J-S48025-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JOHNNY T. BRANFORD
Appellant No. 2018 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 2, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at No: CP-06-CR-0002592-2015
BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, and PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 31, 2018
Appellant Johnny T. Branford (“Appellant”) appeals from the November
2, 2016 judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks
County (“trial court”), following his jury convictions of two counts of first-
degree murder, two counts of third-degree murder, theft by unlawful taking,
access device fraud, possessing instruments of crime (“PIC”), and
unauthorized use of an automobile.1 Appellant’s counsel has filed a petition
to withdraw, alleging that this appeal is wholly frivolous, and filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). Upon review, we
affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 2502(c), 3921(a), 4106(a)(1)(ii), 907(a), and
3928(a), respectively.
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On January 26, 2015, a neighbor heard screams emanating from the
Reading residence of Mary Branford (“Mary”), who was seventy-four years old,
and her son Johnny M. Branford (“Johnny”). N.T. Trial, 9/26-30/16, at 102,
131-32, 275. Someone, in what sounded like Johnny’s voice, exclaimed six
or seven times, “[N]o stop, why are you doing this.” Id. at 131-32.
Subsequently, the police were called and Officer Christopher Baker performed
a security check at the residence. Id. Officer Baker knocked on the front
door and received no response. Id. at 135-37. He was unable to see inside
the residence because the windows were covered with black trash bags. Id.
A few days later, Mary’s other son, Joey Branford (“Joey”), was alerted
of his brother Johnny’s absence from work.2 Id. at 161-63, 278. Following
his unsuccessful efforts to contact his mother and brother by telephone and
through other family members, Joey called the police to perform a “welfare
check.” Id. at 278-79.
Eventually, Sergeant Wayne Levey and Officer Christopher Gaughen of
the Reading Police Department, accessed the residence through a rear
basement door. Id. at 170-71. Once inside, Officer Gaughen was able to
peer into the first floor of the residence from the door leading from the
basement to the kitchen, where he observed someone’s leg on the ground.
Id. at 174. Based upon Officer Gaughen’s observation, the officers decided
to enter the home. Id. at 174, 186. Inside the residence, the officers
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2 Appellant is Johnny’s son and Mary’s grandson.
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discovered the deceased bodies of Mary and Johnny lying on the floor with
blue liquid (laundry detergent) on them. Id. at 174. Specifically, the mouths
and hands of both bodies were covered in liquid laundry detergent. Id. at
178, 191, 455-56. Although there were no signs of a forced entry, there were
obvious signs that a struggle had taken place. Id. at 177, 189.
An autopsy later revealed that Mary died as a result of asphyxia caused
by neck compression. Id. at 472. A forensic pathologist who examined Mary’s
body reached this conclusion based upon the presence of petechial
hemorrhages on her face, eyes, mouth, and larynx as well as scleral
hemorrhages in both eyes. Id. The time of her death was consistent with
January 26, 2015, when the neighbor heard screams coming from the
residence. Id. at 478.
Johnny was killed as a result of multiple stab wounds. Id. at 479. The
pathologist noted that Johnny’s body revealed the presence of twenty stab
and ten incised wounds. Id. Of those wounds, five were fatal and included a
wound under the left ear which transected the jugular vein in addition to
wounds penetrating his heart, lungs, pancreas and spleen. Id. at 481-83.
Johnny succumbed to his injuries at the same time Mary died. Id. at 484.
After the police released the crime scene, Joey entered the residence to
collect important papers and items. Id. at 291. Joey noticed that Mary’s
wallet was missing from her purse, which he located in the living room. Id.
at 292. Joey also discovered that Mary’s rings were missing. Id. at 294. The
following day, Joey called banks to close out her accounts. Id. at 293. In the
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process, he learned of recent account activity, which he forwarded to the
police. Id. The police eventually obtained Mary’s bank records and, as a
result, were able to obtain surveillance videos for a cash ATM withdrawal and
two purchases made using Mary’s bank cards in the days following the
murders. Id. at 356, 58, 873-908. The surveillance footage depicted
Appellant using Mary’s card and her PIN number. Specifically, in the early
morning hours of January 27, 2015, Appellant was recorded using Mary’s debit
card at a Sheetz in Muhlenberg Township, where he arrived in Johnny’s
Subaru. Id. at 361-62. Later on the same day, Appellant was recorded using
Mary’s card to make a purchase at Sneaker Villa. Id. at 363. On February 1,
2015, Appellant was captured on video using Mary’s debit card at an ATM
inside the Berkshire Mall. Id. at 365-66.
