IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE,
AT NASHVILLE
_______________________________________________________
)
COASTCOM, INC., ) Williamson Chancery Court
) Nos. 24333 & 24353
Plaintiff/Appellee. )
)
VS. ) C.A. No. 01A01-9707-CH-00349
)
GLEN CRUZEN, et ux, et al, )
)
Defendants/Appellants. )
) FILED
______________________________________________________________________________
May 29, 1998
From the Chancery Court of Williamson County at Franklin.
Honorable H. Denmark Bell, Chancellor Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
Glen Cruzen, Pro Se
James David Nave, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN & CALDWELL, Nashville, Tennessee
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee.
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
FARMER, J.
CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S.: (Concurs)
LILLARD, J.: (Concurs)
This matter emanates from three judgments which Coast Publishing, Inc., obtained
against Glen Cruzen and Helen Cruzen d/b/a Image Express and Desktop Systems in the state of
Florida. Coastcom, Inc. (formerly known as Coast Publishing, Inc.), brought an action in the
Chancery Court of Williamson County to enforce certain judgment liens recorded in the office of
the register of deeds of that county against real property owned by defendant Helen Cruzen.1
Defendant Glen Cruzen brought a separate action titled “Claim for Fraud and Misrepresentation.”
The trial court treated this as an answer and counterclaim to Coastcom’s complaint and consolidated
the two actions. Both Coastcom and Glen Cruzen filed motions for summary judgment. The trial
court granted Coastcom’s motion, denied Cruzen’s, and this appeal followed.
Pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, T.C.A. § 26-6-101
et seq., Coastcom filed in the Chancery Court of Davidson County a petition to domesticate the first
and second foreign judgments. The Cruzens were personally served with summons and responded
that the Florida judgments were illegally obtained because the Florida court had improperly denied
a motion for a continuance, that Coastcom had made misrepresentations to the Florida court, and that
the first foreign judgment was being appealed in the state of Florida. These two actions were
consolidated, and Coastcom filed a motion to enforce the foreign judgments which was granted.
Coastcom then filed a writ of execution, and a writ was directed to the sheriff of Williamson County
to levy on two vehicles. A temporary restraining order was granted pursuant to a motion because
the Cruzens’ appeal of the first Florida judgment was still pending. 2 Following an unsuccessful
appeal in Florida, Mr. Cruzen, acting pro se and attempting to act for Ms. Cruzen as well, filed a
motion pursuant to Rule 60 T.R.C.P. asking that the foreign judgments be set aside. The trial court
denied that motion and granted Coastcom’s motion to dissolve the injunction, thus permitting
Coastcom to proceed with enforcement of the foreign judgments. Coastcom then filed in the
1
Additional defendants were Scott D. Brison, Christine A. Brison, and City Federal
Savings Bank. None of these defendants are parties to this appeal. The Brisons were the
grantors in the deed to Helen Cruzen. She assumed a deed of trust which the Brisons had given
to secure an indebtedness to City Federal Savings Bank. Glen and Helen Cruzen also executed a
deed of trust given to secure an indebtedness to the Brisons simultaneous with the conveyance to
Helen Cruzen.
2
26-6-106. Appeal or stay of judgment. -- (a) If the judgment debtor shows the court of
this state that an appeal from the foreign judgment is pending or will be taken, or that a stay of
execution has been granted, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment until the
appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires, or the stay of execution expires or is vacated.
Chancery Court for Williamson County to enforce the judgment liens against the real property owned
by Helen Cruzen located in that county and the trial court’s order, referred to previously, is the
subject of this appeal.
It appears that the position taken in the appellant’s brief is that the court below should
have permitted a relitigation of the Florida actions because the Cruzens were deprived of due process
by the Florida courts in denying them a second continuance, in failing to notify them that a
continuance had been denied, and in failing to give them proper credit.
Foreign judgments are entitled to full faith and credit. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. Once
a foreign judgment has been enrolled, it has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures,
defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a court of record in
Tennessee and may be enforced or satisfied in a like manner. T.C.A. § 26-6-104(c). Therefore, the
grounds and procedures for vacating or reopening foreign judgments are those contained in Rule
60.02 T.R.C.P. Biogen Distribs., Inc. v. Tanner, 842 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tenn. App. 1992). Parties
seeking to undermine the validity of a foreign judgment must meet a “stern and heavy” burden to
demonstrate that the foreign judgment should not be enforced in Tennessee. Dement v. Kitts, 777
S.W.2d 33, 36 (Tenn. App. 1989). The factual issues underlying the foreign judgment may not be
the basis of an inquiry to deny the foreign judgment full faith and credit. Benham v. Fisher, 650
S.W.2d 759 (Tenn. App. 1983). We are of the opinion that each of the arguments submitted on
appeal either was or could have properly been presented as a defense to the actions in the Florida
court. With regard to at least one of the Florida judgments, the matter proceeded through the
appellate process in the Florida judicial system. The appellant further contended that the Florida
judgments were obtained by fraudulent means. Fraud is the basis for setting aside a judgment
pursuant to Rule 60.02 T.R.C.P. See also Turley v. Taylor, 65 Tenn. 376 (1873). However, the
argument presented to support the allegation of fraud is that the defendants Cruzen were not the
proper parties in the Florida litigation and, by representing to the court that the Cruzens were the
parties that breached the contracts with Coastcom, the plaintiff in that action perpetrated a fraud
upon the Florida court. We reject this argument because the issue of whether or not the Cruzens
were the proper parties was in fact presented to the Florida courts and the courts rejected that
defense. The full faith and credit clause requires that the common law doctrine of res judicata be
applied in one state to a judgment rendered in another state to the same extent that it applied in the
state of its rendition. Atchley v. Atchley, 585 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tenn. App. 1978). Res judicata is
an absolute bar to a subsequent suit between the same parties on the same cause of action, and it
concludes such parties not only as to all matters that were actually put at issue and determined, but
also all matters which might have been put at issue and determined. McKinney v. Widner, 746
S.W.2d 699, 705 (Tenn. App. 1987).
Summary judgment is appropriate in an action seeking to domesticate a foreign
judgment, so long as there are no disputes as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Biogen Distribs., Inc. v. Tanner, 842 S.W.2d 253 (Tenn. App. 1992).
Although this is not an appeal of the action to domesticate the foreign judgments, but rather from
an order allowing a judgment creditor to proceed with enforcement of previously recorded judgment
liens, we see no reason why the same should not be applicable as long as the requirements for
summary judgment provided in Rule 56.04 T.R.C.P. are met. Summary judgment is appropriate
when there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. When this burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party.
Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993). There appears to be no genuine issue of material of fact
as to the Cruzens’ liability underlying the Florida judgments or that Coastcom holds judgment liens
and that the foreign judgments remain unsatisfied.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the costs of this cause are taxed to Mr.
Glen Cruzen. In view of the result reached, we have not addressed the fact that Mr. Cruzen
undertakes to represent Ms. Cruzen in this matter as well as himself, that the real estate sought to
satisfy the judgment was apparently titled only in the name of Ms. Cruzen, and that there is no
indication in the record that Mr. Cruzen is an attorney authorized to represent Ms. Cruzen. A default
judgment was entered against Helen Cruzen in the trial court, and she did not file a notice of appeal.
____________________________________
FARMER, J.
______________________________
CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S. (Concurs)
______________________________
LILLARD, J. (Concurs)