.C. §

551(6) (emphasis supplied). Thus, the action at issue here — a

rulemaking — would appear to fall outside the scope of review

provided by the Hobbs Act.

Even if one were tempted to suppose that Congress simply

misspoke in limiting Hobbs Act jurisdiction to the review of

orders, other sections of the Act would seem to militate against a

judicial reconstruction of the term "order" to encompass

rulemaking. The Act explicitly provides for initial court of

appeals review of "all rules, regulations, or final orders" of the

Secretary of Transportation, the Federal Maritime Commission, and

the Surface Transportation Board. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2342(3), 2342(5).

The principle is clear that Congress's use of differential language

in various sections of the same statute is presumed to be

intentional and deserves interpretive weight. See Duncan v.

Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 173 (2001); In re 229 Main St. Ltd. P'ship,

262 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2001).

Were we writing on a pristine page, we would likely find

this careful parsing persuasive and thus dismiss the case so that

the petitioners could seek initial review in an appropriate

district court. The page, however, is cluttered, not pristine.

There is a substantial body of precedent elaborating the scope of

-10-
the Hobbs Act with respect to both the NRC and other agencies to

which it applies.

The key case is Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470

U.S. 729 (1985), in which the Supreme Court determined that Hobbs

Act jurisdiction existed in the courts of appeals for initial

review of the NRC's denial of citizen petitions to suspend or

revoke licenses. Id. at 746. In making this determination, the

Court declared that the language of section 2239 was ambiguous as

to whether it limited judicial review to orders entered in

proceedings under that section. Id. at 736. The Court then

declared that the Hobbs Act should be interpreted broadly, so as to

maximize the availability of initial circuit court review of

licensing proceedings. Id. at 745.

The Court laid out two grounds in support of this

reasoning. First, it cited efficiency concerns. In this regard,

the Court deemed initial circuit court review the better use of

judicial resources, observed that such a course eliminates one

layer of review, and stressed that there is usually no need for the

compilation of either a fresh or an augmented record in agency

review proceedings. Id. at 744. Second, the Court harangued

against the evils of piecemeal review. In this regard, it warned

that when Congress clearly places initial review of some agency

actions in the courts of appeals, the jurisdictional provision

should not be interpreted narrowly to shunt review of other agency

-11-
actions to the district courts. Id. at 741-42. For these reasons,

the Court admonished that "[a]bsent a firm indication that Congress

intended to locate initial APA review of agency action in the

district courts, we will not presume that Congress intended to

depart from the sound policy of placing initial APA review in the

courts of appeals." Id. at 745.

Lorion has displayed remarkable vitality. The Seventh

Circuit applied its teachings in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. NRC,

830 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1987), finding jurisdiction to review the

Commission's assessment of fees for the processing of a licensing

application. Id. at 613. In the court's view, the assessment was

sufficiently related to a licensing proceeding to ground circuit

court jurisdiction. Id. at 612-13. Pertinently for present

purposes, the court, in the exercise of its discerned jurisdiction,

reviewed the underlying rules on which the Commission had based its

assessment. Id. at 616.

Closer to home, this court has applied Lorion to find

jurisdiction when a contrary reading of the applicable statute

would, for no apparent reason, have divided judicial review between

the district courts and the courts of appeals. See City of Boston

v. HUD, 898 F.2d 828, 834-35 (1st Cir. 1990). The Third Circuit

has gone even further, holding that Lorion creates a presumption of

initial circuit court review "absent clear and convincing evidence

-12-
of a contrary congressional intent." Conoco, Inc. v. Skinner, 970

F.2d 1206, 1214 (3d Cir. 1992).

Although the question is close, we conclude that

appellate jurisdiction is proper in this case. In reaching this

conclusion, we start with the premise that both the Hobbs Act and

the Atomic Energy Act are ambiguous as to their reach.

Furthermore, while the term "order" has a clear meaning for APA

purposes, its placement in section 2239 of the Atomic Energy Act

suggests that Congress might not have used it with the same

precision in connection with the intersection of the Hobbs Act and

the Atomic Energy Act. Cf. Hanover Ins. Co. v. United States, 880

F.2d 1503, 1504 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that the same word may have

different meanings in different statutory contexts). That premise

is bolstered by the fact that the Atomic Energy Act uses the terms

"order" and "rule" inconsistently. For example, section 2239(b)

refers to "[a]ny final order entered in any proceeding of the kind

specified in subsection (a)," but section 2239(a) includes

proceedings "for the issuance or modification of rules and

regulations dealing with the activities of licensees." This

disharmony renders the meaning of "order" in this context

uncertain.

Given these amphibolies, we believe that the policies

announced by the Supreme Court in Lorion deserve special weight.

We interpret Lorion as holding that original jurisdiction in the

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courts of appeals is proper to review any NRC action that could be

cognizable in a petition for review from a proceeding under section

2239. This interpretation is consistent with the Lorion Court's

instruction that jurisdictional statutes should be construed so

that agency actions will always be subject to initial review in the

same court, regardless of the procedural package in which they are

wrapped. Lorion, 470 U.S. at 742. By like token, an affirmation

of jurisdiction in this case is consistent with the Lorion Court's

conclusion that judicial efficiency is best served by limiting the

layers of review. Id. at 744-45. On this basis, and in conformity

with our earlier decision in City of Boston, we conclude that we

have jurisdiction to entertain these petitions.

III. THE MERITS

We divide our discussion of the merits into three

segments, corresponding with the petitioners' most lively bruited

points.

A. Ultra Vires.

The mainstay of the petitioners' challenge is the

proposition that the new rules exceed the Commission's statutory

authority. The petitioners start with the premise that 42 U.S.C.

§ 2239 requires the NRC to conduct licensing hearings on the

record, that is, in strict accordance with the relevant provisions

of the APA. See supra note 1. In their view, the new rules fail

to satisfy that requirement and, therefore, must be pole-axed. In

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the pages that follow, we examine both the petitioners' premise and

their conclusion.

Section 2239 requires the Commission, "upon the request

of any person whose interest may be affected" by certain agency

actions, to hold "a hearing." It does not explicitly require that

the hearing be on the record. We have held, however, that the

degree of formality that a hearing must afford does not necessarily

turn on the presence or absence of an explicit statutory directive.

If, even absent such a directive, the nature of the hearing that

Congress intended to grant is clear, then that intention governs.

Dantran, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 246 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir. 2001);

Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 876 (1st

Cir. 1978). We assume arguendo, favorably to the petitioners, that

the Seacoast rule still obtains.4

The petitioners advance several arguments for holding

that Congress, in enacting section 2239, purposed to require on-

the-record hearings in reactor licensing cases. In addition to

4
Notwithstanding this assumption, we believe it prudent to
point out that Seacoast predates the Supreme Court's watershed
decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and that Dantran merely
followed Seacoast without assessing its vitality in the post-
Chevron era. It seems clear that while the type of hearing
required by a statute turns on congressional intent, Chevron adds
a new dimension, requiring that the agency's reasonable
interpretation be accorded deference if there is any ambiguity as
to that intent. See id. at 843. To what extent (if at all) this
reality erodes Seacoast's rationale is a question that we leave for
another day.