On February 5, 2015, the police responded to a “burglary in progress”
at a row house in Allentown. Id. at 327-28. At the location, the police
apprehended a male who was on the rooftop attempting to flee. Id. at 328.
Although the male suspect provided false information to the police, he was
later identified as Appellant. Id. at 330-31. Mary’s debit card was discovered
on the ground outside of the row home and turned over to the police. Id. at
334-35.
Following his arrest, Appellant agreed to speak to the police and denied
any involvement in the killing of Mary and Johnny. Appellant asserted that
Joey, his paternal uncle, gave him the bank cards and the keys to Johnny’s
Subaru. Id. at 371. Specifically, Appellant stated that Joey told him that he
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was going to purchase Johnny’s Subaru and directed him to drive the vehicle.
Id. at 518-19, 524-25, 563. Appellant also stated that Joey directed him to
use Mary’s cards so that Joey could pay her bills. Id. at 522-26, 561-63.
Appellant, however, conceded that Mary did not give him permission to use
her cards. Id. at 569. Likewise, he acknowledged that Johnny did not give
him permission to drive the Subaru. Id.
Appellant also denied being in Mary and Johnny’s house in 2015. Id. at
557. He claimed that, as a result of an argument and altercation around
Christmas Eve 2014, Johnny kicked him out of the house and obtained a
protection from abuse order. Id. 299-300, 557.
Joey, on the other hand, stated that he did not manage Mary’s finances
because she handled her own affairs. Id. at 295. Joey stated that he did not
have Mary’s cards and that he did not know the PIN number to her debit card.
Id. at 295-96. Joey further stated that he never drove his brother’s Subaru
and never had a conversation with him about purchasing the vehicle. Id. at
296. Joey denied ever having given permission to Appellant to use Mary’s
cards or Johnny’s Subaru. Id. at 297. Finally, Joey stated that he did not
have a key to Mary’s residence. Id. at 292.
The police took a buccal swab of Appellant and Joey. Id. at 371-72.
Eventually, Appellant’s DNA was found under Johnny’s fingernails and on the
black pants Mary was wearing when she was murdered. Id. at 420, 425. Joey
was excluded as a potential source of any of the DNA collected from the crime
scene. Id. at 424.
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Appellant was charged with and convicted by a jury of two counts of
first-degree murder, two counts of third-degree murder, theft by unlawful
taking, access device fraud, PIC, and unauthorized use of an automobile. On
November 2, 2016, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment
on each of the first degree murder convictions.3 Appellant did not file any
post-sentence motions. Instead, he timely appealed to this Court.
Following Appellant’s counseled filing of a notice of appeal, on December
6, 2016, the trial court ordered him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
within twenty-one days. Appellant failed to comply. On May 19, 2017,
Appellant’s counsel, Jacob Gurwitz, filed in this Court an Anders brief. On
May 24, 2017, Attorney Gurwitz filed a petition to withdraw as counsel.
On appeal, the Commonwealth correctly pointed out that at no point did
Attorney Gurwitz file a Rule 1925(b) statement in accordance with the trial
court’s December 6, 2016 order. In response, on August 1, 2017, a panel of
this Court issued a memorandum decision remanding this case to the trial
court with instruction to direct Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement nunc
pro tunc.
On August 14, 2017, the trial court issued an order directing Appellant
to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. On August 16, 2017, Attorney Gurwitz filed
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3For purposes of sentencing, the third degree murder convictions merged with
the first degree convictions. The trial court also imposed upon Appellant
concurrent sentences of five years’ imprisonment for theft by unlawful taking,
one to seven years’ imprisonment for access device fraud, one to five years’
imprisonment for PIC, and one to two years’ imprisonment for unauthorized
use of a motor vehicle.
