ACCEPTED
02-17-00413-CV
SECOND COURT OF APPEALS
FORT WORTH, TEXAS
12/20/2017 1:51 PM
DEBRA SPISAK
CLERK
NO. 02-17-00413-CV
FILED IN
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND2nd COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT
FORT WORTH, TEXAS
FORT WORTH, TEXAS
12/20/2017 1:51:56 PM
DEBRA SPISAK
Clerk
THE CITY OF FORT WORTH
Appellant,
v.
MARY DEAL,
Appellee.
On Appeal from the 342nd District Court
of Tarrant County, Texas, Cause No. 342-289469-16
the Honorable Wade Birdwell, Presiding
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Laetitia Coleman Brown
State Bar No. 00792417
Laetitia.brown@fortworthtexas.gov
Lynn Winter
State Bar No. 24078135
Lynn.winter@fortworthtexas.gov
CITY OF FORT WORTH
200 Texas Street
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
817.392.7600—Telephone
817.392.8359—Telecopier
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellants/Defendants:
The City of Fort Worth
Counsel for Appellant/Defendant:
Laetitia Coleman Brown
State Bar No. 00792417
Laetitia.brown@fortworthtexas.gov
Lynn Winter
State Bar No. 24078135
Lynn.winter@fortworthtexas.gov
CITY OF FORT WORTH
200 Texas Street
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
817.392.7600—Telephone
817.392.8359—Telecopier
Appellee/Plaintiff:
Mary Deal
Counsel for Appellee/Plaintiff:
Joe Riddell
P.O. Box 41898
Austin, Texas 78704
(512) 663-4669
joeriddell@aol.com
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page i
CFW-Appellant Brief 002
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL .............................................................i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.....................................................................................iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................vi
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ............................................ vii
ISSUES PRESENTED........................................................................................... viii
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 3
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ........................................................................ 3
I. Standard of review ...........................................................................................3
II. The Trial Court erred in denying the City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction
because Appellee alleged intentional torts under the
Texas Tort Claims Act ....................................................................................4
A. The Texas Tort Claims Act .................................................................. 4
B. The deploying of the tire deflation device was an arrest and
therefore an intentional tort .................................................................. 6
C. The act of deploying a tire deflation device is an intentional tort ........ 7
D. The act of deploying a tire deflation device is a battery ....................... 9
PRAYER ..................................................................................................................11
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page ii
CFW-Appellant Brief 003
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................13
INDEX TO APPENDIX ..........................................................................................14
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page iii
CFW-Appellant Brief 004
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
Bland Independent School District v. Blue,
34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000) ........................................................................................4
City of Amarillo v. Martin,
971 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. 1998)......................................................................................4
City of Borger v. Garcia,
290 S.W.3d 325 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied)....................................3, 4
City of Fort Worth v. Chattha,
No. 02-11-00342-CV, 2012 Tex.App. LEXIS 1264, 2012 WL 503223,
(Tex.App.—Fort Worth Feb. 16, 2012, no pet.) ......................................................10
City of Laredo v. Nuno,
94 S.W.3d 786 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.)........................................... 7
City of Lubbock v. Nunez,
279 S.W.3d 739 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2007, pet. granted and dism’d by agr.) . 9, 10
City of Waco v. Williams,
209 S.W.3d 216 (Tex.App.—Waco 2006, pet. denied).......................................8, 10
City of Watauga v. Gordon,
434 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. 2014)................................................................................6, 10
Durbin v. City of Winnsboro,
135 S.W.3d 317 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. denied) ..................................... 9
Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc.,
424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967)....................................................................................10
Harris County v. Cabazos,
177 S.W.3d 105 (Tex.App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) ............................6, 7
Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Brownsville Navigation Dist.,
453 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1970)......................................................................................4
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page iv
CFW-Appellant Brief 005
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES (cont.)
Cases: Page
Pineda v. City of Houston,
175 S.W.3d 276 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) ...........................8, 9
Stansbury v. California,
511 U.S. 318; 114 S.Ct. 1526; 128 L. Ed.2d 293 (1994) .......................................... 6
Tex. Department of Transp. v. Jones,
8 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. 1999) ..........................................................................................3
Tex. Dep’t. of Public Safety v. Petta,
44 S.W.3d 575, 44 Tex. Sup. J 597 (Tex. 2001) ...................................................7, 8
Rules and Statutes:
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021 ................................................... per curiam
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.057 ...............................................................5, 7
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page v
CFW-Appellant Brief 006
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: This is an appeal from the denial of a plea to the
jurisdiction. Appellee filed her original petition
alleging that the City was liable for damages under
the Texas Tort Claims Act. Appellee alleges that
her son was killed when an officer deployed a tire
deflation device during a police pursuit involving
her son.
