J-S78014-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
EDWARD STRICKLER STOVER, III
Appellee No. 1167 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 7, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0001257-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 30, 2015
Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, timely appeals from
the judgment of sentence entered in the York County Court of Common
Pleas, immediately following the guilty plea of Appellee, Edward Strickler
Stover, III, on July 7, 2014, to driving under the influence (DUI), second
offense, with refusal to submit to chemical testing of blood alcohol content
(BAC).1 The Commonwealth argues the maximum sentence available under
the former statute is five years’ incarceration, citing Commonwealth v.
Barr, 79 A.3d 668 (Pa.Super. 2013). The Commonwealth contends the trial
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1
75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), 3803(b)(4). Under Section 3803(b)(4), the
offense is graded as a first-degree misdemeanor, effective July 9, 2012. The
statute was subsequently amended and made immediately effective on
October 27, 2014, after Appellee’s sentencing.
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court erred when it concluded the maximum allowable sentence for
Appellee’s second DUI offense was six months’ incarceration, pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Musau, 69 A.3d 754 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied,
___ Pa. ___, 117 A.3d 296 (2015).
To resolve this exact question, our Court en banc recently decided
Commonwealth v. Grow, ___ A.3d ___, 2015 PA Super 186 (filed
September 4, 2015), holding that: (1) our Supreme Court has defined the
legislative use of the word “notwithstanding” as “regardless of,” which is
synonymous with the ordinary meaning of the word as “in spite of” or
“although”; (2) the plain language of the statute makes the provisions of
former Section 3803(b)(4) subordinate to the provisions of former Section
3803(a)(1); (3) the use of the section titles “Basic offenses” and “Other
offenses” for former Sections 3803(a) and (b), respectively, does not create
a clean break between the sections such that “notwithstanding” applies to
“basic offenses” only; (4) former Section 3803 in its entirety is a specific
provision that trumps the general sentencing provisions governing first-
degree misdemeanors; (5) the sentencing and grading of an offense can
follow separate schemes without leading to an absurd result because the
grading of the offense affects more than just the length of sentence; (6) any
conflict between former Sections 3803(b)(4) and (a)(2) (relating to
defendants with two or more prior DUI convictions), is immaterial to the
issue before the Court; (7) the Barr case involved a jury instruction, and the
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statement about increased penalties was made in passing, was not critical to
the holding of the decision, and was deemed dictum; (8) the legislative and
administrative interpretations of former Section 3803 are irrelevant because
the wording of the statute is unambiguous; (9) even if the language of
former Section 3803 resulted in ambiguity, the defendant would be entitled
to the benefit of the doubt under the maxim that penal provisions should be
strictly construed in favor of the accused; (10) regardless of the grading of
the offense as a first-degree misdemeanor, the maximum sentence under
former Section 3803 for a second DUI conviction, with refusal to submit to
chemical testing, is six months’ imprisonment. After rejecting all of the
Commonwealth’s arguments, this Court held that the trial court properly
followed Musau and sentenced Grow to a maximum sentence of six months’
incarceration. See id.
Instantly, Grow controls the Commonwealth’s challenge to the trial
court’s interpretation of former Section 3803. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/30/2015
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