-15-
canvassing the legislative history and cataloging the relevant

amendments to the statute, they point out that for approximately

four decades the NRC and its predecessor agency, the AEC,

interpreted the statute as requiring on-the-record hearings in

reactor licensing proceedings. In response, the NRC highlights the

ambiguity of the statute and attempts to situate the latest round

of changes in a larger history of procedural experimentation. The

Commission also notes that some courts have interpreted section

2239 to allow informal hearings in licensing proceedings not

involving reactors. See, e.g., City of W. Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d

632, 645 (7th Cir. 1983) (licensing of nuclear materials). Last —

but far from least — the Commission urges us to defer to its

judgment that informal hearings are a suitable prophylactic for

reactor licensing. Cf. Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 19-20 (1st

Cir. 2004) (deferring to the agency's judgment on the proper

application of a procedural statute).

For years, the courts of appeals have avoided the

question of whether section 2239 requires reactor licensing

hearings to be on the record. See, e.g., Kelley v. Selin, 42 F.3d

1501, 1510-14 (6th Cir. 1995) (discussing, but not resolving, the

issue while approving the use of informal hearings for materials

storage issues); Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. NRC, 969 F.2d 1169,

1180 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (deeming the issue forfeited and

declining to decide it); Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 920

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F.2d 50, 53 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding the procedural rules at

issue to comply with the APA and declining to decide whether formal

hearings are required); City of W. Chicago, 701 F.2d at 642-43

(distinguishing reactor licensing from materials licensing and

addressing only the latter). We too decline to resolve this issue.

Because the new rules adopted by the Commission meet the

requirements of the APA it does not matter what type of hearing the

NRC is required to conduct in reactor licensing cases.

Before elaborating our reasoning on this point, we must

dispense with a procedural theory advocated by the petitioner

Public Citizen. It is a bedrock principle that a court may only

uphold an administrative action on a rationale advanced by the

agency in the administrative proceeding. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318

U.S. 80, 95 (1943). Embracing this principle, Public Citizen

asserts that the Commission has waived the argument that the new

rules satisfy the APA's requirements because, in promulgating the

new rules, it relied exclusively on its view that section 2239 does

not mandate on-the-record hearings. Thus, it cannot now rely on a

different rationale to defend the rules in court.

This assertion reads the record through rose-colored

glasses. The Commission explicitly memorialized in the statement

of considerations for the final rule the view that even if reactor

licensing hearings were required to be on the record, the new rules

would meet that requirement. 69 Fed. Reg. at 2,192 ("[T]he

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Commission believes that . . . the hearing procedures in each of

these subparts meets [sic] the requirements for an on-the-record

hearing under the APA . . . ."). No more was exigible to preserve

the point. Accordingly, we turn to the merits of this rationale.

We exercise plenary review over the Commission's

compliance with the APA. See Dantran, 246 F.3d at 48 (stating that

agencies' interpretations of statutes they do not administer are

not entitled to particular deference). The APA lays out only the

most skeletal framework for conducting agency adjudications,

leaving broad discretion to the affected agencies in formulating

detailed procedural rules. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United

States, 627 F.2d 1313, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In specific terms,

the APA requires only that the agency provide a hearing before a

neutral decisionmaker and allow each party an opportunity "to

present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to

submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as

may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts." 5

U.S.C. § 556(d).5

5
The APA requires the presiding officer to be the agency, a
member of the agency, or an administrative law judge. 5 U.S.C. §
556(b). In NRC hearings, 42 U.S.C. § 2241 explicitly authorizes
the Commission to empanel safety and licensing boards consisting of
one person "qualified in the conduct of administrative proceedings"
and two persons with "such technical or other qualifications as the
Commission deems appropriate" to preside at hearings under section
2239.

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 The petitioners urge that the magnitude of the risks

involved in reactor licensing proceedings warrant the imposition of

a more elaborate set of safeguards. It is beyond cavil, however,

that, short of constitutional constraints, a court may not impose

procedural requirements in administrative cases above and beyond

those mandated by statute (here, the APA). Vt. Yankee Nuclear

Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543-

44 (1978); Union of Concerned Scientists, 920 F.2d at 53.

Accordingly, we are not at liberty to impress on the Commission (or

any other agency, for that matter) a procedural regime not mandated

by Congress. The NRC's new rules will, therefore, succumb to the

petitioners' first line of attack only if they fail to provide the

minimal procedural safeguards actually demanded by the APA. See

Nat'l Classif. Comm. v. United States, 765 F.2d 1146, 1151 (D.C.

Cir. 1985).

We turn now from the general to the particular. The

rulemaking at issue here effected several changes in the

Commission's procedures. The petitioners focus their challenge on

two aspects of the newly minted process. First, they object to the

Commission's decision to eliminate discovery. Second, they

complain about the Commission's decision to circumscribe the

availability of cross-examination. Because these are the only

issues on which the petitioners have offered developed

argumentation, we confine our analysis to those portions of the new

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rules. Cf. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.

1990) (holding that "a litigant has an obligation to spell out its

arguments squarely and distinctly, or else forever hold its peace"

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We begin with the question of whether the new rules fall

below the APA's minimum requirements by eliminating discovery. The

Commission points out, and the petitioners do not seriously

contest, that the APA does not explicitly require the provision of

any discovery devices in formal adjudications. See 5 U.S.C. § 556;

see also Kelly v. EPA, 203 F.3d 519, 523 (7th Cir. 2000); Frilette

v. Kimberlin, 508 F.2d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 1974). Thus, if the APA

requires the Commission to provide any discovery to satisfy the

standards for formal adjudications, that discovery must be

necessary either to effectuate some other procedural right

guaranteed by the APA or to ensure an adequate record for judicial

review. Cf. U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d

519, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that an agency charged with

holding a hearing to determine the public interest must provide

adequate means of public participation); Seacoast, 572 F.2d at 876-

77 (noting that in some cases procedural requirements may be

implied to ensure adequate judicial review).

The petitioners suggest that discovery is necessary to

realize the right of citizen-intervenors to present their case and

submit an informed rebuttal. See 5 U.S.C. § 556. If discovery is

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unavailable, this thesis runs, citizen-intervenors will be unable

to gather the evidence needed to support their contentions and,

thus, will be shut out of meaningful participation in licensing

hearings.

This thesis is composed of more cry than wool. The

petitioners argue as if the new rules have eliminated all access to

information from opposing parties — but that is a gross distortion.

