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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
STEVEN JOSEPH ANDERSON, :
:
Appellant : No. 698 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 25, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-06-CR-0002167-2014
BEFORE: BOWES, OTT, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 11, 2016
Appellant, Steven Joseph Anderson, appeals from the judgment of
sentence following a bench trial and convictions for driving under the
influence of alcohol (“DUI”)1 and driving a vehicle at an unsafe speed.2
Appellant contends the police lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle. We
affirm.
We set forth the findings of fact in the trial court’s opinion:
1. On April 15, 2014, at approximately 1:59 a.m., Officer
Peter P. O’Brien was on duty in a marked patrol vehicle
and was merging onto the southbound SR222 from SR
183. As Officer O’Brien merged into the right lane, he was
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802.
2
75 Pa.C.S. § 3361.
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passed by a Nissan Altima travelling in the passing lane
travelling at a high rate of “speed.”
2. Officer O’Brien was following the vehicle for about 1
mile traveling 80mph. The vehicle slowed down to 50mph
for .4 miles then accelerated to approximately 75mph.
Officer O’Brien initiated a vehicle stop. [The driver] was
identified as [Appellant].
3. Upon making contact with the [Appellant], Officer
O’Brien detected an odor of alcoholic beverage coming
from inside the vehicle. Officer O’Brien informed
[Appellant] of the violations committed and noticed
[Appellant’s] eyes to be bloodshot and glassy with dark
puffy eyelids. Officer O’Brien asked [Appellant] if he had
anything to drink. The Defendant responded and said “one
drink”.
4. Officer O’Brien asked [Appellant] to step out of the
vehicle. [Appellant] was asked to submit to a series of
standardized field sobriety tests (SFST). Officer O’Brien
testified that he was certified to administer the SFST’s on
the date in question. He further testified that [Appellant]
failed all three tests given. Officer O’Brien asked
[Appellant] if he would submit to an Alco-Sensor test.
[Appellant] agreed and the result was positive for alcohol
consumption.
5. At the conclusion of said SFST’s, [Appellant] was placed
under arrest for suspicion of [DUI].
6. [Appellant] was transported to St. Joe’s Medical Center.
[Appellant] signed and consented for a sample of his blood
to be tested. The BAC results were .125%[.]
Trial Ct.’s Findings of Fact, 10/7/14,3 at 1.
Appellant was charged with the above crimes; the Commonwealth did
not charge Appellant with violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3362, driving in excess of
3
The document was served on this date.
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the maximum speed limit. Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress
challenging, inter alia, whether the officer had probable cause to stop his
vehicle.
At the suppression hearing, Officer O’Brien testified that the speed
limit for that portion of Route 222 was fifty-five miles per hour. N.T.
Suppression Hr’g, 9/5/14, at 5. With respect to the conditions of the road,
the following testimony was heard:
[Commonwealth] I would like to briefly discuss Route
222 in detail in the area specifically.
[Officer O’Brien] Okay.
Q Can you describe the shape of the road there?
A Ah, that section is straight but downhill.
Q Any curves?
A Not immediately where I noticed [Appellant]. Further
down the road there is.
Q Are there any street lights in that area?
A No.
Q You said this was a two-lane road; is that correct?
A Yes.[4]
Q Specifically that night what were the road conditions
like?
4
Specifically, this was a four-lane highway with two southbound and two
northbound lanes. N.T. Supression Hr’g at 10.
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A There were no weather conditions.
Q So the road was dry?
A Right.
* * *
Q And why did you decide to activate your emergency
equipment?
A Because of the excessive speed I had observed.
Id. at 5-9.
On cross-examination, the following exchange transpired:
[Appellant’s counsel] Officer, you are familiar with the
speeding -- to clock a car or to clock someone for
speeding, give them a speeding ticket, you need to have
either an approved device in your car or certified
speedometer, correct?
A Yes.
Q You did not have a device in your car to clock this
vehicle’s speed, did you?
A No, I did not.
Q You did not have a certified speedometer to clock this
vehicle’s speed, correct?
