J-S62035-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHAZ PAGE
Appellant No. 204 MDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order January 12, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0001623-2012
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., DUBOW, J., and JENKINS, J.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 16, 2016
Appellant, Chaz Page, appeals from the order entered in the Dauphin
County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his second petition filed under
the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On
June 18, 2013, Appellant pled guilty to attempted homicide, persons not to
possess firearms, and possession of firearm by minor. The trial court
sentenced Appellant on August 26, 2013, to an aggregate term of 10-20
years’ incarceration. Appellant did not file a direct appeal. Appellant filed
his first PCRA petition on April 21, 2014, which was denied on July 14, 2014.
This Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief. See Commonwealth v.
Page, No. 1443 MDA 2014, unpublished memorandum (Pa.Super. filed April
24, 2015). Appellant filed the current pro se PCRA petition on June 5, 2015,
challenging the legality of his sentence. On July 27, 2015, the court issued
J-S62035-16
notice of its intent to dismiss the petition per Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. With leave
of court, Appellant filed an amended petition on September 10, 2015. The
court issued new Rule 907 notice on December 15, 2015. Appellant filed a
pro se response on January 7, 2016. On January 12, 2016, the court
dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition. Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of
appeal on January 28, 2016. The court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),
and Appellant timely complied.1
The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite.
Commonwealth v. Hackett, 598 Pa. 350, 956 A.2d 978 (2008). A PCRA
petition must be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment
becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final at
the conclusion of direct review or at the expiration of time for seeking
____________________________________________
1
On February 18, 2016, Appellant pro se filed an application for relief with
this Court, requesting a remand to the PCRA court for “adequate review” of
his illegal sentencing challenge in light of Alleyne v. United States, ___
U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). Appellant filed another
pro se application for relief with this Court on April 26, 2016, denying the
PCRA court’s assertion that it was not served with a copy of Appellant’s
notice of appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 906(a)(2), and requesting this Court to
correct his “illegal sentence.” Appellant filed a third application for relief
with this Court on July 19, 2016, contesting various assertions in the
Commonwealth’s brief. Appellant’s apparent failure to comply with Rule 906
does not implicate our jurisdiction, and the PCRA court ultimately addressed
Appellant’s claims in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 902 (stating
failure of defendant to take any step other than timely filing of appeal does
not affect validity of appeal). Due to our conclusion that this appeal is
proper and our disposition that Appellant’s current PCRA petition is untimely,
we deny all of Appellant’s applications for relief.
-2-
J-S62035-16
review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The three statutory exceptions to the
PCRA’s timeliness provisions allow for limited circumstances under which the
late filing of a petition will be excused. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-
(iii). To invoke the “new facts” exception, the petitioner must plead and
prove: “[T]he facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the
petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). The “new constitutional right”
exception requires the petitioner to plead and prove: “[T]he right asserted is
a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the
United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).
Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on
September 25, 2013, upon expiration of the time to file a direct appeal with
this Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Appellant
filed the current PCRA petition on June 5, 2015. Thus, Appellant’s petition is
patently untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). See also
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa.Super. 2013) (stating
issues regarding legality of sentence must be presented in timely PCRA
petition). To the extent Appellant attempts to invoke the “new facts”
exception, the Alleyne decision and its Pennsylvania progeny do not
constitute “new facts” under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). See Commonwealth
-3-
J-S62035-16
v. Watts, 611 Pa. 80, 23 A.3d 980 (2011) (stating judicial determinations
are not “facts” within meaning of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)). Moreover, the
“new constitutional right” exception cannot benefit Appellant because the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that Alleyne does not apply
retroactively for purposes of collateral review. See Commonwealth v.
Washington, ___ A.3d ___, 2016 WL 3909088 (Pa. filed July 9, 2016).
Therefore, the PCRA court properly dismissed Appellant’s petition as time-
barred.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/16/2016
-4-
Com. v. Page, C.
Combined Opinion