The new rules provide meaningful access to information from adverse

parties in the form of a system of mandatory disclosure. See 10

C.F.R. § 2.336. Although there might well be less information

available to citizen-intervenors under the new rules, the

difference is one of degree. There is simply no principled way

that we can say that the difference occasioned by replacing

traditional discovery methods with mandatory disclosure is such

that citizen-intervenors are left with no means of adequately

presenting their case.

Nor do we think that full-dress discovery is essential to

ensure a satisfactory record for judicial review. The Commission's

final decision in any hearing must survive review based on the

evidence adduced in the hearing. 5 U.S.C. § 556(e). The applicant

bears the burden of proof in any licensing hearing, id. § 556(d),

and it will have every incentive to proffer sufficient information

to allow the agency to reach a reasoned decision. That same

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quantum of information should be adequate for a reviewing court to

determine whether the agency's action is supportable.

To say more on this point would be to paint the lily.

There is simply no discovery-linked conflict between the new rules

and the APA's on-the-record adjudication requirement. The

petitioners' first line of argument is, therefore, a dead end.

Turning to cross-examination, the petitioners'

contentions fare no better: the new rules meet the APA's

requirements. To explain this conclusion, we first must strip away

the rhetorical flourishes in which the petitioners shroud their

reasoning.

It is important to understand that, contrary to the

petitioners' importunings, the new rules do not extirpate cross-

examination. Rather, they restrict its use to situations in which

it is "necessary to ensure an adequate record for decision." 10

C.F.R. § 2.1204. The legitimacy of this restriction must be

weighed in light of the fact that the APA does not provide an

absolute right of cross-examination in on-the-record hearings.

Seacoast, 572 F.2d at 880. The APA affords a right only to such

cross-examination as may be necessary for a full and fair

adjudication of the facts. Id. Equally to the point, "[t]he party

seeking to cross-examine bears the burden of showing that cross-

examination is in fact necessary." Id. at 880 n.16.

-22-
 The Commission represents that, despite the difference in

language, it interprets the standard for allowing cross-examination

under the new rules to be equivalent to the APA standard. 69 Fed.

Reg. at 2,195-96. When an agency provides a plausible

interpretation of its own procedural rules and there is no record

or pattern of contrary conduct a court has no right either to

slough off that interpretation or to deem it disingenuous. Cf.

Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 378-79 (1st Cir. 2003) (accepting

the agency's good faith in carrying out its procedures, while

acknowledging that evidence to the contrary might warrant judicial

intervention). Given the Commission's stated interpretation, the

new rules on cross-examination cannot be termed inconsistent with

the dictates of the APA. Nor do we see how cross-examination that

is not "necessary to ensure an adequate record for decision" could

be necessary to ensure appropriate judicial review.

Because we find that the new rules meet the APA

requirements for on-the-record adjudications, we hold that their

promulgation does not exceed the Commission's authority.

Consequently, the petitioners' ultra vires argument founders.

B. Arbitrary and Capricious.

Our labors are not yet done. Even though we hold that

the new rules are within the ambit of the NRC's authority, we still

must consider whether its decision to discard the old in favor of

the new was arbitrary and capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.

-23-
 An agency's rules, once adopted, are not frozen in place.

The opposite is true: an agency may alter its rules in light of

its accumulated experience in administering them. Rust v.

Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1991). An agency must, however,

offer a reasoned explanation for the change. If the agency fails

to furnish such an explanation, or if the proffered explanation

fails to demonstrate that the agency fully considered its new

course, the revised rules must be set aside. See Motor Vehicle

Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) ("If Congress established a presumption from

which judicial review should start, that presumption . . . is . .

. against changes in current policy that are not justified by the

rulemaking record.").

The petitioners begin this branch of their assault with

a global challenge to the rationality of departing from the NRC's

forty-year-old procedural regime. They do not suggest that the

Commission's goal of improving hearing efficiency is impermissible;

rather, they maintain that the current procedures worked well

enough and that the Commission has made no showing that they were

the source of any past inefficiencies. The petitioners further

note evidence in the rulemaking record suggesting that efficiency

gains could be brought about through less drastic measures, such as

more aggressive case management.

-24-
 To resolve this point, we first must determine what an

agency must show to justify modifying its procedural rules. As a

general principle, agencies have broad authority to formulate their

own procedures — and the NRC's authority in this respect has been

termed particularly great. Union of Concerned Scientists, 920 F.2d

at 54; BPI v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 502 F.2d 424, 428 n.3 (D.C.

Cir. 1974). A necessary corollary of this authority is the freedom

to experiment with different procedural formats. Consequently,

tinkering with rules is by no means a forbidden activity.

Of course, there are limits on this prerogative. An

agency may not act precipitously or in an irrational manner in

revising its rules. But so long as these limits are observed, it

is not the place of a reviewing court to second-guess the agency's

decision as to when to make procedural changes. It is enough that

the agency reasonably determines that existing processes are

unsatisfactory and takes steps that are fairly targeted at

improving the situation.

In this case, the NRC has determined that its existing

rules of practice lead to hearings that are cumbersome,

unnecessarily protracted, and wasteful of the resources of the

parties and the Commission. This determination warrants a high

degree of deference. See Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 543-44 (holding

that agencies' evaluations of their procedural needs are entitled

to great respect). Although the petitioners may disagree, we

-25-
descry nothing in the record that would support setting aside the

rule on the basis that the agency should have left well enough

alone. It would unfairly handcuff administrators if agencies could

not change their procedures simply because certain of their

constituencies admired the status quo.

That leaves the how of the Commission's new rules; that

is, the question whether the Commission acted arbitrarily in making

a specific set of changes in order to achieve its goal of improved

hearing efficiency. To clear this hurdle, the Commission must show

both that its new rules constitute a rational means for achieving

its stated objective and that it sensibly rejected other options

considered in the rulemaking proceeding (including the option of

maintaining the status quo). See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43-44.

This calculus must fairly account for any benefits lost by

modifying existing rules, as well as any advantages expected to be

gained through the adoption of updated rules. See id.

Here, too, we address only the NRC's decisions to replace

traditional discovery with mandatory disclosure and to restrict the

availability of conventional cross-examination. With regard to

discovery, the NRC explained in its statement of considerations for

the final rule that the proposed substitute "has the potential to

significantly reduce delays and resources expended by all parties

in discovery." 69 Fed. Reg. at 2,194. The Commission also

expressed the view that replacing traditional discovery with

-26-
mandatory disclosure would eliminate a substantial amount of motion

practice related to discovery matters. Id. Finally, the

Commission determined that any prejudice to citizen-intervenors

from eliminating traditional discovery would be offset by the

mandatory disclosure requirements and the general public

availability of NRC documents. Id.

