The defendants demurred to the complaint ore tenus on the ground that it did not set forth a cause of action; thát, admitting all the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, as a matter of law, the plaintiff had no cause of action, and the temporary restraining order was properly dissolved by the court below. There is no allegation in the complaint that the Asheville Typographical Union is a corporation, and it is not a natural person. It is an unincorporated association and cannot be sued.
In Tucker v. Eatough, individually and as agent for the United States -Textile Workers of America, an unincorporated association, 186 N. C., 509, Clark, C. J., said: “If, contrary to common law, an action could be brought without authority of a statute against an unincorporated body, it would be permissible for. any person to bring an action *47against the Confederate Veterans Association, or the American Legion, or the League of "Women Voters, or any other unorganized body, upon an allegation that one of their members had committed the libel or other legal wrong against the person bringing the action. It certainly cannot be necessary to discuss further the proposition that, the United Textile 'Workers of America'not being a legal entity, and there being no statute authorizing them to be sued, that the action was properly dismissed as to them.”
This principle is well settled in this State. Nelson v. Belief Department, 147 N. C., 104; Kerr v. Hicks, 154 N. C., 268. The Yale Law Journal of 'February, 1924, has an interesting article (by Wesley A. StUrges) citing- numerous authorities. It says: “The cases are remarkably in accord that, in the absence of enabling statute, an unincorporated association cannot sue or be sued in the common or association, name.” (Added, since opinion was written, by consent of the Court.) We think the court below was correct in dissolving the restraining order against the Asheville Typographical Union, No. 263, but not so against the individuals sued.
In the case of Tucker v. Eatough, supra, Clark, C. J., further said: “The defendant, Eatough, is liable for any libel that he may be proven to have issued, and any individuals or corporations who aided and abetted him in issuing a libel can be made parties defendant, but not an unincorporated body of men.”
In the instant case the plaintiff has brought suit against forty-five individuals. They have been served with summons, and the plaintiff in the complaint alleges (and for the purpose of this suit it is admitted by the defendants) that it is engaged in the business of printing and publishing a daily newspaper in the city of Asheville, of general circulation in said city and'in the State, and known as The Asheville Citizen and The Sunday Citizen. That the defendant Frank J. Torlay is the organizer of the International Typographical Union and came to Asheville for the purpose of advising his codefendants as to calling and conducting a strike.
Sherwood, J., in the case of Clothing Co. v. Watson, 168 Mo., 150, says: “If these defendants are not permitted to fell the story of their wrong, or, if you please, their supposed wrongs, by word of mouth or with pen or' print, and to endeavor to persuade others to aid them by all peaceable means, in securing redress of such wrongs, what becomes of free speech and what of" personal liberty ?” Every person has the liberty of working for whom he pleases. The complaint alleges “That on or about 16 October, 1923, and subsequent thereto, the defendants, with malice and absence of lawful excuse,
*48“(a) Performed and have executed organized picketing, accompanied by threats, intimidation and violence towards persons employed or seeking employment at the place of business of the plaintiff; and
“(b) Have done actual injury to said employees and the plaintiff in an effort to cause said employees to breach their contracts with the plaintiff and to compel the plaintiff to discharge said employees, through intimidation; and,
“(c) Pursuant to said conspiracy, have advised and are executing a systematic course of espionage, annoyance, intimidation, threats, abuse, and insults, which are intended to make, or calculated to make, and are making the lives of said employees miserable, intolerable, and unendurable ; and,
“(d) Unless the defendants are compelled to desist from such conduct, said employees will be forced by intimidation to abandon their contracts with the plaintiff and quit working for the plaintiff, and the plaintiff will be unable to carry on its business; and,
“(e) In pursuance of said conspiracy, plan and purpose, the defendants gather, and have gathered, in large numbers around and about the place of business of the plaintiff, and when said employees are entering said place of business to perform their work, or are emerging and have emerged therefrom after the day’s work, the defendants indulge in threatening gestures, insulting jeers and hisses, using abusive, insulting, vile and profane language when addressing said employees, and in many ways annoy, disturb, humiliate, and put said employees in fear; and
“(f) Defendants also are guilty of acts of violence in throwing bricks and other missiles into, upon, and against the building in which the plaintiff carries on its business; and
“(g) Have made threats of great bodily harm and to kill said employees if they continue in the employment of the plaintiff or remain in the city of Asheville; and,
