Collins v. Comerica Bank

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C h i e f J u s ti c e J u s t ic e s
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh

Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

FILED JULY 2, 2003

GWENDOLYN COLLINS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 121563

COMERICA BANK and CATHY MASALSKIS,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________________

PER CURIAM

The issue presented in this case concerns when the period

of limitation begins to run for a claim of discriminatory

termination of employment under the Civil Rights Act, MCL

37.2101 et seq.

I. Background

Plaintiff Gwendolyn Collins was employed by defendant

Comerica Bank as a customer-service representative. In August

1996, defendant1 notified plaintiff that an investigation was

1
For ease of reference, defendants Comerica Bank and

Cathy Masalskis will collectively be referred to as

“defendant.”

being conducted to determine whether she had accepted cash

gifts from customers or disclosed customer account balances to

third parties.

On September 5, 1996, defendant suspended plaintiff,

apparently for failing to cooperate with the investigation.

While suspended, plaintiff was required to be available during

normal working hours.2 After the investigation was completed,

defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment on September 25,

1996.

On September 24, 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint

alleging, inter alia, that the termination of her employment

was the product of race and gender discrimination. Defendant

moved for summary disposition on several grounds. One of the

arguments advanced by defendant was that plaintiff failed to

meet the applicable three-year period of limitation on filing

discrimination claims, MCL 600.5805(10).

The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that

plaintiff’s causes of action for discriminatory termination

arose on the date of termination, September 25, 1996.

Therefore, plaintiff’s filing of the complaint on

September 24, 1999, satisfied the statute of limitations.

The Court of Appeals granted defendant interlocutory

2
Plaintiff signed the following agreement:

I, Gwen Collins, understand effective

Thursday, Sept. 5, 1996, I am being suspended

indefinitely with pay pending further

investigation. I understand that I must be

available to the bank during my normal scheduled

working hours.

leave to appeal. Relying primarily on Parker v Cadillac Gage

Textron, Inc, 214 Mich App 288; 542 NW2d 365 (1995), the Court

reversed the judgment of the circuit court, concluding that

plaintiff’s causes of action for discriminatory termination

accrued on the last day plaintiff actually worked, September

5, 1996. Because plaintiff’s complaint was filed on September

24, 1999, the Court of Appeals held that it was time-barred.

Plaintiff sought leave to appeal with this Court.

II. Standard of Review

Whether a cause of action is barred by a statute of

limitations is a question of law, which we review de novo.

Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 62; 642 NW2d 663

(2002). Similarly, we review de novo decisions on summary

disposition motions. First Public Corp v Parfet, 468 Mich

101, 104; 658 NW2d 477 (2003).

III. Discussion

In Parker, the plaintiffs were advised on December 3,

1990, that they would be among the next group of employees to

be laid off pursuant to a work force reduction plan. On

December 21, 1990, the plaintiffs worked their last day.

However, the defendant’s records indicated that the

plaintiffs’ “effective date of separation” was January 7,

1991. The plaintiffs filed claims for discriminatory

termination on January 7, 1994, and the defendant moved for

summary disposition on the ground that the period of

limitation had expired.

The Court of Appeals in Parker rejected the proposition

that the period of limitation on a discriminatory employment

termination claim begins to run on the “effective date of

separation,” writing:

A claim of discriminatory discharge accrues on

the date the plaintiff is discharged. The last day

worked is the date of discharge. Subsequent

severance or vacation pay does not affect the date

of discharge. In this case, plaintiffs filed their

case more than three years after the date they were

discharged. Despite the fact that January 7, 1991,

may have been plaintiffs’ “effective” date of

separation, it is undisputed that the last day they

actually worked was December 21, 1990. [Parker,

supra at 290 (internal citations omitted).]