The petitioners renew their exhortation that discovery is

necessary for citizen-intervenors to participate effectively in

reactor licensing hearings. They speculate that without discovery

they will be without access to large amounts of detailed technical

information (information that is available to the applicant and the

Commission staff) and, thus, will be unable to respond adequately

to technical and factual arguments.

We agree with the petitioners that the Commission's

explanation for the change in discovery practice is thin. The

Commission baldly states its belief that eliminating traditional

discovery will shorten hearings and conserve resources, but it

provides no empirical analysis of its experience with traditional

discovery from which an outside observer can determine what

benefits the Commission might reasonably expect. In a substantive

rule, this omission might be fatal. See, e.g., Portland Cement

Ass'n v. Ruckelhaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("It is not

consonant with the purpose of a rulemaking proceeding to promulgate

-27-
rules on the basis of inadequate data, or on data that, [in]

critical degree, is known only to the agency.").

In the realm of procedure, however, agencies are presumed

to have special competence and, accordingly, are held to less

exacting standards of explication. See Union of Concerned

Scientists, 920 F.2d at 54 (noting that procedural determinations

"fall uniquely within the expertise of the agency"). To add to

this leeway, we are not willing to ignore matters that are common

knowledge to courts of law. Discovery, especially in complex

matters, is both time-consuming and costly. We do not think it can

reasonably be questioned that the replacement of discovery with

mandatory disclosure will make reactor licensing hearings faster

and less expensive.

The Commission also has explained that it believes any

harm to citizen-intervenors will be minimal. Although the

petitioners offer some hypothetical examples of information that

may be unavailable under the new rules, they have not made a

persuasive case that mandatory disclosure will undercompensate for

the loss of traditional discovery. We thus find no basis for

setting aside the new rules on discovery-related grounds.

The new rules' outlook on cross-examination presents a

closer question. The Commission reasons that restricting cross-

examination will reduce the amount of testimony taken and make

hearings more efficient. 69 Fed. Reg. at 2,196. The Commission

-28-
further observes that, in its experience, cross-examination is not

always helpful to the resolution of scientific or technical issues.

Id.

The petitioners retort that cross-examination is a vital

component of a citizen-intervenor's case. They note that citizen-

intervenors often lack the resources to present their own expert

testimony and must rely on cross-questioning of the adverse party's

experts to make their case. They also stress the value of cross-

examination as a means for bolstering public confidence in

licensing hearings. Tellingly, the Commission's own administrative

judges agree that cross-examination is helpful for the resolution

of issues raised in many licensing hearings. In addition to the

reasons advanced by the petitioners, the administrative judges note

that the prospect of cross-examination discourages exaggeration in

direct testimony because witnesses are aware that they will have to

defend their statements later.

Experience in the courts has left no doubt that cross-

examination can be a useful tool. Had the new rules abolished

cross-examination entirely, we might well find the Commission's

action insupportable. Importantly, however, the new rules do not

completely do away with cross-examination. Rather, they leave its

availability to the discretion of the hearing officer. Just as we

will not ignore the fact that discovery is resource-consuming, we

will not presume that all — or, perhaps, even most — cross-

-29-
examination is essential to the just resolution of issues. With

this in mind, we find no fault with the Commission's decision to

attempt to curtail unnecessary cross-examination. Cf. 5 U.S.C. §

556(d) ("[T]he agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the

exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious

evidence."). Accordingly, we cannot say that it is arbitrary and

capricious for the Commission to leave the determination of whether

cross-examination will further the truth-seeking process in a

particular proceeding to the discretion of the individual hearing

officer.

We do, however, add a caveat. The APA does require that

cross-examination be available when "required for a full and true

disclosure of the facts." Id. If the new procedures are to comply

in practice with the APA, cross-examination must be allowed in

appropriate instances. Should the agency's administration of the

new rules contradict its present representations or otherwise flout

this principle, nothing in this opinion will inoculate the rules

against future challenges.

C. Constitutional Claims.

One petitioner, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN), charges

that the new rules are unconstitutional because they deprive

citizen-intervenors of fundamental political rights and

discriminate against them in violation of the Fifth Amendment. We

explore these charges.

-30-
 CAN's first charge implodes because there is no

fundamental right to participate in administrative adjudications.

Reactor licensing (unlike, say, voting) is not "preservative of

other basic civil and political rights." Reynolds v. Sims, 377

U.S. 533, 562 (1964). Assuming, for argument's sake, that citizen-

intervenors have a protected liberty interest in the outcome of

reactor licensing proceedings — a proposition that we consider

extremely dubious, see City of W. Chicago, 701 F.2d at 645 — the

quantum of process required before the government may deprive

citizen-intervenors of that interest would depend on the three-part

analysis adumbrated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335

(1976). CAN makes no effort to apply the Mathews rubric to the

rules at issue, and we will not do CAN's homework for it. The

issue is, therefore, forfeit. See Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17.

As for equal protection, CAN claims that we should apply

strict scrutiny because citizen-intervenors are a "discrete and

insular minority." This claim is meritless. The Supreme Court has

made it crystal clear that the criteria for deeming a class suspect

are both rigorous and specific. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361,

375 n.14 (1974); San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

1, 28 (1973). As a class, citizen-intervenors cannot begin to meet

those criteria. They are not "saddled with such disabilities, or

subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or

relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to

-31-
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political

process," Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28, nor do they share any

"immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of

birth," Johnson, 415 U.S. at 375 n.14.

Belaboring this point would serve no useful purpose.

Whatever legitimate grievances citizen-intervenors may have, it is

absurd to equate discrimination against them with the historic

discrimination against racial and other minorities that lies at the

core of suspectedness. The bottom line is that citizen-intervenors

are not a suspect class. We so hold.

This holding means, of course, that rational basis review

applies, not strict scrutiny. See Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 42

(1st Cir. 2000). Thus, CAN bears the burden of demonstrating that

no plausible set of facts exists that could forge a rational

relationship between the challenged rules and the government's

legitimate goals. Id. at 44; Montalvo-Huertas v. Rivera-Cruz, 885

F.2d 971, 978-79 (1st Cir. 1989). For the reasons set forth above,

see supra Part III(B), there can be no doubt that the Commission's

action is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.

It follows inexorably, as night follows day, that CAN's

constitutional argument is meritless.

IV. CONCLUSION

We need go no further. Procedural flexibility is one of

the great hallmarks of the administrative process — and it is a

-32-
feature that courts must be reluctant to curtail. Though the

Commission's new rules may approach the outer bounds of what is

permissible under the APA, we find the statute sufficiently broad

to accommodate them. Similarly, the Commission's judgments as to

when its procedures need fine-tuning and how they should be

retooled are ones to which we accord great respect. We cannot say

that the Commission's desire for more expeditious adjudications is

unreasonable, nor can we say that the changes embodied in the new

rules are an eccentric or a plainly inadequate means for achieving

the Commission's goals. Accordingly, both of the instant petitions

must be denied.