A The speedometer in the vehicle is certified on the dash.
They are not regularly calibrated.
Q You do not have any, you do not have any
documentation with you showing that this was a certified
speedometer and that someone had tested it within the --
A No, I do not have that.
* * *
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Q I know you have a form in your police report that gives
you like boxes that you can check for your observations as
to how the vehicle was driving in motion. And you got a
whole bunch of options about weaving or straddling lane
lines, swerving, and drifting. You got all those boxes on
that preprinted form you could use, correct?
A Yes
Q You didn’t check any of the boxes about swerving or
drifting or crossing the line or straddling the line, correct?
A Correct.
Q Because you were following [Appellant]. He was
maintaining his lane and driving his car, you know, where
it was supposed to be, correct?
A Yes.
Q Dry roadway, correct?
A Yes.
Q No other cars on the road, correct?
A Yes.
Id. at 10, 13-14.
On redirect examination, the Commonwealth again asked the officer
the basis for stopping Appellant:
[District attorney] You were asked about weaving or
erratic driving. Was it your testimony you stopped this
vehicle based only on speed; is that correct?
A Yes.
Id. at 14. Following the hearing, the court denied Appellant’s motion on
October 7, 2014.
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After a February 25, 2015 bench trial, the court found Appellant guilty
of the above charges.5 On March 25, 2015, the court sentenced Appellant to
forty-eight hours to six months’ imprisonment. Appellant did not file a post-
sentence motion but filed a timely appeal. Appellant timely filed a court-
ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
Appellant raises the following issues:
Did the trial court err by denying . . . Appellant’s motion to
suppress evidence obtained following a traffic stop without
probable cause?
Did the trial court err in denying the motion to suppress
evidence where it applied an incorrect standard in
determining the validity of the traffic stop?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
We summarize Appellant’s arguments in support of both of his issues.
Appellant contends that the record failed to establish he was driving at an
unsafe speed. He notes the Commonwealth did not present any testimony
regarding the condition of the road, his car was equipped with a headlight,
and he could slow down prior to the highway’s exit lane. Appellant
maintains the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence of an adverse
condition. In sum, he posits the Commonwealth failed to establish the
officer had probable cause for the vehicle stop. We hold Appellant is due no
relief.
5
We add that Appellant’s bail paperwork reflects a pending DUI charge in
Chester County. Affidavit of Rights, 5/13/14, at 2.
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Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a
trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from
those facts are correct. Where the prosecution prevailed in
the suppression court, we may consider only the
Commonwealth’s evidence and so much of the evidence for
the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the record
supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are
bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal
conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
In re J.E., 937 A.2d 421, 425 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted).
In Pennsylvania, the authority that addresses the
requisite cause for a traffic stop is statutory and is found at
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b), which provides:
(b) Authority of police officer.—Whenever a
police officer is engaged in a systematic program of
checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable
suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or
has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or
signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s
registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle
identification number or engine number or the
driver’s license, or to secure such other information
as the officer may reasonably believe to be
necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). In Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10
A.3d 1285 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc), this Court,
consistent with our Supreme Court’s clarification of
constitutional principles under the Fourth Amendment and
Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, stated
with respect to § 6308(b):
In light of our Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the current language of Section 6308(b), we are
compelled to conclude that the standards concerning
the quantum of cause necessary for an officer to
stop a vehicle in this Commonwealth are settled;
notwithstanding any prior diversity on the issue
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among panels of this Court. Traffic stops based on a
reasonable suspicion: either of criminal activity or a
violation of the Motor Vehicle Code under the
authority of Section 6308(b) must serve a stated
investigatory purpose.
* * *
Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle
stop when the driver’s detention cannot serve an
investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected
violation. In such an instance, “it is encumbent [sic]
upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed
by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which
would provide probable cause to believe that
the vehicle or the driver was in violation of
some provision of the Code.”
