Colstrip Faculty Ass'n v. Trustees, Rosebud County Elementary School District No. 19

NO. 91-166

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1992

COLSTRIP FACULTY ASSOCIATION, MEA/NEA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-VS-

TRUSTEES, ROSEBUD COUNTY ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 19 AND HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 19,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Rosebud,
The Honorable Joe L. Hegel, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Charles E. Erdmann, Erdmann Law Office, Helena,
Montana.
For Respondent:
Emilie Loring, Hilley & Loring, Missoula, Montana:
Charles F. Moses (Amicus), Moses Law Firm,
Billings, Montana.

Submitted: September 18, 1991
3AN 16 199ZC
Decided: January 16, 1992
Filed: k'2 3 , d L
CLERK OF SUPRE!'riE C0URf-x
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Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Plaintiff, Colstrip Faculty Association (the union), initiated
this suit against the defendants, Trustees of the Rosebud County
Elementary School District (school district), seeking specific
performance of the arbitration provision of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement entered into by the union and the school
district. The school district appeals from a judgment of the
District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, Rosebud County,
Montana, granting summary judgment in favor of the union and
ordering the school district to submit the grievance to
arbitration. We affirm.
The issues presented for review are:
1. Can a school district be compelled to arbitrate a
grievance with a union concerning the dismissal of a teacher when
the teacher is concurrently pursuing his statutory remedy?
2. Does collateral estoppel prevent the school district from
continuing this litigation?
This action arises from the school district's termination of
a tenured teacher, Elmer Baldridge. Baldridge was a member of the
teachers' union, Colstrip Faculty Association, MEA/NEA, during his
employment as a teacher in the Rosebud County school system. After
his dismissal, Baldridge filed an appeal with Rosebud County
Superintendent of Schools pursuant to § 20-3-210, MCA. The County
Superintendent determined the school district lacked good cause to
terminate Baldridge and ordered the school district to reinstate
him. The school district appealed the County Superintendent's
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decision to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction who
vacated the order and remanded the case back to the County
Superintendent. This action was stayed, but has been scheduled to
be heard by the County superintendent. At this point, it may be
pending before the State Superintendent on appeal.
Concurrently, the union filed a grievance against the school
district alleging a violation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (Agreement). The union followed the grievance procedural
steps set forth in the Agreement. The final step allows the
grievant to submit the grievance to arbitration. Unsatisfied with
the results at the prior steps, the union requested arbitration;
the school district refuses to submit to arbitration.
Subsequently, the school district filed a complaint for
declaratory relief in the Sixteenth Judicial District, Rosebud
County, naming the union, Baldridge, and the County Superintendent
as defendants. The school district petitioned the c o u r t for an
injunction to compel the union and Baldridge to elect one forum in
which to pursue their legal claims. The court issued a temporary
restraining order and calendared a show cause hearing in which the
defendants were ordered to appear and show cause why the court
should not grant the injunction. Baldridge moved to dismiss the
complaint arguing that the two avenues pursued by Baldridge and the
union were separate and distinct causes of action.
The District Court held the show cause hearing in which all
parties were represented by counsel. The union filed a memorandum
contending that both avenues should proceed. The union urged the

