Clark v. Lavallie

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
FEB 28 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

ERNEST FRANK CLARK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 99-1082
LAVALLIE; PATRICK; IREULLI;
GALL; PRUYNE; and BASINGER,

Defendants-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 96-S-823)

Submitted on the briefs:*

Ernest Frank Clark, pro se.
Susan L. Foreman, Boulder, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Thomas L. Strickland, United States Attorney; Mark S. Pestal, Assistant United States
Attorney; and Sean Connelly, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, for Defendants-
Appellees.

Before BRISCOE, PORFILIO, Circuit Judges; and ROGERS, District Judge.**

*
The parties have requested this case be submitted without oral argument, and we
have honored that request and determined the matter on the briefs.
**
The Honorable Richard D. Rogers, Senior District Judge for the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge.

The sole issue presented in this case is whether Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)1 trumps

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)2. We hold it does and affirm.

After filing a pro se legal action in the United States District Court for the District

of Colorado on April 9, 1996, Ernest Frank Clark, a federal prisoner, was transferred

from the Federal Correctional Institution in Florence, Colorado, to a facility in

Manchester, Kentucky. Then on May 11, 1998, Mr. Clark was moved from Manchester

1
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) states:
Reopening the Time to File an Appeal.
The district court may reopen the time to file an appeal for a period of 14
days after the date when its order to reopen is entered but only if all the
following conditions are satisfied:
(A) the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is
entered or within 7 days after the moving party receives notice of the entry,
whichever is earlier;
(B) the court finds that the moving party was entitled to notice of the
entry of the judgment or order sought to be appealed but did not receive the
notice from the district court or any party within 21 days after entry; and
(C) the court finds that no party would be prejudiced.
2
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) states in part:
Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered
Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

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to the Federal Correctional Institution in Milan, Michigan. That transfer was not

immediately accomplished because of stops at two different institutions, and he ultimately

arrived in Milan on June 3, 1998.

On June 5, 1998, the district court in Colorado dismissed Mr. Clark’s action. A

copy of the judgment entered on June 19, 1998, was mailed to him at Manchester,

Kentucky, but not forwarded. On July 20, 1998, Mr. Clark filed a motion for a status

conference in the district court, but no action was taken. In December 1998, Mr. Clark

wrote the district court to ascertain the status of his lawsuit. On January 18, 1999, he

received notice informing him of the dismissal. He then filed a motion seeking relief

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) on February 1, 1999.

Relief was denied, and Mr. Clark appealed to this court pro se. In his brief and

reply, Mr. Clark sets out the “exceptional circumstances” he believes his situation

presented which the district court erroneously overlooked. To the government’s

suggestions “plaintiff could have provided the district court with his temporary address

and immediately checked the status of his case on his return” and that he has not

“satisfactorily explained why he waited eight months to learn” of the adverse judgment,

Mr. Clark responds he was never told in advance where he would be taken and he did

move for a status conference but never received a response.

The government responds Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) was “designed exclusively for

situations such as this in which a party did not receive timely notice of entry of

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judgment.” It asserts the rule was intended to make the 180-day time limit absolute and

out of Rule 60(b)’s reach. Relying on Zimmer St. Louis, Inc. v. Zimmer Co., 32 F.3d

357 (8th Cir. 1994), the government contends permitting Rule 60(b) to trump Rule 4(a)(6)

would nullify the notice provision of Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d)3.

Because of the significance of this issue, we appointed counsel for Mr. Clark. In

her supplemental brief, counsel contends the “more liberal” time limits in Rule 60(b) are

recognized as an “extraordinary procedure,” Brown v. McCormick, 608 F.2d 410, 413

(10th Cir. 1979), and “grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular

case.” Pierce v. Cook & Co., Inc., 518 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1975) (en banc).

