J-S37022-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
LEE TAYLOR,
Appellant No. 1957 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 3, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CP-0006459-2009
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, and LAZARUS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JULY 24, 2015
Appellant, Lee Taylor, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
following the revocation of his probation. We affirm.
In a prior decision addressing Appellant’s direct appeal, this Court
summarized the underlying facts of this case as follows:
[Appellant, at the age of forty-three,] lived next door to
thirteen-year-old [Victim] on the 6100 block of Edmund Street in
Philadelphia. [Victim’s] mother was friendly with [Appellant],
and he would occasionally babysit [Victim’s] two younger
brothers. In June of 2008, [Victim] accidently locked herself out
of her house and went to [Appellant’s] home to await her
mother’s return from work. [Victim] testified that while she was
there, [Appellant] began to play with [Victim’s] hair and
attempted to kiss her. [Victim] left [Appellant’s] house, but she
testified that she did not tell her mother about the incident
because [Victim] was scared.
Later that summer, [Appellant] entered [Victim’s] home
unannounced. [Victim] testified that, while her mother and
brothers were out of sight, [Appellant] began to kiss [Victim] on
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the lips. [Victim] did not tell her mother about this second
incident.
On the morning of December 24, 2008, while [Victim] was
sleeping in her bedroom in the basement of her home,
[Appellant] came downstairs and approached [Victim].
According to [Victim’s] testimony, [Appellant] sat on her bed and
proceeded to kiss [Victim] on her lips and rub her buttocks.
[Appellant] then fondled [Victim’s] breasts under her shirt and
attempted to put his tongue in her mouth. During this
encounter, [Appellant] told [Victim] that he missed her and
loved her. After telling [Appellant] to leave, [Victim] left and
walked to her uncle’s home, where she told her uncle’s girlfriend
about [Appellant’s] actions. [Appellant] was arrested later that
morning.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 2322 EDA 2010, 82 A.3d 1057 (Pa. Super. filed
July 8, 2013) (unpublished memorandum at 1-2) (citations omitted).
On April 12, 2010, at the conclusion of a nonjury trial, Appellant was
convicted of indecent assault, unlawful contact with a minor, simple assault,
and corruption of minors. On July 12, 2010, the trial court sentenced
Appellant to serve a term of incarceration of two and one-half to five years
for the conviction of unlawful contact with a minor, plus a term of probation
of five years. For the convictions of indecent assault, simple assault, and
corruption of minors, the trial court also sentenced Appellant to serve
concurrent terms of probation of five years, which were to run consecutive
to the term of incarceration. Appellant then filed a direct appeal, and this
Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on July 8, 2013. Taylor, 2322 EDA
2010, 82 A.3d 1057 (unpublished memorandum). The record does not
reflect that Appellant sought any further appellate review.
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After serving the five-year maximum term of incarceration, Appellant
began serving the probationary portion of his sentence on January 5, 2014.
N.T., 6/3/14, at 6. On February 19, 2014, Appellant tested positive for
cocaine use. Id. at 13. Then, on April 12, 2014, Appellant participated in
an altercation at the home of Michele Hutchinson. Id. at 6-11.
The trial court summarized the events of April 12, 2014, as follows:
On the evening of April 12, 2014, [Appellant] assaulted
Hutchinson at her home while she was holding a benefit for her
father, who had recently passed away. Before [Appellant]
arrived, two attendees got into an argument. Wayne Simmons
(“Simmons”) and his girlfriend were arguing because she was
talking to another man. Simmons pulled out a baseball bat, but
Hutchinson stopped him and took the bat. Simmons then left.
Approximately five minutes later, Simmons returned with
[Appellant] and a third man named Dana Baynes (“Baynes”).
They were in search of the man who had spoken with Simmons’
girlfriend. Hutchinson tried to prevent an altercation and asked
the men to leave. [Appellant] grabbed Hutchinson’s wrist and
threw her to the ground.[1] Hutchinson tried to get away but
[Appellant] tackled her. Others intervened and [Appellant] and
his associates fled when they heard police sirens.
The police instructed Hutchinson to file a private criminal
complaint. When Hutchinson filed the complaint, she learned
that [Appellant] was on probation, which prompted her to file a
second complaint with the probation department.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/18/14, at 3 (citations omitted).