3
court to deny the requested relief because the school district
could have bargained for an election of remedies provision in the
Agreement but failed to do so, and is now bound by the terms of the
Agreement which does not prohibit different defendants from
pursuing their claims in different forums.
On July 19, 1988, Judge A. B. Martin denied the request for an
injunction stating:
After considering arguments and memorandum of counsel,
the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion for injunctive relief
on the ground that Plaintiff's [sic] will not suffer
irreparable harm by the simultaneous prosecution of
appeal by Defendant Baldridge and Plaintiff's prosecution
of its claim for declaratory judgment under the
collective bargaining agreement. While concurrent
proceedings may result in duplication and conflict such
potential factors are outweighed by the importance of
timely disposition in the several forums involved. Any
conflicts that may develop can be dealt with by the Court
at a later stage.
Although the school district did not appeal Judge Martin's
ruling, it still refused to submit to arbitration and it
discontinued prosecution of its complaint for declaratory relief.
Consequently, the union filed a complaint and an amended complaint
seeking specific performance of the arbitration provision in the
Agreement. The school district filed its answer admitting most, if
not all, material facts alleged in the union's amended complaint.
The District Court granted the union's motion for summary
judgment ordering the school district to submit the grievance to
arbitration. Additionally, the District Court denied the school
district's cross motion for summary judgment. The school district
appeals from these judgments. We affirm.
Our answer to the second issue is dispositive of this case
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thereby rendering it unnecessary, at this time, to discuss the
substantive issue set forth by the school district. The
dispositive point in this case occurred thirty days after Judge
Martin denied the school district's motion for injunctive relief
when the school district failed to appeal the order.
It is well settled that an appeal lies from an order denying
an injunction. Bown v. Somers (1919), 55 Mont. 434, 178 P. 287;
Rule l(b), M.R.App.P. Since the school district failed to appeal
the order within thirty days of the District Court's denial of the
injunction pursuant to Rule 5, M.R.App.P., it is bound by Judge
Martin's July 19, 1988, decision and must participate in
arbitration with the union while Baldridge pursues his statutory
remedies. Accordingly, the school district is collaterally
estopped from raising the issue of whether Baldridge and the union
should be allowed to pursue their separate claims in separate
forums .
The doctrine of collateral estoppel has three elements:
1. The issue has been decided in a prior adjudication
and is identical to the one presented.
2. A final judgment on the merits was issued.
3. The party against whom the plea is asserted was a
party or privity to the party in the prior adjudication.
Smith v. Schweigert (1990), 241 Mont. 54, 58, 785 P.2d 195, 197;
quoting In re Marriage of Stout (1985), 216 Mont. 342, 701 P.2d
729. The union asserts that each element has been established by
the facts which are before this Court. We agree.
Regarding the first element, we note that the controversy in

5
the case at bar is identical to the controversy raised by the
school district in its complaint for declaratory relief and its
subsequent motion for a preliminary injunction against the union,
Baldridge, and the County Superintendent. In the school district's
complaint for declaratory relief, the school district petitioned
the court to determine whether the school district could be forced
to proceed in two separate forums; one, in final and binding
arbitration to determine the union's claims pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement and two, the statutory appeals
process brought by Baldridge to determine his individual claims.
In the declaratory judgment action, the school district
contended that the two avenues could not be pursued concurrently
because of the possibility of conflicting decisions by the County
Superintendent and the arbitrator. The union contended m a t the
school district could have avoidedthis situation by bargaining for
an election of remedies provision in the collective bargaining
agreement. The court refused to grant the school district's
injunction, stating that both avenues could be pursued
concurrently. In denying injunctive relief, the court formally
adjudicated the issue in controversy.
The union brought the present action in an attempt to enforce
the prior court order because the school district has continued to
refuse to submit to arbitration. In the case at bar, the school
district argues that it should not be forced to proceed in two
forums because of the possibility of conflicting results. Again,
the union contends that the school district could have avoided this

6
situation by bargaining for an election of remedies provision in
the collective bargaining agreement. Since the same issues were
argued in the school district's action for declaratory relief, they
were previously adjudicated and the first element of the doctrine
of collateral estoppel has been satisfied.
The second element requires the court to issue a final
judgment on the merits. Arguably, the court did not issue a final
judgment on the merits when it denied the school district's
injunction, thus precluding the application of collateral estoppel.
However, when the school district failed to appeal the decision,
failed to prosecute its complaint for declaratory relief, and
waited until after the appeal in the present case was filed to
dismiss the complaint for declaratory relief, the District Court's
order denying injunctive relief and directing the parties to
proceed in the two separate forums became final. State ex rel.
Rankin v. Wibaux County Bank (1929), 85 Mont. 532, 281 P. 3 4 1 . A l l

parties were represented by counsel during the proceedings for
injunctive relief. Both the school district and the union had the
opportunity, and in fact made the identical arguments in the
injunction proceeding which were presented to the District court in
the case at bar. After hearing arguments from both parties, the
court made a decision based on the merits of the case. Thus the
second element of collateral estoppel has been satisfied.
The final element of collateral estoppel requires that the
party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity
to the party in the prior adjudication. Smith, 241 Mont. at 59,

