J-A22037-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RICHARD ARDEN REDMAN
Appellant No. 930 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 13, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-08-CR-0000580-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED JUNE 10, 2016
Appellant Richard Arden Redman appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on May 13, 2014 following his bench trial convictions of
three counts of driving under the influence (“DUI”).1 Appellant challenges
the denial of his motion to suppress. After careful consideration, we affirm.
On February 27, 2013, at approximately 2:30 a.m., the Pennsylvania
State Police dispatched Trooper David Sweeney to the scene of a one-car
accident. N.T. 10/11/2013, p. 2. Three to four minutes later, Trooper
Sweeney arrived at the scene and observed a white male (later identified as
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), (b), and (c).
J-A22037-15
Appellant) lying in the middle of the crash scene, and a white pickup truck in
a pond. Id. at 2-3.
Trooper Sweeney approached Appellant, smelled alcohol, and noted
Appellant’s eyes were bloodshot and glossy. N.T. 10/11/2013, p. 4.
Appellant was conscious and yelling. Id. at 3-4. Appellant told Trooper
Sweeney that he was not the driver of the truck. Id. Some ten to fifteen
minutes later, emergency medical personnel removed Appellant and took
him by ambulance to a hospital approximately 30 minutes away. Id. at 5.
Trooper Sweeney remained at the scene and continued to investigate
the crash. N.T. 10/11/2013, p. 5. He ascertained that Appellant had driven
across the double yellow line, hit an embankment, and flipped his truck. Id.
Appellant’s girlfriend arrived at the scene together with a bartender from the
Knight’s Out Bar, where Appellant and his girlfriend had been earlier in the
evening. Id. at 6-7. The bartender was driving Appellant’s girlfriend home.
Id. Both the girlfriend and the bartender stated that Appellant had
consumed alcohol at the Knight’s Out and driven away in the truck. Id.
They noted that Appellant left the bar, which was four to five miles from the
crash scene, at approximately 2:05 a.m. Id. at 10.
Trooper Sweeney left the scene and drove to the hospital. N.T.
10/11/2013, pp. 7-8. When he arrived, Trooper Sweeney discovered the
medical staff had intubated Appellant, rendering him unconscious and unable
to consent to a blood draw. Id. at 8. Trooper Sweeney directed the medical
staff to draw Appellant’s blood and they complied at 3:40 a.m. Id. Lab
-2-
J-A22037-15
results showed that Appellant had a blood alcohol content of 0.185. Id. at
9.
On August 13, 2013, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information
charging Appellant with DUI. On August 19, 2013, Appellant filed a motion
to suppress his blood test results. The trial court conducted a suppression
hearing on October 11, 2013. At the hearing, Trooper Sweeney testified to
the above information. On cross-examination, Trooper Sweeney admitted
that a magisterial district justice (“MDJ”) was on call on the night in
question, and that a procedure was in place for obtaining a warrant. N.T.
10/11/2013, p. 10. However, Trooper Sweeney testified that he was
familiar with the procedure for obtaining a blood draw without a warrant.
Id. at 14.
The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress on December 4,
2013. Thereafter, on March 11, 2014, the trial court conducted a non-jury
trial and found Appellant guilty of DUI. On May 13, 2014, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to a term of incarceration of 72 hours to six months.
The instant, timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2
Appellant raises the following questions for our review:
____________________________________________
2
On September 30, 2014, the trial court filed a statement in lieu of a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that adopted the court’s December 4, 2013
opinion denying Appellant’s motion to suppress as its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion in this matter.
-3-
J-A22037-15
1. [Whether] 75 Pa.C.S.[ §] 3755 is unconstitutional as it
violates a defendant’s federal constitutional right against a
warrantless seizure thus the warrantless blood draw of Appellant
should have been suppressed[?]
2. [Whether the trial court] erred as a matter of law in failing to
suppress Appellant’s blood test results as [the court’s] factual
finding that the dissipation of alcohol in Appellant’s blood and
the two hour rule were exigent circumstances negating the
necessity of a warrant [was erroneous] [?]
Appellant’s Brief, p. 2.
This Court’s well-settled standard of review of a denial of a motion to
suppress evidence is as follows:
[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a
challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth
prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only
the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence
for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s
factual findings are supported by the record, [the appellate court
is] bound by [those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s
legal conclusions are erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of the
determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of
legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not
binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if
the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to []
plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa.2010) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, our scope of review from a
suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary record created at the
suppression hearing. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa.2013).