The petitions for judicial review are denied and

dismissed.

— Concurring Opinion Follows —

-33-
 LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Although I concur fully in Judge

Selya's thoughtful and comprehensive opinion, I write separately to

describe some oddities about this case which should not go

unnoticed. The basic proposition of Judge Selya's decision is

indisputably correct: the new rules promulgated by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) to reduce the level of formality in

reactor licensing proceedings comply with the "on-the-record"

requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Yet that

legal proposition was largely an afterthought of the NRC in the

effort to justify its new rules. Instead, the NRC principally

argued in the long run-up to this case that 42 U.S.C. § 2239, which

simply requires the Commission to hold a hearing "upon the request

of any person whose interest may be affected" before granting a new

license, did not invoke the requirements for formal adjudication

(commonly referred to as "on-the-record" hearings) under the APA.

It is striking that so many smart people at the NRC could

be so wrong for so long about the requirements of the APA.

Although this history does not affect the outcome of this case, it

should be noted as a cautionary tale about the power of analogy and

the endurance of unexamined legal theories. This history also

serves to explain some of the legitimate frustrations of the

petitioners, who felt that they were dealing with a moving target

as the NRC tried to justify its new regulations. With so much at

stake in these nuclear reactor licensing proceedings, the

-34-
rulemaking process should have followed a steadier course. For

reasons I shall explain, this was not the rulemaking process at its

best.

Terminology

The terminology for hearings under the APA can be

imprecise and confusing. The everyday meaning of terms like

"formal" and "informal" sometimes creeps into the discussion,

although those terms have specific, functional definitions under

the APA. As Judge Selya notes, the terms "formal" and "on-the-

record" are generally used as shorthand for hearings that must be

conducted pursuant to the requirements of 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, and

557 of the APA. Other terms, too, are sometimes used to refer to

such procedures -- "trial-type" and "quasi-judicial." These vague

and indefinite terms are particularly mischievous because they

evoke images of courtroom trials, and they have contributed to the

false impression that the APA's requirement of on-the-record

hearings involves procedures more akin to civil trials than is

actually the case.

To be specific, § 554 requires that, in cases of an

“adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record

after opportunity for an agency hearing,” the agency must follow

the procedures outlined in §§ 556 and 557. Although the statutory

text at issue here is itself rather pithy, these procedures can be

usefully condensed into the following ten points:

-35-
 1. The agency must give notice of legal authority and
matters of fact and law asserted. § 554(b).

2. The oral evidentiary hearing must be presided over by
an officer who can be disqualified for bias. § 556(b).

3. Presiding officers cannot have ex parte
communications. §§ 554(d), 557(d)(1).

4. Parties are entitled to be represented by attorneys.
§ 555(b).

5. The proponent of an order has the burden of proof.
§ 556(d).

6. A party is entitled to present oral or documentary
evidence. § 556(d).

7. A party is entitled "to conduct such cross-examination
as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the
facts." § 556(d).

8. Orders can be issued only on consideration of the
record of the hearing. § 556(d).

9. The transcript of testimony and exhibits is the
exclusive record for decision and shall be made available
to parties. § 556(e).

10. The decision must include "findings and conclusions,
and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material
issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the
record." § 557(c)(3)(A).

See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 8.1 (4th

ed. 2002). Strikingly, there is no reference to discovery in these

statutory provisions of the APA, and cross-examination is assured

only if necessary "for a full and true disclosure of the facts."

5 U.S.C. § 556(d). Most of these provisions relate to the conduct

and responsibilities of the presiding officer or the basis for

agency orders (on the record). Only a few relate to the conduct of

-36-
the hearing itself. These APA requirements leave agencies with a

great deal of flexibility in tailoring on-the-record hearing

procedures to suit their perceived needs.

If hearings are not required to be “on the record,” the

procedures of §§ 556 and 557 are not triggered; the only section of

the APA applicable to the proceedings is § 555, titled "Ancillary

matters." Section 555(b) entitles a party to be represented by a

lawyer, § 555(c) entitles people who have submitted data or

evidence to retain copies of their submissions, and § 555(e)

requires agencies to give prompt notice when they deny a petition

made in connection with a proceeding, and to give a brief statement

of the grounds for denial. Additionally, subsections (c) and (d)

require that process, subpoenas, and other investigative demands

must be made in accordance with law. Of course, these “informal”

hearings must also comply with basic due process requirements.

From the beginning of its proposed rulemaking, the NRC

repeatedly referred to the procedures outlined in the new

regulations as "informal," as opposed to the outmoded formal

procedures of the past. The clear implication was that the new

informal procedures would not meet the APA’s requirements for

formal, on-the-record hearings. Thus, the NRC believed that it

first had to establish that its authorizing statute, the Atomic

Energy Act (AEA), did not require it to hold on-the-record hearings

for reactor licensing.

-37-
 Background to Rulemaking

Judge Selya outlines some of the important history of the

rulemaking in this case. However, there is more to this curious

history that is worth telling. From the 1998 Policy Statement to

the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the NRC barely contemplated the

possibility that it could reform its hearing procedures to its

liking and still comply with the APA after all. Indeed, at first,

the NRC did not propose any dramatic changes to its hearing

procedures. In its August 5, 1998 Policy Statement, the NRC stated

that it hoped to encourage a renewed vigor in the enforcement of

already-existing hearing procedures by the Atomic Safety and

Licensing Boards (ASLBs).6 To expedite hearings, the NRC advocated

greater adherence to schedules, more rigorous enforcement of time

limits for filing (for example, allowing extensions of time only in

"unavoidable and extreme circumstances"), more rigorous enforcement

of contention requirements,7 and tighter management of discovery.

6
On-the-record hearings at most agencies must be presided over
by the agency, one of the members of the body that comprises the
agency, or an administrative law judge (ALJ). 5 U.S.C. § 556(b).
Because of the highly technical nature of hearings before the NRC,
however, Congress authorized the NRC "to establish one or more
atomic safety and licensing boards, each comprised of three
members, one of whom shall be qualified in the conduct of
administrative proceedings and two of whom shall have such
technical or other qualifications as the Commission deems
appropriate to the issues to be decided." 42 U.S.C. § 2241. These
ASLBs now preside over the bulk of licensing hearings at the NRC.
7
A request for hearing or a petition for leave to intervene in
a licensing hearing must set forth with particularity the
contentions sought to be litigated in the hearing. These

-38-
It also announced that the NRC "may consider further changes to the

Rules of Practice as appropriate to enable additional improvements

to the adjudicatory process."

