COM., DSS, EX REL. GAGNE v. Chamberlain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Willis, Lemons and Frank
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,
ex rel. MARC GAGNE
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2573-98-1 JUDGE DONALD W. LEMONS
FEBRUARY 22, 2000
JANET CHAMBERLAIN, A/K/A
JANET CLARK

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Jerome James, Judge

Maryann Shea Bright, Special Counsel (Beth J.
Edwards, Regional Special Counsel; Mark L.
Earley, Attorney General; Ashley L. Taylor,
Jr., Deputy Attorney General; Robert B.
Cousins, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney
General; Craig M. Burshem, Regional Special
Counsel, on brief), for appellant.

(Herbert W. Laine, on brief), for appellee.

The Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Social

Services, Division of Child Support Enforcement, ex rel. Marc

Gagne ("DSS"), appeals an order of the Circuit Court of the City

of Norfolk vacating an administrative order requiring Janet

Chamberlain to reimburse the State of New Hampshire for Aid to

Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") expended on behalf of

her two daughters. Finding that the trial court erred in its

conclusion that the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act

("UIFSA"), Code § 20-88.32, et seq., does not authorize the
Commissioner of the Department of Social Services of Virginia to

determine the existence of an amount of a public assistance debt

owed to another state, we reverse and remand.

Marc Gagne ("father") and Janet Chamberlain ("mother") are

unmarried and are the biological parents of two children.

Father and his two daughters reside in and formerly received

public assistance from the State of New Hampshire. Mother

resides in Virginia. In 1996, pursuant to the UIFSA, New

Hampshire filed a support petition with the Commonwealth

requesting the issuance of a support order against mother for

the support of her two children and requesting an order of

reimbursement for public assistance paid to father on behalf of

the children in New Hampshire while mother was residing in

Virginia. The parties stipulate that the amount of assistance

paid to father was $9,023.50.

The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for Isle

of Wight County entered an order requiring mother to pay child

support. That order was not appealed. The Commissioner of the

Department of Social Services administratively ordered mother to

reimburse New Hampshire for the public assistance paid to

father. Mother appealed the administrative order to the

Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for the City of

Norfolk, which vacated the administrative order. DSS appealed

that decision to the Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk, and

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the circuit court also vacated the administrative order. DSS

now appeals this adverse ruling.

The UIFSA is a model uniform law that has been enacted in

all fifty states. See Code § 20-88.32 et seq. It provides a

comprehensive statutory scheme to establish and enforce support

obligations in proceedings involving two or more states. In

this case, the Commonwealth, as a "responding tribunal,"

received a petition from the State of New Hampshire, the

"initiating tribunal." A "tribunal" is defined as "a court,

administrative agency, or quasi-judicial entity authorized to

establish, enforce, or modify support orders or to determine

parentage." Code § 20-88.32. Pursuant to Code § 20-88.48, the

responding tribunal is authorized, inter alia, to "issue or

enforce a support order" and to "[d]etermine the amount of any

arrearages, and specify a method of payment." By definition,

"support order" "means a judgment, decree, or order, whether

temporary, final, or subject to modification, for the benefit of

a child, a spouse, or a former spouse, which provides for

monetary support, health care, arrearages, or reimbursement

. . . . " Code § 20-88.32 (emphasis added). An "obligee" is "a

state or political subdivision to which the rights under a duty

of support or support order have been assigned or which has

independent claims based on financial assistance provided to an

individual obligee." Code § 20-88.32. "Duty of support" "means

an obligation imposed or imposable by law to provide support for

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a child, spouse, or former spouse, including an unsatisfied

obligation to provide support." Code § 20-88.32.

Under New Hampshire law, the receipt of public assistance

constitutes an assignment of all rights and interest in the

support obligation up to the amount of public assistance money

paid for or on behalf of the children. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 161-C:22 (1998). Additionally, New Hampshire law states that

"any payment of public assistance made to or for the benefit of

a dependent child creates a debt due and owing to the department

by any responsible parent." N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161-C:4

(1998). Consequently, the State of New Hampshire is an obligee

as defined by Code § 20-88.32. 1

The definitions of "obligee," "support order," and "duty of

support" in UIFSA anticipate states sending petitions to each

other seeking reimbursement from obligors for public assistance

paid to their families. Furthermore, when a court or agency of

the Commonwealth acts as a "responding tribunal," it "shall

apply the procedural and substantive law, including the rules on

choice of law, generally applicable to similar proceedings

originating in this Commonwealth and may exercise all powers and

1
The official comments to the UIFSA explain that while
"obligee" usually refers to the individual receiving the
payments, it "may be a support enforcement agency which has been
assigned the right to receive support payments in order to
recoup Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 42 U.S.C.
§ 601 et seq., formerly known as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC)." Unif. Interstate Family Support Act (1996)
§ 101, 9 U.L.A. 259 (1999).

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remedies available in those proceedings." Code § 20-88.46.

These remedies are "cumulative and do not affect availability of

remedies under other law." Code § 20-88.34.