Counsel asserts Mr. Clark’s motion was not only timely under Rule 60(b) but also

meritorious, describing in pro se fashion the exceptional circumstances that thwarted his

ability to receive notice. Further, counsel states the government would not be prejudiced

were the court to grant Mr. Clark relief. Its only burden would be the same risks and

costs of the appeal had the Bureau of Prisons properly forwarded the notice. She

distinguishes Zimmer on the ground it is inconsistent with Wallace v. McManus, 776

3
Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d) states in part:
Notice of Orders or Judgments. Immediately upon the entry of an
order or judgment the clerk shall serve a notice of the entry by mail in the
manner provided for in Rule 5 upon each party who is not in default for
failure to appear, and shall make a note in the docket of the mailing. . . .
Lack of notice of the entry by the clerk does not affect the time to appeal or
relieve or authorize the court to relieve a party for failure to appeal within
the time allowed, except as permitted in Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

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F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1985), a case decided before adoption of Rule 4(a)(6). Counsel also

argues Zimmer should not be regarded as precedential here because it does not involve a

pro se prisoner.

The answer to this conundrum lies within the mandatory language of Rule 4(a)(6)

which gives a district court discretion to reopen the time to file an appeal only upon

specific conditions. Moreover, nothing within Rule 4(a)(6) indicates it is permissive or

that its limitations may be waived for equitable reasons. The 180-day limitation which

governs this case is specific and unequivocal.

We believe Wallace is not helpful here because it was decided before the

amendment adding Rule 4(a)(6). Consequently, the Wallace court’s resort to Rule

60(b)’s excusable neglect standard is understandable, but not persuasive. Moreover,

when Wallace was decided, the less restrictive language of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)

permitted a more lenient treatment of pro se cases. 776 F.2d at 916-17.

For similar reasons, we are not inclined to follow or approve United States v.

Brown, 179 F.R.D. 323 (D. Kan. 1998), relied upon by appointed counsel. In that case,

Brown filed a § 2255 motion which the court denied. Because the clerk of the court

failed to send Brown a notice of the denial for more than a year, Brown moved for relief

under Rule 60(b). Noting that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d) a party’s lack of notice does

not alter the time period to appeal an order, the court looked to both Fed. R. App. P

4(a)(5) and (6), for direction. Ultimately, although noting Rule 4(a)(6) post-dated

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Wallace, the court nonetheless interpreted Wallace to view 4(a)(5) and (6) as safety

valves, and not as exclusive remedies or exclusive means for extending the time to appeal

a district court order. “If relief under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) and (6)

is unavailable, then rule 60(b) is available to prevent manifest injustice,” id. at 327,

precluding a clerical error from penalizing a pro se incarcerated plaintiff. The court

further observed a need to distinguish between counseled and uncounseled cases in

applying Rule 4(a)(6).

Unlike the Brown court, we see no latitude on the clear and restrictive language of

Rule 4(a)(6). Like the Eighth Circuit, we agree the addition of that rule “was designed to

respond to the circumstances that had prompted courts to use Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) to

circumvent the deadlines specified by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5).” Zimmer, 32 F.3d at 360

(citing supporting cases and authority). We also agree the specificity of Rules4(a)(6) and

77(d) “precludes the use of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) to cure problems of lack of notice.”

Id. at 361.4 See also Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 98-2258,

2337, 2000 WL 194185 (10th Cir. Feb. 3, 2000).

4
In Lewis v. Alexander, 987 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 1993), a post-Rule 4(a)(6) case, the
court applied Rule 60(b), and permitted a reopening of the appeal. That case is not
helpful here, however, because the court did not address the limitations of Rule 4(a)(6), a
fact that has not gone unnoticed in the Sixth Circuit. See FHC Equities, L.L.C. v. MBL
Life Assurance Corp., 188 F.3d 678, 683 (6th Cir. 1999). Also see Zimmer St. Louis v.
Zimmer Co., 32 F.3d 357, 361 (8th Cir. 1994).

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 The essence of Rule 4(a)(6) is finality of judgment. While application of that

concept infrequently may work misfortune, it is an overriding principle which demands

enforcement without distinction between counseled and uncounseled cases. Having

reached that conclusion, we need not determine whether Mr. Clark’s failure to comply

was “excusable neglect.”

AFFIRMED.

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