True to its word, the NRC issued a Staff Requirements

Memorandum to its Office of General Counsel (OGC) on July 22, 1999,

directing it to develop a proposed rulemaking. At the same time,

the Commission noted that it would also pursue a legislative

solution by lobbying Congress to confirm its authority to reform

licensing hearings as it wished. Again, the Staff Requirements

Memorandum never suggested that the NRC could reduce the formality

of its hearing procedures while staying within the strictures of

the APA's requirements for on-the-record hearings. Instead, the

NRC apparently still believed that the more informal licensing

procedures it sought would not comply with the APA, and that it had

to establish its freedom from the APA's strictest requirements.

The Staff Requirements Memorandum also directed the NRC's

OGC to solicit the views of interested parties on the proposed

rulemaking. Consequently, the general counsel held a two-day

meeting in October 1999, called a "hearing process workshop," with

representatives from the nuclear industry, citizens' groups

(including the petitioners in this case), other federal agencies,

academia, and the NRC's Atomic Safety Board and Licensing Panel.

Although the OGC encouraged a wide-ranging conversation, no one

requirements were further tightened by the rulemaking.

-39-
raised the possibility that the NRC licensing procedures could be

more informal yet still comply with the APA.

In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking itself, 66 Fed. Reg.

19,610 (April 16, 2001), which for the first time proposed specific

changes to the NRC's hearing procedures, there was still no

argument that the proposed procedures complied with the APA's

requirements. Instead, the notice offered pages of legal analysis

on the history of the AEA, all intended to justify the NRC's

ability to promulgate new hearing procedures that are not subject

to the APA's requirements for on-the-record hearings.

Other choices made by the NRC in its regulatory overhaul

further emphasize the firmness of its conviction that the

supposedly “informal” procedures it was proposing did not comply

with the APA's requirements for on-the-record hearings. In the one

instance where no one disputes that the NRC must hold on-the-record

hearings -- the licensing of construction and operation of uranium

enrichment facilities, see 42 U.S.C. § 2243(b) -- the Notice

described this process as "requiring formal trial-type hearing

procedures to be used." 66 Fed. Reg. at 19,623. Consequently, the

NRC believed that it could not use new subpart L for these hearings

but had to resort to the more formal procedures of subpart G.8

8
Public Citizen emphasizes this point in its reply brief,
stating: “The retention of Subpart G procedures for enrichment
facility hearings confirms that the NRC concluded in the rulemaking
that only Subpart G provided on-the-record hearing procedures.”

-40-
 Strikingly, in the entire record of this rulemaking prior

to the promulgation of the Final Rule, I can find only one footnote

hinting that anyone at the NRC thought that it could reduce the

formality of its procedures while at the same time complying with

the strictures of the APA. In a footnote in its January 1999 memo,

the OGC acknowledged the possibility of eliminating the "elements

of Subpart G that go beyond the Administrative Procedure Act's

requirements for 'on-the-record' hearings. One immediate effect

would be to eliminate formal discovery in NRC adjudications." The

memo contains no further discussion of how far beyond the APA's

requirements the OGC understood Subpart G to go.

Not until publication of the Final Rule itself did the

NRC assert for the first time that the new procedures comply with

the APA's requirements for an on-the-record hearing -- and even

here, the NRC devotes only a few sentences to the issues of cross-

examination, discovery, and the presiding officer.9 Indeed, the

NRC's few statements are easily reproduced in their entirety. In

response to concerns about the reforms to cross-examination, the

NRC stated: "The Commission believes that this approach strikes an

appropriate balance in the use of cross-examination, and is

9
The APA has various provisions intended to keep the presiding
officer independent of the parties and of the agency. See 5 U.S.C.
§§ 554(d), 556(b), and 557(d)(1). ALJs' compensation is handled by
the Office of Personnel Management, not the agency appointing them
for adjudications. This arrangement is designed to keep them free
of any undue influence from the agency.

-41-
consistent with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure

Act (APA), which does not require cross-examination for on-the-

record proceedings unless necessary for a 'fair and true disclosure

of the facts.'" 69 Fed. Reg. 2182, 2188 (Jan. 14, 2004). A little

later, the NRC states: "The Commission's consideration of cross-

examination in the hearing process begins with the observation that

parties have no fundamental right to cross-examination, even in the

most formal hearing procedures provided in Subpart G." 69 Fed.

Reg. at 2195-96.

As for concerns about the availability of discovery, the

NRC stated: "Thus, the mandatory disclosure requirement in subpart

C, the hearing file provision in subparts G, L, and N[,] and the

requirement for an LSN and 'electronic docket' in subpart J, go

well beyond the 'discovery' provisions for full, on-the-record

adjudicatory hearings under the APA."10 69 Fed. Reg. at 2189. As

10
The Final Rule explains elsewhere some of this passage’s more
obscure terms. For hearings conducted under subpart J, the NRC and
potential parties must

disclose pertinent documents by participating in the
"Licensing Support Network" (LSN) before an application
is filed. In addition, under subparts G, L, and N the NRC
staff is required to prepare, make available, and update
a "hearing file" consisting of the application and any
amendments, NRC safety and environmental reports relating
to the application, and any correspondence between the
NRC and the applicant that is relevant to the
application. A parallel concept is provided in subpart J
by the requirement for the NRC staff to maintain an
"electronic docket."

69 Fed. Reg. at 2189.

-42-
for presiding officers, the NRC described how the new regulations

provided for either an ALJ or a three-member ASLB to preside over

the hearing, and then stated: "The Commission has taken this step

to ensure that all of these proceedings meet the requirements with

regard to a presiding officer for an on-the-record hearing under

the APA." 69 Fed. Reg. at 2191. However, despite these few

references in the Final Rule to meeting the APA’s requirements for

on-the-record hearings, the NRC's primary rationale for its new

procedures remained its long-standing position that reactor

licensing hearings did not have to comply with the on-the-record

requirements of the APA.11

In considerable part, administrative agencies set the

terms of the debate in the rulemaking process with the arguments

they advance in support of their rulemaking initiatives. If

certain arguments are unmistakably primary, those arguments will

draw most of the attention during the administrative process, and

during the judicial review that follows. Not surprisingly,

opponents will believe that the primacy of the argument means that

it is the most important argument to address. If, in the end, the

dispositive issue on appeal is a different issue, addressed only

glancingly in the administrative process, there has been enormous

wasted effort, and the courts of appeal will be poorly served by

11
As Public Citizen says, the NRC filled both the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and the Final Rule with “page after page of
argument” meant to establish this proposition.

-43-
appellate briefing that reflects the outdated emphases of the

administrative process. That is precisely what happened here.

