J-S23024-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JESSE GODFREY,
Appellant No. 1397 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 30, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0710991-1990
BEFORE: DONOHUE, SHOGAN, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JUNE 05, 2015
Appellant, Jesse Godfrey, appeals pro se from the order denying his
serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42
Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the factual history of this case as follows:
On June 2, 1990, in the early morning hours, [Appellant]
and Robert “Sonny” Thomas decided to break into the home of
Melvin Johnson, located at 2127 North Ninth Street in
Philadelphia to steal money from him. While “Sonny” waited
outside the building watching for police, [Appellant] crawled
through a window on the first floor and then went upstairs to the
third floor where he pried open the lock on Mr. Johnson’s
bedroom door and entered. Mr. Johnson was asleep on the bed
when [Appellant] entered the room, but he soon awoke when
[Appellant] took five dollars out of his pocket. [Appellant] then
showed Mr. Johnson a knife which [Appellant] had found on the
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S23024-15
floor of the bedroom and told Mr. Johnson not to move. Mr.
Johnson charged at [Appellant] who fatally stabbed him in the
chest.
At approximately 4:10 p.m. on June 2, [1990], Detective
Michael Cahill and Detective Raymond Dougherty arrived at 906
West Susquehanna Street, [Appellant’s] mother’s home, as a
result of a phone call from a family member of [Appellant].
[Appellant] and his brother, Michael Pigford, were waiting for the
Detectives when they arrived and both willingly got into the
Detectives’ car and rode to the Police Administration Building
(PAB). Upon arrival at the PAB, [Appellant] was taken to the
Special Investigation Unit where he was orally warned of his
Miranda rights. [Appellant] waived his rights and proceeded to
answer questions about the murder of Melvin Johnson. During
the questioning, [Appellant] admitted involvement in the incident
including the stabbing of the victim.
[Appellant] was charged with 2nd Degree Murder, Burglary,
Robbery and Possession of an Instrument of Crime [(“PIC”)]. He
subsequently filed a Motion to Suppress the statement he gave
on June 2, 1990. This motion was heard by the trial court and
denied on April 30, 1991.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/13/97, at 1-2 (citations omitted).
On April 30, 1991, at the conclusion of a nonjury trial, Appellant was
convicted of 2nd degree murder, burglary, robbery, and PIC. On February
14, 1994, Appellant was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. 1
Thereafter, Appellant brought a nunc pro tunc direct appeal, and this Court
affirmed his judgment of sentence on June 30, 1998. Commonwealth v.
____________________________________________
1
As the PCRA court noted in its opinion dated June 16, 2014, “[Appellant]
was deemed incompetent to undergo sentencing following his conviction
thereby delaying his sentencing hearing until such time as he was deemed
competent.” PCRA Court Opinion, 6/16/14, at 1 n.1.
-2-
J-S23024-15
Godfrey, 1865 PHL 97, 724 A.2d 954 (Pa. Super. 1998) (unpublished
memorandum).
On March 2, 2000, Appellant filed an untimely pro se PCRA petition.
PCRA counsel was appointed and filed a Turner/Finley2 letter. On April 24,
2001, the PCRA court dismissed the PCRA petition and granted counsel
permission to withdraw. Appellant then filed a nunc pro tunc appeal. On
September 29, 2002, this Court entered an order dismissing the appeal due
to failure to file a brief.
On January 30, 2003, Appellant filed his second pro se PCRA petition.
New PCRA counsel was appointed and filed an amended PCRA petition. On
November 14, 2003, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s second PCRA
petition. Appellant filed an appeal, which this Court dismissed by order
dated June 22, 2004, due to the failure to file a brief.
On May 16, 2012, Appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA petition,
which is his third. The PCRA court dismissed the PCRA petition on April 30,
2014. This timely pro se appeal followed.
Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing the Appellant’s third PCRA
Petition without appointing counsel to Amend the PCRA Petition
and advance the Petition in legally acceptable terms?
____________________________________________
2
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth
v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
-3-
J-S23024-15
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the
record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA
court’s determination is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31
A.3d 317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Berry, 877
A.2d 479, 482 (Pa. Super. 2005)). The PCRA court’s findings will not be
disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Super.
2001)).
A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date that the
judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). This time
requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not
ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition. Commonwealth v.
Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 2000). A judgment of sentence “becomes
final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(3).
However, an untimely petition may be received when the petition
alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to
the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii),
-4-
J-S23024-15
and (iii), is met.3 A petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed
within sixty days of the date the claim could first have been presented. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to the exceptions to the
PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, “the petitioner must plead and prove
specific facts that demonstrate his claim was raised within the sixty-day time
frame” under section 9545(b)(2). Carr, 768 A.2d at 1167.
Our review of the record reflects that the trial court imposed a
sentence of life imprisonment on February 14, 1994. This Court affirmed
Appellant’s judgment of sentence on June 30, 1998. The record does not
reflect that Appellant sought review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Accordingly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on July 30,
1998, thirty days after this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence and the
____________________________________________
3
The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
-5-
J-S23024-15
time for filing a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court expired. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
Appellant did not file the instant PCRA petition until May 16, 2012. Thus, the
instant PCRA petition is patently untimely.
As previously stated, if a petitioner does not file a timely PCRA
petition, his petition may nevertheless be received under any of the three
limited exceptions to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1). If a petitioner asserts one of these exceptions, he must file his
petition within sixty days of the date that the exception could be asserted.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
Our review of the record reflects that Appellant has attempted to
invoke the third exception to the PCRA timeliness requirements, i.e., “the
right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme
Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the
time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b)(1)(iii), with reliance upon the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309
(2012). However, Appellant’s reliance upon Martinez is misplaced and
entitles him to no relief.
In Martinez, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized, for
purposes of federal habeas corpus relief, that “[i]nadequate assistance of
counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a
-6-
J-S23024-15
prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.”
Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315. Moreover, the Martinez Court specifically
cast its holding as “equitable” rather than “constitutional,” stating “[t]his is
not the case … to resolve whether that exception exists as a constitutional
matter.” Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315. Therefore, Martinez does not
provide a basis for Appellant to assert the section 9545(b)(1)(iii) exception
to the PCRA’s jurisdictional timeliness requirements. See Commonwealth
v. Saunders, 60 A.3d 162, 165 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding that “[w]hile
Martinez represents a significant development in federal habeas corpus law,
it is of no moment with respect to the way Pennsylvania courts apply the
plain language of the time bar set forth in section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA”).
Accordingly, the ruling in Martinez fails to provide Appellant an exception to
the time bar of the PCRA. Thus, the PCRA court did not err in denying
Appellant’s untimely third PCRA petition.
Consequently, because the PCRA petition was untimely and no
exceptions apply, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to address the claims
presented and grant relief. See Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d
396, 398 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding that PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to
hear untimely petition). Likewise, we lack the authority to address the
merits of any substantive claims raised in the PCRA petition. See
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007)
-7-
J-S23024-15
(“[J]urisdictional time limits go to a court’s right or competency to adjudicate
a controversy.”).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/5/2015
-8-
Com. v. Godfrey, J.
Combined Opinion