“(h) While said employees are away from the place of employment, the defendants constantly shadow them, following them on the streets, in the restaurants and stores, and to their homes, to their work, in the day, in the night; always and everywhere they are pursued and persecuted by the defendants, sometimes in such numbers as to cause said employees to fear for their lives; and
“(i) Frequently surround said employees whenever and wherever they can find one or more of them, and, by words and gestures, humiliate them and put them in fear; and
“(j) Constantly and systematically call said employees insulting-names, such as ‘rats,’ ‘scabs,’ ‘runts,’ ‘bowery bums,’ and other epithets calculated to humiliate and distress, and which do humiliate and distress said employees and have a tendency to bring on breaches of the peace; and,
*49“(k) But for tbe forbearance of said employees, bloodshed and probable loss of life would have occurred; and
“(1) Use of approbrious epithets and insulting language in address-* ing those of said employees who are ladies, and, while in the presence of said ladies, have used profane and indecent language, all with like purpose and intent; and
“(m) Defendants are constantly and systematically threatening, and have constantly and systematically threatened, said employees by saying-in their presence, We will get you yet/ and ‘We will mop up with you/ and ‘You had better leave Asheville or you will be killed/ and ‘If you come out again you will be carried back a corpse’; and
“(n) Planned and conspired to destroy the business of the plaintiff for no other reason than that it declined to accede to the unreasonable and unrightful demands of the defendants; and,
“(o) In further pursuance of said plan, purpose and conspiracy to utterly destroy the business of the plaintiff, solely because of the malice and without any lawful excuse, the said defendants have induced many of the employees of the plaintiff to break their contracts that they have, made with the plaintiff to work for the plaintiff, and to quit work for the plaintiff; and
“(p) Defendants are still engaged in the acts herein complained of, and threaten to continue the commission of said acts, to the irreparable damage and injury of the plaintiff; . . . unless the defendants are restrained and enjoined, the plaintiff will be irreparably damaged, . . . if not destroyed; and
“(q) That by reason of the said acts of the defendants the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.”
As we understand the law to be, any individual or group -of individuals have a right to organize and use all peaceful means to see that their rights and liberties, as they conceive or believe them to be, are protected, and their idea and endeavor for betterment and uplift are carried into effect. Justice should be done them in their calling or avocation in life. Freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, free writing, and freedom of action are the fundamentals of our government, subject to well-known exceptions as to abuse of these privileges. This right belongs to all individuals and groups — to all sorts and conditions of men alike. "We should have no special class or favored few in our government, either of capital or labor. Any individual or group of individuals have a right to work for whom they please, either individually or collectively, and to contract in any manner they see fit and proper. Ordinarily, any individual or group have a right to quit work when he or they see fit, and, by peaceable means, use their influence and argument with other individuals and groups from filling or taking their *50places. Tbe quitting work by individuals or combination must be peaceful, and their conduct in persuasion of others must be peaceful. $No individual or group of individuals who have these rights can infringe on the lawful rights of others. No individual or group of individuals, in carrying out their idea of right and justice as they consider' ■them to be, can resort to any illegal means to accomplish their purpose ■ — ■ violence, assault, unlawful conspiracy, trespass, or any other actionable wrong. The success of all endeavor for uplift and betterment is lasting and permanent when founded on law and order in its accomplishment. In the adjustment of differences the ideal principle is the “Golden Rule”: “And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise.” Organized labor, or labor organizations, are not unlawful; they are no more unlawful than any organization or combination of farmers or manufacturers, or any organization or group of lawyers or doctors.
In the case of S. v. Van Pelt, 136 N. C., 664, Connor, J., said:. “We would not be misunderstood. Capital, either in the form of money or other property, or in the form of skill, experience, intelligence and strength, may combine for lawful purpose. When in either form, or under whatever guise it seeks or conspires to effectuate its purpose, however lawful, by means of violence to person or property, or by fraud or other criminal means, or when by such means it conspires to prevent any pérson from conducting his own business in his own way, or from employing such persons as he may prefer, or by preventing any person from being employed at such wages or upon such terms as he may prefer, the courts will be prompt to declare and firm to administer the law to punish the guilty and protect .the injured.”