In their petition for review, petitioners never even

mentioned the argument of the NRC that its new procedures complied

with the APA's requirements for on-the-record hearings. Not one of

the petitioners addressed the argument in their opening briefs.12

Indeed, the NRC tried to exploit this omission by arguing that

petitioners had thereby waived the issue. In response, Public

Citizen stated that the NRC argued from the beginning of the

rulemaking that its freedom from the APA's on-the-record

requirements was essential to its ability to fashion informal

procedures, and “[t]here would have been no need for page after

page of argument that Section 189 does not require on-the-record

hearing procedures in reactor licensing cases if the NRC had

believed that the new Subpart L procedures conformed to these

requirements.”13 Public Citizen added that the few references to

APA-compliance in the Final Rule were nothing more than "stray

remarks" when weighed against the overwhelming number of statements

to the contrary made by the NRC throughout the rulemaking. Public

12
However, the amici States did devote a section of their
brief, filed before the NRC's opposition, to arguing that the new
procedures fail to meet the APA's requirements for on-the-record
hearings.
13
Public Citizen refers to § 189 of the AEA, now codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2239, which provides for hearings in licensing
decisions and judicial review.

-44-
Citizen then tried to turn this lament into a legal argument based

upon SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). Although the lament

is a fair one, the legal argument does not work.

SEC v. Chenery

In Chenery, the Supreme Court warned courts that they

must not substitute their own policy judgments for those of the

administrative agencies whose decisions they review. The Court

explained that this rule did not disturb the settled rule that

appellate courts can affirm trial court decisions that are right

for the wrong reasons:

In confining our review to a judgment upon the validity
of the grounds upon which the Commission itself based its
action, we do not disturb the settled rule that, in
reviewing the decision of a lower court, it must be
affirmed if the result is correct although the lower
court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.
The reason for this rule is obvious. It would be
wasteful to send a case back to a lower court to
reinstate a decision which it had already made but which
the appellate court concluded should properly be based on
another ground within the power of the appellate court to
formulate. But it is also familiar appellate procedure
that where the correctness of the lower court's decision
depends upon a determination of fact which only a jury
could make but which has not been made, the appellate
court cannot take the place of the jury. Like
considerations govern review of administrative orders. If
an order is valid only as a determination of policy or
judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and
which it has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made
to do service for an administrative judgment. For
purposes of affirming no less than reversing its orders,
an appellate court cannot intrude upon the domain which
Congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative
agency.

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SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted) (Chenery I).14

The dispute in Chenery came before the Court again in

1947, after the SEC had "reexamined the problem, recast its

rationale and reached the same result." SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332

U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (Chenery II). Accepting the SEC's new

decision as justified by an administrative determination that "is

based upon substantial evidence and is consistent with the

authority granted by Congress," id. at 207, the Court noted the

"important corollary" to Chenery's rule of judicial review of

agency decisions:

If the administrative action is to be tested by the basis
upon which it purports to rest, that basis must be set
forth with such clarity as to be understandable. It will
not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory
underlying the agency's action; nor can a court be
expected to chisel that which must be precise from what
the agency has left vague and indecisive. In other
words, 'We must know what a decision means before the
duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or wrong.'

14
Citing broad equitable principles of fiduciary duty taken
from case law, the SEC had refused to approve a stock
reorganization plan until it was amended to eliminate the effect of
some suspect stock purchases by the company's management. The
company amended the plan accordingly and the SEC approved it. The
Court found that the case law cited by the SEC, however, did not
support its decision. Rather than deciding whether the SEC's
decision could be sustained on a second basis -- that of the
special authority given by Congress to the SEC to administer the
securities laws -- the Court remanded the case to the agency for
further proceedings. If the SEC had intended to invoke that second
basis as an alternative ground, it had not done so with sufficient
clarity to allow the Court to review its action.

-46-
Id. at 196 (quoting United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R.

Co., 294 U.S. 499, 511 (1935)). The Chenery decisions have

continuing vitality today. See, e.g., NLRB v. K. River Cmty. Care,

Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 721 (2001); Nat'l Tower, LLC v. Plainville

Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 297 F.3d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 2002); Rizek v.

SEC, 215 F.3d 157, 161 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing the

"well-established rule that agencies must sufficiently articulate

the grounds of their decisions so that appellate courts are able to

perform their function of judicial review meaningfully.")

Despite the NRC's disproportionate attention to its

original premise that it could alter its procedures for the

licensing of nuclear reactors free of the on-the-record

requirements of the APA, and its scant attention to the APA-

compliance argument that prevails here (found primarily in several

sentences placed in the Final Rule), I agree with Judge Selya that

the NRC preserved the rationale that has become the basis for

affirming its rulemaking initiative. However, if the Chenery cases

have a spirit, the NRC came perilously close to violating it here,

with the unfortunate consequences for efficient administrative

process and effective appellate review that I have already

described. Although, to quote Chenery II, we did not have "to

guess at the theory underlying the agency's action," 332 U.S. at

197, we had to find it with too little help from the parties

because of the NRC's failure to understand the APA's flexibility.

-47-
 Further History

The NRC's belated recognition that the new licensing

procedures might in fact comply with the on-the-record requirements

of the APA is all the more surprising because sources

contemporaneous with the APA's passage suggest that flexibility has

always been a hallmark of the APA, and that agencies have always

had considerable discretion to structure on-the-record hearings to

suit their particular needs. This flexibility is nowhere more

evident than in determining the role of cross-examination in on-

the-record hearings.

The Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative

Procedure Act (1947) is a "key document" for interpreting the APA,

Am. Min. Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109

(D.C. Cir. 1993). We have described it as containing the "most

authoritative" account of the history of the Act's passage, Warder

v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 79 (1st Cir. 1998). See also V. Yankee

Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.

519, 546 (1978) (the Attorney General's Manual is "a

contemporaneous interpretation previously given some deference by

this Court because of the role played by the Department of Justice

in drafting the legislation"). The Attorney General’s Manual

offers a vision of cross-examination entirely consistent with that

advanced by the NRC in this rulemaking.

-48-
 The Manual begins by stressing the general importance of

cross-examination in on-the-record hearings, cautioning that "it is

clear that the 'right to present his case or defense by oral or

documentary evidence' does not extend to presenting evidence in

affidavit or other written form so as to deprive the agency or

opposing parties of opportunity for cross-examination." AG's

Manual at 77. Technical evidence may be introduced in written form

as long as its admission "would not prejudicially deprive other

parties or the agency of opportunity for cross-examination. Thus,

technical and statistical data may be introduced in convenient

written form subject to adequate opportunity for cross-examination

and rebuttal." Id.