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1
When Appellant threw Ms. Hutchinson to the ground, she struck her face
on the street and a tire, causing road burn and abrasions, and
Ms. Hutchinson will have permanent marks on her face as a result. N.T.,
6/3/14, at 8-9, 11.
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As a result of the incident, the trial court held a Daisey Kates hearing2
on June 3, 2014. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked
Appellant’s probation and imposed a new sentence. Specifically, the trial
court sentenced Appellant to serve a term of incarceration of one and one-
half to three years for the conviction of indecent assault, and a consecutive
term of probation of four years for the conviction of corruption of minors.
The trial court imposed no further penalty on Appellant’s conviction of simple
assault.
The record further reflects that on June 6, 2014, Appellant filed a post-
sentence petition to vacate and reconsider sentence, which the trial court
never acted upon. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on July 3, 2014.
Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1. Did not the lower court err by failing to correct the illegal
sentence originally imposed on appellant under the charge of
unlawful contact with a minor?
2. Did not the lower court err by imposing a manifestly excessive
and grossly disproportionate sentence of 1 ½ to 3 years of
incarceration plus 4 years of reporting probation where appellant
had only committed technical violations of his probation and
where the lower court failed to fashion an individualized
sentence that accounted for appellant’s rehabilitative needs?
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2
Commonwealth v. Kates, 305 A.2d 701 (Pa. 1973). In Kates, our
Supreme Court held that when a probationer has been charged with a new
offense, his probation may be revoked prior to a trial on the new charge
provided that the court supervising the probationer holds a hearing on the
matter. Id. at 708-709.
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Appellant’s Brief at 3.
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the original judgment of
sentence imposed upon Appellant by the trial court following his conviction
in 2010 was illegal. Specifically, Appellant states the following:
[T]he original sentence on unlawful contact with a minor as a
third degree felony was 2 ½ to 5 years of incarceration to be
followed by 5 years of probation. Thus, the sentence required a
total of 10 years of supervision. However, the maximum
sentence for a third degree felony is 7 years. 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1103(3). Accordingly, the sentence was illegal.
The revocation court failed to correct that sentence. The
revocation court was originally going to impose its new sentence
on the unlawful contact with a minor charge (N.T. 6/3/14, 23).
However, defense counsel pointed out that [Appellant] had
almost maxed out that charge and the lower court instead
constructed the sentence with the misdemeanors. The issue of
the unlawful contact with a minor charge was not readdressed.
See (N.T. 6/3/14) generally. Accordingly, the illegal portion of
[Appellant’s] sentence is still in effect and [Appellant’s] sentence
must be vacated.
Appellant’s Brief at 11-12.
As a prefatory matter, we observe that “[i]ssues relating to the legality
of a sentence are questions of law[; as a result, o]ur standard of review over
such questions is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Delvalle, 74 A.3d 1081, 1087 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citations omitted). However, Appellant does not allege that the instant
judgment of sentence is illegal. Rather, he contends that his original
judgment of sentence, which was revoked following his violation of
probation, was illegal.
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This Court has concluded that where an appellant receives a new
sentence upon resentencing and fails to allege that his current sentence is
illegal, an attack on his original judgment of sentence is rendered moot.
See Commonwealth v. McGriff, 638 A.2d 1032, 1035 (Pa. Super. 1994)
(explaining that where the appellant was resentenced due to probation
violations, and does not challenge the legality of the new sentence, claim
that original sentence was illegal is moot). Instantly, Appellant does not
allege that the instant judgment of sentence, which was imposed upon
revocation of his probation, is illegal. Rather, he attacks the legality of the
original judgment of sentence. Therefore, any illegality in Appellant’s 2010
sentence for unlawful contact with a minor was corrected on June 3, 2014,
when his probation was revoked and he was resentenced. Hence, to the
extent that Appellant argues that his original sentence was illegal, we will
not address this claim as it is moot. McGriff.
Secondly, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing the sentence following the revocation of his probation. Appellant’s
Brief at 12-16. Specifically, Appellant contends that the sentence imposed
was manifestly excessive and disproportionate in light of the technical
violations of his probation, and thus the court failed to fashion an
individualized sentence based upon his rehabilitative needs.