According to Virginia law, "[a]ny payment of public

assistance money made to or for the benefit of any dependent

child or children or their caretaker creates a debt due and

owing to the Department by the person or persons who are

responsible for support of such children or caretaker in an

amount equal to the amount of public assistance money so paid."

Code § 63.1-251; see also Powers v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App.

309, 411 S.E.2d 230 (1991). "'Department' means the State

Department of Social Services." Code § 63.1-250. It is well

settled that both parents owe a duty of support to their child.

See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 7 Va. App. 614, 376 S.E.2d 787

(1989).

A cursory examination of this section would appear to

confine its application only to actions where the Virginia

Department of Social Services provided public assistance.

However, the "Definitions" provision of Code § 63.1-250 is

preceded by "[u]nless a different meaning is plainly required by

the context, the following words and phrases as hereinafter used

in this chapter shall have the following meanings." Under

UIFSA, "state" means, inter alia, "a state of the United

States." Consequently, in the context of a petition under UIFSA

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for the determination of the existence of a public assistance

debt, the word "state" means "any state."

We hold that by adoption of UIFSA the General Assembly

intended to permit Virginia to determine the existence of a

public assistance debt owed to another state.

In the construction of its provisions,
it is to be remembered that the Code itself
is a single act of the legislature. "The
different sections should be regarded, not
as prior and subsequent acts, but as
simultaneous expressions of the legislative
will." All provisions there appearing which
deal with the same subject should be
construed together and reconciled whenever
possible.

* * * * * * *

We do not search through the history of
statutes for difficulties not patent on
their face, but take them first as they are
written into the Code itself. If when so
read they are reasonably clear, that
suffices.

Shepherd v. F.J. Kress Box Co., 154 Va. 421, 425-26, 153 S.E.

649, 650 (1930) (citations omitted). "Moreover, it is a

familiar rule of statutory construction that subsequent

legislation is enacted in light and with knowledge of such

interpretive statutes, and hence the latter control unless there

be clear legislative intent to substitute a different

interpretation." Alphonse Custodis Chimney Constr. Co. v.

Molina, 183 Va. 512, 515, 32 S.E.2d 726, 727 (1945) (citation

omitted).

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 Further, when possible, statutes must be read in a manner

that achieves the beneficial purpose intended by their

enactment. "A statute must be construed 'to give reasonable

effect to the words used' and to further its remedial purposes."

Commonwealth v. Wallace, 29 Va. App. 228, 233, 511 S.E.2d 423,

425 (1999) (quoting Mayhew v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 484,

489, 458 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1995)). "Proper construction seeks to

harmonize the provisions of a statute both internally, and in

relation to other statutes." Id. (citations omitted). We wrote

in Wallace:

The words chosen by the legislature in
drafting a statute derive meaning from both
definition and context and, therefore, we
divine legislative intent by construing an
enactment as a whole, together with
companion statutes, if any. The legal
maxim, noscitur a sociis, instructs that "a
word takes color and expression from the
purport of the entire phrase of which it is
a part, and . . . must be read in harmony
with its context." Turner v. Commonwealth,
226 Va. 456, 460, 309 S.E.2d 337, 339
(1983). Similarly, legislative purpose can
best be "'ascertained from the act itself
when read in the light of other statutes
relating to the same subject matter.'"
Moreno v. Moreno, 24 Va. App. 190, 197, 480
S.E.2d 792, 796 (1997). The doctrine of
pari materia teaches that "'statutes are not
to be considered as isolated fragments of
law, but as a whole, or as parts of a great,
connected homogenous system, or a simple and
complete statutory arrangement.'" Id. at
198, 480 S.E.2d at 796.

29 Va. App. at 233-34, 511 S.E.2d at 425.

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 Had Virginia paid the AFDC funds, a debt due and owing DSS

would have been created as a matter of law. See Code

§ 63.1-251. Since UIFSA requires the uniform application of

Virginia laws to interstate petitions, New Hampshire is entitled

to the benefit of Virginia law allowing the creation by law of a

debt for provision of AFDC funds. To hold otherwise would

defeat the clear purpose of the statute and, therefore, be

inconsistent with the manifest intention of the General

Assembly.

Under UIFSA, an out-of-state petitioner (in this case, the

State of New Hampshire) is entitled to the application of

Virginia law in the same manner as an in-state petitioner. It

would be incongruous that no debt would be created in favor of

the providing agency if the agency is out of state while a debt

is created if the providing agency is the Commonwealth of

Virginia, particularly when the source of the funds, namely

AFDC, is the same.

Because the matter is not before us, we do not address

whether the juvenile and domestic relations district court would

also have been a proper "tribunal" for the original petition for

reimbursement of public assistance funds. We hold that an

administrative proceeding in the Department of Social Services

is a proper tribunal for receipt of a petition under UIFSA for

the provision of an order of support, including reimbursement of

AFDC funds provided by another state. Accordingly, we reverse

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the order of the trial court and remand for proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

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