Trial Court: The 342nd Judicial District Court, Tarrant County,
Texas, Cause No. 342-289469-16, the Honorable
Wade Birdwell, presiding.
Trial Court’s Disposition: The City filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction. [1 CR 9].
The trial court partially granted and partially denied
the City’s Plea. [1 CR 299]. In denying the City’s
Plea, the Court determined that the allegations in
Appellee’s Petition did not allege an Intentional
Tort for which the City would have been entitled to
governmental immunity under the Texas Tort
Claims Act.
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page vi
CFW-Appellant Brief 007
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(e), the City requests oral
argument. The legal issues involve a determination as to what constitutes an
intentional tort under the Texas Tort Claims Act. The Court’s decisional process
will be aided significantly by oral argument, which will help to emphasize, clarify,
and focus the facts and legal arguments presented in the briefs.
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page vii
CFW-Appellant Brief 008
ISSUES PRESENTED
Did the trial court err in denying the City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction,
determining that the deployment of a tire deflation device was not an intentional tort
under the Texas Tort Claims Act?
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page viii
CFW-Appellant Brief 009
INTRODUCTION
Jakob Lange, the son of Appellee, led police officers on a police pursuit
through residential neighborhoods lasting several minutes. During the pursuit,
Lange drove in excess of the speed limit and disregarded several stop signs and red
lights. The pursuit ended when Lange lost control of the vehicle and struck a tree.
Lange later died.
Appellee brought suit against the City alleging both federal and state law
violations. The federal court dismissed all federal causes of actions and remanded
the state causes of action back to state court. In her state cause of action Appellee
alleged that an unknown Fort Worth police officer negligently deployed a tire
deflation device (“TDD”) that caused Lange to lose control of the vehicle.
The City denies that any of its police officers deployed a TDD. However,
based on the Appellee’s pleadings, the City filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction contending
that Appellee’s allegation that an officer deployed a TDD was an intentional tort.
The City also contended it maintained its governmental immunity from Appellee’s
allegations of negligent training, negligent supervision, and negligent entrustment.
The trial court granted the City’s Plea on all issues related to negligent supervision,
negligent entrustment, and negligent training. Appellee has not appealed. However,
the trial court denied the City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction with respect to its contention
that the conduct complained of amounted to an intentional tort.
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page 1
CFW-Appellant Brief 010
Appellee’s allegations that a City employee deployed a TDD alleges an
intentional tort. The City’s governmental immunity is not waived and the Court
should reverse the trial court’s denial of its plea and render judgment for the City.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 7, 2013, Officer T. G. Shelton and Officer R. Mask were on duty
as police officers with the City of Fort Worth Police Department. [1 CR 50]. Both
officers were in uniform and in separate marked police units. [1 CR 50]. The
officers were parked in the Bank of America/Kroger parking lot located at 3120 S.
University Drive. [1 CR 50]. This area is near Texas Christian University and local
bars, and is a high pedestrian area. [1 CR 50]. There is a crosswalk for pedestrian
traffic located at the intersection of S. University and W. Berry Street. [1 CR 50].
Officer Shelton noticed a group of people in the median of the crosswalk. [1 CR
50]. Officer Shelton then noticed one of the individuals grab the arm of another
individual to prevent him from continuing across the south bound side of the
crosswalk. [1 CR 50]. Officer Shelton then observed a dark colored vehicle
travelling at a high rate of speed going south bound on University through the W.
Berry intersection. [1 CR 50-51]. Officer Shelton was able to maintain visual contact
on the vehicle and observed the driver proceed through a red light and make an
illegal left turn onto Granbury Road. [1 CR 51]. Officer Shelton activated the
emergency lights and the siren on his police vehicle, and attempted to conduct a
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page 2
CFW-Appellant Brief 011
traffic stop of the vehicle. [1 CR 51]. The driver of the vehicle, later identified as
Jakob Lange, would not stop. [1 CR 51]. Lange continued to drive at a high rate of
speed as he led police officers on a vehicle pursuit lasting several minutes. [1 CR
51]. The pursuit was recorded by the in-car video contained in Officer Shelton’s
police vehicle. [1 CR 51-52.] [In Camera Video attached to Exhibit A]. Lange can
be observed on the video running through several stop signs, and at least two red
lights. [1 CR 51]. The pursuit ended when Lange lost control of the vehicle and
crashed into a tree. [1 CR 52]. Lange later died.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying the City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction. Appellee
alleged that an unknown police officer deployed a TDD. Although Appellee
couched the allegation as a negligent deployment, the facts alleged by Appellee
allege an intentional tort. Governmental immunity is not waived for intentional torts
and therefore the City is entitled to dismissal of this action.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I. Standard of review.