Id. at 1290–1291. Accordingly, when considering whether
reasonable suspicion or probable cause is required
constitutionally to make a vehicle stop, the nature of the
violation has to be considered. If it is not necessary to
stop the vehicle to establish that a violation of the Vehicle
Code has occurred, an officer must possess probable cause
to stop the vehicle. Where a violation is suspected, but a
stop is necessary to further investigate whether a violation
has occurred, an officer need only possess reasonable
suspicion to make the stop. Illustrative of these two
standards are stops for speeding and DUI. If a vehicle is
stopped for speeding, the officer must possess
probable cause to stop the vehicle. This is so because
when a vehicle is stopped, nothing more can be
determined as to the speed of the vehicle when it was
observed while traveling upon a highway. On the other
hand, if an officer possesses sufficient knowledge based
upon behavior suggestive of DUI, the officer may stop the
vehicle upon reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code
violation, since a stop would provide the officer the needed
opportunity to investigate further if the driver was
operating under the influence of alcohol or a controlled
substance. With these guiding principles and examples in
mind, we now turn to the examination of the Vehicle Code
violation subject of this appeal.
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Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 992-93 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(second emphasis added and parentheticals and some citations omitted).
To determine whether probable cause exists, we must
consider whether the facts and circumstances which are
within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the
arrest, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy
information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is
committing a crime.
Commonwealth v. Ibrahim, ___ A.3d ___, 2015 WL 6777602 at *4 (Pa.
Super. Nov. 6, 2015).
We are mindful that probable cause does not require
certainty, but rather exists when criminality is one
reasonable inference, not necessarily even the most likely
inference. . . . [W]hile an actual violation of the [Vehicle
Code] need not ultimately be established to validate a
vehicle stop, a police officer must have a reasonable and
articulable belief that a vehicle or driver is in violation of
the [Vehicle Code] in order to lawfully stop the vehicle.
Commonwealth v. Spieler, 887 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (holding validity of detention is not
dependent on whether defendant actually committed or was later acquitted
of crime). “We have made clear that the kinds and degree of proof and the
procedural requirements necessary for a conviction are not prerequisites to a
valid” detention. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 36. Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court held that an officer’s reasonable mistake of law can give rise
to reasonable suspicion justifying a vehicle stop. Heien v. North Carolina,
135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014); id. at 539 (“the mistake of law relates to the
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antecedent question of whether it was reasonable for an officer to suspect
that the defendant’s conduct was illegal. If so, there was no violation of the
Fourth Amendment in the first place.”).
Instantly, the record reflects Officer O’Brien followed Appellant’s
vehicle for almost a mile at approximately eighty miles per hour according to
the officer’s uncertified speedometer. Trial Ct.’s Findings of Fact at 1; N.T.
Suppression Hr’g at 10. The speed limit was fifty-five miles per hour. N.T.
Suppression Hr’g at 5. The officer repeatedly testified he stopped Appellant
because of speeding.6 Id. at 9, 14. The record reflects that the officer,
based on firsthand knowledge, articulated specific facts tending to establish,
at the very least, a reasonable inference that Appellant was violating the
Vehicle Code. See Salter, 121 A.3d at 992-93; see also Ibrahim, 2015
WL 6777602 at *4; Spieler, 887 A.2d at 1275. As the Spieler Court
observed, whether Appellant actually violated the Vehicle Code is not a
prerequisite for a legitimate vehicle stop. See Spieler, 887 A.2d at 1275.
That the record may be insufficient to convict Appellant of violating Section
3361 (or Section 3362) of the Vehicle Code does not necessarily invalidate
the vehicle stop.7 See Spieler, 887 A.2d at 1275; accord DeFillippo, 443
6
Presumably, the officer was relying on 75 Pa.C.S. § 3362, driving in excess
of the maximum speed limit.
7
Indeed, an officer’s reasonable, mistaken belief that a defendant violated
the law may justify the vehicle stop. See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534.
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U.S. at 36. Thus, after careful consideration, we affirm the court below.
See In re J.E., 937 A.2d at 425.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/11/2016
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Com. v. Anderson, S.
Combined Opinion