Labor is human capital. It is the bone and sinew of all industry. Without it material things would crumble and go to waste. The toiler and breadwinner carries out the ideal “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread.” There should be no strife between capital and labor if it can possibly be avoided or prevented. The world is big enough for all, but if strife should come, and the relation of employer and employee cease, it must be peaceful. They have their respective rights under the law. This is orderly government.
In the instant case, we do not finally pass on the facts. Their probative value is for another tribunal. For the purposes of this action, they are admitted to be true. Do the allegations of the complaint entitle plaintiff to have the restraining order issued continued to the hearing as to the persons named as defendants in the action? After a thorough consideration of the entire matter, we think they do, subject to certain modifications. We have listened to the able arguments of the attorneys for plaintiff and defendants and examined carefully their well-prepared *51briefs. We think the allegations in the present case go far beyond the facts alleged in the case of Van Pelt, supra. The admitted facts by the demurrer ore tenus for a decision of this case are different from the case of McGinnis v. Typo. Union, 182 N. C., 770. In the McGinnis case nothing unlawful was admitted, and every allegation of actionable wrong denied (which appears from the record of the case in the clerk’s office). In that case “All motions to dismiss and the demurrer were overruled; whereupon a large rmmber of affidavits were filed by both sides (italics ours); and, after a full consideration of the evidence, his Honor continued the temporary restraining order until the final hearing. From this ruling the defendants excepted and appealed.” The opinion per curiam was as follows: “Some serious and weighty questions of law are presented by the demurrer and the several motions filed in the cause; but we deem it unnecessary to pass upon them now, as we are convinced from a perusal of the record that the evidence adduced and offered on the hearing was not sufficient to warrant a continuance of the injunction. It will, therefore, be dissolved without prejudice to the rights of the parties.”
The complaint in this cause alleges, with certainty and definiteness, much that is unlawful — continuous trespass, conspiracy, assault, etc. (which is admitted by the demurrer). There are sufficient allegations and specific facts stated that are definite and certain enough to continue the restraining order against the individual defendants to the hearing, subject to certain modifications. The defendants have a legal right to have a reasonable number for peaceful picketing, but this cannot be attended by any disorder, intimidation or obstruction, but only by observation, watching and persuasion.
The U. S. Supreme Court, in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council et al., 257 U. S., 204, says: “How far may men go in persuasion and communication and still not violate the rights of those whom they would influence? In going to and from work, men have a right to as free a passage without obstruction as the streets afford, consistent with the right of others to enjoy the same privilege. We are a social people, and the accosting by one of another in an inoffensive way, and an offer by one to communicate and discuss information with a view to influencing the other’s action, are not regarded as aggression or a violation of the other’s rights. If, however, the offer is declined, as it may rightfully be, then persistence, importunity, following and dogging become unjustifiable annoyance and obstruction which is likely soon to savor of intimidation. From all of this the person sought to be influenced has a right to be free, and his employer has a right to have him free.”
*52In Tise v. Whitaker-Harvey, 144 N. C., 510, Hoke, J., said: “It is the rule with us that in actions of this character, the main purpose of which is to obtain a permanent injunction, if the evidence raises serious question, as to the existence of facts which make for plaintiff’s right, and sufficient to establish it, that a preliminary restraining order will be continued to the hearing. Hyatt v. DeHart, 140 N. C., 270; Harrington v. Rawls, 131 N. C., 39; Whitaker v. Hill, 96 N. C., 2; Marshall v. Comrs., 89 N. C., 103.” Cab Co. v. Creasman, 185 N. C., 551; Parks v. Comrs., 186 N. C., 490.
The exceptions of plaintiff have been considered on the demurrer ore tenus of defendants to the complaint. The judgment of the court below dissolving the restraining order against the Asheville Typographical Union, No. 263, is affirmed. As against the individuals set out in the complaint, the judgment is reversed and modified in accordance with this opinion.
The restraining order under the judgment of the court below is continued against the individual defendants to the hearing and modified in accordance with this opinion.
Affirmed as to the Asheville Typographical Union, No. 263.
Beversed and modified as to the individuals, Frank J. Torlay and others.