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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ERIC RAUL MUNIZ
Appellant No. 1965 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 7, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0002483-2016
BEFORE: OLSON, J., MOULTON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2017
Eric Raul Muniz appeals from the November 7, 2016 judgment of
sentence entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas following his
convictions for driving under the influence (“DUI”), driving while operating
privilege is suspended, and driving vehicle at an unsafe speed.1 Muniz’s
appellate counsel has filed an Anders2 brief and a petition to withdraw from
representation. We affirm and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
This case stems from a single-vehicle crash on March 6, 2016 at
approximately 2:45 a.m. N.T., 11/7/16, at 8-10 (“N.T.”). Sergeant Adam
Garman testified that he arrived at 600 Rathton Road in York County where
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1
75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a)(1), 1543(b)(1), and 3361, respectively.
2
Anders v. California 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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he observed a silver sedan with front-end damage. Id. at 8-9. Sergeant
Garman testified that he observed a person standing near the vehicle’s
trunk, who he later determined to be Muniz. Id. at 9. Sergeant Garman
also observed a person in the passenger seat of the vehicle who appeared to
be highly intoxicated. Id. at 10. Sergeant Garman testified that when he
asked Muniz what had happened, Muniz stated that he swerved to miss a
deer and hit the guardrail. Id. Muniz further explained that he was going to
try to change the tire so that he could drive away. Id. at 11. Sergeant
Garman testified that the damage to the vehicle was so severe that the
vehicle could not be driven away. Id.
Sergeant Garman testified that he detected an odor of alcohol while
speaking with Muniz and that Muniz’s speech was slurred and his eyes were
“bloodshot and very glassy.” Id. at 12. He further testified that Muniz’s
responses to his questions were slow and deliberate, which are indicators of
impairment. Id. at 18-19. Sergeant Garman stated that Muniz appeared to
be impaired and that Muniz initially denied, but later admitted, consuming
alcohol. Id. at 13.
Sergeant Garman, who has experience with crash investigation and
reconstruction, testified that he concluded that Muniz had not swerved to
avoid a deer because the tire marks indicated “that the driver was not in
control of the vehicle at the time the vehicle was sliding across the roadway,
not being steered by him.” Id. at 17. Sergeant Garman concluded that
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Muniz “was traveling too fast as he came around the corner and was unable
to control the vehicle.” Id.
Upon being asked for license and registration, Muniz provided a
Pennsylvania identification card and stated that his license was suspended.
Id. at 18. Sergeant Garman testified that Muniz performed three field
sobriety tests – lack of convergence, walk and turn, and one-leg stand. Id.
at 19. Muniz’s performance on these tests furthered Sergeant Garman’s
belief that Muniz was impaired. Id. at 19-26. Sergeant Garman arrested
Muniz for DUI. Id. at 26. While in custody, Muniz explained that the crash
had taken place within approximately the last three minutes. Id. at 13.
On November 7, 2016, following a bench trial, the trial court convicted
Muniz of the aforementioned offenses and sentenced him to 3 to 6 months’
incarceration on the DUI conviction and a consecutive 90 days’ incarceration
on the conviction for driving while operating privilege is suspended. Muniz
timely filed a notice of appeal.
Because counsel has filed a petition to withdraw pursuant to Anders
and its Pennsylvania counterpart, Santiago,3 we must address counsel’s
petition before reviewing the merits of Muniz’s underlying claims.
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa.Super. 2007). We
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3
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
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first address whether counsel’s petition to withdraw satisfies the procedural
requirements of Anders. To be permitted to withdraw, counsel must:
1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that,
after making a conscientious examination of the record,
counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous;
2) furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant; and 3)
advise the defendant that he or she has the right to retain
private counsel or raise additional arguments that the
defendant deems worthy of the court’s attention.
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en
banc).