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a Rule 1925(b) statement. On August 28, 2017, the trial court permitted
Attorney Gurwitz to withdraw from the case. On the same day, the trial court
issued an order appointing John Fielding, Esquire, to represent Appellant on
direct appeal. On August 29, 2017, the trial court issued another order
instructing Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. Following the trial
court’s grant of two extensions, on December 14, 2017, instead of the court-
ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, Attorney Fielding filed a statement of
intent to file an Anders brief under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4).4 On January 2,
2018, the trial court issued a two-page Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, concluding
that no meritorious issues exist for purposes of direct appeal.
Attorney Fielding, however, failed to file an Anders brief consistent with
Rule 1925(c)(4) or an Application to Withdraw. Thus, on January 18, 2018,
we issued an order, directing Attorney Fielding to file an Application to
Withdraw and an Anders brief in this Court, or a Rule 1925(b) statement in
the trial court. Eventually, after we issued additional orders over the course
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4 Rule 1925(c)(4) provides:
In a criminal case, counsel may file of record and serve on the
judge a statement of intent to file an [Anders] brief in lieu of filing
a Statement. If, upon review of the [Anders] brief, the appellate
court believes that there are arguably meritorious issues for
review, those issues will not be waived; instead, the appellate
court may remand for the filing of a Statement, a supplemental
opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a), or both. Upon remand, the trial
court may, but is not required to, replace appellant’s counsel.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4).
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of several months,5 Attorney Fielding finally filed the instant Anders brief,
raising three issues for our review.
[I.] Was the evidence adduced at trial insufficient to support the
jury’s verdict?
[II.] Was the verdict of the trial court below against the weight of
the evidence?
[III.] Should ineffective assistance of counsel be an issue raised
at this point in the case?
Anders Brief at 5.
When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the
merits of the underlying issues without first examining counsel’s petition to
withdraw. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super.
2007) (en banc). It is well-established that, in requesting a withdrawal,
counsel must satisfy the following procedural requirements: 1) petition the
court for leave to withdraw stating that, after making a conscientious
examination of the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be
frivolous; 2) provide a copy of the brief to the defendant; and 3) advise the
defendant that he or she has the right to retain private counsel, proceed pro
se or raise additional arguments that the defendant considers worthy of the
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5 To review in detail the tortured procedural history of this case, we direct the
reader’s attention to our March 27, 2018 memorandum remanding with
instructions for Attorney Fielding to comply with the minimum requirements
of Anders/Santiago, as well as our August 27, 2018 order remanding for a
hearing to determine whether Attorney Fielding had abandoned Appellant and
to take further action to protect Appellant’s right to appeal.
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court’s addition. Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super.
2009).
Instantly, counsel’s petition to withdraw from representation provides
that counsel reviewed the record and concluded that the appeal is frivolous.
Furthermore, counsel notified Appellant that he was seeking permission to
withdraw and provided Appellant with copies of the petition to withdraw and
his Anders brief. Counsel also advised Appellant of his right to retain new
counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional points he deems worthy of
this Court’s attention. Accordingly, we conclude that counsel has satisfied the
procedural requirements of Anders.
We next must determine whether counsel’s Anders brief complies with
the substantive requirements of Santiago, wherein our Supreme Court held:
[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s
petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the
procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer
to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports
the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the
appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have
led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Here, our review of counsel’s brief indicates that
he has complied with the briefing requirements of Santiago. We, therefore,
conclude that counsel has satisfied the minimum requirements of
Anders/Santiago.
Once counsel has met his obligations, “it then becomes the responsibility
of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the proceedings and make
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an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly
frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355 n.5. Thus, we now turn to the merits
of Appellant’s appeal.
In his first issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence underlying his convictions.
“A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law.”
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000).
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal
denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014).
The Crimes Code defines first-degree and third-degree murder as
follows:
§ 2502. Murder
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(a) Murder of the first degree.—A criminal homicide
constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an
intentional killing.
.....
(c) Murder of the third degree.—All other kinds of
murder shall be murder of the third degree. Murder of the third
degree is a felony of the first degree.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a), (c).
