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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
WILLIAM PHILIP BLACK,
Appellant No. 1504 WDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order August 27, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000943-2009
BEFORE: SHOGAN, OTT, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MAY 19, 2016
Appellant, William Philip Black, appeals from the order entered on
August 27, 2014, denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
A prior panel of this Court provided the following factual background
relevant to Appellant’s underlying conviction:
On July 15, 2009, the Commonwealth charged Appellant
with criminal homicide and robbery—infliction of serious bodily
injury, resulting from the April 20, 2009 murder of William
Joseph Pierce (victim), and the theft of victim’s wallet and cell
phone. (See Information, 7/15/09, at 1).
The trial court aptly provided the evidence adduced at
trial, as follows:
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Evidence presented at trial held February 7 through
February 11, 2011, included the testimony of Jamie
Douglas of Denbo, Fayette County, who stated that
she knew both the victim and Appellant. Ms. Douglas
testified that earlier in April 2009, Appellant asked
her to use her cell phone to call the victim to see
about his money. (See N.T., 2/09/11, at 423-24).
She knew Appellant actually called the victim
because his name came up in her contact list on the
phone, Appellant appeared to Ms. Douglas as
“pissed”, and she overheard him tell the victim that
he wanted his money. (See id.).
Another witness, Tina Pitcock, testified that she
knows Appellant as “Teeni” and thought he was one
of her best friends. She told the jury that she also
knew the victim, . . . and had been with him at
Appellant’s house. On the day of the crime, April 20,
2009, Appellant borrowed her car, a Mustang, from
about 7:00 P.M. until he returned it at about 8:17
P.M., when she then gave him a ride to the home of
his cousin Brandi. (See N.T., 2/08/11, at 187-94).
When she allowed Appellant to use her vehicle, Ms.
Pitcock knew he was trying to collect money from the
victim. (See id.). An hour or two after dropping
Appellant off at Brandi’s residence, Ms. Pitcock went
back to Brandi’s house to borrow either cigarettes or
money to buy some. While there, she saw Appellant
for the last time.
Commonwealth witness April Krushak told the
jury that she knows Appellant and was talking to him
at approximately 7:30 P.M. on April 20, 2009, on her
front porch when they saw the victim drive by. (See
id. at 212). Appellant immediately left the porch and
tried to get the victim to stop his car. (See id. at
215). When the victim just kept going, Appellant got
into [a] silver-colored Mustang and drove off in the
same direction that the victim had been going. (See
id. at 217). Ms. Krushak also testified that a few
weeks before the day of the murder, she had been
involved in a telephone call with Appellant, during
which he said he wanted to get in touch with the
victim to “fuck him up” because the victim allegedly
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owed him money. (See id. at 219). When Ms.
Krushak saw Appellant on the day of the crime,
Appellant was wearing a black hooded sweatshirt
and jeans. When she last saw the victim driving
away in his green car and Appellant driving after him
in the silver Mustang, both men were heading toward
Brownsville, Fayette County. (See id.). She heard
the next day that somebody had been shot in
Brownsville. (See id.).
At some point later in the evening of April
20th, Appellant arrived alone at the residence of
Brandi Brooks, his cousin, on Water Street in
Brownsville. He stayed there for a couple of hours
and left at about 2:00 A.M. the following morning
(April 21st). (See N.T., 2/07/11, at 62-66). A couple
of days later Appellant called Ms. Brooks to tell her
to make sure everything was cleaned up in her
house. He also told her to throw her three garbage
bags in a dumpster located in one of the housing
projects some distance away. (See id. at 68-70).
Appellant told his cousin that she needed to get rid
of her garbage because of the drug paraphernalia in
it, and offered to babysit her children so she could
drive the garbage bags to the project dumpster. Ms.
Brooks removed the garbage contained in the three
black plastic bags from her residence, but put it into
the trash can right outside instead of removing it to
a dumpster as Appellant had instructed. (See id. at
72). On April 24, 2009, Trooper Beverly Ashton went
to Brandi Brooks’ residence and obtained her consent
to take the three garbage bags from her trash can.
(See id. at 88-89). Trooper Ashton then drove the
bags to the state police barracks and searched them,
eventually finding therein the victim’s cell phone and
his wallet which had within it his driver’s license.
(See id. at 89-90).
Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Christian
Lieberum, the lead investigator on this case,
questioned Appellant as to his whereabouts on April
20, 2009, and the answers Appellant provided
differed in germane and relevant details from the
statements given by the other witnesses. (See N.T.,
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2/09/11, at 450-53). Trooper Lieberum then
obtained a search warrant for Appellant’s Brownsville
residence, pursuant to which he found a dark grey
hooded sweatshirt, which he confiscated. Said
sweatshirt was later determined to belong to the
victim. (See id. at 467-68). On April 28, 2009, the
trooper served a search warrant on Appellant so as
to take his palm prints and a bucchal swab. Trooper
Lieberum asked no questions during the execution of
the search warrant, but when Appellant asked him
how the investigation was going, the officer told him
he was in custody for the crime and he was getting
the credit for it. Appellant then replied that you don’t
get any credit for wasting a basehead. (See N.T.,
2/07/11, at 46-61).
Alfred J. Schwoeble, a forensic technical
advisor with the R.J.Lee Group, an analytical
laboratory, testifying as an expert in gunshot residue
analysis, told the jurors that one particle consistent
with gunshot residue was found on the steering
wheel of the silver Mustang. (See N.T., 2/08/11, at
168, 170). More particles consistent with gunshot
residue were found on the grey sweat shirt belonging
to the victim as well as on his wallet. (See id. at
171-72, 175-76).
(Trial Court Opinion, 4/21/11, at 1-4 (some record citations
omitted; record citation format provided)).
Commonwealth v. Black, 108 WDA 2012, 53 A.3d 923 (Pa. Super. filed
June 1, 2012) (unpublished memorandum at pages 1-4) (internal footnote
omitted). On February 11, 2011, a jury convicted Appellant of second-
degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of life in prison.
This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on June 1, 2012. Id.
Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme
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Court was denied on March 1, 2013. Commonwealth v. Black, 63 A.3d
1242 (Pa. 2013).
Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on November 4, 2013,
and the PCRA court appointed counsel. An amended PCRA petition was filed
on April 1, 2014. The PCRA court held hearings on Appellant’s petition, and
in an order filed on August 27, 2014, the PCRA court denied Appellant relief.
This timely appeal followed. Both the PCRA court and Appellant have
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.1
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for this Court’s
consideration:
1. WAS TRIAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO CROSS
EXAMINE THE FORENSIC GUNSHOT EXPERT?
2. WAS TRIAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILINT [sic] TO
OBJECT TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE
SWEATSHIRT WHICH WAS THE VICTIM’S AND NOT THE
APPELLANT’S?
3. WAS TRIAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO
REQUEST THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMANT WHOSE TIP LED TO THE SEARCH OF THE TRASH?
4. WAS TRIAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO
INTERVIEW OR CALL TO TESTIFY THE ALIBI WITNESS WHO
WOULD HAVE TESTIFED [sic] THAT THE APPELLANT WAS WITH
HIM DURING THE PERIOD THAT THE SHOOTING OCCURRED?
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1
It appears that the delay in disposing of this appeal was due to the PCRA
court’s failure to forward the record to this Court. The Superior Court docket
entries reflect that on December 17, 2014, this Court’s Prothonotary sent
notice to the PCRA court that the record was delinquent. The record was
received in Superior Court on January 15, 2016.
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5. WAS IT PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT FOR THE
COMMONWEALTH TO INTRODUCE THE SWEATSHIRT OF THE
VICTIM AS EVIDENCE, CAUSING THE JURY TO CONFUSE THE
ITEM WITH ONE TAKEN FROM THE RESIDENCE OF THE
APPELLANT?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.2
Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the
record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA
court’s determination is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31
A.3d 317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Berry, 877
A.2d 479, 482 (Pa. Super. 2005)). The PCRA court’s findings will not be
disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Super.
2001)).
In Appellant’s first four issues, he raises claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. When considering an allegation of ineffective
assistance of counsel, counsel is presumed to have provided effective
representation unless the PCRA petitioner pleads and proves that: (1) the
underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis
for his or her conduct; and (3) Appellant was prejudiced by counsel’s action
or omission. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975-976 (Pa.
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2
For purposes of our discussion, we have renumbered Appellant’s issues on
appeal.
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1987). “In order to meet the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness
standard, a defendant must show that there is a ‘reasonable probability that
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.’” Commonwealth v. Reed, 42 A.3d 314, 319 (Pa.
Super. 2012). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will fail if the
petitioner does not meet any of the three prongs. Commonwealth v.
Williams, 863 A.2d 505, 513 (Pa. 2004). “The burden of proving
ineffectiveness rests with Appellant.” Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d
997, 1018 (Pa. 2007).