Relying on Parker, the Court of Appeals in the present

case held that plaintiff’s causes of action for discriminatory

termination accrued on the last day she actually performed

work for defendant. Because plaintiff was a suspended

employee on the date of her termination, the Court of Appeals

held that the day of her suspension served as her last day

worked and, according to Parker, the date of her discharge.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s denial

of defendant’s motion for summary disposition, disagreeing

with the trial court that the applicable period of limitation

began to run on the date plaintiff was actually terminated

from employment as a result of the investigation. The Court

of Appeals concluded:

Because plaintiff’s last day of work was

September 5, 1996, claims of race and gender

discrimination were required to be filed on or

before September 5, 1999. Since plaintiff’s

complaint was not filed until September 24, 1999,

her discrimination claims were time-barred and the

trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion

for summary disposition on these claims.

[Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 30,

2002 (Docket No. 227834), p 3.]

In sum, the Court of Appeals held that the limitation

period for plaintiff’s discrimination claims began to run on

the date of her suspension, September 5, 1996, even though

plaintiff’s employment was not terminated until September 25,

1996. The Court did so because the last day plaintiff

“actually worked” was the date of her suspension on September

5, 1996, and the Court read Parker as instructing that the

last day worked is always the date of discharge. We disagree.

Properly understood, Parker’s “last day worked” holding

is limited to situations where a discriminatory discharge

claim has already surfaced. We agree with Parker’s holding

because the “effective date of separation” there was not the

date of discharge. Rather, where a plaintiff has already been

subjected to an alleged discriminatory termination, a cause of

action naturally accrues on the last day an employee worked.

However, if a discharge has yet to occur, it cannot be

said that the last day worked represents the discharge date.

Simply put, a claim for discriminatory discharge cannot arise

until a claimant has been discharged. Accordingly, the “last

day worked” cannot represent the date of discharge, as held in

Parker, where a claimant’s last day actually worked precedes

the discharge.

In the present case, even though plaintiff was suspended

on September 5, 1996, and in retrospect that date represents

the last day she actually worked, it was not until September

25, 1996 that she was actually discharged, or terminated, from

employment. Unlike the plaintiffs in Parker who knew on the

last day they worked that their employment had been terminated

and that they were being discharged as employees on that date,

on September 5, 1996, plaintiff in this case only knew that

she had been suspended indefinitely.

On September 5, 1996, plaintiff had not been terminated

and thus had no causes of action based on her discharge on

that date. In fact, although it may have been a foregone

conclusion that the investigation would lead to plaintiff’s

termination, it is clear that plaintiff’s official status as

an employee was nothing other than “suspended” until September

25, 1996, when her employment was terminated as a result of

the investigation. “Suspended” does not equate with

“terminated” or “discharged,” and, thus, being suspended does

not create a cause of action for discharge or termination.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s causes of action for

discriminatory termination had yet to arise on the date of her

suspension, September 5, 1996, and the limitation period does

not begin to run before a cause of action accrues. Plaintiff

had no causes of action for discriminatory termination on

September 5, 1996.3

Because we hold that plaintiff’s causes of action for

3
We note that Sumner v The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co,

427 Mich 505; 398 NW2d 368 (1986), does not compel a different

result. Sumner concerned the “continuing violation theory,”

which is not relevant to a cause of action for discriminatory

termination of employment, because a termination occurs at a

fixed time and is not susceptible to being a continuing

violation. Plaintiff has filed suit for discriminatory

termination, not discriminatory suspension.

discriminatory termination did not arise until the date she

was discharged as an employee, September 25, 1996, plaintiff’s

filing of her complaint on September 24, 1999 satisfied the

three-year period of limitation. Accordingly, the trial court

properly denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition on

this ground.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, we reverse in part the judgment of the

Court of Appeals and remand to that Court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.4 In all other

respects, leave to appeal is denied.5

Maura D. Corrigan

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Clifford W. Taylor

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ.

We concur in the result only.

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Because the Court of Appeals dismissed plaintiff’s

discrimination claims on the basis of a statute of limitations

analysis, it did not address defendant Masalskis’s alternative

issue concerning whether she was properly served.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should address this matter

on remand.

5
We do not disrupt the judgment of the Court of Appeals

regarding the timeliness of plaintiff’s claims for tortious

interference of contract and business relations and invasion

of privacy.