Collazo v. Nicholson

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 06-2678

RAMÓN COLLAZO,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

R. JAMES NICHOLSON,
Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs;
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Gustavo A. Gelpí, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Baldock,* Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.

Elaine Rodríguez-Frank, for appellant.
Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney,
with whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and
Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief,
Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellees.

July 24, 2008

*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
 LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Appellant Ramón Collazo brought

suit against his employer, appellees R. James Nicholson and the

Department of Veterans Affairs, alleging that he was discriminated

against in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. He argues that he suffered mental

and emotional distress as a result of the hostile work environment

created by appellees. After reviewing affidavits and documentation

provided by both parties, the district court granted summary

judgment in favor of Nicholson because the conduct at issue, in the

court's view, was "not sufficiently severe or pervasive" to create

a hostile work environment.

We affirm the district court's judgment, but on an

alternate ground. Even if Collazo's allegations are true, the

remedy he seeks (compensatory damages for mental anguish, pain,

suffering, humiliation, and loss of enjoyment) is not available

under the statute.

I.

We recite the relevant facts in the light most favorable

to Collazo, the nonmoving party. Skinner v. Cunningham, 430 F.3d

483, 485 (1st Cir. 2005).

After working at the San Juan VA Medical Center for

several years, first as a volunteer and then as a paid employee in

various capacities, Collazo was promoted to the position of Patient

Services Assistant in August 1998, under the supervision of José

-2-
Rivera. Collazo, in his sixties during this period, contends that

Rivera threatened him and directed age-discriminatory remarks at

him, leading Collazo to file four incident reports and two VA

police reports. The last incident report, filed on April 23, 2003,

discussed an incident that had occurred on April 16, 2003. Several

of Collazo's allegations of abuse were corroborated by Rivera's co-

workers and/or hospital patients in affidavits submitted by Collazo

in opposition to the appellee's motion for summary judgment.

While Collazo was initiating complaints against his

supervisor, he also became the subject of patient complaints

submitted to the VA. In June 2003, the VA Medical Center Director

convened an Administrative Board of Investigation to investigate

these complaints. During the course of the investigation over the

next several months, Collazo was transferred to another position

within the Medical Center with no patient contact. On August 11,

2003, the Administrative Board completed its investigation and

reported that Collazo had difficulty listening to patients and

understanding their specific situations, showing empathy and care,

and asking appropriate questions to offer helpful responses to his

patients' needs. The Board recommended that Collazo be relocated

to areas with minimal contact with the public, where he would have

little or no contact with patients or employees who were at high

risk of becoming violent in the workplace. In October 2003, the VA

reassigned Collazo to the task of address correction and patient

-3-
demographics. The transfer did not result in a change of pay grade

or position description, but did remove Collazo from direct

supervision by Rivera.

On April 25, 2003, Collazo filed an informal EEO

harassment complaint, alleging he suffered age discrimination in

connection with the incident on April 16, 2003, when Rivera

threatened him, and when the VA temporarily reassigned him, also on

April 16, 2003, to a non-patient processing area. In October 2004,

the EEO issued a decision in favor of the VA, concluding that

Collazo "was not discriminated against on the basis of his age in

violation of the ADEA by being threatened or when he was reassigned

to a non-patient processing area." This decision was upheld by the

EEOC Office of Federal Operations on appeal.

On July 14, 2005, Collazo filed suit in federal court,

alleging only that he suffered a hostile work environment on the

basis of his age, in violation of the ADEA. In his complaint,

Collazo sought a declaration that a settlement agreement executed

by the parties in 1998 was violated;1 compensatory damages for his

mental anguish, pain, suffering, humiliation, and loss of

enjoyment; and attorney's fees. On November 15, 2005, the

appellees moved for summary judgment, arguing that Appellant failed

to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. The

district court granted appellees' motion, finding that Collazo had

1
Collazo has not pursued this claim on appeal.

-4-
failed to show that the alleged incidents he identified were

"sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile work

environment claim under the ADEA." Collazo filed this timely

appeal.

II.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment

de novo, with all reasonable inferences resolved in favor of the

nonmoving party. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d

165, 170 (1st Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate where

there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

see id. "We may affirm the district court's decision on any

grounds supported by the record." Estades-Negroni v. Assocs. Corp.

of N. Am., 377 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2004).

"[E]nacted in 1967 as part of an ongoing congressional

effort to eradicate discrimination in the workplace," McKennon v.

Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995), the ADEA makes

it unlawful for an employer to "discharge . . . or otherwise

discriminate against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual's age," 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). To state

a claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff must establish that he

"suffered an adverse job action, that this was motivated by age,

and that he suffered injury as a result of it." Meléndez-Arroyo v.

-5-
Cutler-Hammer de P.R. Co., 273 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001); see

also Hoffman v. Applicators Sales & Serv., Inc., 439 F.3d 9, 17

(1st Cir. 2006).

The district court concluded that Collazo failed to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA

because the incidents of harassment he described were, as a matter

of law, "not sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile

work environment claim under the ADEA." However, there is a more

basic problem with Collazo's claim. Collazo has "failed to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted" because the remedy he

seeks, compensatory damages for the alleged mental anguish, pain,

suffering, humiliation, and loss of enjoyment he suffered as a

result of being required to work in a hostile work environment

based on his age, is not available to him under the statute. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).2 Although we have recognized hostile work

environment claims under the ADEA, see Rivera-Rodríguez v. Frito

Lay Snacks Caribbean, 265 F.3d 15, 24 (1st Cir. 2001), it is well-

established that the statute does not allow compensatory damages

for pain and suffering,3 Vazquez v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d

2
Collazo's claim should have been disposed of below by a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
3
In contrast to the ADEA, Title VII permits claims for
compensatory damages for emotional distress and pain and suffering
arising from a discriminatorily hostile or abusive work
environment. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)-(b); see Villescas v. Abraham,
311 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Congress had another
opportunity to enlarge the remedies available under the federal

-6-
107, 109 (1st Cir. 1978); see also Comm'r of Internal Revenue v.

Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 326 (1995) (noting unanimity among the

circuits on this principle). Modeled after the Fair Labor

Standards Act of 1938, the remedy provisions of the ADEA allow

awards for "only those pecuniary benefits connected to the job

relation," including unpaid wages or overtime compensation.4 Kolb

v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 872 (1st Cir. 1982) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); McKennon,

513 U.S. at 357. Aside from monetary relief, federal courts may

also grant "such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to

effectuate the purposes of the Act," including reinstatement or

promotion, if warranted. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).

Here, Collazo has made no claim for pecuniary benefits

related to his job or any equitable relief. His claim is limited

to compensatory damages for pain and suffering. Therefore, even if

he could establish a hostile work environment claim based on the

record before us, the damages he seeks are not available.

employee ADEA when it amended Title VII and other Acts in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 to permit compensatory damages, subject to caps,
and it conspicuously chose not to do so for ADEA claims.").
4
For willful violations, the statute "authorizes an award of
liquidated damages equal to the back pay award." McKennon, 513
U.S. at 357; 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Because liquidated damages are
predicated on a plaintiff's lost wages or compensation award and
Collazo has not raised a claim for any such losses in this case, he
is also not entitled to liquidated damages. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(incorporated into 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)) (stating that liquidated
damages may be awarded in an amount equal to the pecuniary losses
suffered).

-7-
Affirmed.

-8-