In his first two issues, Appellant avers that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to cross-examine Alfred Schwoebel, the forensic gunshot expert
(“the expert”). Appellant asserts that while the gunshot residue expert
testified that residue was found on the victim’s sweatshirt and the steering
wheel of the car Appellant drove, no residue was found on Appellant’s shirt.
Appellant’s Brief at 7. The crux of Appellant’s argument in issues one and
two is that, in Appellant’s opinion, it was not clear whether the jury believed
the gunshot residue was from the victim’s sweatshirt or Appellant’s
sweatshirt. Id. at 9.
The record reveals that at trial, the Commonwealth questioned the
gunshot-residue expert about the steering wheel and a sweatshirt. N.T.,
2/7-11/11, at 168, 170. While the Commonwealth on direct examination did
not reiterate that the sweatshirt belonged to the victim, and while counsel
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for Appellant did not cross examine the witness regarding ownership of the
sweatshirt, we do not conclude that Appellant has established ineffective
assistance of counsel. Appellant merely asserts that ownership of the
sweatshirt was not clear. Appellant’s Brief at 9.
At the PCRA hearing, Attorney Michael Garofalo, Appellant’s trial
counsel who cross-examined the expert, testified that he “didn’t even
address the sweat shirt, because it was the victim’s sweat shirt that had
been discussed.” N.T., 6/25/14, at 43. Attorney Garofalo stated that he
focused on the Commonwealth’s attempt to introduce new evidence that had
not been inventoried, the victim’s wallet, and the steering wheel of the car
Appellant drove. Id. Counsel’s rationale for focusing the jury’s attention on
the steering wheel was that if Appellant drove that car “you would think that
the steering wheel would be covered [with residue] if [Appellant] had fired
[a] gun with his bare hands and then drove away.” Id. at 44. There was,
however, “minimal amounts” of residue on the steering wheel. Id. Thus,
counsel was aware that the sweatshirt did not belong to Appellant and
concluded there was no need to address that item further. Rather, as a
matter of strategy, counsel opted to focus on the minimal amount of gun
shot residue recovered from the car.
After review, we conclude that despite Appellant’s opinion on this
matter, he has failed to establish how he was prejudiced. In other words,
Appellant has failed to establish that, if counsel had cross examined the
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expert as to ownership of the shirt, the result of the trial would have been
different. Reed, 42 A.3d at 319. Moreover, while counsel for Appellant did
not specifically ask the expert about ownership of the sweatshirt, the notes
of testimony reveal that the sweatshirt, which was marked as
Commonwealth Exhibit 12, was repeatedly identified as the victim’s shirt and
admitted into evidence. N.T., 2/7-11/11, at 170, 292, 295, 467-468, and
481. For these reasons, Appellant’s first two issues are meritless.
Next, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
request the identification of the confidential informant who led police to
search Brandi Brook’s garbage where the victim’s wallet and phone were
discovered. A review of Appellant’s Brief, however, reveals that he
abandoned this issue on appeal as there is no argument on this issue in his
brief. Therefore, it is waived. See Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d
267, 293-294 (Pa. 2008) (deeming a claim waived where the appellant failed
to make or develop an argument).
In his fourth issue, Appellant alleges that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to interview or call to testify an alibi witness. We disagree.
In order to establish that counsel was ineffective for failing to call an
alibi witness, the defendant must prove: the witness existed and was
available; counsel was aware of or had a duty to know of the witness; the
witness was willing and able to appear; and the proposed testimony was
necessary to avoid prejudice to defendant. Commonwealth v. Thomas,
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44 A.3d 12, 17 (Pa. 2012) (citing Commonwealth v. Morris, 684 A.2d
1037, 1044 (Pa. 1996)).
The PCRA court addressed this issue as follows:
[Appellant assails] the failure of trial counsel to call
Alexander R. Thompson as an alibi witness on [Appellant’s]
behalf during the trial. At [PCRA] hearing on this matter, Mr.
Thompson testified that he met [Appellant] for the first time on
the evening of the homicide when [Appellant] came to the
residence of Brandi Brooks, Mr. Thompson’s girlfriend, when he
was babysitting her children while she went to bingo. PCRA
Proceedings, July 15, 2014, p.7. At some time after the
homicide, Trooper Lieberum talked to Mr. Thompson, and Mr.
Thompson subsequently provided a written statement to the
police. Id. p. 6. In the statement dated April 20, 2011, Mr.