To find a defendant guilty of first-degree murder a jury must find
that the Commonwealth has proven that he . . . unlawfully killed
a human being and did so in an intentional, deliberate and
premeditated manner. It is the element of a willful, premeditated
and deliberate intent to kill that distinguishes first-degree murder
from all other criminal homicide. Specific intent to kill may be
inferred from the defendant’s use of a deadly weapon upon
a vital part of the victim’s body. The mens rea required for
first-degree murder, specific intent to kill, may be established
solely from circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Schoff, 911 A.2d 147, 159-60 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
A person may be convicted of third-degree murder where the
murder is neither intentional nor committed during the
perpetration of a felony, but contains the requisite malice
aforethought. Malice consists of a wickedness of disposition,
hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a
mind regardless of social duty, although a particular person may
not be intended to be injured.
Commonwealth v. Pigg, 571 A.2d 438, 441-42 (Pa. Super. 1990) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). “The elements of third-degree murder, as
developed by case law, are a killing done with legal malice but without specific
intent to kill required in first-degree murder. Malice is the essential element
of third[-]degree murder, and is the distinguishing factor between murder and
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manslaughter.” Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536, 539 (Pa.
Super. 1995) (citations omitted).
We have stated that a person may be convicted of third-degree
murder where the murder is neither intentional nor committed
during the perpetration of a felony, but contains the requisite
malice aforethought. . . . We have defined malice as a
wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness
of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty, although
a particular person may not be intended to be injured. In addition,
malice may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon
upon a vital part of the body. Malice may also exist where the
principal acts in gross deviation from the standard of reasonable
care, failing to perceive that such actions might create a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death or serious bodily injury.
Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 690 A.2d 260, 264 (Pa. Super. 1997) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
Instantly, our review of the record confirms that the evidence was
sufficient to enable the jury to find every element of first- and third- degree
murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant’s claim that because of a PFA
he had not been to Mary and Johnny’s residence since Christmas Eve 2014
fails because his DNA was found nearly a month later at the crime scene under
Johnny’s fingernails and on the black pants Mary was wearing at the time of
her death. Further, Appellant’s claim that Joey had murdered Mary and
Johnny was contradicted by DNA evidence, excluding Joey as a potential
suspect.6 The record establishes that Appellant acted with the specific intent
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6The trial court also was well within its authority to reject Appellant’s proffered
version of the facts. Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 756 (“the finder of fact while
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and malice in the killing of Mary and Johnny. As detailed above, Mary died as
a result of asphyxia caused by neck compression,7 and Johnny because of
thirty stab wounds, five of which were fatal, including a wound under the left
ear which transected the jugular vein and others penetrating his heart, lungs,
pancreas and spleen. See Commonwealth v. Nichols, 692 A.2d 181, 184-
85 (Pa. Super. 1997) (“[I]t is well settled that the use of a deadly weapon on
a vital part of the body is sufficient to establish a specific intent to kill. Clearly,
a specific intent to cause serious bodily injury can be inferred from the same
circumstances.”). Moreover, in the days following the murders, Appellant was
captured on film making an ATM cash withdrawal and purchases at two
different locations using Mary’s bank cards. In addition, Mary’s bank card was
discovered at the scene of a burglary where Appellant was arrested while
attempting to flee. Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the evidence adduced at trial was
sufficient to sustain, beyond a reasonable doubt, Appellant’s convictions for
first- and third- degree murders in connection with the killing of his
grandmother and father.
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passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence
produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.”).
7 It is settled that “evidence of death by strangulation can be sufficient to
establish the requisite intent for first-degree murder.” Commonwealth v.
Martin, 101 A.3d 706, 718–19 (Pa. 2014), citing Commonwealth v. Pruitt,
951 A.2d 307, 318–19 (Pa. 2008).
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We next review the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the non-
homicide charges. To sustain a conviction for the crime of theft by unlawful
taking, the Commonwealth must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a
person unlawfully took or exercised control over movable property of another
with an intent to deprive them of that property. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).
A person commits access device fraud if he “uses an access device to
obtain or in an attempt to obtain property or services with knowledge that
. . . the access device was issued to another person who has not authorized
its use[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4106(a)(1)(ii).
To sustain a conviction for PIC, the Commonwealth must prove that the
defendant (1) possessed an instrument of crime, (2) with intent to employ it
criminally. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a). Under the statute, an “instrument of
crime” is defined, in pertinent part, as “[a]nything specially made or specially
adapted for criminal use.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(d).
A person is guilty of unauthorized use of an automobile if he operates
an automobile . . . of another without consent of the owner. See 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3928(a).