The Attorney General's Manual goes on, however, to

acknowledge that the general opportunity to cross-examine is

subject to restrictions which become more salient as the complexity

of the hearing's subject matter increases. On this point, the

Manual quotes from the Report of the House Committee on the

Judiciary on the APA. The Report cautions that the APA's provision

for "such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true

disclosure of the facts" does not

confer a right of so-called 'unlimited'
cross-examination. Presiding officers will have to make
the necessary initial determination whether the
cross-examination is pressed to unreasonable lengths by
a party or whether it is required for the 'full and true
disclosure of the facts' stated in the provision. Nor is
it the intention to eliminate the authority of agencies
to confer sound discretion upon presiding officers in the

-49-
 matter of its extent. The test is -- as the section
states -- whether it is required 'for a full and true
disclosure of the facts.' In many rule making
proceedings where the subject matter and evidence are
broadly economic or statistical in character and the
parties or witnesses numerous, the direct or rebuttal
evidence may be of such a nature that cross-examination
adds nothing substantial to the record and unnecessarily
prolongs the hearings.

H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 37.

The Attorney General’s Manual and the House Report serve

as good indicators that Congress, when it passed the APA,

understood that agencies needed a considerable amount of

flexibility in fashioning hearing procedures for on-the-record

hearings. Despite the frequent use of terms like "trial-type" and

"quasi-judicial" over the years to refer to on-the-record hearings,

agencies have always been able to adapt their procedures for on-

the-record hearings under the APA. Today, this statute of general

applicability governs the procedures for an enormous variety of

hearings -- everything from relatively simple claims for workers'

compensation, to enforcement proceedings under the National Labor

Relations Act or the Occupational Health and Safety Act, to complex

rate-setting hearings before the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission. See Manual for Administrative Law Judges (ALJ Manual),

49-51.

This historical flexibility is confirmed by a modern-day

guide to the conduct of on-the-record hearings, the Manual for

Administrative Law Judges, which provides a thorough overview of

-50-
the current state of on-the-record procedures.15 Although the

Manual is primarily designed as a practical aid for ALJs, it also

offers an analysis of the fundamental requirements of the APA,

including a section on the special problems presented by complex

hearings at both the agency and ALJ levels. See ALJ Manual at 49-

70. Ultimately, if the ALJ Manual tells us anything about what a

typical on-the-record hearing looks like, it is that there is no

typical hearing.

In its section on complex hearings, the ALJ Manual begins

by noting that the term "quasi-judicial" is most often used to

refer to "relatively simple cases." Id. at 50. "Typically, these

quasi-judicial proceedings are nearly identical to a formal

adjudication without a jury," with the full panoply of pleadings,

pre-hearing discovery, and witnesses who testify orally on direct

and cross-examination. Id. at 49. Complex cases, however, are

15
See http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/apa/refrnc/malj.pdf. The
current edition of the Manual is not an official government
publication. Previous editions of this Manual, however, had been
published by the Administrative Conference of the United States
(ACUS), a government body. Prof. Morell E. Mullins of the
University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law was the
principal editor and revisor of the third edition in 1990. After
Congress eliminated funding for the ACUS in the 1990s, Prof.
Mullins took it upon himself in 2001 to reproduce the Manual on the
web in somewhat updated form. Recently, this 2001 "interim
Internet edition," as he called it, was published in substantially
unchanged form in the journal of the National Association of
Administrative Law Judges, a nonprofit professional organization.
Also, the website of the Office of Administrative Law Judges, U.S.
Department of Labor, links to the Manual (while not guaranteeing
its accuracy or expressing a view on its contents).

-51-
"another matter," bearing less resemblance to our traditional

concept of a civil trial. Id. at 51. The ALJ Manual cites the

NRC's use of ASLBs as an "innovative approach to complex cases"

with highly technical subject matter. Id. at 52. In general, the

ALJ Manual emphasizes the use of written submissions of direct and

rebuttal evidence: "Typically, much of the testimony is highly

technical and lengthy, and is submitted in written form prior to

the hearing." Id. at 51. "Preparation and exchange of direct and

rebuttal evidence is usually beneficial in complex cases." Id. at

56.16

Like the Attorney General's Manual, the ALJ Manual

emphasizes the basic importance of the opportunity to cross-examine

in on-the-record hearings, noting that "judges should be extremely

cautious about denying parties an opportunity to cross-examine

witnesses." Id. at 55 n.149. In the end, however, and again like

the Attorney General's Manual, the ALJ Manual also acknowledges the

agencies' need to adapt hearing procedures to suit especially

complex cases, observing that "[u]nless witness credibility is

involved, cross-examination is frequently confined to clarifying

the exhibits, determining the source of the material, and testing

the basis for the witness's conclusions." Id. at 83. In fact, the

16
Of course, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) provides that, in deciding
applications for initial licenses, all evidence may be submitted in
written form only so long as "a party will not be prejudiced
thereby."

-52-
ALJ Manual even notes a proposal by one legal commentator that "the

major rebuttal of expert opinion testimony should take place not by

cross-examination but by submission, prior to the hearing, of

rebuttal testimony prepared by the opponent's experts." Id.

These sources, both contemporaneous with the APA's

passage and modern, show that procedures in on-the-record hearings,

despite sometimes being described as "trial-type" procedures, can

in fact stray considerably from the procedures found in civil

trials as the subjects of the administrative proceedings become

more complex and more technical. This flexibility is inherent in

the APA, and has been acknowledged by commentators and by courts.

See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 880

(1st Cir. 1978) (finding no basis to petitioners' argument that the

APA required presiding officer to afford opportunity for cross-

examination); Cellular Mobile Systems of Pa., Inc. v. FCC, 782 F.2d

182, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Cross-examination is therefore not an

automatic right conferred by the APA; instead, its necessity must

be established under specific circumstances by the party seeking

it.").17 With these abundant sources pointing the way, the NRC's

belated recognition that the APA could, in fact, accommodate its

procedural reforms is all the more puzzling.

17
Of course, it hardly needs repeating that "[n]aturally, the
Administrator's decision regarding the necessity of holding
cross-examination will be subject to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A)." Seacoast, 572 F.2d at 880 n.18.

-53-
 Conclusion

For most of the history of this rulemaking, the NRC

argued that it did not have to comply with the APA's on-the-record

requirements in refashioning its procedures for reactor licensing

hearings. Belatedly, and then only sketchily, the NRC advanced the

alternative argument that its proposed procedures complied with

those on-the-record requirements. The staying power of old

theories and flawed analogies (the repeated references to trial-

type proceedings) may account for some of this delay. Whatever the

reasons, the deleterious effect of this late insight on the

rulemaking process and our review of it is undeniable. Countless

hours were wasted during the administrative process fighting over

the tired issue of whether 42 U.S.C. § 2239 requires reactor

licensing hearings to be on the record. This tired issue dogged

judicial review as well. Although we have done what Chenery

requires -- affirming on a basis advanced by the agency itself

during the administrative process -- we got there with too little

help from the parties. There is a victory here for the NRC, but it

should be a cause for self-examination rather than jubilation.

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