A plea to the jurisdiction contests a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
Texas Department of Transp. V. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999); City of
Borger v. Garcia, 290 S.W.3d 325, 329 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied).
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page 3
CFW-Appellant Brief 012
The plea is used to defeat a cause of action without regard to whether the claims
asserted have merit. Garcia, 290 S.W.3d at 329; Bland Independent School District
v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). The purpose of the plea “is not to force
the plaintiff to preview their case on the merits but to establish a reason why the
merits of the plaintiff’s claims should never be reached.” Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 554.
Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that is reviewed
de novo on appeal. Garcia, 290 S.W.3d at 329.
II. The trial court erred in denying the City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction
because Appellee’s alleged intentional torts under the Texas Tort
Claims Act.
A. The Texas Tort Claims Act
Generally, a municipality in Texas is immune from tort liability under the
doctrine of governmental immunity. City of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426,
427 (Tex. 1998). The party suing a governmental entity must allege consent to suit
either by statute or express legislative permission. Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Brownsville
Navigation Dist., 453 S.W.2d 812, 813-14, (Tex. 1970). The Act waives
governmental immunity in certain circumstances, and to a limited extent; Section
101.021 of the Act contains the primary waiver provisions found in the Act. That
section states:
“A governmental unit in the state is liable for:
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page 4
CFW-Appellant Brief 013
(1) property damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused
by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee
acting within his scope of employment if:
(A) the property damage, personal injury, or death arises
from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or
motor-driven equipment; and
(B) the employee would be personally liable to the claimant
according to Texas law; and
(2) personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of
tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would,
were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas
law.”
In order to maintain a cause of action against a governmental entity such as
the City of Fort Worth, a plaintiff must make some allegation arising under one
of the waivers contained within § 101.021. However, even if a Plaintiff can assert
a cause of action under Section 101.021, §101.057 of the Act reinstates immunity
for certain claims, such as intentional torts. Section 101.057, “Civil Disobedience
and Certain Intentional Torts”, states in pertinent part:
“This chapter does not apply to a claim:
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page 5
CFW-Appellant Brief 014
(2) arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, or any other
intentional tort, including a tort involving disciplinary action by
school authorities.”
Furthermore, Courts have held that “If a plaintiff pleads facts which amount
to an intentional tort, no matter if the claim is framed as negligence, the claim
generally is for an intentional tort, and is barred…” Harris County v. Cabazos, 177
S.W.3d 105, 111 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
B. The Deploying of the Tire Deflation Device Was An Arrest and
Therefore an Intentional Tort
An officer commits an arrest when he or she deprives a person of the freedom
of movement. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322; 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.
Ed.2d 293 (1994). In City of Watauga v. Gordon, the Texas Supreme Court held
the “actions of a police officer in making an arrest necessarily involve a battery,
although the conduct may not be actionable because of privilege.” Gordon at 591.
This is the case even if the suspect yields to the arrest, because submitting against
one’s will is not the same as consent. Id.
In this case, the officer who deployed the TDD would have intended the action
to restrain Lange’s movement, in other words he or she would have been arresting
Lange. The harm would have been the restrained freedom, therefore the actions of
the officer amounted to an arrest, an intentional tort for which the City is immune
from liability.
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page 6
CFW-Appellant Brief 015
C. The Act of Deploying a Tire Deflation Device in an Intentional Tort
Even if the act of deploying the TDD was not an arrest, the City would still
be entitled to dismissal of the action because the act of deploying the TDD was an
intentional tort, for which that City is entitled to immunity.
Courts have historically taken two distinct approaches when determining
whether an officer’s actions are an intentional tort under Section 101.057 of the
Texas Tort Claims Act. Some courts have held that the intentional tort exception is
met if the governmental actor intended the act that caused the injury complained of.
See Tex. Dep’t of Public Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 580, 44 Tex. Sup. J. 597
(Tex. 2001) (Claim that an officer was negligent by ignoring police procedure and
aiming a gun, blocking the vehicle and firing at a suspect’s tires was an intentional
tort); See also Harris County v. Cabazos, 177 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (Claim that a sheriff deputy wrongfully shot suspect was an
intentional tort claim, although couched as negligence.); City of Laredo v. Nuno, 94
S.W.3d 786 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (Claim of negligence in
improperly applying handcuffs and improperly placing suspect in police vehicle
were based on the intentional act of excessive force, an intentional tort.)