Instantly, based upon the evidence presented at trial, viewed in a light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, we agree with Attorney Fielding that
the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt Appellant committed
theft by unlawful taking, access device fraud, unauthorized use of an
automobile, and PIC. As noted earlier, after the police released the scene and
permitted Joey to enter the residence, Joey noticed that Mary’s rings and
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bank cards were missing. He stated that Mary managed her own affairs. Joey
also stated that he never possessed the bank cards in question and never
granted Appellant any permission to use them. Joey remarked that he never
had a conversation with Johnny about purchasing Johnny’s Subaru and Joey
denied ever having given permission to Appellant to drive the Subaru.
Additionally, Appellant acknowledged at trial that Mary never authorized him
to use her cards and that Johnny never gave him permission to drive the
Subaru, which Appellant drove to Sheetz shortly after the murders. Lastly,
based on the fact that Johnny suffered thirty stab wounds, the jury concluded
that Appellant necessarily possessed an instrument of crime, i.e., a knife or a
similar sharp object. See Commonwealth v. Keaton, 419 A.2d 578, 580
(Pa. Super. 1980) (holding that the jury, having concluded that appellant was
the slayer, and that death resulted from the infliction of a stab wound with a
knife, “could logically have concluded from all the evidence that appellant had
possession of a knife, and that the knife was an instrument commonly used
for criminal purposes” under Section 907(a)).
Appellant next argues that his convictions were against the weight of
the evidence. We, however, as Attorney Fielding points out, need not address
the merits of this issue as Appellant failed to preserve it for our review. Under
Pa.R.Crim.P. 607, a challenge to the weight of the evidence generally must be
preserved in a post-sentence motion. “As noted in the comment to Rule 607,
the purpose of this rule is to make it clear that a challenge to the weight of
the evidence must be raised with the trial judge or it will be waived.”
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Commonwealth v. Gillard, 850 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal
denied, 863 A.2d 1143 (Pa. 2004). A claim challenging the weight of the
evidence generally cannot be raised for the first time in a Rule 1925(b)
statement. Commonwealth v. Burkett, 830 A.2d 1034 (Pa. Super. 2003).
An appellant’s failure to avail himself of any of the methods for presenting a
weight of the evidence issue to the trial court constitutes waiver of that claim,
even if the trial court responds to the claim in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Id.
Instantly, Appellant failed to challenge the weight of the evidence at
sentencing. Additionally, as mentioned, he did not file any post-sentence
motions. Accordingly, his weight of the evidence claim is waived.
Appellant lastly raises a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
We, however, agree with Attorney Fielding that Appellant cannot raise this
claim on direct appeal but must instead raise it in a PCRA petition. In
Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002), our Supreme Court held
that as a general rule, defendants must wait to raise ineffective assistance of
counsel claims until collateral review. Only in specific limited circumstances
may a defendant raise ineffectiveness claims in post-sentence motions and on
direct appeal. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 563–64
(Pa. 2013) (trial court has discretion to entertain ineffectiveness claims on
post-verdict motions and direct appeal where: (1) claim of ineffectiveness is
apparent from record and meritorious to the extent that immediate
consideration best serves interests of justice; or (2) where good cause is
shown and defendant knowingly and expressly waives his entitlement to seek
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subsequent PCRA review from his conviction and sentence). These exceptions
do not apply here. Appellant did not claim ineffective assistance of trial
counsel in post-verdict motions, and he did not knowingly or expressly waive
his entitlement to seek subsequent PCRA review from his conviction. At
present, there is nothing in the record that facilitates intelligent appellate
review of Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance. Therefore, Appellant
must wait until PCRA proceedings to raise an ineffective assistance claim.
Commonwealth v. Britt, 83 A.3d 198, 204 (Pa. Super. 2013) (appellant
cannot seek review of ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal, “as it involves
non-record-based claims, nor has Appellant waived PCRA review”).
We have conducted an independent review of the record and addressed
Appellant’s arguments on appeal. Based on our conclusions above, we agree
with Attorney Fielding that the issues Appellant seeks to litigate in this appeal
are wholly frivolous. Additionally, we do not discern any non-frivolous issues
that Appellant could have raised. We, therefore, grant Attorney Fielding’s
petition to withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.
Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: December 31, 2018
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