J-S15004-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
SHAWN SAUNDERS
Appellant No. 3132 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order August 15, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0001537-2000
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 24, 2017
Shawn Saunders appeals from the August 15, 2016 order denying a
petition seeking PCRA relief.1 We affirm.
Based upon the following events, a jury convicted Appellant of second
degree murder, robbery, conspiracy, and possession of a unlicensed firearm.
On October 18, 1999, Appellant, Omar Davis, and David Burroughs traveled
together to Ninth and Lincoln Streets in Chester so that Davis could
purchase marijuana. On the way, Appellant, who was armed with a gun,
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1
In the August 15, 2016 order, the court denied a separate habeas corpus
petition that Appellant had filed. The appeal from the denial of that petition
is also pending before this panel. Although the appeals are from the same
order, that order disposed of separate requested for post-conviction relief.
Accordingly, we have not consolidated them for review.
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informed his cohorts that he intended to rob the individual who was going to
sell Davis the controlled substance. When they arrived at their destination,
Appellant put on a ski cap and covered his face. Appellant, Davis, and
Burroughs encountered Cleven Pender and Shammer Thomas. Davis rifled
through Thomas’ pockets, and Appellant told Pender to give him money.
When Pender started to back away, Appellant shot Pender in the chest,
killing him. Appellant was twenty-two years old when he murdered Pender.
Appellant was convicted on March 9, 2001, and, on April 9, 2001, he
was sentenced to life imprisonment. On August 27, 2002, we affirmed,
Commonwealth v. Saunders, 809 A.2d 964 (Pa.Super. 2002)
(unpublished memorandum), and our Supreme Court denied allowance of
appeal on December 2, 2003. Commonwealth v. Saunders, 839 A.2d 352
(Pa. 2003). No further review was sought.
Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition on February 7, 2005, and
counsel was appointed. Counsel was allowed to withdraw and relief was
denied. Appellant did not appeal. On August 14, 2009, Appellant filed a
second PCRA petition, which was dismissed as untimely. On appeal, we
affirmed. Commonwealth v. Saunders, 15 A.3d 538 (Pa.Super. 2010)
(unpublished memorandum).
Appellant filed a third PCRA petition on March 15, 2012, claiming that
he was entitled to relief under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012),
wherein the United States Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional,
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under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, to sentence a juvenile homicide offender to a mandatory term
of life imprisonment without parole. Relief was denied, and we affirmed.
Commonwealth v. Saunders, 102 A.3d 519 (Pa.Super. 2014)
(unpublished memorandum). In this third Saunders decision, we concluded
that Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on March 1, 2004, ninety
days after our Supreme Court denied review, and that Appellant had until
March 1, 2005 to present a timely PCRA petition. We observed that
Appellant’s petition was not timely. We also held that the Miller decision did
not apply to him because he was an adult when he committed the murder in
question. See Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759 (Pa.Super. 2013)
(Miller does not apply to homicide offenders who are eighteen years of age
or older when they committed the murder).
Next, Appellant filed a motion arguing that the court had no authority to
impose its sentence and seeking facts regarding its decision. The motion
was treated as a fourth PCRA petition and denied as untimely. We once
again affirmed the denial of relief, agreeing that the motion was an untimely
PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Saunders, 122 A.3d 1126 (Pa.Super.
2015) (unpublished memorandum).
On April 11, 2016, Appellant filed the present PCRA petition, his fifth
one. He once again invoked the Miller decision, which had been accorded
retroactivity on January 27, 2016 in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct.
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718 (2016). On August 15, 2016, an order was issued denying the fifth
petition. The Court held that Appellant was not entitled to relief under
Miller because he was an adult when he committed the murder and because
the matter was already litigated in Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition. This
appeal followed. Appellant raises this argument as to the denial of his fifth
PCRA petition:
1. Whether the PCRA Court erred in denying Appellant's
Post -Conviction Relief Delineated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(iii) &
(2)?
II. Whether the PCRA Court erred in denying
Appellant's asserted Constitutional right guaranteed
by the United States Constitutional 8th & 14th
Amendments in conjunction with Pennsylvania
Constitution Art. 1 § 13, and the United Nations'
Universal Declaration of Human Rights Art. 7;
whereas, Appellant has a Right to Be free from cruel
and unusual punishment, Due Process of law, and
equal protection of the laws?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
Initially, we note that this Court reviews the “denial of PCRA relief to
determine whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the
record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Roane, 142 A.3d 79, 86
(Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 444
(Pa. 2015)). Appellant once against seeks relief under Miller, suggesting
that when he committed the crime, he lacked the mental development and
maturity that the Miller decision relied upon in its ruling that juvenile
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homicide offenders cannot automatically be sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole.
Our case law currently holds that Miller is inapplicable to anyone
eighteen years of age or older, and we have rejected the same arguments
now presented by Appellant. Cintora, supra. Moreover, a PCRA petitioner
cannot obtain relief based upon an issue that has been previously litigated.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3) (“To be eligible for relief under this subchapter, the
petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence all of
the following . . . . [t]hat the allegation of error has not been previously
litigated[.]”). The PCRA also provides that “an issue has been previously
litigated if . . . . it has been raised and decided in a proceeding collaterally
attacking the conviction or sentence.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(a)(3). In the
previous proceeding collaterally attacking this conviction, we held that Miller
did not apply to Appellant since he was over eighteen when he shot Pender.
Thus, Appellant’s entitlement to relief under that decision has been
previously litigated, and he is not eligible for relief on its basis. The PCRA
court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/24/2017
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Com. v. Saunders, S.
Combined Opinion