Thompson said that he was standing on the porch as Ms. Brooks
was leaving for bingo around 6:30 or 6:45 P.M. when [Appellant]
strolled onto the premises, stating his intention to play video
games on the game consol[e] in Ms. Brooks’ home. Id. p. 9; See
also Mr. Thompson’s pretrial statement. Under cross-
examination at the hearing, Mr. Thompson conceded the
possibility that Ms. Brooks left the house late that evening, as
she herself testified at trial, but the bingo itself started at 7:00
P.M. Id. p. 8. He further testified that he cannot remember
anyone from the Fayette County Public Defender’s office calling
him or contacting him. Id. p. 6. The only person he could
remember talking to about [Appellant’s] presence in his
residence on the evening of the killing was Trooper Lieberum. Id.
p.12.
Mr. Thompson’s testimony at the PCRA hearing is
contradicted by other testimony elicited at that proceeding.
Attorney Susan Ritz Harper of the Public Defender’s office, one of
Petitioner’s trial attorneys, testified that she was aware of Mr.
Thompson’s statement and spoke to [Appellant] about it before
the trial. PCRA Proceedings Part One, June 25, 2014, p. 21. She
absolutely denied that [Appellant] ever told her that he wanted
Mr. Thompson to be called as a witness, pointing out that he was
Ms. Brooks’ boyfriend, and she was testifying for the
Commonwealth. Id. p. 32. Likewise, trial co-counsel, Michael
Garofalo, did not remember [Appellant] ever saying that he
wanted Alexander Thompson called to testify. Id. p. 41. In
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addition, Mr. Thompson’s written statement relative to the time
of [Appellant’s] arrival at Ms. Brooks’ house was an estimated
time and, as Attorney Harper stated, was contradicted by Ms.
Brooks, who testified at trial that she was late for bingo and
missed the early bird game, which, as Attorney Harper went on
to say, put her arriving at the bingo after 6:45 or even 7:00 P.M.
Id. p. 32. Most importantly, [Appellant] himself had said that he
never left his mother’s house where he had been prior to arrival
at the Brooks house until after 7:00 P.M., and he walked from
one residence to the other. Id. Attorney Harper further said that
Mr. Thompson’s statement also placed [Appellant] in the kitchen
of the Brooks house, where the garbage can was kept, which
meant that he could have put something in it. Id. pp. 33-34.
That garbage can was later placed outside and subsequently
searched, and the victim’s wallet and cell phone were found
therein. Id. Part of the defensive argument during the trial was
that the garbage can was outside, and anyone could have put
those incriminating items in it. Id. p. 34. The Court finds this
issue of the alleged failure to call Alexander Thompson as an
alibi witness at trial to be without merit in that defense counsel
considered doing so, but had very good strategic reasons for
deciding not to.
PCRA Court Opinion, 8/27/14, at 5-7.
We agree with the PCRA court. We cannot conclude that counsel was
ineffective for failing to call Mr. Thompson as a witness and elicit testimony
from an individual who could directly connect Appellant to the garbage can
where the victim’s wallet and phone were found. Thus, Mr. Thompson’s
testimony would not have prevented prejudice; rather, it would have caused
prejudice to Appellant. Thomas, 44 A.3d at 17. Accordingly, Appellant is
due no relief on this issue.
Finally, Appellant avers that the Commonwealth committed
prosecutorial misconduct when it introduced the victim’s sweatshirt because
it caused the jury to confuse the item with one belonging to Appellant.
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Appellant’s Brief at 13. Appellant baldly claims that the attorneys for the
Commonwealth intentionally mislead the jury regarding ownership of the
shirt. Id. 14. We are constrained to point out that an allegation of
prosecutorial misconduct is not cognizable as an independent basis for relief
under the PCRA.3 Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1138
(Pa. 2012); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2). Moreover, Appellant could have raised
this issue on direct appeal but failed to do so; therefore, the issue is also
waived. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b).4
For the reasons set forth above, we discern no error of law or abuse of
discretion in the PCRA court’s decision. Accordingly, we affirm the order
denying Appellant’s PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/19/2016
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3
Were this issue cognizable, we would conclude it is meritless. As noted
above, the sweatshirt was properly referred to and identified as belonging to
the victim, and we would conclude that there is no support for Appellant’s
accusation.
4
“[A]n issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do
so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state
postconviction proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b).
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Com. v. Black, W.
Combined Opinion