J-A08001-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
STEPHEN R. RANDALL
Appellant No. 473 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 3, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004208-2012
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JUNE 29, 2017
The Philadelphia Police Department charged Appellant, Stephen R.
Randall, with assorted crimes arising from an attempted carjacking of
Monica Kelly and Earl Stanton. The primary factual issue at Randall’s bench
trial was Kelly and Stanton’s identification of Randall as one of the three
males who accosted them. Despite significant evidence of suggestive taint
by police procedures, the trial court found Kelly and Stanton’s in-court
identification of Randall credible, and therefore found him guilty on all
charges.
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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On appeal, Randall contends that the trial court erred in failing to
grant him a new trial as the weight of the evidence at trial was against its
verdict.
The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact
who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to
determine the credibility of the witnesses. An appellate court
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact.
Thus, we may only reverse the lower court’s verdict if it is so
contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.
Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim
below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the underlying
question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial
court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.
Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003) (internal
citations omitted).
When the challenge to the weight of the evidence is predicated
on the credibility of trial testimony, our review of the trial court’s
decision is extremely limited. Generally, unless the evidence is
so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any verdict based
thereon pure conjecture, these types of claims are not
cognizable on appellate review.
Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 282 (Pa. Super. 2009) (internal
quotes and citations omitted).
A review of the trial transcript reveals the following testimony. Stanton
testified that at approximately 8:00 p.m. on March 18, 2012, he was a
passenger in a vehicle driven by Kelly. At the intersection of 15th Street and
70th Avenue, three armed men approached the vehicle. One man
approached Stanton on the passenger side of the vehicle; the other two
menaced Kelly through the driver’s side window.
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Neither Stanton or Kelly recognized any of the males. One of the
males directed Kelly to disembark from the vehicle. However, another car
approached the intersection and its headlights distracted the assailants,
allowing Kelly to quickly drive away from the intersection. The incident
lasted less than a minute.
Once safely away from the scene of the crime, Stanton called 911. He
told the dispatcher that the assailants were “three black males … I think one
… guy had white sneakers [and] I think a blue sweat suit jacket on [and] I
think blue jeans.” He could not provide a description of the other two
assailants to the dispatcher.
The information Kelly provided to the dispatcher was, if anything, even
sparser. She informed the dispatcher that she could not describe the
assailants’ clothing except that one of them had a hoodie on.
When police arrived to interview Stanton, he provided the following
description:
Black male, 160 pounds approximately, brown skin, mustache,
early 20s. He had a hoodie. His clothes were not as dark as the
other males. He was closer to the vehicle. His clothes were not
dark, but not bright that would stand out. … [T]hey all had
hoodies and hats on.
He could not describe the hats worn by the assailants, because the hoodies
covered them.
Police drove Kelly and Stanton around the neighborhood in an effort to
locate their assailants. This effort was unsuccessful, and Kelly and Stanton
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were driven to the police station. At the police station, officers received a
report of a gunshot victim, Randall, at a local hospital claiming that he had
been shot while being robbed at the intersection of 15th Street and 70th
Avenue. Randall informed hospital personnel that he had driven himself to
the hospital after being shot during a robbery.
Police quickly surmised that the two incidents were related. Kelly and
Stanton were informed that the gunshot victim at the hospital was suspected
to be one of their assailants, and they were driven to the hospital to make
an identification. Both Stanton and Kelly positively identified Randall as one
of their assailants.
Over a year later, after Randall had been charged, a line-up
identification was held. Six men were in the lineup; Stanton immediately
identified Randall.
Randall testified in his own defense. He stated that he lived at the
intersection of 15th Street and 70th Avenue. He was sitting in his car texting
when an assailant approached his passenger side window and demanded
that he “give it up.” Randall drove away, but suffered a gunshot wound to
his arm as the assailant fired at him. When Stanton and Kelly were brought
to the hospital to identify him, his hat was lying next to him on the bed.
Randall contends that under these circumstances, Stanton’s and
Kelly’s identifications were unreliable. He highlights: (a) the short amount of
time the victims had to observe their assailants, (b) the sparse descriptions
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given by the victims to the police dispatcher, (c) the taint caused by the
police informing the victims that Randall was a suspect before they saw him,
and (d) the presence of his hat and boots in his hospital room when Stanton
and Kelly first identified him.
In rejecting these arguments, the trial court provided the following
reasoning:
[T]his [c]ourt submits that it correctly concluded that the verdict
does not shock the conscience. The complainants identified
[Randall] shortly after the incident occurred as one of the three
persons involved in the incident. They identified [Randall]
immediately upon seeing him and Stanton again identified him at
a lineup that occurred months after the incident happened. Both
complainants were absolutely certain in the reliability of their
identifications.
Support for the reliability of the identifications is found in the
fact that both complainants placed defendant on the driver’s side
of the car and did not identify any other person shown to them
the night of the incident. They were also consistent in their
testimony with respect to many of the other details of the crime.
In addition, [Randall] turned away from both complainants when
they were asked to identify him.
In addition, this [c]ourt did not find [Randall’s] testimony
credible. According to [Randall,] despite being shot, he did not
call police and instead drove himself to a hospital using a route
that took longer than necessary. In this [c]ourt’s opinion, a
person that had been shot during a robbery would not have
acted as defendant did that evening. Instead, such a victim
would have done what the complainants herein did and
immediately contact[ed] the police.
Finally, while the police should not have advised the
complainants that a possible suspect was at the hospital before
transporting them there, this [c]ourt did not find that the police’s
actions so tainted the complainants’ identifications such that the
verdict shocks the conscience because the complainants: 1.)
were certain in identifying [Randall]; 2.) were consistent in their
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recall of the incident; and 3.) identified [Randall] shortly after
the incident occurred. Moreover, [Randall’s] testimony about his
actions the night of the incident was preposterous.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/16, at 10-11 (citation omitted).
After reviewing the certified record, we cannot conclude that the
reasoning quoted above constitutes an abuse of the trial court’s discretion
on this issue. The trial court acknowledges the weaknesses in the case
presented by the Commonwealth, but provides cogent reasons for finding
Stanton’s and Kelly’s identification of Randall credible. As such, Randall’s
sole issue on appeal merits no relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/29/2017
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Com. v. Randall, S.
Combined Opinion