As this Court recently clarified in Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83
A.3d 1030 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), our scope of review following the
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revocation of probation is not limited solely to determining the validity of the
probation revocation proceedings and the authority of the sentencing court
to consider the same sentencing alternatives that it had at the time of the
initial sentencing. Rather, it also includes challenges to the discretionary
aspects of the sentence imposed. Specifically, we unequivocally held that
“this Court’s scope of review in an appeal from a revocation sentencing
includes discretionary sentencing challenges.” Cartrette, 83 A.3d at 1034.
Further, as we have long held, the imposition of sentence following the
revocation of probation is vested within the sound discretion of the trial
court, which, absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed on
appeal. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. Super. 2000).
We are also mindful that “[t]he right to appeal a discretionary aspect
of sentence is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Martin, 727 A.2d 1136,
1143 (Pa. Super. 1999). Rather, where an appellant challenges the
discretionary aspects of a sentence, the appeal should be considered a
petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d
155, 163 (Pa. Super. 2007).
As we observed in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa.
Super. 2010):
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his
sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a
four-part test:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal,
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see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue
was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion
to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P.
[708]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
substantial question that the sentence appealed from
is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Id. at 170 (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super.
2006)). The determination of whether there is a substantial question is
made on a case-by-case basis, and this Court will grant the appeal only
when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing
judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the
Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie
the sentencing process. Sierra, 752 A.2d at 912-913.
Herein, the first three requirements of the four-part test are met,
those being that Appellant brought an appropriate appeal, raised the
challenge in a post-sentence motion, and included in his appellate brief the
necessary separate concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
allowance of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Therefore, we next
determine whether Appellant raises a substantial question requiring us to
review the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed by the trial court.
Appellant argues in his Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement that the trial court
abused its discretion by imposing a sentence following the revocation of
probation that was unduly excessive and failed to consider his rehabilitative
needs. Appellant’s Brief at 8-9. Essentially, Appellant asserts that the
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sentencing court failed to properly consider factors set forth under 42
Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).3 Thus, we conclude that, in this instance, Appellant has
raised a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d
843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (concluding that the appellant raised a
substantial question where it was alleged that the trial court failed to
consider the factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b)). Nevertheless, we
conclude that Appellant is entitled to no relief on his claim, as the record
reveals that the court properly considered Appellant’s rehabilitative needs in
fashioning the sentence.
Again, we are mindful of our standard of review, which is as follows:
The imposition of sentence following the revocation of
probation is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court,
which, absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed
on appeal. An abuse of discretion is more than an error in
judgment - a sentencing court has not abused its discretion
unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill-will.
Sierra, 752 A.2d at 913 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
With regard to our review of a sentence imposed following the
revocation of probation, we observe that, “[p]ursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9771(b), when a defendant is found in violation of his probation, upon
revocation the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the
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3
The factors to be considered under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) include the
protection of the public and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006).
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same as were available at the time of initial sentencing, due consideration
being given to the time spent serving the order of probation.”
Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Pa. Super. 2010). When
imposing a sentence of total confinement after a probation revocation, the
sentencing court is to consider the factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c)
and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 893 A.2d 735
(Pa. Super. 2006). Pursuant to Section 9771(c), a court may sentence a
defendant to total confinement after a revocation of probation if one of the
following conditions exists:
1. the defendant has been convicted of another crime; or
2. the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely that
he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or
3. such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of
this court.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c); Commonwealth v. Coolbaugh, 770 A.2d 788 (Pa.
Super. 2001). A sentencing court need not undertake a lengthy discourse
for its reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the statute in
question, but the record as a whole must reflect the sentencing court’s
consideration of the facts of the crime and character of the offender.
Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2006).
See also Commonwealth v. Fish, 752 A.2d 921, 924 (Pa. Super. 2000)
(reiterating that although a court is required to explain its reasons for
imposing sentence, it need not specifically cite or include the language of the
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sentencing code; it must only demonstrate that the court had considered the
factors specified in the code.).
Appellant argues that the sentence of incarceration and probation he
was ordered to serve, which was within the statutory maximum, is
manifestly excessive and unreasonable. In effect, Appellant contends that
his sentence was disproportionate to the probation violations he committed
and that the court did not consider his rehabilitative needs.