Here, counsel has stated that after a conscientious examination of the
record, he believes this appeal would be wholly frivolous. Pet. to Withdraw,
4/25/17, at 1. Counsel furnished a copy of the Anders brief to Muniz, as
well as a letter advising Muniz that he could seek new counsel or proceed
pro se and “raise any points which [he] deems worth[y] of the Superior
Court’s attention in a[ddi]tion to the points” raised by counsel. Ltr. to
Muniz, 2/3/17. We conclude that counsel’s petition to withdraw complies
with the procedural dictates of Anders.
We next address whether counsel’s Anders brief meets the
requirements established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago.
The brief must:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,
with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the
record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal;
(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding
that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the
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relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or
statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the
appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
Counsel’s brief provided a summary of the procedural history and the
facts with appropriate citations to the record. Anders Br. at 5-7. Counsel’s
brief states that he conducted a thorough review of the record and
determined that any appeal would be frivolous, and set forth his reasons for
that conclusion. Id. at 10-11. Accordingly, counsel has substantially
complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago.
Muniz has not filed a pro se brief or a counseled brief with new,
privately-retained counsel. We, therefore, review the issue raised in the
Anders brief.
Muniz raises the following issue: “Whether the Commonwealth
presented insufficient evidence as a matter of law in order to support
[Muniz]’s conviction of DUI, [driving while operating privilege is suspended,]
and driving vehicle at safe speed[.]” Anders Br. at 4.
We apply the following standard when reviewing a sufficiency of the
evidence claim:
[W]hether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the
light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is
sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
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defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless
the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain
its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact
while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Best, 120 A.3d 329, 341 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Harden, 103 A.3d 107, 111 (Pa.Super. 2014)).
At the conclusion of trial, the trial court summarized the testimony
and evidence it considered in arriving at its conclusion:
I have listened to the testimony of Sergeant Garman, who
is an experienced and trained police officer both in
investigating [DUI] cases as well as in accident
reconstruction.
Sergeant Garman testified to the events that occurred
on March 16th of 2016 in the area of 600 Rathton Road in
York County at approximately 2:45 in the morning.
Sergeant Garman testified that there was a single car
accident that occurred. He testified to extensive damage
to the car as well as damage to the guardrail that the car
had evidently run into. He also testified in his experience
and expertise in accident reconstruction that the car had
not hit something prior to hitting the guardrail, and he
made this determination on the basis of tire striation prior
to the time the car hit the guardrail. He also pointed out
in the video that we observed that the fluid path from the
location of the guardrail being struck led back to the car
that was driven by [Muniz] that was parked at 600
Rathton.
Sergeant Garman testified to initially seeing several
indicators of driving under the influence. Those indicators
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were glassy eyes, slurred speech, and a smell of alcohol.
He then conducted two[4] field sobriety tests, the walk and
turn test and the one legged stand test, and there is a
videotape of the [S]ergeant conducting these tests. The
videotape was observed by me. The videotape in my
opinion clearly shows that Mr. Muniz is impaired when he
attempts to perform those tests and is not able to perform
those tests.
Under all these circumstances, as well as after learning
about [Muniz]’s prior driver’s license suspension, we find
that [Muniz] is guilty of Count 1, driving under the
influence of alcohol after imbibing a sufficient amount of
alcohol that he was rendered incapable of safe driving;
Count 3, driving while his operating license was suspended
and DUI related; and Count 4, driving vehicle at a safe
speed.
N.T., at 48-50. We agree. Further, the trial court was free to believe all of
Sergeant Garman’s uncontradicted testimony. See Best, 120 A.3d at 341
(quoting Harden, 103 A.3d at 111) (“[T]he [finder] of fact while passing
upon the credibility of witnesses . . . is free to believe all, part or none of the
evidence.”). Therefore, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the convictions.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition for leave to withdraw as
counsel granted.
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4
Sergeant Garman testified that he conducted three field sobriety
tests and indicated that Muniz failed two of those tests. N.T., at 19, 26.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/19/2017
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Com. v. Muniz, E.
Combined Opinion