-4-
J-A22037-15
Appellant’s claims center first on the question of the constitutionality
of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3755 and, second, on an exigent circumstances argument
closely related to the constitutionality of section 3755.3 However, for the
reasons that follow, we find that 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547, the Vehicle Code’s
Implied Consent Law, controls. Accordingly, we need not reach Appellant’s
section 3755 issues.
“The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section
8 of our state Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures.” Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 46 A.3d 781, 784
(Pa.Super.2012). “A search conducted without a warrant is deemed to be
unreasonable and therefore constitutionally impermissible, unless an
established exception applies.” Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d
884, 888 (Pa.2000). Established exceptions to the warrant requirement
include actual consent, implied consent, search incident to lawful arrest, and
____________________________________________
3
“Our courts have found that, together, [75 Pa.C.S.] sections 1547 and
3755 comprise a statutory scheme which, under particular circumstances,
not only imply the consent of a driver to undergo chemical or blood tests,
but also require hospital personnel to withdraw blood from a person, and
release the test results, at the request of a police officer who has probable
cause to believe the person was operating a vehicle while under the
influence.” Commonwealth v. Barton, 690 A.2d 293, 296
(Pa.Super.1997), appeal denied, 700 A.2d 437 (Pa.1997). Appellant
acknowledges this scheme in his brief. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 5.
Appellant believes the two statutes to be separate and distinct, however,
and does not challenge the constitutionality of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547. See
Appellant’s Brief, p. 4.
-5-
J-A22037-15
exigent circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Riedel, 651 A.2d 135, 139
(Pa.1994).
The Vehicle Code’s Implied Consent Law provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
§ 1547. Chemical testing to determine amount of alcohol
or controlled substance
(a) General rule.--Any person who drives, operates or is in
actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle in this
Commonwealth shall be deemed to have given consent to one or
more chemical tests of breath, blood or urine for the purpose of
determining the alcoholic content of blood or the presence of a
controlled substance if a police officer has reasonable grounds to
believe the person to have been driving, operating or in actual
physical control of the movement of a vehicle:
(1) in violation of section 1543(b)(1.1) (relating to driving
while operating privilege is suspended or revoked), 3802
(relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled
substance) or 3808(a)(2) (relating to illegally operating a
motor vehicle not equipped with ignition interlock); or
(2) which was involved in an accident in which the
operator or passenger of any vehicle involved or a
pedestrian required treatment at a medical facility or was
killed.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1547. Further, the Implied Consent Law “grants an explicit
right to a driver who is under arrest for driving under the influence to refuse
to consent to chemical testing.” Commonwealth v. Eisenhart, 611 A.2d
681, 683 (Pa.1992). The statute provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Suspension for refusal.--
(1) If any person placed under arrest for a violation of
section 3802 is requested to submit to chemical testing
and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted. . .
-6-
J-A22037-15
75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b).
Individuals not under arrest at the time a blood test is administered,
however, cannot claim the explicit statutory protection of section 1547(b).
Riedel, 651 A.2d at 142. Likewise, individuals who are unconscious at the
time of a blood draw, or whose blood is drawn for medical treatment
purposes, are not entitled to section 1547(b)’s explicit right to refuse. Our
Supreme Court has explained:
[W]e will not engraft an additional provision onto the Implied
Consent Law. The decision to distinguish between classes of
drivers in the implied consent scheme is within the province of
the legislature. We will not reformulate the law to grant an
unconscious driver or driver whose blood was removed for
medical purposes the right to refuse to consent to blood testing.
Id.
Here, Appellant was involved in a motor vehicle accident that required
treatment at a medical facility and police suspected him of operating a
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Accordingly, he impliedly
consented to testing of his blood. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a). Further,
Appellant could not avail himself of the statutory right to refuse testing
because, when Trooper Sweeney arrived at the hospital, Appellant (1) had
not been placed under arrest, and (2) was intubated, unconscious, and
unable to consent to a blood draw. See Riedel, 651 A.2d at 142.
Because Appellant impliedly consented to the blood draw and did not
revoke that consent, the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the
results of Appellant’s blood test. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
-7-
J-A22037-15
order. Commonwealth v. Moser, 999 A.2d 602, 606 n.5 (Pa.Super.2010)
(“[T]his Court may affirm a decision of the trial court if there is any basis on
the record to support the trial court’s actions, even if we rely on a different
basis.”).
Order affirmed.
Judge Bowes joins in the memorandum.
Judge Platt concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/10/2016
-8-
Com. v. Redman, R.
Combined Opinion