7
785 P.2d at 198. In the prior adjudication, the school district
brought the action against the union and two other defendants: in
the case at bar, the union brought the action against the school
district. Although their roles have changed, two of the parties
are identical. Therefore, the third element of collateral estoppel
has been satisfied in this case.
An end to litigation must exist. m, 55 Mont. at 435, 178
P. at 287. Application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is
one way to end the litigation. When Judge Martin denied the school
district's injunction in the declaratory judgment action, the
school district's remedy was to appeal the order. m, 55 Mont.
at 435-36, 178 P. at 287. When the school district failed to avail
itself of that remedy, discontinued prosecution of its complaint,
and failed to comply with the court's order by refusing to submit
to arbitration, the school district became bound by the court's
order which stated that two forums could be utilized concurrently.
Parties are not allowed to litigate the same matters over and
over again. Smith, 241 Mont. at 59, 785 P.2d at 198. The school
district had its day in court when it filed its complaint for
declaratory relief, petitioned the court to enjoin the defendants
from pursuing their claims, and presented arguments to support that
petition. The school district did not prevail in their attempts at
that stage and cannot now seek the same relief on the same set of
facts in this action that was denied in the previous action. The
elements of collateral estoppel have been satisfied and the school
district is estopped from relitigating the issues previously
determined by Judge Martin.
We affirm the decision of the District Court. The parties are

directed to comply with the District Court's order dated December

12, 1990, and submit the grievance to arbitration.

Justices

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Justice Fred J. Weber specially concurs as follows:
While I agree that the order of the District Court requiring
the School District to submit to arbitration should be affirmed, I
disagree with the legal basis used by the majority for that
affirmance.
The majority concluded collateral estoppel barred the School
District from raising the issue of whether Baldridge and the
Colstrip Faculty Association may simultaneously pursue arbitration
and administrative remedies. As pointed out in the majority
opinion, the second element required in collateral estoppel is that
"a final judgment on the merits was issued." The majority
concludes the District Court entered a final judgment on the merits
in a separate proceeding brought by the School District in which it
denied a preliminary injunction against the union's arbitration
proceeding.
First, it is essential to note that the District Judge based
his order denying the injunction on the grounds that Rosebud
Schools showed no irreparable harm by the simultaneous prosecution
of separate remedies in the different forums. Further the order
states: '!Any conflicts that may develop can be dealt with by the
Court at a later stage." Clearly the trial court did not enter a
final decision on the merits.
Next, it is important to consider the nature of an order
denying a preliminary injunction. In Dreyer v. Board of Trustees
of Mid-River Electric Cooperative (1981), Mont . ~, 630 P.2d

226, 229, this Court held temporary injunctions function only to

10
preserve the statu quo pending a determination on the merits.
Further, we concluded it is inappropriate for the district court or
this Court on appeal, to make findings and conclusions regarding
the ultimate issues during an injunctive hearing. Such findings
and conclusions directed to the resolution of the ultimate issues
are properly reserved for final trial on the merits.
There has not yet been a trial on the merits to resolve the
issues before the Court in the present case. Thus collateral
estoppel does not apply. Without considering the same, the
apparent result of the majority opinion is to overrule Dreyer.
In addition, I would point out that if a district court
attempts to make a decision on the merits in the course of a
hearing on preliminary injunction, such a decision would be
premature. Eliason and Indreland v. Evans (1978), 178 Mont. 212,
2 1 8 , 583 P.2d 398, 402. In Eliason this Court concluded the trial
court prematurely entered findings and conclusions on the ultimate
issue during the preliminary injunctive hearing. We stated that:
The problems inherent in trying the merits of a case at
an injunctive hearing are obvious. Typically, an
injunction, or a motion for an injunction is filed very
early in the proceedings, usually before discovery has
been completed and often before the pleadings of the
parties are complete. At such juncture, the District
Courts normally do not have sufficient evidence to
conclusively resolve the merits of the case.
Certainly the foregoing factual situation is present in this case.
Here the court based its denial of an injunction on the
defendant’s failure to prove irreparable harm, but in no way
intended to make a decision on the merits. Had it rendered a

decision on the merits at the preliminary hearing, such a decision
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would require reversal under Eliason.
By applying collateral estoppel to this action, the majority
has effectively ignored intent of the District Judge and modified
the role of preliminary injunctive hearings. By holding the trial
court rendered a decision on the merits of this issue, the majority
opinion forecloses both parties from raising any contention of
conflicts between the two methods of procedure in future
proceedings. Clearly res judicata would apply under the majority
opinion.
I conclude that the determination of the District Court in
granting summary judgment to the plaintiff Faculty Association
could be affirmed on other grounds. My hope is that this special
concurrence will help to minimize the argument that Montana cases
have been effectively repealed by the majority opinion.

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 January 16, 1992

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following
named:

Charles E. Erdmann
Erdmann Law Office
P.O. Box 5418
Helena, MT 59604

Emilie Loring
Hilley & Loring
500 Daly Ave.
Missoula. MT 59802

Charles F. Moses
MOSES LAW FIRM
P.O. Box 2533
Billings, MT 59103-2533

ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MONTANA

BY:
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