There is no dispute that the act of deploying a TDD is an intentional act. In
order for an officer to deploy the TDD the officer must stop the police vehicle, open
the trunk, release the TDD from its mount, unlock the cord reel, throw the sleeved
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page 7
CFW-Appellant Brief 016
TDD on the road, lock the cord reel, hold the TDD by the handle and then pull the
TDD into the path of the target vehicle. [1 CR 33]. After the device has been struck,
the officer must then remove the device from the roadway to prevent other vehicles
from striking the device. [1 CR 33]. The act of deploying a tire deflation device
should be treated the same as an officer deploying a Taser or drawing and firing a
firearm. See City of Waco v. Williams, 209 S.W.3d 216 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006,
pet. denied) (Officer’s use of a Taser was an intentional tort); See also Pineda v. City
of Houston, 175 S.W.3d 276, 282-284 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no
pet.) (Officer who shot individual committed an intentional tort despite Plaintiff’s
contention that the Texas Tort Claims Act applied because officer handled the
firearm in a negligent fashion).
Appellee contends that the unknown officer may have been negligent in
deciding where to deploy the tire deflation device, and/or failing to abide by City
policies. The deploying of the TDD is the actual focus of Appellee’s complaint, and
the act of deploying the TDD is an intentional tort. However, as the Court determined
in Petta, a party cannot maintain a negligence claim under the Texas Tort Claims
Act for the “same conduct” as the intentional tort. Petta at 580. See also Pineda at
283 (finding that despite Plaintiff’s contention that officers were negligent by failing
to exercise sound judgment in shooting individual, the real focus was on the shooting
of the individual which was an intentional tort).
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page 8
CFW-Appellant Brief 017
D. The Act of Deploying the Tire Deflation Device is a Battery
Appellee’s Original Petition stated that she was not alleging an intentional tort
because she was not alleging that officers intended to injure or harm Lange by
deploying the TDD. See Durbin v. City of Winnsboro, 135 S.W.3d 317 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. denied) (intentional tort exception did not apply to an
officer who intentionally bumped a motorcycle during a pursuit causing the suspect
to wreck and get run over by a police vehicle because the officer did not intend to
injure the suspect but simply to end the pursuit). In fact, Appellee’s Response to
the City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction extensively quotes the Seventh District Court of
Appeals opinion in City of Lubbock v. Nunez, 279 S.W.3d 739 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2007, pet. granted and dism’d by agr). Nunez involved an officer who deployed a
Taser on an individual who later died. The Court held that the Plaintiff pled a cause
of action for negligence because the Plaintiff did not allege that the officer intended
to cause Nunez injury. The Court found that they could not infer an intent to injure,
because at the time the Taser was advertised as “non-lethal.” Nunez at 743. The
case was appealed to the Texas Supreme Court and petition was granted. The
petition was later dismissed by agreement of the parties.
The Texas Supreme Court addresses these lines of cases in City of Watugua
v. Gordon. 434 S.W.3d at 594. In Gordon the City calls the Nunez decision
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page 9
CFW-Appellant Brief 018
“doctrinally unsound.” The Court then comprehensively discusses the law of battery
and how it applies to intentional torts under the Texas Tort Claims Act.
The Court held that a battery occurs when 1) a person intentionally or
knowingly causes bodily injury; or 2) a person intentionally or knowingly causes an
offensive bodily contact. Id. at 590. Battery does not require the intent to injure. It
only requires an “offensive bodily contact.” See City of Fort Worth v. Chattha, No.
02-11-00342-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 1264, 2012 WL 503223, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Feb. 16, 2012, no pet.) [**9] (Allegation that officer took
complainant to the ground amounted to an offensive touching and was therefore a
battery under the Texas Tort Claims Act). In fact, battery does not even require the
accused to make physical contact with the complainant. See Fisher v. Carrousel
Motor Hotel, Inc. 424 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1967) (Individual who snatched a plate
from the Plaintiff’s hand committed a battery, even though the individual never
made physical contact with the Plaintiff). See also City of Waco v. Williams, 209
S.W.3d 216 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. denied) (Officer who used a Taser on a
suspect who later died committed an intentional tort and therefore the City’s
sovereign immunity was not waived).
Deal alleges that that the TDD made contact with the tire on the vehicle being
driven by Lange while Lange was fleeing from police officers. The contact as
described by Deal amounts to a battery, a touching that was not consensual. Because
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page 10
CFW-Appellant Brief 019
a battery is an intentional tort for which governmental immunity is not waived, the
trial court erred in dying the City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction and the City is entitled to
dismissal of the cause of action against it as a matter of law.