Our review of the record reflects that, at the time of sentencing, the
court heard a detailed stipulated account of the altercation in which
Appellant was involved and also viewed photographs of the victim’s injuries.
N.T., 6/3/14, at 6-11. In addition, our review of the record reflects that the
court accepted testimony from Appellant’s probation officer, as well as a
recommendation from the probation officer. Id. at 12-15, 21-22. The court
also heard Appellant’s apology to the victim of the altercation and his
request for forgiveness. Id. at 15-16. Moreover, Appellant’s counsel
presented facts surrounding Appellant’s mental health issues and need for
mental health treatment. Id. at 16-17. The record further reflects that the
court heard from the Assistant District Attorney regarding the details of
Appellant’s previous criminal history, the physical altercation that led to
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probation revocation, Appellant’s mental health concerns, and the need for
incarceration.4 Id. at 17-21.
In explaining the reasons surrounding the sentence imposed, the trial
court offered the following:
Here, [Appellant] presents a substantial question on
appeal when he asserts that the Court imposed an excessive and
unreasonable sentence; that that the Court failed to adequately
examine [Appellant’s] background, character and rehabilitative
needs; and that the Court failed to state adequate reasons on
the record for imposing [Appellant’s] sentence. See Statement.
The Court considered [Appellant’s] background, character
and rehabilitative needs, and although [Appellant] states that
the Court “imposed a sentence that was more than necessary to
vindicate the authority of the Court” — presumably under 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c)(3) — the Court imposed a new sentence,
under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c)(2), after weighing the evidence
and concluding that [Appellant] will likely commit another crime
as indicated by his conduct while on probation. See N.T., June
3, 2014 at 5; also see Statement at ¶¶ 3(b).
On April 12, 2010, [Appellant] was originally sentenced to
two and one-half to five years [of] incarceration. On April 15,
2014, after [Appellant’s] Daisey Kates hearing, the Court
imposed a new legal sentence of one and one-half [to three]
years of incarceration on the Indecent Assault, and four years
consecutive reporting probation on the Corruption of Minors in
compliance with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771.
At the hearing, the Court considered the [Appellant’s]
record, sentence, and conduct while on probation. See N.T.,
June 3, 2014 at 5, 17-19. The Court knew that [Appellant] was
convicted of murder in 1983 and served the maximum term of
twenty years before he was released in 2004. Id. at 17. The
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4
Specifically, after arguing that Appellant is “not safe in the community,”
the Commonwealth requested that the court impose “a sentence of 4-to-8
years in state custody.” N.T., 6/3/14, at 21.
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Court also considered that [Appellant] was convicted of child
molestation in 2010, served his full five year sentence and was
released on January 5, 2014. Id. at 18. The following month,
on February 19, 2014, he tested positive for cocaine. Id.
Within four months of release he violated probation again with
the current offense. Id. at 17-19.
Also considered was [Appellant’s] treatment after he
tested positive for cocaine. Id. at 13. [Appellant] self-reported
that he was schizophrenic, and he was diagnosed with cocaine
abuse and mood disorder. His therapist stated that [Appellant]
was compliant with the program, had perfect attendance,
worked well within group sessions, and had excellent
relationships with peers and staff. Id. at 13.
Additionally, the Court considered [Appellant’s] therapist’s
statement that [Appellant] needs anger management because
“he constantly talks about issues ranging from personal rage and
anger.” Id. The Court considered that [Appellant] had missed
his appointment with his probation officer scheduled for April 15,
2014, three days after the incident because he had reported to
his therapist instead of his probation officer, where he told his
therapist that an incident had occurred over the weekend and
that he was suicidal; and that [Appellant] was taken to the
hospital and then to an inpatient program for a week. Id. at 13-
14. Finally, the Court considered that [Appellant] had been in
custody for about six weeks. Id. at 17.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/18/14, at 6-7.
Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion. The court carefully
considered the appropriate factors, including Appellant’s need for
rehabilitation, when it imposed the prison sentence and term of probation
following revocation. Accordingly, Appellant is entitled to no relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Lazarus joins the Memorandum.
P.J. Gantman Concurs in the Result.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/24/2015
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