PRAYER
For all of the reasons set forth above, the City respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial court’s order partially denying the City’s plea and render
judgment for the City and grant any other relief, whether at law or in equity, that the
City is justly entitled to receive.
Respectively submitted,
/s/ Laetitia Coleman Brown
Laetitia Coleman Brown
State Bar No. 00792417
Laetitia.brown@fortworthtexas.gov
Lynn Winter
State Bar No. 24078135
Lynn.winter@fortworthtexas.gov
CITY OF FORT WORTH
200 Texas Street
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
817.392.7600—Telephone
817.392.8359—Telecopier
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page 11
CFW-Appellant Brief 020
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(B) because it contains 2,523 words, excluding
the parts of the brief exempted by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.4(i)(1).
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Texas Rule of
Procedure 9.4(e) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally
spaced typeface using “Microsoft Word 2010” in fourteen (14) point “Times
New Roman” style font.
/s/ Laetitia Coleman Brown
Laetitia Coleman Brown
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page 12
CFW-Appellant Brief 021
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
forwarded via e-service on December 20, 2017, to the following counsel of record:
Joe Riddell
P.O. Box 41898
Austin, Texas 78704
(512) 663-4669
joeriddell@aol.com
Counsel for Appellees
/s/ Laetitia Coleman Brown
Laetitia Coleman Brown
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page 13
CFW-Appellant Brief 022
NO. 02-17-00413-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND DISTRICT
FORT WORTH, TEXAS
THE CITY OF FORT WORTH
Appellant,
v.
MARY DEAL,
Appellee.
On Appeal from the 342nd District Court
of Tarrant County, Texas, Cause No. 342-289469-16
the Honorable Wade Birdwell, Presiding
INDEX TO APPENDIX TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT
A. Plaintiff’s Original Petition—December 14, 2016.
B. Order on City of Fort Worth’s Plea to the Jurisdiction—November 15, 2017.
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page 14
APPENDIX A
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page 15
CFW-Appellant Brief 024
CFW-Appellant Brief 025
CFW-Appellant Brief 026
CFW-Appellant Brief 027
CFW-Appellant Brief 028
CFW-Appellant Brief 029
CFW-Appellant Brief 030
CFW-Appellant Brief 031
CFW-Appellant Brief 032
CFW-Appellant Brief 033
CFW-Appellant Brief 034
CFW-Appellant Brief 035
CFW-Appellant Brief 036
CFW-Appellant Brief 037
CFW-Appellant Brief 038
CFW-Appellant Brief 039
CFW-Appellant Brief 040
CFW-Appellant Brief 041
CFW-Appellant Brief 042
CFW-Appellant Brief 043
APPENDIX B
Brief of Appellant City of Fort Worth Page 16
CFW-Appellant Brief 044
..
342-289469-16 FILED
TARRANT COUNTY
11/6/201710:51 AM
CAUSE N0.342-289469-16 THOMAS A. 'WILDER
DISTRICT CLERK
MARY DEAL § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff §
§
Vs § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS
§
CITY OF FORT WoRm, TEXAS §
Defendanr § 342ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ORDER ON CITY OF FORT WORTH'S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
On November 2, 2017, the Court heard and considered Defendant City of Fort Worth's Plea
to The Jurisdiction. Counsel for the City of Fort Worth, Laetitia Coleman Brown appeared. Counsel
for Plaintiff, Joe Riddell appeared. After considering the arguments of both parties, evidence
presented and the pleadings on file, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant City of Fort Worth's
Plea to The Jurisdiction should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED, JUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant City of Fort
Worth's Plea to The Jurisdiction is hereby GRANTED on the claims of:
Negligent Entrustment;
Negligent Supervision and Training;
And is hereby DENIED on the claims of:
Intentional Tort; and
Official Immunity.
-''f':-1. f:-MAILED'{)Y
:: . ~·iJd~~'
WLYctU7
CFW-Appellant Brief 045
The Court FURIBER ORDERS that any further action in this case is STAYED pending
appeal of this order.
,s'l'A Nr-· ~. , _.
SIGNEDthis_dayof_-'-~--'-""'"-----·2017.
~ Judge Presiding ·
Order on Defendant City of Fort Worth's Plea to the Jurisdiction Page2
Deal v. City of Fort Worth
CFW-Appellant Brief 046
City of Fort Worth, Texas v. Mary Deal
Combined Opinion